ABSTRACT
As Andrew Williams once observed (2006a: 187), one attraction of political philosophy is that with relatively weak assumptions it can deliver radical conclusions. Luck egalitarianism is a paradigm example. According to luck egalitarianism, disadvantages that are due to the disadvantaged person’s bad luck are inegalitarian (i.e. objectionably unequal), while disadvantages that are of one’s own making are not. The view is composed of three elements. First, it assumes that some form of equality is a key requirement of justice. Call this the requirement of egalitarian justice. Second, it is anti-luck, in that it sees disadvantages that are due to luck as upsetting equality and in this sense objectionable. Third, it is pro-choice (or pro-“choicist” to avoid famous connotations), in that it sees disadvantages that are of one’s own making (or, for short, due to choice) as consistent with equality, and in this sense acceptable. The three elements are distinct, but they interact with each other and are sometimes, unhelpfully, run together.
