ABSTRACT

Buddhist cosmology proposes a hierarchical taxonomy of sentient beings cycling endlessly through samsaric realms propelled by their karma. Within this hierarchy, the status and capacities of animals are characterised as subordinate to those of human beings; rebirth as an animal is considered unfortunate while rebirth as a human is considered particularly fortunate. The Buddhist hierarchy of sentient beings is thus superficially similar to Aristotle’s scala naturae in which animals also occupy a lowly position. A lasting consequence of Aristotle’s scala naturae and reflected in The Politics, is the belief that all natural things are located in a graduated scale and oriented toward some end, with animals being intended for the use of humans (Newmeyer, 2011). For Aristotle, animals’ lack of rational capacity was a sufficient morally relevant distinction justifying the possibility of exploitation (Engle and Jenni, 2010). This morally relevant distinction was later incorporated into Christian theology through Thomas Aquinas whose Summa Theologica reflects and modifies Aristotle’s scala naturae with the result that, once again, animals were subordinated to the desires and needs of humans (McInerney, 1998). This presentation argues that while Buddhism also subordinates the capacities of animals to those of humans, it does not find a morally relevant distinction within this framework justifying the ordering of animals to human ends. This apparent paradox of subordination-without-exploitation is explained by the very different way Buddhist philosophy characterises animals. The Buddhist characterisation of animals is reflected in practices intended to benefit animals while acknowledging the significant differences between human and animal capacities.