ABSTRACT
The issue of whether or not transnational organized crime is a threat to national and international security has been debated since the early 1990s. Sceptics argue that the transnational organized crime threat is overblown, only arrived on the agenda because of the paucity of military challenges after the end of the Cold War, and, at best, only plays a marginal role as a national security concern. Ironically, sceptics range from those who see military threats as the only real threats and, therefore, dismiss transnational organized crime as irrelevant, to those who contend that the whole idea of transnational organized crime is based on ‘fundamental errors of logic and interpretation’ (Naylor 2005: 26). R. Thomas Naylor, in an incisive critique of the whole concept of organized crime, argues that those who emphasize the threat posed by transnational organized crime are guilty of ‘equating an association of criminals with a criminal association, confounding the criminal firm and the criminal industry, and attempting to convert a military or fraternal hierarchy (an extremely simplistic one) into a business structure’ (Naylor 2005: 26). Others claim that crime is local rather than transnational (Hobbs 1998) and that the threat from transnational organized crime is deliberately exaggerated by the US in order to spread US laws and enforcement mechanisms around the globe (Woodiwiss 2001). At the other extreme are those who perceive organized crime as a major global threat
in which transnational criminal organizations are regarded as global criminal conglomerates, engaging in high-level meetings at which they agree on joint ventures and spheres of influence within the large and lucrative criminal markets that they control (Sterling 1994; Robinson 1999). Some even claim that the global criminal economy, which is not defined in any specific way, could be well over US$2 trillion – twice the value of global expenditure on armaments (Glenn et al. 2008: 34). The absence of a clear methodology for determining such figures does little to dent the apparent authority with which they are presented. The analysis here stakes out a middle ground between doves who dismiss the threat
posed by transnational organized crime and hawks who exaggerate it. A useful starting point for a middle position is the recognition that threats depend in large part on vulnerabilities that can readily be exploited. Transnational organized crime is a far greater threat to small and weak states with limited capacity and low levels of legitimacy than it
is to strong, prosperous, well-functioning liberal democracies where it challenges law and order, but does not jeopardize the integrity and viability of the state. For most of the states of the EU, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, organized crime – unless related directly to terrorism and the dangerous movements of hazardous goods discussed more fully below – is a nuisance, but not an existential security threat. For states in the developing world, however, organized crime poses a much greater threat, challenging the rule of law and their monopoly on violence. While variations in the impact of organized crime must be acknowledged, it is equally important to consider the levels at which threats have an impact. Accordingly, this chapter examines the ways in which organized crime challenges security at the global level, the national level and the individual level (human security). It focuses in large part on drug trafficking, which remains the most significant and lucrative of all transnational criminal activities; provides the major (although not the only) source for the concentration of illicit wealth and power in many societies; and is most closely associated with violence and corruption. In addition, the chapter looks at human trafficking, which is a direct threat to human security. The impact on security of other transnational criminal activities, as well as of criminal organizations that concentrate power and use corruption and violence to protect themselves and their activities, is also considered. This suggests the need for a dual focus – on both organizations and activities. Indeed,
the term ‘transnational organized crime’ can be understood in two different but complementary ways. The term can refer to transnational criminal enterprises, organizations, or networks. These entities are Clausewitzian in the sense that crime for them is simply a continuation of business by other means. Transnational organized crime can also refer to cross-border criminal activities that can be undertaken by a variety of non-state entities such as terrorists, warlords and militias. States – especially those that are both authoritarian and isolated – can also use criminal activities as ways of circumventing sanctions and obtaining foreign exchange. Sometimes, of course, there is a neat convergence between entities and activities. After all, transnational criminal organizations engage in transnational criminal activities; this is their essence. Such convergence is not necessary, however. The rise and empowerment of transnational criminal enterprises is one of the by-products
of globalization. The compression of time and space and the associated reductions in transaction costs have been as important to criminal enterprises as to licit businesses, and global expansion is a feature shared by both. At the same time, the rise of criminal organizations is part of a broader phenomenon involving the emergence of violent nonstate actors that pose a fundamental, if long-term challenge to the viability of the Westphalian state. These actors have become particularly important in states that suffer from governance deficits and have a low legitimacy quotient. They typically appropriate transnational criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, as well as domestic criminal activities, such as extortion and kidnapping, to provide funding for their political and military agendas. The result is that while criminal organizations have become more powerful, criminal activities have become ubiquitous.
