ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an original account of the main ethical dilemmas underpinning the recognition of states in normative theory and state practice. The ethics of international recognition can be best understood around three sceptical positions, ranging from strong scepticism, which holds that there are no moral principles to bind states’ past and future decisions to recognise other states or not, moderate scepticism, which holds that past decisions cannot be judged, yet there is scope to judge future decisions, to weak or instrumental scepticism, which holds that recognition is justified either prospectively and retrospectively to a achieving a strategic goal. The chapter seeks to counter these claims and to show how we might begin to evaluate individual recognition decisions and the practice of international recognition as a whole. By demonstrating which principles ought to bind international agents, we can pave the way for reforming our overall practice while providing grounds for publicly justifying individual decisions (especially) when they are controversial. The chapter proposes the principle of critical mass, which seeks to make recognition conditional upon committing and making progress towards achieving a global ideal, such as peace and justice.
