ABSTRACT
Iran launched its uranium-enrichment programme in the mid-1980s in the middle of the war with Iraq, after it was attacked with chemical weapons. This decision was a reversal of the leadership’s original opposition to the Shah’s nuclear programme, which was based on moral grounds. Iranians argue that Saddam Hussein would not have dared to start the war or use chemical weapons if Iran had possessed a nuclear capability. It is also often remarked that Iran inhabits a dangerous region, with four close neighbours (Israel, Russia, Pakistan and India) that possess nuclear weapons, and a domineering superpower with troops positioned to its east in Afghanistan and to its west in Iraq, and with naval forces off its coast to the south. Pronouncements by the Bush administration assigning Iran to the ‘axis of evil’, a policy of ‘preventive deterrence’, and loose talk of regime change on the part of the US have undoubtedly motivated the Iranian leadership to develop the ability to resist coercive measures. The exposure in August 2002 of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium-production
programmes prompted intense scrutiny, diplomatic enticements and financial coercion on the part of the major powers to persuade Iran to stop work that is giving it a latent nuclear weapons capability. Although technical difficulties and limited components still may restrict the size and effectiveness of its programmes, Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium has become a fait accompli. By early 2009, Iran had produced enough low-enriched uranium to supply the feed material for an atomic bomb if further enriched and put to weapons use. Time would appear to be on Iran’s side as it advances its weapons capabilities. There
are no good options for dealing with Iran’s nuclear challenge. As Harvard scholar Matthew Bunn (2007) puts it, the choice is between the ‘least-bad’ options. This chapter describes Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium production
facilities and the reasons many in the West conclude that its purpose is to acquire a weapons capability. It also assesses Western strategy to date, starting with the denial of supply policy tools employed for two decades and the more recent ‘demand-side’ strategies focused on both sanctions and incentives. The conclusion addresses the key question of whether Iran’s latent capability can be kept from crossing the line of being used for a weapon.
