ABSTRACT
Emotion has had a checkered history in the scienti c literature. Some theorists have promoted a view of emotions as dysregulating forces that disrupt cognitively based, well-reasoned action (e.g., Young, 1961), and others have questioned the existence of emotion as a separate psychological construct. Lest one assume that this is true only for “old-fashioned” theories from long ago, one need only peruse the scienti c literature and popular curricula for interventions with children and families. Some of the “hottest” new theories either deny the importance of emotions as unique psychological processes, construing emotions as cognitive processes-particular ways of conceptualizing a situation (e.g., Feldman Barrett, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall, Feldman Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011)—or indicate that “well-regulated” or “adaptive” emotion typically is emotion that has been carefully and consciously managed by cognitive processes (e.g., Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). Popular curricula implore students to “use their Wizard brain” (high-level cognitive processing) and not their “Lizard brain” (emotional or “primitive” brain; Barry & Welsh, 2007). Moreover, this position is also promoted by well-respected scientists in the eld. For example, Westen and Blagov (2007) argue that adaptive decision making is decision making that is not in uenced by emotion, contrasting “goal-driven decision making (and hence adaptive behavior) and emotiondriven cognitive distortions” (p. 384). Ironically, at a recent workshop I attended on enhancing socioemotional development in young children, the facilitator discussed how a certain approach was better because it enabled one to “remove the emotion” from the caregiver’s thinking about the child’s behavior. Moreover, most of the scripted “good practices” by caregivers in response to children’s “challenging behavior” in this curriculum did not include any acknowledgment by the caregiver of the child’s feelings, despite the child’s obvious strong emotion.
