


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## **The Ottoman World**

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## **The Reign Of Violence**

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## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# THE REIGN OF VIOLENCE

The *celalis* c.1550–1700



*Oktaý Özel*

Modern historiography depicts Ottoman history in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as a period of crisis, generally associated with the *celali* rebellions which occurred primarily in Anatolia and, to a lesser extent, northern Syria.<sup>1</sup> Discussion of *celali* causes has centred largely around sixteenth-century political-fiscal and economic-demographic developments. Recently added to the argument has been the agency problem of the predatory state, the nature of the overall transformation that the empire and society experienced in parallel with the *celali* movements throughout the seventeenth century, and climatic changes. The present essay reassesses the issue in the light of new findings based on recently explored sources. It examines internal demographic, economic and political dynamics and conditions, as well as conjunctural factors in the 1590s which led marginalized groups within rural society, primarily the peasant masses, into a violent reaction in the form of banditry and rebellion. A reconstruction of the historical context and causes is followed by discussion of the destructive character of the *celali* movements and its consequences in Anatolia, and of the nature of this violence as a phenomenon within Ottoman social history. The central argument of the essay is that the political-level analysis of the *celalis* falls far short in understanding both the peculiarities of the historical process which prepared the ground for the *celali* movements and the extent of destructive violence throughout the seventeenth century. Banditry and occasional rebellions continued, transforming rural society, the economy and the ecological environment as well as leaving a legacy of institutionalized violence which became an inherent characteristic of later Ottoman Anatolian society.

### CONTEXT AND CAUSES

#### Financial crisis and the military institutions

The late 1580s and early 1590s were critical years for the Ottoman fiscal administration. Rising prices, increasing war expenditure, failure in the flow of tax revenue to the central treasury, and consequent difficulties in payment of salaries to thousands

of *kapıkulus*, both the imperial guards and the standing army, infantry and cavalry, placed great pressure on the Ottoman treasury. The pragmatic solution to this crisis was devaluation and debasement of the currency: between 1584 and 1589 the Ottoman *akçe* was devalued by 100 per cent and its silver content reduced by 40 per cent.<sup>2</sup> Another attempted devaluation in 1589 and inability to pay full salaries in the new currency provoked revolt among the imperial cavalry in Istanbul, appeased only by the execution of the chief treasurer and the vezir held responsible. During a similar revolt in 1593, the grand vezir was sacked and the treasurer saved only with difficulty.<sup>3</sup> Fiscal concerns had become the government's chief priority.<sup>4</sup>

Debasement had been common practice from the time of Mehmed II (1451–81). Such a fierce reaction in 1589 was due partly to the large increase in the number of salaried *kuls* during the third quarter of the sixteenth century, and partly to a growing sense of marginalization among Istanbul-based troops.<sup>5</sup> While regular recruitment of Christian boys through the *devşirme* continued, numbers had increased also through recruitment of local Muslim peasants, particularly during periods of border warfare and princely succession struggles. Peasant recruits who had subsequently been given status and payment as *kapıkulu* soldiers were considered outsiders (*ecnebi*) by the Istanbul-based *kapıkulu* troops and their incorporation as violation of an established rule.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, during the long wars against Iran (1578–90 and early 1600s) and Habsburg Hungary (1593–1606), the position of the *kapıkulu* soldiers deteriorated as the financial crisis deepened. Salaries, even if paid on time, had drastically lost value and purchasing power as a result of debasements and rising prices.<sup>7</sup> Contemporary sources also mention increasing distrust on the part of these soldiers towards the pashas and vezirs under whom they fought, due to unpaid salaries and unkept promises or to their incompetence, insults and abuse of power.<sup>8</sup>

*Kapıkulu* troops may also have considered themselves the losers within a climate of 'selective promotion' which had begun to affect all categories of the imperial elite.<sup>9</sup> Stationed in Istanbul, they were among the first to observe how high positions and lucrative revenue holdings were sold through advance payments (often seen as 'bribery' by contemporary observers) rather than given on merit. By the 1590s, sale of office had become established practice as all governorships were given to senior military administrators in return for advance payment in gold to the treasury and to grand vezirs.<sup>10</sup> Rank-and-file *kuls* witnessed their hopes for higher positions gradually fade away. Increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in fiscal and military administration, they began to react more violently to deteriorating conditions.

Istanbul *kapıkulu* troops were not the only ones affected by the crisis. From the mid-sixteenth century, thousands of middle- and lower-ranking provincial cavalry – *timarli sipahis* financed by revenue-holdings (*dirlik*) in return for military service – also began to react to similar financial and administrative changes in the Ottoman redistributive system.<sup>11</sup> The *sipahi* class had originally been composed largely of local elements, most of whom had connections with landed and/or military aristocracy from pre-Ottoman times. From the mid-fifteenth century onwards, they were incorporated more closely into the Ottoman *timar* system as fief-holding soldiers, gradually losing previous privileges as their *dirliks* shrank in size and lost value.<sup>12</sup> Over time they were increasingly replaced by timariots of *devşirme-kul* origin,<sup>13</sup> and in both cases, during the sixteenth century, there was a tendency towards smaller, less valuable fiefs.<sup>14</sup> By mid-century there was a growing pool of disaffected *sipahis*, particularly in Anatolia.

Inflation and debasement of the currency probably had negative effects on the *sipahis* too, in addition to natural fluctuations in revenue income on account of climate changes and unpredictable harvests. The more their fixed-income *dirlik* lost value, the more difficult it was to equip themselves and their mounted soldiers (*cebeli*) for military campaigns, particularly during the thirty-year period of regular campaigns from 1578 onwards.<sup>15</sup> By that year, many had already begun to squeeze their revenue sources, the taxpaying peasantry, by extracting illegal payments and food, and were drifting into lawlessness and *de facto* banditry. By 1600 a significant proportion of remaining fief-holders simply could not afford to attend military expeditions on their diminishing resources; many sought to evade military duty.<sup>16</sup>

The most serious manifestations of reactionary discontent among provincial *sipahis* occurred from the last quarter of the fifteenth century to the 1560s, through their direct involvement in the political crises caused by struggles for the throne among competing princes: between Selim [I] and Ahmed (and his son Murad, 1507–12), and between Bayezid and Selim [II] (1559–62).<sup>17</sup> The former coincided with the most violent phase of Ottoman–Safavid rivalry and its offspring, the *kızılbaş* revolts, which lasted until 1528 and created havoc in Anatolia. A certain proportion of the *sipahi* class clearly participated actively in these revolts, either for religious-spiritual motives through sympathy for the Safavid cause or due to deterioration in their financial and military/political status.<sup>18</sup> In addition, from the 1530s onwards, the imperial administration gradually increased the number of soldiers with firearms, which further undermined the position of the *sipahi* cavalry as a whole.<sup>19</sup> Hence, during the Bayezid–Selim rivalry in the 1550s there was a significant number of disaffected *sipahis* in the countryside who hoped to restore their fiefs or to better their condition, and to whom the competing princes appealed for support.<sup>20</sup>

As argued originally by Akdağ, the *celali* rebellions of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were closely related to the general financial crisis and the transformation of the *kapıkulu* and *sipahi* institutions. By the 1590s, not only *sipahis* in Anatolia but also *kapıkulus* everywhere were participating in unlawful activities and violent reactions. The same soldiers' increasingly undisciplined behaviour and uncontrollable desire to gather as much war booty and spoils as possible during campaigns and regular frontier raids fits into this picture.<sup>21</sup>

