ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the basis of providing consent for others in cases of adult individuals who are unable to provide consent for themselves due to, for example, incapacity. The purpose is to highlight some of the tensions that exist between the need to make decisions for others, the practical means we have of doing this, and the justifications we might offer to treat this as a form of consent. It begins by considering the foundations of such consent, as grounded in conceptions of precedent and extended autonomy. It then examines various approaches to consenting for others, such as through the use of proxy decision-makers, advance decisions, appeal to family members, and the judiciary. Different standards of consent for others, such as substituted judgements, best-interests tests, and assent or dissent are also briefly considered. Finally, it discusses three of the most prominent philosophical issues for this area: personal identity concerns, epistemic concerns, and concerns over the moral authority of proxy decision-makers, before concluding that, although we have legal and practical means for establishing decision-makers, their decisions are unlikely to constitute consent unless a compelling account of the moral authority of consenting for others can be established.
