Abstract

Research on the psychology of reasoning shows that people often make mistakes on logical reasoning problems and that they are greatly influenced by prior beliefs. This led to dual process theories in which Type 2 process, slow and engaging working memory, were seen as necessary for logical reasoning and Type 1 processes, fast and belief-based, often adduced to explain cognitive biases. However, contemporary views of reasoning and rationality have radically modified this picture. Type 2 reasoning is bounded by the cognitive capacity of working memory which it requires for its operation, so that people may struggle with abstract and novel problems. However, expert thinking, for example, that of chess masters, is hugely assisted by fast pattern recognition processes that reflect a history of implicit learning. Type 1 intuitive processing thus compensates to a great extent for the bounds of working memory, while Type 2 processing still allows us to deal with novel aspects of problems. In the new paradigm psychology of reasoning, it is recognised that logic is a poor model for rationality in the real world, and that it is necessary to take account of uncertainty, drawing on prior belief in the process.