### Oppression and demo-economic factors

The ordinary subjects of the empire (*reaya*), particularly the peasantry, were the primary victims of maladministration, financial crisis and over-taxation, and of extortion by agents of the imperial administration, mostly the *kuls* and *sipahis*.<sup>22</sup> Economic and demographic factors also contributed greatly to the deteriorating conditions of the peasantry. The empire-wide survey registers (*tahrir*) indicate an almost linear trend of growth in the sixteenth-century taxpaying population and agrarian economy. The population growth rate varied between regions, but often exceeded 100 per cent. Both rural and urban settlements expanded, as did agricultural production.<sup>23</sup> Arable lands were extended to the limits, particularly in areas with fertile soil; new villages emerged, some developing rapidly into towns. There was also a clear trend towards sedentary life among semi-nomadic elements in regions such as Bozok and Kayseri.<sup>24</sup>

However, economic and demographic expansion brought its own problems. Repeated fragmentation of peasant farmsteads (*çifiliks*) produced a 'surplus' population with minimal plots of land to cultivate, or none at all. By the 1570s the number of landless peasants exceeded the number of households who still held some plots of land, however small in size.<sup>25</sup> Another critical and related development was a sharp increase in the number of unmarried adult males. Although the gross agricultural product expanded in parallel with the expansion of agricultural land, this was ultimately limited, and the growth of population far exceeded the increase in arable land. Two significant problems arose: demographic pressure, particularly in densely settled areas of fertile land in Anatolia, and a decrease in *per capita* production, which produced a serious subsistence crisis during the third quarter of the sixteenth century.<sup>26</sup> These factors combined to push a large proportion of the most dynamic peasant groups out of their villages, to migrate and seek livelihoods elsewhere.<sup>27</sup>

However, signs of demographic pressure and subsistence crisis were present throughout the empire's rural areas. The crucial question is why the *celali* movements as such, with chronic waves of big rebellions of large armies, took place only in Anatolia and northern Syria, and not elsewhere. The Balkan provinces were plagued by low-level banditry and highway robbery.<sup>28</sup> In the Arab provinces, including North Africa, tribal banditry was chronic and there were frequent regional rebellions with their own characteristics. However, neither the Balkans nor the Arab provinces experienced a *celali*-type phenomenon.

Probable answers lie in three principal semi-structural characteristics of Anatolia under Ottoman rule. First is the existence of a large, uncontrollable Turkish/Türkmen population, particularly in the Karaman, İç-il and Zulkardiye provinces, as well as western Taurus regions of Anadolu province, whose socio-political characteristics were shaped by the tension between the lifestyle of dynamic, mobile semi-nomadic tribes and the centralizing policies of the state.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, in south-eastern Anatolia and northern Syria, the chief problem for the central administration was the Kurdish and Arab tribes who were routinely active in highway robbery, raiding and rampage.<sup>30</sup> Second is a 'culture of popular dissent' associated with messianic ideology and a tradition of extreme self-sacrificing zeal, evident from the Babai revolts of the 1240s, through the popular-messianic rebellion of Şeyh Bedreddin in the 1410s, to the early sixteenth-century *kızılbaş* era.<sup>31</sup> This helped fuel resistance to the centralizing state.<sup>32</sup> Third is the unique source of chronic socio-political instability created by the practice of 'prince-governorships', in Anatolian provinces only, and the Ottoman system of competitive succession to the throne. Dating from the long period of civil strife after Bayezid I's defeat at Ankara in 1402, the periodic attempts of rival princes to gain the support of notables and the ordinary population in their respective localities destroyed the precarious social balance, undermined class barriers and further exacerbated popular discontent. Resistance to imperial centralizing policies among the most mobile and economically deprived segments of the *reaya*, peasants as well as the semi-nomadic Türkmen and Kurdish elements, increased during the dynastic struggles of 1507–12 and especially 1559–62.<sup>33</sup> In the latter period such men were recruited *en masse* as soldiers in the warring camps and offered either *sipahi* fiefs or *kapıkulu* rank. As the mainstay of the rival princely armies, they became further politicized. In this context, Arıcanlı and Kafadar suggest that Süleyman's sons may be considered the 'first *celali* leaders'.<sup>34</sup>

From another angle, Yunus Koç emphasizes the diminishing capacity of the state to absorb the most mobile, dynamic elements of the lower echelons of society by offering them opportunities for upward mobility and status change.<sup>35</sup> This had particular relevance in Anatolia, where ever-increasing numbers of young peasants who filled the *medrese* lodges as students graduated with no prospect of employment in the Ottoman religious and bureaucratic establishments and resorted to low-profile alms-taking by wandering in their localities. This soon deteriorated into chronic banditry, with student (*subte*) bands active in both rural and urban areas until the early seventeenth century.<sup>36</sup> Further, those *levend* mercenaries recruited by rival princes in the 1550s who subsequently failed to obtain fiefs or *kapıkulu* rank formed brigand bands, often equipped with firearms.<sup>37</sup> Early in the reign of Selim II (1566–74), there already existed a sizeable, dangerously mobile rural population in the Anatolian countryside, active in low-level but chronic brigandage.

### The explosion c.1580–1600

The number of soldier-brigands with firearms increased during the 1580s and 1590s as provincial governors formed their own retinues by employing these same people, the uprooted peasants, as *sekban* and *sarıca* mercenaries. Contemporary sources indicate that such a trend then accelerated, encouraging more and more peasants to leave their homes to join such retinues.<sup>38</sup> This fatal combination – the sultan’s provincial agents and their *sekban* retinues – furthered acts of oppression targeting primarily the remaining taxpaying villagers. Akdağ estimates that in the 1590s there were some hundreds of thousands of *levendat* and *sekbans* active in *celali* bands, either independently or in the retinues of provincial governors.<sup>39</sup>

The general situation of provincial governors themselves also deteriorated rapidly, due to the high cost of obtaining and maintaining office.<sup>40</sup> The resentment of increasingly marginalized members of the *askeri* resulted in acts of rebellion in the capital and increasing lawlessness in the provinces.<sup>41</sup> Special sultanic decrees (termed by historians *adaletnames*, ‘justice decrees’) reminded governors of their primary duty to observe justice and avoid illegal acts of all kinds.<sup>42</sup> In practice, however, the breakdown in authority was a much more complex phenomenon that cut across all sectors of society, from the palace, through all levels of administrative officials, down to *sekbans* of *reaya* origin.

