ABSTRACT
The analysis of energy transmission networks is an important topic in papers across a wide variety of disciplines. An important aspect is to study the energy losses in these networks. In many cases there are losses whose sources are almost impossible to identify and the transmission network is owned by different agents. The authors model such situations using cooperative game theory. Besides, the authorities that manage the network should decide how much energy each agent is allowed to lose. This decision should follow some general principles which appear in the regulations. This chapter then considers the Shapley rule defined as the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game. The properties satisfied by the Shapley rule are study. This rule is compared, in terms of the principles mentioned in the (European Union) EU regulations, with the rules studied in G. Bergantinos, J. González Díaz, A. M. González-Rueda, and M. P. Fernández de Córdoba (2017). Loss allocation in energy transmission networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 102:69-97. Finally, this rule is applied to the Spanish gas transmission network and a simulation analysis is carried out to explore new connections between the different allocation rules.
