ABSTRACT

The relation between the emotions and morality is complex and varied, and phenomenological reflection thereupon—we shall call it “moral phenomenology” 1 —is equally complex and varied. Moral phenomenology seeks to clarify the intentional structures at work in (1) our experiences of valuing, choosing, planning, and acting in ways that have moral significance; (2) our experiences of persons, actions, situations, and events as good or bad, right or wrong, and obligatory, permissible, or impermissible; and (3) our experiences of institutions and social structures as beneficial or harmful or as liberating or imprisoning. This chapter will discuss (i) the emotions in the disclosure of moral value, (ii) the emotions and moral obligation, and (iii) a well-ordered and -balanced emotional life as a constituent of a flourishing life (see, e.g., Drummond 2010a; Ozar 2010; Hermberg and Gyllenhammer 2013; Steinbock 2014, 2016; Drummond and Rinofner-Kreidl 2017).