ABSTRACT
Over the past 20 years or so, throughout Europe, extreme-right parties have consolidated their electoral gains, and in some cases, entered government coalitions. In countries where their electoral success remains mediocre, their ideas have often been co-opted by mainstream parties. Their success has received widespread attention in the media and has been the subject of many academic debates. These debates have, for the most part, raised contentious questions about the political nature of such parties (Mudde, 2007), notably their degree of kinship with fascism (Wolfreys, 2013; Ignazi, 2003); the reasons for their relative electoral success (Carter, 2005); their actual impact on both party competition (on the right: Godin and Hanley, 2013; on the left: Rydgren, 2012) and policy making (Howard, 2010; Schain et al., 2002); and the strategies to combat their influence (Downs, 2012; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). There is a general consensus that these parties form a heteroclite family, albeit with obvious ideological and organisational differences. This family draws on different national traditions to articulate concurring ideas about immigration, race and identity. Family members are able to learn fast from one another and regularly, formally or informally, engage in the transnational exchange of ideas, staff and resources (Rydgren, 2005). The search for a generic definition, encompassing both the family’s diversity and the political principles that form its ideological core, has led to persistent arguments.
