ABSTRACT
Solidarity concerns the social bond, the complex amalgam of emotional relations towards other persons and groups: sympathy of various forms, but also commitment to a conviction and to those people and groups (supposedly) sharing this conviction, an emotional investment in a cause or an idea. “Solidarity” denotes an attitude one holds or a stance one takes, and so a disposition to act. The attitude of solidarity is realized in solidary action, and ideas of solidarity are invoked to provide practical reasons: someone may demand assistance from another who, if this alleged affiliation holds, is obliged by her solidary attitude towards the claimant (cf. Margalit 2011, 177). These aspects characterize the word’s ordinary uses, where solidarity sometimes takes on the moral guise of a virtue or an intrinsically valuable idea; at the same time, references to solidarity are decried as merely “ideological” appeals—for instance when it is dubious whether an affiliation with a group (which might have constituted reasons for action) actually exists.