The long wars of the late sixteenth century had imposed extra burdens on the rural population and economy. That of 1578–90 against Iran proved especially detrimental on account of the war-time obligations upon both peasants and nomads of extra taxes, labour and animals in provisioning large armies both on campaign and in winter quarters. Exactions continued for the Hungarian war of 1593–1606, and in the early 1600s for the ‘*celali* campaigns’ against the rebels in Anatolia.<sup>43</sup> The imperial treasury attempted to overcome the cash shortage not only by debasing the currency, but also by regularizing extraordinary levies, the *avarız* and *tekalif*,<sup>44</sup> and by multiplying the rate of these taxes and services in kind as well as the poll tax (*cizye*) paid by non-Muslim subjects. In response, the taxpaying *reaya* began to resist these exactions by arming themselves against the tax-collecting agents of provincial governors and other officials. Meanwhile, the *kapıkulus* of İstanbul as well as provincial *sipahis* also began to evade military campaigns in ever-increasing numbers.<sup>45</sup> The result was dangerous

militarization of the countryside, with highly mobile and discontented elements at all social levels. Furthermore, Sam White draws attention to extraordinary climatic fluctuations which coincided with these developments as a serious ‘external pressure’ on the peasantry. To him, the years of drought and famine played a crucial role in the rise of violence and banditry during the last decade of the century.<sup>46</sup>

Andıç and Andıç see this development as the consequence of a system of ‘predatory finance’ which aimed to maximize revenue for the imperial treasury and the individual wealth of grandees by creating highly politicized kinship networks that made arbitrary use of the opportunities amply provided for them by the imperial system.<sup>47</sup> The result was the exclusion of certain sections of the agents – i.e., the *askeri* class – from the redistribution mechanism of privileges or political favours, and of the taxpaying subjects from the imperial system of welfare and prosperity, eventually pushing them all into the margins of the law. Cook refines the agency problem further by drawing attention to the same institutional elasticity of the Ottoman ruling elite that left its agents considerable room for manoeuvre in order to maintain themselves in the zone between the sultanate and its subjects, without any overwhelming interest in the preservation of the prevailing social structure either in Ottoman Anatolia or elsewhere.<sup>48</sup> Theoretically, they functioned as the instrument of Ottoman ‘centralization’, but in practice they acted quite independently with the means (both military and economic) to reproduce themselves. They did this not necessarily by preserving such basic institutions as the *timar*, but rather by adapting themselves to changing conditions pragmatically and often at high cost even for themselves. Here, one should note that lower-ranking members of the Ottoman ruling elite such as timariots and *kapıkulu* soldiers were not part of the emerging elites, or of the empire’s ‘sub-state structure’, as Andıç and Andıç define them. On the contrary, along with the *reaya*, they were at the losing end of the gradual institutional dissolution and deeper imperial transformation beginning in the later sixteenth century.

## THE *CELALIS*: BANDITRY AND REBELLIONS

Contemporary sources point unanimously to the crucial impact of the 1596 Hungarian campaign on the escalation of violence and devastation in the Ottoman countryside. Although victorious at Haçova, the Ottoman army struggled on the battlefield and lost substantial numbers of men. Many more fled and disappeared, leaving the sultan and the commanding vezirs in a state of shock. A summary roll-call revealed that thousands of Janissaries had deserted and that, according to contemporary sources, some 30,000 *sipahi* provincial cavalry had evaded the campaign altogether, while others had sent substitutes. Punishment was severe: both deserters and those who had failed to appear were to be persecuted wherever caught, and all their ranks, fiefs and income sources revoked. Thousands of Janissaries and *sipahis* are said to have fled to the ‘other side’ (*öte yaka*) – i.e., Anatolia. Most became involved in large-scale banditry, often forming their own bands from the *levends* and *sekbans* already active in the countryside.<sup>49</sup> This finally brought home to the imperial administration the seriousness of the *celali* movements in Anatolia.<sup>50</sup>

In 1598, two years after the Haçova campaign, and coinciding with a major earthquake in Anatolia, came the first great *celali* rebellion, which set the precedent for others throughout the seventeenth century. Contemporary sources mention for the

first time a ‘rebellious’ pasha, Hüseyin Paşa, the governor of Karaman, in association with Karayazıcı Abdülhalim, a former police chief and head of a *sekban* division in Sivas province, who rebelled in the same year with a local force of some 20,000 men and declared himself ruler of the Urfa region. Karayazıcı’s army defeated the Ottoman forces sent against him, and roamed the countryside of north-central Anatolia for four years with such success that the imperial administration sought to buy him off with the governorate of Çorum. When he died in 1602, Karayazıcı had an army of 30,000 men under his command.<sup>51</sup> Paradoxically, the Ottoman forces sent against him were themselves composed partially of former *celalis* and *levends*, and also behaved like *celalis* in the Anatolian countryside, ruining villages and causing great distress to the peasantry. Karayazıcı had complained to Istanbul about the oppressive and *celali*-like behaviour of the Ottoman commander, a point raised again by Nasuh Paşa in 1603.<sup>52</sup>

After Karayazıcı’s death, his brother Deli Hasan continued to devastate Anatolia to such a degree that the government attempted to conciliate him with the governorship of Temeşvar in the western Balkans. Moving with his men to Rumeli, he subsequently fought with the Ottoman army in Hungary. The most serious rebellion led by an Ottoman pasha was that of Canbulatoğlu Ali Paşa, governor of Aleppo. Canbulatoğlu’s rebellion had a significant local character closely linked to his family’s near hereditary rule north of Aleppo and to a struggle for regional autonomy; it was therefore particularly important for the Ottoman administration to win him over, again by conciliation.<sup>53</sup> Although Ali Paşa was executed in 1610, various members of the Canbulatoğlu family continued to hold high positions in Ottoman service.<sup>54</sup> Kalenderoğlu and other rebel pashas in this period – in Sivas, Kayseri, Ayntab and Aydın – commanded armies of 10,000 to 30,000 men, mostly *levends* and *sekbans*.<sup>55</sup> The greatest *celali* armies were led by leaders of *sekban* origin, with between 30,000 and 70,000 men under their command. Most of these rebellions took place simultaneously in different parts of Anatolia between 1603 and 1608 and easily defeated the government forces (also composed largely of Anatolian *levends*) sent against them.<sup>56</sup>

At the peak of this devastation and anarchy came ‘the great flight’ of peasants from the land (*büyük kaçgun*, 1603–6).<sup>57</sup> Some tried to defend themselves by building fortified towns (*palankas*); most sought refuge in already fortified local cities or fled to Istanbul, Rumeli, Syria or even Crimea.<sup>58</sup> The government response, between 1606 and 1608, was relatively successful in asserting control; according to one contemporary source, around 80,000 *celalis* had been killed by 1608.<sup>59</sup> However, this was only a temporary and partial success. Brigandage by *celali* bands, in small or large numbers, and the unlawful activities of provincial officials continued.

The second phase of the *celali* rebellions broke out in 1623, with the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Paşa, governor of Erzurum and formerly the treasurer of Canbulatoğlu Ali Paşa.<sup>60</sup> Mehmet Paşa’s declared aim was revenge for the deposition and assassination by Janissaries of Osman II (1618–22). With 15,000 of his own men, mostly *sekbans* recruited from local Turks, Kurds and Türkmén, as well as *sipahis*, and with support from many Anatolian provincial governors, he laid siege to Ankara with a force of 50,000. He was pardoned twice, in 1624 and 1628, and, by analogy with the treatment of previous *celali* rebels, was appointed to governorships in the Balkans before eventually being executed in 1634.<sup>61</sup> Abaza Mehmed Paşa’s revolt was followed by the local rebellions of Cennetoğlu around Manisa (1620s), İlyas Paşa (governor of Anatolia) around Balıkesir to Manisa and Midilli, the Türkmén clan chief Boynuinceli



Hacı Ahmedoğlu Ömer around Kayseri (all 1630s), and Gürcü Abdünnebi, Karahaydaroğlu and Katırcıoğlu around Kütahya and Isparta (1640s). After the short-lived counter terror of Murad IV (1623–40) came another period of disorder in the imperial administration and provinces, and in 1651 a further phase of rebellion led by Abaza Hasan Paşa, a former member of the imperial cavalry, whose eight-year revolt destabilized the Anatolian countryside from Kayseri to Aleppo.<sup>62</sup> In this rebellion also, the rebel pasha aimed to intervene in Istanbul factional politics, supporting the vezir İbşir Mustafa Paşa, who was of Türkmen origin and a nephew of Abaza Mehmed Paşa.<sup>63</sup> These later rebellions partially coincided with and were exacerbated by the lengthy war with Venice over Crete from 1645 to 1669.

