ABSTRACT
Since the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework the ability of North Korea to continue successfully to develop its nuclear and missile programmes is a testament to years of failed US policy and lack of initiative that has left the White House largely sidelined amid defunct bilateral talks and a stalled six-party format that is unlikely to be revived. China, like the USA, is opposed to a nuclear North Korea not only because of the direct threat it would pose but also due to the potential for greater regional instability. This is something that the President of South Korea, Park Guen-hye, has referred to publicly in order to remind the Chinese leadership of the serious implications of an expected fourth nuclear test, hoping that Xi Jingping will more vigorously try to pressurize Pyongyang not to carry it out. However, in Beijing’s policy calculus a negotiated end to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme is not given quite the same priority as it is in Washington. China is wary of pushing North Korea too far, and the long-standing economic support it has provided is a testament to its inherent value as a stable, pro-China/anti-USA buffer state. While frustrated by North Korea’s refusal genuinely to attempt a transposition of Chinese-style economic reform, Beijing has tolerated the mercurial antics of the North Korean leadership and is unlikely to abandon the regime until a more secure strategic option presents itself.
