ABSTRACT
Vietnam has been ruled in its entirety by the Vietnamese Communist Party since the country was reunified shortly after the end of the American war in 1975. Since that time, the Party has sought to prevent independent political parties from forming while also trying to keep other forms of social organization or popular expression under wraps.1 Nevertheless, politics has not stood still, in part because of changes permitted by the Party but also because of the consequences of marketization and international integration which have led to social change and the emergence of new political forces. The latter can reasonably be said to include a more powerful business elite – still with close ties to the state even if in some cases it is operating under a ‘private sector’ label – a richer and more assertive middle class, and recently, new opposition groups and independent trade unions, the latter still illegal and of questionable influence in the greater scheme of things (Cheshier 2010; Gainsborough 2010: 9-24; Hayton 2010: 113-34; Wells-Dang 2010). In terms of characterizing these ‘new’ political forces, the key point is that we need to be
extremely sceptical of the ‘triumph of the private sector’ kind of arguments which are sometimes advanced to explain change in Vietnam. Instead, the story is one of the emergence of new business interests – and their associated family members – from within the state sector, and generally speaking continued close ties between this elite and the state – as an essential condition of operating successfully. A similar caution is needed when assessing new forms of middle-class activism often associated with the growth of non-government organizations or so-called civil society. Yes, there is increased outspokenness and some pressure for new forms of political expression, but aside from isolated dissident elements most people are content to operate within the one-party context. Consequently, it is important to understand that the epithet ‘new’ needs to be understood circumspectly. Against this backdrop, most accounts of Vietnamese politics today have adopted a narrative of
change with caveats. In many respects, such an approach seems self-evidently reasonable. However, such approaches are not without weakness. This chapter argues that Vietnam scholars need to be much clearer and more precise about what has changed and what has not, about the direction of change, and about how we explain the diverse outcomes we observe. In terms of diversity of outcome, I am particularly thinking of the fact that while many of the old Party elite have made the transition into the reform era, not everyone has. To try and shed light on these issues, I shift the focus in this chapter onto what I regard as the fundamental building
blocks of Vietnamese politics understood as the importance of relationships in Vietnamese politics; the close connection in people’s minds between public office and money-making; the importance of patronage; uncertainty as an instrument of rule; and political paternalism. Understanding these often enduring economic and political relationships, I argue, is crucial if we are to move towards a deeper understanding of Vietnamese politics, including properly contextualizing the emergence of ‘new’ political forces, including opposition forces. The chapter is structured as follows. I first look at how Vietnamese politics has conventionally
been analysed. This also serves to orientate the reader in relation to some of Vietnam’s key political landmarks. I then critique the existing literature before setting out my approach. I am calling my approach a ‘patronage’ approach to politics to contrast it with some of the other approaches used to analyse Vietnamese politics, which are discussed below. However, to be clear, this is not a cultural, behavioural or modernization theory approach. I am using a patronage approach to shed light on the mechanics of how the ruling elite has metamorphosed over the last two decades so that while it has many things in common with the past, it is not identical with it. This applies to both how the elite is constituted (‘its character’) and some of its outlooks, although I would not wish to exaggerate the latter. Having set out my approach, I then look at its implications, both for how we characterize change (and continuity) in Vietnamese politics and for how we understand it. Finally, I conclude.
