ABSTRACT
In an address delivered on September 30, 1847 to the Agricultural Society of Rutland County (Vermont), then US Congressman George Perkins Marsh warned that “though man cannot at his pleasure command the rain and the sunshine, the wind and frost and snow, yet it is certain that climate itself has in many instances been gradually changed and ameliorated or deteriorated by human action” (Marsh 2001: 10). Some 170 years later, we are witness to the growing impacts of human action on the earth’s climate, without any very clear idea of where it might lead.What is clear is that human efforts to address the climate change quandary have had a negligible impact on the state of the global climate system while the effects of human efforts to govern climate are, so far, more consequential for human societies than the climate. In addition to already being felt today, over the next 50 years or so, those efforts that do (or do not) transpire will have significant effects on later twenty-first century societies and ecosystems. As yet, despite the decades-long trend of increasing concern regarding climate change in public opinion worldwide (WPO 2011), and more than 20 years of global climate conferences, the world is very far from even beginning to address some very serious matters. Over its long history, the Earth’s climate has never been stable – at best, and in various
places, it has been relatively constant for periods of decades and, in a few instances, for centuries. But in those instances, it was variation in exogenous inputs – solar energy – that was largely responsible for climate change – ice ages, interglacial periods, semi-tropical conditions at the poles, etc. Only since the beginning of large-scale industrialization in the late eighteenth century have human beings acquired a major role in affecting global biogeophysical systems. One might imagine that, given human adaptability to the wide range of environmental and climatic conditions found across the planet, climate change would pose no great challenge to humanity or its social systems.Yet, it is becoming clear that many people, and even entire societies, could soon find themselves in unviable positions, as a result of climate change and its impacts (IPCC 2014). What does globalization have to do with climate change? The co-occurrence of globaliza-
tion and global climate change is hardly coincidental: the two are tightly linked. Indeed, it is the globalization of carbon burning, in both physical and social terms, and the vast growth in global
economic activity linked to carbon that has led humanity and the Earth to its current precarious position. Consequently, doing something about climate change will require global changes in human activities, especially massive decreases in carbon burning. To be sure, sea coal had been burned for heat in the British Isles since Roman times, and probably all over the world. It was not until the beginning of systematic mining of coal in the eighteenth century, for industrial purposes and profit, that anthropogenic emissions of combustion gases into the atmosphere began to change the latter’s composition (most famously visible in the graph of rising CO2 concentration as measured on Manua Loa – see Figure 11.1). Today, the equivalent of approximately 50 gigatons of CO2 (other GHGs, such as nitrous oxide and methane, are included in this number after being converted into units of CO2 equivalent that reflect their “global warming potential” in comparison to CO2) is emitted annually into the atmosphere from anthropogenic sources. This is nearly double the quantity of emissions in 1970, with the vast majority coming from the burning of fossil fuels and industrial processes (IPCC 2014: 5). There is no sign of any leveling off in emission rates, not withstanding constant debate over how reductions might be accomplished. To the contrary, over the first decade of this century, emission rates were higher than during the previous thirty years (2.2% compared to 1.3% per year), even though the 2007/2008 global financial crisis resulted in a small, short-term reduction (IPCC 2014, 61). The first measurements of rising atmospheric CO2 levels at Manua Loa were taken during
the International Geophysical Year in 1957-58, but it was not until the late 1980s that global climate change became a prominent international concern. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was introduced at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Both mandated emission reductions to 1990 levels by industrialized countries, but both have had only minimal impact. More than 20 years after the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international
group of climate scientists, policymakers, and national governments continue to meet at annual COP meetings to squabble over who will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and when; who is most responsible for rising levels of greenhouse gases; and who will pay for the reductions. A possible sign of progress appeared in 2014, when China and the USA, the world’s two biggest carbon polluters, negotiated a mutual agreement to reduce future emissions. The promised reductions, however, fall far short of the levels that the IPCC says are necessary, and these commitments are hardly guaranteed to materialize over the coming decades – plans to reduce GHGs do not always come to fruition, as Australia and Canada have recently demonstrated. At the same time, scientists warn not only that climate change is irreversible – although its severity and extent might be mitigated through near-term action –climate change is already here, and much sooner than expected, as seen, for example, in the rapid melting of the Arctic, Greenland, and even Antarctic ice caps; a surprise that is somehow not surprising (IPCC 2014: 4; Heneo and Borenstein 2015). What is to be done? The first instinct of many is to propose solutions that align with the
