ABSTRACT

The theological problem of evil – how can we speak of the goodness of God in the face of the existence of evil in the world? – is raised in a powerful way by neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, because natural evils such as pain, death and species extinction are intrinsic to the creative evolutionary process which generates new forms of life. Non-human animal suffering is a particularly acute problem, because some factors that might mitigate the problem of human suffering do not apply to (most) other species. In an important recent book, Christopher Southgate attempts to address the problem by arguing that (1) such a process is the only means by which even an all-powerful God could create a world containing complex life; (2) God suffers with suffering creatures; (3) God will compensate the victims of evolution in the world to come. However, Southgate’s account entails some deep theological difficulties, in the light of which I argue for a theological response to evolutionary evil which understands the created world both as God’s ‘very good’ creation and as ‘fallen’ – radically affected by evil. God’s promised good future is understood as one in which all creatures find their true fulfilment, and the evils intrinsic to the evolutionary process in this world will be no more. This paper will defend my position against Southgate’s criticisms of it, and explore the implications of this debate for human responsibilities in respect of other animal species. The ways in which we make theological sense of animal suffering in this world and understand God’s promised good future have an important bearing on the responsibilities we recognize towards non-human animals here and now.