ABSTRACT

The pre-election political conflict in Bangladesh during 2013 renewed speculation over the return of the 2007 ‘soft coup’ or some form of military intervention in the country. However, the conjecture was proved wrong as overall affairs had been under the management and coercive control of the civilian administration. The military was also called out to assist the government to keep order throughout the tenth national elections, which took place on January 5, 2014 amid a boycott by the major opposition political alliance, erratic violence and a low voter turnout. Although the polls have been criticized as a setback for democracy, the foregone results brought the ruling Awami League to power with an absolute majority implying civilian pre-eminence and indicating a continuation of the post-2009 state of civil–military relations. Earlier, 2009 marked a new chapter in the country’s political history as, after two years of political uncertainty under a military-backed caretaker government, Bangladesh returned to democracy following the ninth parliamentary elections held in December 2008. It signified a fresh start of building democracy and institutionalizing civilian control over all state institutions/apparatuses, including the armed forces. Indeed, the parameters of civilian control of the military are spelt out in the country’s constitution, wherein the supremacy of the former is enshrined allowing no room for involvement of the latter in the process of politics or state governance. The practicality of functioning of the armed forces under the Ministry of Defense headed by the prime minister, control over the Armed Forces Division, security and intelligence agencies as well as parliamentary oversight are the significant institutional mechanisms in this regard. The recent Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution incorporated further restrictive measures in Article 7A aimed at the military, and thus any attempt to abrogate or suspend the constitution would be regarded as an act of sedition punishable by death. Despite these safeguards for civilian supremacy the nature of political governance over the last five years portrays a dismal scenario characterizing improper functioning of vital state organs and political institutions, intense politicization, lack of agreement on peaceful transfer of power, abolition of a non-partisan caretaker system through the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and consequential violent political confrontations. The legacies of military interventions, militarization of the polity, civilianization processes, the 2007 ‘soft coup’, as well as the military’s ascendancy as a dominant institutional pressure with its cosseted corporate interests – all have a colossal bearing on the existing civil–military relations. As observed, all through the democratic phases, 110institutionalizing civilian control could not be accomplished owing to lack of proper state- and nation-building, weak political institution-building, partisan decision process and politicization of the major formal and informal segments of the society together with the country’s armed forces. The current phase that began in 2009 resembles the post-1990 processes with a policy of appeasement toward the armed forces in supporting their corporate interests under a semblance of civilian control. Any active or circuitous military involvement in the future depends on extreme cases of political ambiguity, multifarious insurmountable crises, rise of Islamic extremist forces hampering national and international security and miserable malfunctioning of the political sector to steer the wheel of the state. This chapter furnishes an overview of civil–military relations in different phases of political developments in Bangladesh since independence in 1971, with a focus on the post-2009 state of affairs highlighting the strategies of the government, state decisions, related processes and practices affecting those relations.