ABSTRACT
Epistemic injustice is, broadly speaking, about ways that members of marginalized groups may be wronged in their capacity as knowers, due to prejudicial stereotypes. Members of marginalized groups are also the main subjects of concern in discussions of implicit bias and stereotype threat. Those writing on implicit bias are primarily concerned with the ways that largely unconscious, largely automatic associations and stereotypes may play a role in how we interact with members of stigmatized groups. And those writing on stereotype threat are primarily concerned with the ways that awareness of negative stereotypes about one’s group may impair performance. A key concern in discussions of both implicit bias and stereotype threat has been the effects of these phenomena on academic endeavours. It may seem clear, then, what the relationship is between epistemic injustice, implicit bias, and stereotype threat: at first glance, it would appear that implicit bias and stereotype threat are simply varieties of epistemic injustice.
