


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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND SPORT

Paul Davis

Introduction

Philosophy of mind is a vast subject, covering the criss-crossing areas of consciousness, subjectivity, personhood, personal identity, thought, cognition, action, emotion, free will and responsibility, transcendence, authenticity and death. It has interfaces with, *inter alia*, psychology, philosophy of psychology, moral philosophy, philosophy of language, theories of human nature, philosophy of religion, feminism and the philosophy of sport. Luminaries and major influences include Plato, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Hegel, Spinoza, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Davidson, Putnam, Lewis, Strawson, Nagel, Searle, Dennett, Flanagan, Chalmers, Clark and Hurley.

Nagel advises that 'philosophy is not like a particular language. Its sources are preverbal and often pre-cultural, and one of its most difficult tasks is to express unformed but intuitively felt problems in language without losing them' (Nagel 1986: 11). Stephen Priest (1991) expresses such intuitively felt problems about the mind by offering two sets of predicates, one tacitly implied in calling something 'mental' and the other tacitly implied in calling something 'physical'. Priest does not mean to suggest that 'all are correctly implied or that all of them are implied in all people's usage, only that many are implied in many people's usage' (Priest 1991: 212). Those in the former, mental set include temporal, private, incorrigible, internal, one, free, active, I, sacred, indivisible, unextended, without shape, invisible, intentional and subjective; those in the latter, physical set include spatiotemporal, public, corrigible, external, many, determined, passive, other, profane, divisible, extended, with shape, visible, non-intentional and objective.

This chapter first outlines some approaches in the philosophy of mind, before proceeding to some of their manifestations in the philosophy of sport.

Dualism

If dualism is true, the implications of many people's language use to which Priest avers are largely correct. Dualism is the theory that there are two and only two kinds of stuff: physical stuff, which is extended in space and is the bearer of physical properties, and mental stuff, which is unextended and is the bearer of mental properties. The physical and mental are irreducibly

different. For dualism, a person is a mind and a body, although most dualists hold that a person is essentially a mind and merely has a body. If this is true, it is logically possible that a person continues to exist after their body has ceased to exist.

Dualism's most vaunted proponents are Plato and Descartes. For each, the person, again, is identified with the immaterial soul, which contingently *has* a body. Plato, indeed, champions physical education ultimately for the health of the immaterial soul (Reid 2007).

The most celebrated of Plato's arguments for dualism is probably the recollection argument, which is that the knowledge we have is recollection of what we were acquainted with in a prenatal state. This is dialectically continuous with Plato's theory of forms, which is that the world of sensible particulars is an approximation to perfect, quasi-mathematical, non-spatiotemporal universals, which are, in turn, the only genuine objects of knowledge. Christianity is routinely taken to have imported Plato's dualism, including his hostility to the flesh.

The best known of Descartes' dualist arguments is an epistemological one, elicited by Descartes' method of radical doubt: I can doubt that my body exists but I cannot doubt that I exist, therefore I am not my body. Another, the argument from conceivability, is dialectically equivalent but invokes the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct ideas: to form a clear and distinct idea of myself, I do not need to think of my body and to form a clear and distinct idea of my body I do not need to think of myself, therefore my mind and body are distinct. Descartes' conclusion that he is essentially a thinking thing – an immaterial mind – is expressed in his famous *cogito*: 'I think, therefore I am'. For Descartes, there is something it is like for human beings to be hungry, in pain, and so on, and we are acquainted with this immediately and from the inside, as opposed to discovery through observation.

The most prominent objection to dualism focuses on the putative causal interaction between extended material stuff and unextended immaterial stuff: how can states of something immaterial bring about states of something material, and vice versa?

