ABSTRACT

It had been expected by earlier modernization theorists that social and economic transformations generated by rapid capitalist development would promote new aspirations, opportunities and functional governance pressures favouring liberal democracy (Huntington 1991). However, in Southeast Asia, while authoritarian regimes have collapsed in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, they have proved durable in precisely the most economically advanced countries of Singapore and Malaysia. Such patterns in Southeast Asia and elsewhere led to analytical attention by transition theorists to the contingencies of political change (Diamond et al. 1997) – a focus that has both enriched the literature and also reinforced the limited nature of the problematic under investigation. Preoccupation with understanding the prospects of liberal democratic regimes has come at the expense of more open and fundamental questions. Where are political regimes headed, and why? What are the possibilities for the continuation of authoritarian rule and the forms this might take? Answering these questions of Singapore reveals significant institutional and ideological changes

challenging transition theory assumptions of liberal democracy as the natural regime partner of advanced capitalism. Indeed, Singapore’s experience suggests the possibility that some authoritarian regimes may be able not just to survive advanced capitalism but to be modified and thereby strengthened in response to dynamics emanating from capitalism. Given leaders of the world’s most populous authoritarian regime in China have embraced capitalism with the aim of shoring up the ruling party’s legitimacy, understanding where and why political change has been headed in the city-state assumes an obvious wider theoretical and policy significance. The Singapore case has led to a variety of explanations for the absence of a liberal democratic

regime transition. In his influential book The Third Wave, Huntington (1991: 108) contended that the missing ingredient was one of political will, observing that ‘a political leader far less skilled than Lee Kuan Yew could have produced democracy in Singapore’. Subsequently, explanations increasingly centred on the quality of political institutions. This approach has seen Singapore and other authoritarian regimes variously classified as a ‘semi-democracy’ or ‘hybrid regime’ because of the formal appearance of political competition through elections and other

institutions (Case 2005). In this vein, Levitsky and Way (2002: 54) portray Singapore as a ‘façade electoral regime’ where ‘electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power’. Such a characterization of the regime is descriptively accurate. However, it offers no particular insights into the determinants and dynamics of authoritarian rule in Singapore. This chapter is intended to redress this, both by making non-democratic institutions a focus of analysis in their own right and by examining political institutions in relation to the wider conflicts and alliances over state-civil society relationships inherent to capitalist development. The institutional and ideological means by which authoritarian rule in Singapore is reproduced

have changed significantly since the 1960s, as has the balance of interests served by the regime. None of this can be understood without analysing the way that capitalism has developed. As anticipated by early modernization theorists, economic development has indeed produced greater social diversity and new social interests that require a political accommodation. However, rather than leading to an irrepressible expansion of independent civil society, creative institutions within the state have been developed to facilitate expanded opportunities for political participation. In what might be described as an evolving consultative authoritarian regime,2 these new institu-

tions traverse parliamentary and extra-parliamentary spheres to involve a range of individuals and groups in public policy discussion or feedback. At the same time, they exclude contestation with the ruling party and increasingly involve the development of non-democratic values of political representation. Such a direction is related to how the consolidation and expansion of state capitalism has enhanced the power of technocratic elites predisposed towards more bureaucratic and administrative techniques of political control and mobilization. While their emphasis on consultation is meant to limit the boundaries and conduct of political conflict, this is also informed by a view of politics as principally a problem-solving rather than normative exercise that can usefully harness relevant information and expertise. Consultative authoritarianism, then, is distinguished from other forms of authoritarianism

by the emphasis on state-controlled institutions to increase political participation. Political suppression and intimidation remain integral to these regimes. However, new social and economic interests generated by capitalist development are increasingly engaged through various creative mechanisms of consultation in an attempt to obviate greater demand for independent political space. In these particular authoritarian regimes, ideological emphasis on consensual politics is marked and consultative mechanisms are necessary to give substance and legitimacy to claims about more appropriate alternatives to liberal democratic change. Importantly, while consultative authoritarianism reflects growing sophistication in strategies of political control, perceived advantages in economic and social governance in the context of dynamic and globalized market systems can also be important considerations by ruling elites. The discussion below begins by explaining the circumstances that gave rise to the emergence

of consultative authoritarianism and then proceeds by examining, in turn, the parliamentary and non-parliamentary institutions through which new opportunities for political participation have been promoted. This will be followed by some observations about the implications of this analysis for understanding political regime dynamics more generally within Southeast Asia. The core argument is that in Singapore new modes of political participation are shaping the

inclusion and exclusion of different groups and individuals in the political process, favouring both functional and elitist conceptions of citizenship and representation as clear alternatives to a rights-based democratic politics. The social foundations of this sort of consultative authoritarianism have been laid by the particular dynamics of state capitalism in Singapore. Similar historical and geopolitical contexts of capitalism’s development across Southeast Asia may also render emerging social and political forces in some parts of the region potentially vulnerable to new

forms of state-sponsored political participation. However, the precise coalitions of interest associated with capitalist development in Singapore are not replicated elsewhere in Southeast Asia, suggesting limits to the possibilities of consultative authoritarianism in the region.