ABSTRACT
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the G-20 established itself as the pivotal forum for collective international response to the crisis. The apparent centrality of the G-20 in preventing global economic collapse has thrown the spotlight onto this relatively new player in global economic governance, and has led to debate about both its legitimacy and effectiveness. Many have praised the G-20 for quick and robust action in the wake of the crisis (Cooper and Helleiner 2010; Heinbecker 2011; Smith 2011). In this view, the G-20 has emerged as a powerful player, more truly representative of developed and emerging economies than other institutions, and the best hope for global financial governance (Smith 2011; Carin et al. 2010). Others, in contrast, argue that the G-20 has done far too little to effectively address the crisis and, in addition, suffers from a range of legitimacy problems, including its exclusive membership, informality and lack of transparency and accountability (Vestergaard and Wade 2012). In this critical view, the G-20 is an elite club promoting the interests of powerful market economies and impeding deep regulatory reform that is needed to prevent future crises.
