ABSTRACT
By giving others our consent we give them permission to do things with us that without our consent would wrong us. In this chapter I would like to explore two questions concerning the relationship between valid consent, permissibility, and the wronging of persons. The first is (a) the question of how consent changes the moral status of an act; and the second is (b) the question of what it is that could make consent in certain cases morally ineffective, such that it does not change the moral property of the act. Regarding the first question, various authors believe that it is the interests of the consenting person that transform an impermissible action into one that is permissible or not wrongful, while others hold the view that the autonomy of the consenter plays a central role in making acts permissible. The chapter deals with the normative consequences of consent, the role the interests and the autonomy of the consenter thereby play, and, finally, what could make it the case that consent is morally ineffective.
