ABSTRACT

Virtue ethics is a form of normative ethics that appraises action and guides choice by focusing on the virtues of character. Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has seen tremendous growth as a modern approach to normative and applied ethics. This is no small accomplishment, since virtue ethicists have had much work to do just to claim space for character-based ethics alongside more familiar rival theories that focus more on rules, duties, and actions (see e.g. Frankena 1980 and Louden 1984 for representative challenges). The impetus for such a movement can be traced to the 1950s, when Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) and Philippa Foot (1958) each called for a renewed focus in moral philosophy on human nature, well-being, wisdom, and character, and in the following decades there grew a hope for an “ethic of virtue” as a distinctive form of normative ethics. Since then, virtue ethics has become widely recognized as a distinct alternative in ethical theory, demonstrating a unique and useful approach to action appraisal and guidance (on which see esp. Hursthouse 1995 and 1999). Today, some of the most exciting work in virtue ethics focuses on extending that approach to political philosophy as well.