*Sekbans* again came to prominence in Anatolia, this time providing the manpower to challenge the *sipahis* and Janissaries.<sup>64</sup> They remained significant in other local activities of rebellious seventeenth-century pashas, finally and most seriously during the Hungarian war of 1683–99 against Austrian-led coalition armies following the Ottoman defeat at Vienna. Violence again erupted in Anatolia, comparable to that at the beginning of the century. The last *celali* leader of note was Yeğen Osman Bölükbaşı (later Paşa), who between 1685 and 1688 led thousands of *sekbans* and free-floating *levends*. Similar to earlier rebel pashas, he was first made governor of Rumeli, then commander-in-chief of the Ottoman armies against Austria; while in power he appointed his men to governorships in Anatolian provinces but was executed after a failed attempt to become grand vezir.<sup>65</sup> Disorder reigned in Anatolia for the duration of the Austrian war, military expenditure produced a major financial crisis in Istanbul and *kul* revolts, and the taxation system was overhauled to meet the urgent need for cash. When peace was agreed at Karlowitz in 1699, the general picture of internal chaos and disorder, as well as the violence and financial crisis, were strikingly similar to the conditions of the late sixteenth century, and to the situation in 1606 when the treaty of Zsitvatörök concluded the earlier ‘long war’ in Hungary.

### THE CONSEQUENCES: DESTRUCTION, DEPOPULATION, AND TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

Mustafa Akdağ’s seminal work on the *celali* movements was carried out from the 1940s to the 1960s. Recent research, with access to a greater variety of sources, confirms that it was a much longer-lasting phenomenon, causing far greater damage, than has been generally known. Violence became the underlying characteristic at all levels of seventeenth-century politics and society, both in the provinces and in Istanbul. It brought about changes in the imperial structure, either dissolution and breakdown (as in the *timar* and social order) or gradual change and transformation (as in the *kapıkulu* and household/patronage networks, and in the wider application of tax farming). It also produced a profound transformation in Anatolian economy and society.

The number of those involved in the *celali* movements in general is unknown, though scattered archival and chronicle evidence suggests that, in the first decade of the seventeenth century, it was between 150,000 and 200,000.<sup>66</sup> The mass abandonment of rural settlements, particularly during the ‘great flight’ of 1603–6, left half-ruined, drastically depopulated villages and towns.<sup>67</sup> As administrative records of the period




Figure 13.1 The reign of the celalis: causes, symptoms, characteristics and consequences

clearly attest, large tracts of arable lands left uncultivated for years were often acquired by members of the local *askeri* class. Years of famine often followed, which combined with attempts to enforce as much tax collection as possible, furthered the desertion of villages and drove large numbers of people into hunger, death or banditry.<sup>68</sup> Rural violence meant the disappearance, temporarily or permanently, of a great number of Anatolian rural settlements and caused also major destruction in some cities targeted by the *celalis*.

Rhetorical dramatization of the *celali* phenomenon in early seventeenth-century advice literature was not simply exaggeration for effect.<sup>69</sup> We can now consult detailed correspondence (*telbis*) between grand *vezirs* and sultans from the turn of the seventeenth century; *mühimme* and *ahkam* series of outgoing imperial orders, including fiscal concerns; registers of the *kadi* courts; and the annual account books of the great *evkaf* or pious endowments.<sup>70</sup> Narrative sources have been re-evaluated and subjected to closer textual and contextual readings.<sup>71</sup> These all provide further evidence of the extent and complexity of the movement. Most significant among these new sources are the seventeenth-century *avarız* and *cizye* tax registers,<sup>72</sup> which allow comparison with preceding *tahrir* surveys and make it possible to observe changes in the taxpaying population, in settlement patterns and in the composition of both rural and urban Anatolian society.<sup>73</sup>

Between the 1570s and 1640s, a period which includes the most violent phase of the *celali* terror and the greatest rebellions, the rural taxpaying population in central, north-central and eastern Anatolian provinces such as Konya, Bozok, Amasya, Canik, Tokat, Harput and Erzurum fled to safer areas, either high mountains or urban settlements with better protection.<sup>74</sup> Akdağ gives dramatic examples from the Ankara region, where official reports show that, in 1604 in the district of Bacı, thirty-three out of thirty-eight villages were totally depopulated, while in the two districts of Haymana over eighty villages, once amounting to two-thirds of the rural population, had no inhabitants left. Similarly, in the Afyon region south-west of Ankara, officials found peasants in only ten villages.<sup>75</sup> Günhan Börekçi has recently drawn attention to the existence of similar reports for western Anatolian districts.<sup>76</sup> In the Ayntab region, immigration into the city from its rural surroundings early in the century was followed in the 1650s by peasant flight and abandoned villages, due most probably to Abaza Hasan Paşa's rebellion.<sup>77</sup> Katip Çelebi, who visited Anatolia in the twelve years prior to 1635, emphasizes particularly the large number of refugees flowing into cities, especially to Istanbul.<sup>78</sup> Simeon of Poland, who traversed Anatolia in the aftermath of the 'great flight', observed a similar picture, noting especially that half of the western Anatolian city of Bursa had been destroyed, burned and depopulated by the *celalis*; the situation was similar for Kayseri and Ankara.<sup>79</sup> Evliya Çelebi confirms similar destruction elsewhere in Anatolia in mid-century.<sup>80</sup> Even the English ambassador to Istanbul, commenting in the 1620s, states that, out of 553,000 villages formerly in the entire empire (in 1606), only 75,000 were left inhabited in 1619.<sup>81</sup> This statement, allegedly based on two surveys, though perhaps grossly exaggerated, conveys a sense of the contemporary perception of the degree of destruction and desolation of the Anatolian countryside.<sup>82</sup>

The tax registers of the 1640s also show a dramatic drop in recorded population in both urban and rural settlements. In Bozok and Harput in the province of Rum, the number of rural taxpayers was barely 30 per cent of that recorded in pre-*celali* registers: some 70 to 80 per cent of the rural population had disappeared from the tax

surveys.<sup>83</sup> In Manyas, the *avarız* register of 1603–4 refers to the depopulation of some quarters of the town as a result of the attacks by the ‘*celali* bandits’.<sup>84</sup> It seems that no significant recovery was observed in the depopulated villages during the rest of the century, despite sporadic references to some peasants returning to their villages after ten, twenty or even thirty years, usually to find their lands occupied either by *askeris* or by peasant refugees from other worse-affected regions.<sup>85</sup> Rare examples of similar registers from the late seventeenth century suggest that the situation was no better in the 1690s. The population of the city of Lazikıyye (Denizli), for example, decreased even further (by 36.22 per cent) between 1678 and 1699.<sup>86</sup>

