ABSTRACT
Classical theism and the problem of evil have enjoyed an intriguing, yet hostile relationship for centuries, if not millennia. Despite the fact that proponents of theism would be happy to eliminate the problem of evil if they could, and many atheistic proponents of the problem would gladly discredit theism once and for all if they could, the fact remains that the longstanding celebrity and fascination of the problem of evil owe their existence to classical theism. For evil is precisely a problem in a very distinctive way for theism that it is not for other worldviews, particularly its main rival, naturalism. This is not to say that suffering, death, and existential anguish are not problems for naturalists, but they are not so in the same sense as they are for theists. For given the claim of classical theism that the ultimate reality is a God of perfect goodness and power, the question quickly becomes urgent why these terrible things should exist at all, let alone devastate our lives the way they often do. By contrast, if ultimate reality consists of matter, natural laws and the like, and naturalistic evolution is the true account of our origins, then disease, suffering, natural disasters, and death are hardly to be unexpected. That does not make these matters pleasant or easy to cope with, but there is no reason to be surprised or outraged at such harsh realities if Mother Nature is the ultimate architect of our world. Nor is there the same sort of demand to make sense of them as there is if a God of perfect goodness and power exists.