scale of the problem. This logic would have it that global climate change be addressed globally, by institutions whose reach is global, such as the United Nations and its associated institutions and agencies. Individual countries would then follow the dictates of these institutions. The difficulty is that the UN system is only as effective as its members are willing to be; as a result, the roadblock in international negotiations for an effective, binding convention stubbornly holds fast. The closest the world has come to this goal was the Kyoto Protocol, which established modest emissions reduction targets, was never ratified by the USA, and whose commitment period expired in 2012. All efforts to create a successor regime have stalled.Given the international impasse among countries, it is worthwhile to examine other approaches, devised and implemented by state and provincial governments, cities, corporations, business associations, individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and social movements. These fall into three broad categories, some of which have been proposed, but not implemented, at the global level: harnessing market logic, preferred by many governments and economists; technological modernization of pollution-producing systems and activities, the favorites of engineers and corporations; and socialization of individuals and societies into less carbon-intensive “green” behaviors and practices, widely advocated by activists and educators. The first approach aims to work within or to adjust market logic by putting a cost on green-
house gas emissions.“Cap and trade” schemes rely on the sale and purchase of carbon emission permits in markets, viewing governments’ role (if any) as creating emission “rights” and making adjustments to the rules under which market transactions take place. Market logic also applies to attempts to foster “green consumerism,” which now dominates the minds of many producers, advertisers, organizations, and individuals. According to the logic of commodification, the market will green itself in response to the demands of ecologically conscious consumers, thus ratcheting down the emissions associated with everyone’s goods. In a similar vein, the idea behind a “carbon tax” is that the demand for goods associated with high GHG emissions, such as gasoline, would fall in response to higher rates of taxation. Market-based approaches, however, function according to the capitalist imperative for growth and profit and, in that vein, many market-based programs have a good track record of turning a profit for entrepreneurs and speculators, with a growing body of evidence showing that such programs, in practice, are likely to result in both financial speculation and dubious emissions reductions (Spash 2010). The second approach relies on optimistic promises and the“progress”of technological inno-
vation, relying on decarbonization through “ecological modernization” (EM). The argument is that deployment of new, low-carbon or even carbon-free technologies can reduce producer costs – especially if a price is imposed on emissions – as well as greenhouse gas production.
Those advocating EM often call upon statistics and projections to make their case, offering claims that “if everyone replaced an incandescent lightbulb with a compact fluorescent… ” or “if half of all new cars were built with hybrid technology… ” then so many tons of emissions and so many barrels of imported oil would be avoided.While this discourse extols the glories of efficiency, it often fails to mention that improvements in efficiency could well coincide with increases in production of goods, with the latter easily cancelling out any of the “reductions” brought about by the former (this is sometimes called the “rebound effect”; see, e.g. Hilty et al. 2006). The third approach takes place at smaller geographic scales, relying on state, regional, and
local action. The logic of such programs and projects is premised on the desire to institutionalize and promulgate greenhouse gas management in ways that are more closely matched to existing institutions, jurisdictions and political economies at more tractable scales. In this instance, it would seem that a cost-benefit motive is less prominent or, at least, that a form of ecological civic virtue is the impetus for decarbonization, while climate change itself is the rationale. One drawback of such localized approaches is that they are more likely to be implemented in wealthier,“developed” places, such as California.Moreover, it is entirely possible that local green initiatives may be undertaken primarily as a form of municipal marketing, with more attention to image than ecological outcomes at a time when “green is in” (McKendry and Janos 2015; Millard-Ball 2012). Marketization, modernization, and localization each approach the same problem by calling
upon different actors – politicians, scientists, and citizens – and pointing to different venues – markets, labs, and communities –for policy and practice. These three approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive: municipalities can continue to promote “smart growth” at the same time that automotive technology becomes more fuel efficient and larger-scale cap and trade systems are deployed. In some respects, though, these strategies are theoretically discordant. Market solutions prioritize the power of individual prerogatives, technological approaches place their faith in expertise, and local approaches emphasize the collectivist potential of communities and place. Although these approaches do not comprise the universe of possible responses, as we will later show, they all tend to rely on mechanisms and practices that, by “leaving it to the market,” appear to minimize the need to implicate and challenge the global capitalist system. In this chapter, we investigate what does, and what does not, distinguish these approaches to
emission reductions from one another, and link them to globalization. We begin with a “primer” on global climate change: what it is, why it is happening, when changes are expected to occur, and who might be affected.We then turn to globalization and carbonization, and discuss how the former – strongly linked to the global expansion of capitalism – has, historically and today, fostered growth in the latter, so much so that climate change is no longer merely a distant theory but an emergent reality. In the third part of the chapter, we describe those international political projects – or “regimes,” as they are often called – constructed to encourage national reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.We also discuss the logic behind the regime approach and the shortcomings that have become only too visible after more than 20 years of negotiating efforts.We then turn to an examination of market-based “solutions,” all of which are being pursued with considerable enthusiasm but none of which, in our view, can address or ameliorate global climate change very much, if at all. Finally,we ask, if we know what will happen, and we know “what is to be done,” why are we doing so little? This section addresses the interacting roles of science, knowledge, politics, and economic interests – and concludes with a discussion of why politics, rather than markets, will be necessary if we are to respond effectively and fairly to climate change.