Systematic comparison of *avarız/cizye* and *tahrir* registers also shows a significant change in settlement patterns. Some 20 to 40 per cent of pre-*celali* rural settlements (villages and cultivated fields, *mezraas*) were by the 1640s totally ruined; some disappeared for good. The majority of deserted settlements were in the open plains, as was the case in Amasya.<sup>87</sup> This confirms Hütteroth’s findings for the inner Anatolian plateau, namely the province of Karaman: here the rate of abandonment in mountain villages was 30 to 50 per cent but in the open plains was around 90 per cent.<sup>88</sup> A closer examination of settlements in the Amasya region shows that the abandoned villages included almost all the newly founded, smaller-size settlements of the sixteenth century. Similarly, villages established by the gradual settling of semi-nomadic groups had also disappeared. This can justifiably be seen as a sign of re-nomadization.<sup>89</sup> One might expect such a phenomenon to have been particularly the case in the ‘grey area’ or zone of transition between Rum (Anatolia) and Şam (Syria), the area including the regions of İç-il, Maraş and Aleppo.<sup>90</sup> These were populated largely by semi-nomadic Turkish, Kurdish and Arab tribes;<sup>91</sup> here *mezraa*-type settlements constituted a larger proportion of settlements compared with other parts of Anatolia.<sup>92</sup> Sources also indicate from the 1610s onwards a north-westward mass movement, a ‘nomadic invasion’, of Boz Ulus, Halep and Yeni-il Türkmen tribes from this particular zone into central and western Anatolia, all the way to the Aegean coastal areas.<sup>93</sup> Simultaneously, some new villages appeared in different locations, including the higher mountain plateaux. This indicates one of the most drastic ruptures in the historical geography of Anatolia: a great shift in settlement patterns from open plains to mountains. According to Hütteroth, this period lasted for over two hundred years, until reversal began in the nineteenth century.<sup>94</sup> With constant banditry and heavy exploitation by tax collectors, security became the main determinant of settlement patterns. The plains were increasingly left to either the poorest peasants or the new *çiftlik*-owning *askeris*, who formed the nucleus of an emerging landed aristocracy all over Anatolia.

Other factors add to the picture of critical change. With large tracts of arable land destroyed or left uncultivated, and with a drastically reduced number of peasants remaining in villages, a gradual expansion of animal husbandry and a shift towards a more pastoral economy occurred.<sup>95</sup> Frequent years of famine went hand in hand with disease and pestilence.<sup>96</sup> Earthquakes (especially those in 1598 and 1668) and other natural disasters and extreme climatic fluctuations compounded the problem.<sup>97</sup> Although specific detail is lacking, it is clear that such catastrophic conditions must have affected the birth–death ratio to the detriment of the former. What the *avarız* registers of the 1640s show as a drastic decrease of 70 to 80 per cent in the recorded taxpaying population can be accounted for partially by such a demographic crisis or Malthusian scissor.<sup>98</sup>

On the other hand, there were perhaps as many uprooted peasants mobile in the countryside as there were recorded in the remaining villages, even in the mid-seventeenth century. The registers of the 1640s suggest that a significant proportion of the population was either still in hiding to evade tax registration or was active in brigandage; also, tens of thousands of *sekbans* were either employed in the ever-expanding retinues of provincial governors or wandering around unemployed as *celalis*. In all cases they simply went unrecorded in the *avarız/cizye* registers. The same sources also reveal a significant level of internal migration.<sup>99</sup> In effect, the Ottoman imperial treasury lost considerable tax revenue simply by erosion of the imperial tax base through the ‘loss’ of taxpaying subjects, as well as through destruction of the agricultural structure and economy.<sup>100</sup> This is mirrored in the case of large imperial *evkaf*, whose rural income sources suffered from these developments. Being unable to collect village revenues on time or in full, they often had to close their soup kitchens.<sup>101</sup>

Inevitably, the cycle of population dispersal, evasion of registration and tax erosion further deepened the empire’s financial crisis. Indicative of this was the extreme instability in the post of chief treasurer, the obvious scapegoat for financial failures. Evidence in contemporary chronicles testifies clearly how deadly a task the job of imperial treasurer became during the seventeenth century, with frequent changes of tenure as a result of *kapıkulu* rebellions or of the factional conflicts within the Istanbul ruling elite, and occasional execution.<sup>102</sup>

However, perhaps the single most important financial consequence of the *celali* movements was its crucial role in the dissolution of two basic institutions of the ‘classical’ Ottoman imperial regime, the *timar* and *kul* systems. As discussed above, the initial stages of the breakdown of both institutions were key factors in the formative *celali* period. The first wave of rebellions accelerated the process, as a result both of peasant flight and the *sipahis*’ own activity as *celalis*. Howard’s study of ‘inspection registers’ for 1632 reveals that there were substantial numbers of vacant and unassignable *timars* in western Anatolia and more than 900 *kılıç timars* or reserve fiefs in the province of Rum without holders in 1634.<sup>103</sup> The villages whose revenues belonged to these *timars* were ruined and their inhabitants had dispersed; no one was interested in them.<sup>104</sup> With the *sipahis* also went the bases of both the provincial administration and the military system. The former was gradually replaced by tax farming (*iltizam*), with similar financial, administrative and military functions.<sup>105</sup> Through creating revenue units (*mukataa*), mostly from former *timars*, and farming them out to the highest bidders under the *iltizam* system, the state in effect centralized and monetized the revenue-extraction system.<sup>106</sup> The decline in *sipahi* numbers also created further avenues of military employment for a significant proportion of the *celalis*, recruited as *sekban* mercenaries either by provincial governors or by the state. There emerged a self-perpetuating, semi-institutionalized *celali*-ism which lasted until the early eighteenth century. This crucial change from *timar* to *iltizam*, the fine line between *sekban* and *celali*, and the implications of both aspects for the transformation of the imperial administration as a whole have yet to be adequately studied.

As for the *kul* institution, both Janissaries and the *sipahs* had increasingly rooted themselves in the Ottoman countryside during the sixteenth century, also contributing significantly to the *celali* movements, often as leaders of small-sized locally active brigand bands rather than initiators of big rebellions. These members of the *kapıkulu* class seem to have benefited most from the *celali* chaos. *Avarız* registers of the 1640s

show a significant number of Janissaries and *sipahs* of varying ranks, along with many provincial *sipahis*, established in hundreds of villages across Anatolia, holding *çiftlik*s in their own names.<sup>107</sup> These were either *kuls* who had acquired lands abandoned by peasants or former peasants who had obtained *kapıkulu* rank. In other words, it is highly likely that some *çiftlik*-holding *kapıkulus* were native (*yerli*) peasants, often referred to angrily as ‘outsiders’ (*ecnebi*) in contemporary sources. However, we see the same groups in the Balkan countryside also referred to in these seventeenth-century sources as sons of *kul* (*kul oğlu*) or ‘local Janissaries’ (*yerli yeniçeri*).<sup>108</sup> A study of the local and imperial dynamics behind these similar processes in different parts of the empire would assist in reaching clearer conclusions on the role of the *celali* movements in such a development, particularly in Anatolia.

