ABSTRACT
The label “perfectionism” attaches to a family of views in political philosophy. The members of the family differ in substantive content, but they are united in their commitment to two very general, and at first pass, quite plausible claims. The first claim is one in value theory. Some human lives are better lived lives than others. On this claim, a maximally well lived human life, if it were possible, would be a perfect life, even if few or no human beings achieve it. (Some perfectionists deny that a perfect human life is possible. The realization of some excellences precludes the realization of others, but they still accept that some human lives are better lived than others.) The second claim is one in political morality. The state should promote, deliberately and actively, well lived human lives over less well lived human lives. Acceptance of this second claim carries with it the rejection of the currently popular liberal principle of state neutrality-the principle that the state should aim to be neutral among rival conceptions of the good life, at least insofar as these conceptions themselves are consistent with neutral principles of justice. The acceptance of the second claim also, as we will see, poses a challenge to those who favor a principled rejection of state paternalism. The two claims raise a number of important issues, and each is subject to a range of objections. Some of these issues and objections will be discussed in this chapter.
