ABSTRACT
There are a number of interlocking themes in the seventeenth-century discussion of the relationship between mind and body. One concerns the relative value of minds and bodies, as some philosophers inherit from the ancient and medieval tradition the view that minds are more exalted than bodies and are more than merely physical. Opponents of this view counter that minds are exalted and material and thus that body has been the victim of severe misrepresentation. A second theme is that substances have an underlying nature in terms of which of their Modifications can be explained and understood. On this view, if we cannot understand how Modifications like ideas and volitions can arise in a substance with Modifications like size, shape, and motion, then ideas and volitions are to be attributed to a substance of a different kind. An opposing view is that there are independent and compelling arguments for the view that minds arise from matter, and our inability to understand how matter thinks is a fact about us and what we do and do not understand. A third theme is that minds and bodies appear to interact and that there is some difficulty in understanding their interaction if they are mutually exclusive substances with nothing in common. Some philosophers will neutralize the difficulty by arguing that minds and bodies do not interact, and others will argue that because minds and bodies do interact, minds must be physical as well. A final theme is that the behavior of bodies in the natural world is orderly and purposive and that it could not be orderly or purposive without some kind of intelligence guiding the way. Some philosophers will argue that because bodies are not intelligent, the guide must be immaterial, but others will argue that bodies are intelligent and are capable of exhibiting order on their own.