It is nevertheless certain that most Janissaries in Anatolian villages were men of *devşirme* origin who had acquired *reaya çiftlik*s. The *maliye ahkam* registers and the *kadi sicils* contain many legal cases throughout the seventeenth century where returning peasants had found their lands occupied by the members of the *askeri* and demanded them back.<sup>109</sup> There are also cases where such *askeris* claimed exemption from the compulsory *avarız* and *tekalif* taxes paid by all land-holders and house-owners irrespective of their status, military or *reaya*. All in all, peasant flight, insecurity, and the appearance of *askeri çiftlik*s in villages signify a steady change in the position of the peasantry, who gradually lost much of their former freedom and became dependent sharecroppers or wage labourers.<sup>110</sup>

## VIOLENCE AND THE *CELALIS*

Although socio-economic factors have always been prominent in historical discussion of the *celali* phenomenon, some historians have recently proposed an analysis emphasizing the political perspective and the state’s point of view, focusing either on institutional dissolution, on state-making, or on centralization or consolidation of imperial power.<sup>111</sup> In particular, Karen Barkey has demonstrated masterfully how state–bandit (i.e., the *celali* leaders) relations developed with a certain degree of flexibility on the part of the central government and a large margin of negotiation and bargaining.<sup>112</sup> Such analyses have contributed greatly to general understanding of the phenomenon and of the changing nature of the state in the post-classical period. However, their primary focus on the ‘politics’ of the *celali* movements overshadows the internal dynamics of socio-economic conditions and the rural misery which initially produced the main human source of the movement, the ‘push’ factors which drove large masses in rural Anatolia first to the margins of their villages and then out of their rural confines, both physical and economic.<sup>113</sup> It is true that peasants were often utilized by rebel pashas or other *celali* leaders for their own agendas, which were essentially different from those of the uprooted *reaya*. It is also clear that leaders of the major rebellions often sought personal ends, bargaining with the imperial centre over their own reincorporation into the *askeri* class and abandoning the large majority of their followers or allies to join together again under another *celali* leader or as smaller independent brigand bands.

The problem here is that the large, explosive pool of uprooted peasants (and nomads) is usually treated simply as the followers of the major *celali* leaders, as instruments of intra-elite conflicts over military-administrative positions and large revenue sources. As marginalized peasants, they had, perhaps, no clearly defined agenda of col-

lective action, nor a persistent unifying goal other than simply freeing themselves from demographic-economic pressures and financial injustices. However, they were initially driven into banditry and rebellion for reasons essentially different from those of the *celali* leaders of *askeri* origin. Seeing them totally in the context of a power struggle in a ‘declining’/‘dissolving’ or ‘centralizing’ empire or in a process of ‘state-making’ at imperial level using the state’s terminology of ‘banditry’ gives only a partial picture of the *celali* phenomenon. Rather, the *celali* movement represents a social phenomenon with a dangerously self-destructive character. Without a visible ideology to channel their modest everyday concerns, or a higher cause to die for zealously, seventeenth-century *celalis* became the principal actors in a vicious circle of collective violence, if not a collective action.<sup>114</sup>

However, the *celali* movement was not just a response to objective deprivation, but also a social action which may well be seen as a ‘rising’, if not a ‘peasant rebellion’ in the narrower sense.<sup>115</sup> While serfs in the feudal west rose either against their landlords or the centralizing state as their lords’ principal ally, in a sense Ottoman peasants did the same, though in their own traditional ways. In the absence of an immediate landlord, they reacted through banditry and occasional rebellion, taking advantage of their ‘freedom’ (both legal and *de facto*) to challenge conditions partially created by the state.<sup>116</sup> Moreover, while European peasant rebels aimed to better their conditions as peasants under a landlord, with no option of changing either their status or their class, Ottoman peasants did have alternatives. Becoming a student (*suhte*), a mercenary soldier-brigand (*sekban*) or simply an outright bandit (*celali*) meant becoming disconnected from one’s place of origin with no intention of return.<sup>117</sup> This alienation from original social confines and peasant life was perhaps the key factor in the development of chronic banditry.<sup>118</sup>

In this respect, it is imperative not to equate *celalis* – i.e., former peasants – with the peasantry as a whole.<sup>119</sup> *Celalis* neither acted with a group consciousness nor revolted in the name of the peasantry as a class. Seeing the movement as ‘artificial’ with ‘no proclaimed ally or enemy and no significant ideology’<sup>120</sup> makes it neither less real nor asocial. This was a social action, but one of marginalized and excluded groups who spoke only for themselves. It succeeded in that many *celalis* were partially incorporated into the newly emerging system during the seventeenth century as a new *sekban* military force, and became fully institutionalized in the following century as the troops of *ayan*-governors. These bandit-soldiers and their violence, both legitimized and to some extent controlled by their new patrons, became an integral element of a decentralized imperial system, of what Tezcan calls the ‘second empire’, restructured on a much more collaborative basis with provincial leaders.<sup>121</sup>

The pejorative tone of the imperial term ‘*celali* rebel’ (*celali eşkiyası*) for all forms of resistance and rebellion significantly blurs the full social character of the rural disturbances in Anatolia. In both contemporary imperial parlance and modern historiography this blanket terminology denotes not only the chronic *reaya* brigandage but also the big *askeri*-led rebellions. Officially, the unlawful brigand-like acts of Ottoman officials-turned-bandits (with their *sekbans*) were termed ‘oppression’ (*zulm ve ta’addi*), whereas similar acts of vagabond *levendat* groups were generally called banditry (*şekavet* or *fesat*). However, just as the distinction between *sekban* as mercenary and *celali* as brigand was ambiguous, so too was the line between the violence committed by either side. As Cook emphasizes,

tax collection and banditry collapse into the same undifferentiated activity of living off the land, so that whether or not a man is a rebel comes to depend less on what he does than on the more or less fortuitous fact that he has or has not an official authorization for his maraudings.<sup>122</sup>

Despite official attempts at differentiation, *celali* terminology quickly became the shorthand description for all kinds of rural revolt and violence, appropriately perhaps given that the nature of the violence and its destructive impact on rural society was essentially the same.

To add to the confusion, Ottoman bureaucrats also applied the same *celali* terminology to the banditry, rampage and highway robbery which had been routine among some Türkmen, Kurdish and Arab tribal, nomadic or semi-nomadic populations long before the Ottoman period and continued without much change under their rule.<sup>123</sup> We have already seen that semi-nomadic elements were also an integral part of the *celali* phenomenon, although their involvement had causes significantly different from those of peasants.<sup>124</sup> Leaving aside their rebellious acts as *celalis*, banditry as a criminal act and banditry as a way of life become extremely difficult to separate one from another. Similarly, the imperial administration was quick to label as *celali* those peasants whose legitimate attempts at self-defence by organizing themselves militarily under a leader (say a former *sipahi*) against the excesses of an administrative official (say a governor) got out of hand and became violent and destructive.<sup>125</sup> Only in such limited cases could we speak of a certain degree of 'resistance' or 'rebellion' on the part of the Anatolian peasants by allying themselves with a *celali* or bandit chief against 'official oppression'.<sup>126</sup> Also, calling these peasants *celali* reduces to an absurdity the distinction between victim and victimizer. Finally, given that the most common characteristic of the acts referred to by the blanket term *celali* is the undifferentiated and illegitimate use of violence, those whom contemporary sources often refer to as janissary thugs (*yeniçeri zorbaları*) and soldier-brigands of the *sekbans* corps (*bölük eşkiyası*) active throughout the period both in Istanbul and in the Asiatic provinces were also part of the same *celali* movement.<sup>127</sup>

