ABSTRACT
Neo-institutional scholars share the belief that different institutions can produce different incentives for the same political actors. Institutional incentives are believed to shape how politicians work with one another, which policies they address, and how they seek to resolve political conflict. When well formulated, institutions may balance personal ambition to elicit good government. When poorly formulated, however, institutions may hinder good government by allowing ambition to work against the greater interests of society as a whole. Since the initial selection of institutions sets the framework in which the game of politics will be played, how institutions are designed takes on a great deal of significance. According to Lijphart (2004, 99), “The most important choice facing constitution writers is that of a legislative electoral system”. Legislative electoral systems translate votes into seats and help determine the strength of political parties in parliament, which in turn has ramifications for the representation of societal interests, government formation, and policy-making.
