ABSTRACT

Hong Kong’s Basic Law reserves the government’s policymaking power mostly to its Chief Executive, who is appointed by Beijing and is not popularly elected. It gives oversight power to the elected Legislative Council – half of its members are returned by universal suffrage via proportional representation, and another half by business and professional bodies. The legislature holds vetoing power in the areas of legislation and public finance. Such a design contributes to the “disarticulated” relationship in the post-1997 system, the key components of which are “separate at the joints”, leading to dysfunctional governance. The semi-democratic electoral systems of the legislature turn voters’ majority support into minority stake in the Council; they also favour small parties and non-aligned candidates, encouraging fragmentation and radicalization within the Council. Ironically, fragmentation of the legislature does not weaken its obstructive power. It turns the legislature into a political battleground between the opposition and supporters of Beijing, resulting in stalemate in government and constitutional business. With mistrust between Beijing and Hong Kong on the rise, fragmentation and radicalization is to be expected, leading to graver challenges to Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems”.