Contemporary sources show that the ideals of justice and the legitimacy of state power also diminished greatly in the seventeenth century, as the state had serious difficulty in upholding these effectively under conditions of collective violence and intralite conflicts at the centre. Yet they still remained the only hope for the 'real losers' of the period, namely the desperate peasants holding on in their villages or returning after some years or decades, who needed to resort to judicial mechanisms either through the *kadi* courts in provinces or the imperial *divan* in Istanbul.<sup>128</sup> The imperial centre was itself often in a state of desperation. It had to allow peasants to arm themselves for self-defence against the *celali* terror;<sup>129</sup> it was reduced to hiring peasants and *celali*-type *sekbans* to augment the imperial troops sent against *celali* armies in Anatolia.<sup>130</sup> The relationships between state, peasants and *celalis* were constantly changing. How was a *celali* leader or pasha to deal with the *celalis* under his command once he had been pardoned and had accepted a position for himself and his immediate associates within the *askeri* class? The resulting uneasy relationship often led to a former rebel pasha being prepared to sacrifice his men (whom he himself now termed *celali*) simply by driving them into the most dangerous battlegrounds against, say, Iranian armies in the East.<sup>131</sup>



In conclusion, analysis of the *celali* phenomenon primarily at a political level falls short in understanding the full picture. Newly explored sources now allow us to re-examine demographic-economic factors, social deprivation and desperation in rural Anatolia as essential and significant components of the internal dynamics of the *celali* movements as a social phenomenon. Only then will we be able to contextualize other political and military factors, including the management of violence in operation, where the same *celali* group or army fights against the state forces today, against Austrian or Iranian armies tomorrow, and against another *celali* army the following day, in accordance with constantly changing positions. As ordinary bandits at local level or as *sekban* adventurers, recklessly seeking mercenary employment from one end of Anatolia (or even the empire) to the other, swinging between the positions of *celali*-turned-soldier and soldier-turned-*celali*, their mere physical presence and violence became the only source of survival and, to some degree, a psychological driving force. In the absence of a comprehensible target or a common political or ideological cause, all *celali* activities became potentially self-destructive both for the perpetrators themselves and for the targeted groups, primarily the peasantry, as well as for the physical and agricultural environment. The resulting atmosphere of general lawlessness eventually created its own logic, justification and self-perpetuating character, such that banditry came to represent not the exceptional in Anatolian social history, but an integral part of the new routine of rural life, surviving in varying forms and contexts until the beginning of the twentieth century.<sup>132</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 *Celali*, the most common and pejorative Ottoman imperial term for bandits and rebels, originated from the *kızılbaş*-related rebellion in the name of Şeyh Celal in 1519 in central Anatolia.
- 2 Tezcan 2001: 38–9; cf. Tezcan 2009a, where the author interprets the fiscal crisis of these years by reference to the ‘dictates of market forces’ rather than the difficulties faced by the Ottoman imperial treasury.
- 3 Selânikî Mustafa Efendi 1989: I, 209–12, 292, 301–5; Âli 2000: III, 547–53; Hasan Beyzade Ahmed 2004: I, 375–7; II, 346–59.
- 4 *Koca Sinan Paşa telhisleri* 2004.
- 5 *Ibid.*: 20–1, 89–90, 100–1.
- 6 *Ibid.*: 33–4, 85, 89.
- 7 Akdağ 1977; İnalçık 1978.
- 8 Âli 2000: III, 512–25, 556–92; Peçevi 1981: II, 206–7; Andreasyan 1962–3: 34.
- 9 Barkey 1994: 11.
- 10 *Koca Sinan Paşa telhisleri* 2004: *passim*.
- 11 Arıcanlı and Kafadar 1990.
- 12 Özel 1999.
- 13 In 1555, faced with resentment among Anatolian *sipahis* following the execution of his son Mustafa, Süleyman I ordered that fiefs worth 20,000 *akçe* and over be given only to imperial Janissaries, leaving provincial *sipahis* with smaller *timars* (Turan 1961: 38; Cezar 1965: 148–51).
- 14 Özel 1993: 108–18; Barkey 1994: 49.
- 15 Faroqhi 1986b: 75–6, 81.
- 16 Akdağ 1963: 161–5, 185–6; Akdağ 1945; Cezar 1965: 165–6.
- 17 Turan 1961; Yıldırım 2008.
- 18 Akdağ 1945; Cezar 1965: 86–98, 154; Yıldırım 2008.

- 19 Cezar 1963: 155–65; Yücel 1988: *Kitâb-ı Mesâlibi'l Müslimîn*, 99–100.  
20 Turan 1961: 13–14, 107.  
21 Âli 2000: III, 689; cf. Yücel 1988: *Kitâb-ı Müstetâb*, 11.  
22 İnalçık 1972.  
23 Özel 2004: 125–6; McGowan 1981: 45–79; İnalçık 1994. Cf. Tabak 2008 for a Mediterranean perspective on such developments.  
24 Özel 2004; cf. Gündüz 2009: 61.  
25 Cook 1972: 37–8; Özel 1993: 76–9; Öz 1999: 190–3.  
26 Cook 1972; Öz 1999; İslamoğlu-İnan 1994.  
27 Gümüüşçü 2004; cf. Hütteroth 2005, 2006.  
28 Peçevi 1981: II, 145–6, 216–18; Hezarfen 2002; Adanır 1998: 304–8.  
29 Kafadar 1997–8: 44; Yıldırım 2008.  
30 Soyudoğan 2005: 16–20.  
31 For a recent re-evaluation of dissent and popular rebellions in the Ottoman empire, see Barkey 2008: 154ff.  
32 Cezar 1965: 86–98; Cook 1972: 34–7; Koç 2005.  
33 Cf. Cook 1972: 34–7, and, for the 1480s, Tansel 1966: 25–6, 33, 36–8.  
34 Arıcanlı and Kafadar 1990.  
35 Koç 2005; cf. Kafadar 1997–8: 53–4.  
36 Akdağ 1963: 85–107.  
37 Jennings, 1980; cf. Cezar 1965: 166–7.  
38 Cook 1972: 32–3.  
39 Akdağ 1966: 205–7.  
40 *Koca Sinan Paşa telhisleri* 2004; Âli 2000, III: 541.  
41 Peçevi 1981: II, 231–2; 239–42, 257.  
42 İnalçık 1965a; cf. Uluçay 1944: 208–14.  
43 Topçular Kâtibi 2003, I: 353.  
44 *Koca Sinan Paşa telhisleri* 2004: 131, 165–6.  
45 Akdağ 1963: 185–6; İnalçık 1972; cf. Faroqhi 1986b.  
46 White 2008: esp. 214ff.  
47 Andıç and Andıç 2006.  
48 Cook 1972: 41–3.  
49 *Celali* historiography rarely considers the fact that these *sipâhis* were accompanied by their peasant retainers (*cebeli*). Around 1609, there were c.12,000 *dirlik*-holders and 40,000 retainers in the Asiatic provinces (Ayn-i Ali Efendi 1979). The 1596 campaign could have produced some 50,000 fugitives of *sipahi*-related origin. On the reliability of figures given in contemporary sources, see Akdağ 1963: 183–90.  
50 Peçevi 1981: II, 188–92; Naima 2007: I, 121–2; Topçular Kâtibi 2003: I, 344–5.  
51 Griswold 1983: 24ff.  
52 Topkapı Sarayı Archive, Istanbul R 1943 (Karayazıcı's letter); TSMA E6085 (Nasuh Paşa's letter). For access to these documents, I am most grateful to Günhan Börekçi. See also Andreasyan 1962–3: 36–7; White 2008: 244–5.  
53 Griswold 1983: 240–3; Barkey 1994: 189–91.  
54 Naima 2007: II, 691; Griswold 1983: 110–56.  
55 Özel 2005: 68–9.  
56 Griswold 1983: 157ff.; Safi 2003: II, 53–86.  
57 Akdağ 1964; Griswold 1983: esp. 39–55.  
58 Peçevi 1981: II, 239; Topçular Kâtibi 2003: I, 344–5, 458, 508. Cf. Akdağ 1963: 250–6; Darling 1996: 163.  
59 Safi 2003: II, 86; cf. Topçular Kâtibi 2003: I, 503–4. Murphey 2005: 79–81.  
60 Naima 2007: II, 538.  
61 Peçevi 1981: II, 365–85; Naima 2007: II, 498ff., 538–57, 609–15, 792–7. For an analysis of the historiography of Abaza Mehmed Paşa's rebellion, see Piterberg 2003.  
62 Selçuk 2008.

