ABSTRACT
One of the most debated issues surrounding the developmental state idea in the 1980s–1990s was of its relationship with democracy (cf. Öniş 1991: 118–120). A matter of great contention in that debate was over whether, and if so how, authoritarian rule was necessary (or useful) for economic development and specifically for the emergence of a developmental state (Kohli 2004: 373–374). The answer was important because it had a strong bearing on the answer to the corollary question of whether the developmental state was compatible with a democratic political environment. The somewhat underwhelming conclusion to that debate was that as intriguing as it was that many (but not all) authoritarian governments in East Asia resided in economies with high levels of economic growth, regime type had seemingly little connection with development success (Haggard 2004: 60). 1 With the widespread transition to democracy throughout the region and in some cases, its consolidation, this debate has resurfaced. Perhaps as a reflection of the inconclusive outcomes of earlier efforts, the treatment of the developmental state as somehow being synonymous with authoritarian government remains pervasive even today – especially in recent studies of South Korea (hereafter Korea) (Kalinowski 2009; Kim 2010). This chapter discusses how strategically oriented governments are coping with new challenges that have emerged after democratisation.
