ABSTRACT
Thailand’s southern border region is distinctly different from the rest of the country due to its predominantly Malay-Muslim population with a long history of resistance to Thai rule. The spatial patterns of violence follow linguistic and religious patterns, reinforcing the view that southern insurgents rely on ethnic and religious identities for mobilisation. The central Thai government has been largely ineffective at handling the violence in the south. A widespread use of bombs with indiscriminate impact has led to large civilian casualties forming the majority of dead throughout the conflict. The violence reoccurred in 2004 and has claimed more than 6,000 lives. Government efforts to end the conflict have primarily focused on military suppression and state-centred development programmes, with only limited success. As the sources of the conflict is intimately linked to the centralisation of Thai political power and failure to create a widespread sense of legitimacy, only genuine political concessions towards a higher level of self-determination can lead to a permanent settlement of the conflict.