- 63 Naima 2007: II, 540, 632, 639, 779, 945; Murphey 1984: 4–5.  
64 Akdağ 1966; Zak'aria 2003: 57; Andreasyan, 1962–3.  
65 Akdağ 1966: 234–40; Silahdar Mehmed (n.d.).  
66 Özel 2005: 68–9; *Koçi Bey risalesi* 1939: 42.  
67 Simeon 2007: 168–70, 174–5, 183, 264; Akdağ 1963: 250–7.  
68 White 2008; Hütteroth 2006: 32–5.  
69 Abou-el-Haj [1991] 2005; Öz 1997.  
70 Faroqhi 1988a, 1988b; Orbay 2004, 2007b, 2009.  
71 Abou-el-Haj [1991] 2005; Howard 1988; Tezcan 2002; Piterberg 2003.  
72 McGowan 1981; Darling 1997.  
73 See esp. Kiel 1990; Özel 2004; Öz 1993, 1999, 2004–5; Gökçe 2005. For sample published *avarız* registers, see Ünal 1997; Öz and Acun 2008.  
74 See e.g. Naima 2007: II, 808–9; Simeon 2007: 309–10; Andreasyan 1962–3: 29; Yücel 1988: *Kitab-i Müstetab*, 17, 20; *Koçi Bey risalesi* 1939: 48–50, 96; Özel 1993: 195–6.  
75 Akdağ 1963: 251–2.  
76 Börekçi 2010: 28–9.  
77 Canbakal 2007: 29.  
78 Katip Çelebi 1863–4: 127; cf. Akdağ 1963: 254.  
79 Simeon 2007: 60, 271–3, 277–8; Andreasyan 1962–3: 27–9.  
80 Evliya Çelebi [1314] 1896–7: II, 182–5.  
81 Roe (n.d. [1740]): 66–7; cf. Zinkeisen 1855: 784; Hütteroth 1968: 202; Arıcanlı and Kafadar 1990: 13–14.  
82 Griswold 1983: 172–3.  
83 Özel 2004, 2005; Öz 1999, 2004–5.  
84 BOA: MAD 614. I am grateful to Dr Özer Küpeli of Ege University for allowing me to consult his unpublished article on this register.  
85 Özel 1993: 199–200; cf. Akdağ 1963: 252–4.  
86 Gökçe 2000: 44, 46, 95–6.  
87 Özel 1993: 138–9; cf. Koç 2005: 1961–70.  
88 Hütteroth 1968: 184–5.  
89 For earlier works referring to 're nomadization' during this period, see Hütteroth 1968: 163–208; Faroqhi 1976: 298; Özel 1993: 193–4, 208; Öz 1999.  
90 Kafadar 2007: 17.  
91 Survey registers dated 1580 suggest that, in Zulkadriye (Maraş) and Aleppo provinces, the tribal nomadic elements constituted more than half of the total population (Murphey 1984: 5–6).  
92 For expansion of small settlements and gradual sedentarization of tribal elements in some of these areas during the sixteenth century, see Hütteroth 2005: 62–3; İnalçık 1994: 11–43.  
93 White 2008: 268ff.  
94 Hütteroth 2006: 32–5; İnalçık 1994: 155–78.  
95 Hütteroth 2006; Adanır 1998.  
96 Hütteroth 2006: 36–7; Güçer 1964; Orbay 2009. The destructive effects of drought and famine on crop patterns and daily lives of peasants in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century empire are often mentioned in local studies.  
97 See Ambraseys and Finkel 1995. For climatic fluctuations, often referred to as part of the 'little Ice Age', see Goldstone 1991; White 2008.  
98 Özel 2004.  
99 Özel 1993: 158–60.  
100 Özel 2005.  
101 Faroqhi 1988a; Orbay 2009.  
102 Orhonlu 1970: 30–34; *Koca Sinan Paşa Telhisleri* 2004: *passim*.  
103 BOA, Mühimme Defteri (Zeyl) 9: 74/210; cf. Özel 1993: 162, n. 67.  
104 Howard 1988: 222; cf. Ayn-i Ali Efendi 1979; *Koçi Bey risalesi* 1939.

- 105 İnalçık 1980a; on absentee-governorship and *iltizam* in Ayntab, see Kunt 1983; Canbakal 2007: 51–3.
- 106 Darling, 1996: 122ff.; Adanır 1998: 296–7. Cf. Salzmänn 2004.
- 107 Özel 1993; cf. Akdağ 1966: 211–12.
- 108 Radušev *et al.* 2003.
- 109 Özel 1993: 185, 199–200.
- 110 McGowan 1981: 62ff.
- 111 İslamoğlu-İnan 1994; Faroqhi 1994: 411–623; Faroqhi 1996; Barkey 1994.
- 112 Barkey’s somewhat ahistoric and chronologically vague argument on state-making or ‘centralization’ in the *celali* context is less convincing but deserves separate study.
- 113 Cf. Griswold 1983: 22, who emphasizes the ‘depth of despair in Anatolia and the extraordinary spiritual malaise and physical poverty epidemic in the peninsula’.
- 114 Andıç and Andıç 2006; cf. Adanır 1998: 303–8.
- 115 Cook 1972: 34; cf. Akdağ 1958: 87; Akdağ 1963: 250.
- 116 Goldstone 1991; cf. Faroqhi 1996.
- 117 Faroqhi 1996: 103.
- 118 Cf. Barkey 1994: 183–4.
- 119 Faroqhi 1996: 114–15.
- 120 Barkey 1994: 22.
- 121 Tezcan 2009b, 2010; see also Aksan 1998: 24, 28; Yaycıoğlu 2008.
- 122 Cook 1972: 40. For similar developments in the Ottoman Balkans during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, see Adanır 1998: 306–8; Moutaftchieva 2005.
- 123 Soyudoğan 2005: 15–20.
- 124 In areas such as the province of Karaman, however, one might expect that the agricultural crisis, drought and famine of the late sixteenth century did not differentiate much between nomads and peasants. See White 2008: 150ff.
- 125 E.g. Cennetoğlu, who is said to have appeared as the defender of peasants in the province of Aydın in the 1620s (Uluçay 1944: 23–33).
- 126 Cf. Barkey 1994: 8.
- 127 Peçevi 1981: II, 231–2.
- 128 Faroqhi 1992; Adanır 1998: 304.
- 129 Naima 2007: II, 641, 724.
- 130 Akdağ 1966: 208.
- 131 Peçevi 1981: II, 246–7, on attitudes to *celali* troops in the 1604 campaign.
- 132 Cf. Adanır 1998: 303–8; Reid 1998–2000.