ABSTRACT
The development of anti-EU sentiments is one of the most important features of the integration process over the last two decades. Although opposition towards the integration has existed since the very beginning, it remained largely limited and confined to the margins (of the continent and of the political spectrum) until the end of the 1980s. An initial rupture occurred within the context of the adoption of the Single European Act and the programme on the internal market. The apparent consensus among political elites as to both the economic and political benefits of integration was shattered by the emergence of a debate on the transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and regulation of the internal market (Leconte 2010). The Maastricht Treaty, however, is the event which undeniably marked a qualitative rupture. It constituted a ‘critical turn’ for European integration, as opposition became more visible and diversified (Lacroix and Coman 2007). Since then, Euroscepticism has become a stable and embedded phenomenon in a majority of member states (Harmsen 2005; Usherwood and Startin 2013).