It might be, however, that this objection is not the anti-dualist *coup de grace* perfunctorily assumed. Reality cannot be intelligible through and through. Explanations need to terminate in unexplained states of affairs ('brute facts') and there is no *a priori* reason why the dualist's psychophysical interaction could not be one of them. On Hume's doctrine of causation, indeed, no causal connection is 'intelligible', for it makes no sense to posit any sort of necessary connection between cause and effect. And even if we do – as we surely should – acknowledge a disturbing oddity in the notion of a very precise set of physical processes uniquely generating immaterial states, it is not obvious that such causal relations would be more mysterious than some accepted or entertained, or that there is a less problematic alternative.

Moreover, it might be that the most powerful reasons for entertaining dualism do not involve any of the more ambitious Platonic or Cartesian architecture or arguments but are the quotidian grounds of consciousness, intentionality and rational thought. According to a landmark definition, something is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be the thing, *for the thing*. And intentionality is the 'about-ness' of many mental states, for example hoping *that*, believing *that*. How could either of those properties of the mental be physical in nature? (Where are they located?) And how could rational thought be reduced to the behaviour of any set of physical processes? The first of those grounds inscribes Sorrell's 'innocent Cartesianism', defined by: (i) the idea that there is essentially something it is like to have sensations; (ii) that the best way of understanding some mental states may be by reference to what it is like to be in them; and (iii) modesty in claims about the intelligibility through theory of mind-body union (Sorrell 2005: 93–4).

Materialism

Monism is the theory that only one type of stuff exists. One version is materialism (also called ‘physicalism’), the theory that all that exists is physical. Mental states are therefore physical states. Materialism too has a distinguished history, stretching back to at least the fourth-century BC and Democritus, who believed that everything that exists is composed of indivisible physical objects he called ‘atoms’. Sixteenth-century English philosopher Hobbes also believed everything that exists is finally physical in nature. His argument is significant for its consequences for the nature of persons and the resultant intelligibility of posthumous personal survival. He argued that if we talk about a soul travelling or burning, for instance, we are talking about a process whose intelligibility depends upon its happening to something physical. This motif can be applied also to the question of how immaterial persons could be individuated and distinguished: if John and Tom are each divested of material properties, then ‘where’ (spatial language again) does Tom end and John begin, and how does one know that one is talking to John and not Tom? (And how can they even talk or hear?)

Modern materialism’s simplest version is the mind–brain identity theory, which proposes contingent psychophysical identities (for example, ‘pain = c-fibre stimulation’) for ‘occurrent states’. The identities are considered contingent because the mental term does not *mean* the same as its physical co-referent but picks out the same, essentially physical thing. Kripke (1980) challenges the notion of a contingent identity and asserts, moreover, that the essential nature of a state such as pain is how it feels to the subject (compare Sorrell) and not an observable physical state.

The mind–brain identity theory offers a dispositional analysis of intentional states (such as beliefs), which it casts as actual or potential behaviour; for example, to believe that it is raining is to be disposed to take one’s umbrella if one goes out. This account echoes Ryle’s (1949) landmark treatment, typically known as behaviourism (although he disliked the label), which rejects the so-called ‘ghost in the machine’ and argues instead that mental concepts logically refer to dispositions to behave in certain ways. In a more complex version of materialism known as anomalous monism, Davidson (1980) rejects an exhaustively dispositional account of intentional states on the ground that any such reduction always needs an irreducibly mental remainder (for example: ‘provided he notices that ...’).

Anomalous monism sees mental states as physical states but holds that there are no laws on the basis of which mental phenomena can be explained or predicted. Psychophysical identities are not type–type but token–token and the causal laws which finally subsume the mental are to be found at the level of the physical. This has elicited the objection that in anomalous monism, the mental *as mental* does no causal work, expunging the mental of the autonomy and efficacy which Davidson wishes to preserve.

The principal objections to materialism are, again, the oddity of conceiving consciousness, intentionality and rational thought as physical in nature.

Idealism

Idealism is the monist theory that all that exists is mental. Therefore, the world that we take as physical is essentially a manifestation of the mental. Its two most eminent exponents are Hegel and Berkeley.

Hegel proposed that reality is a historical process in which spirit (*Geist*), which can be taken as consciousness, goes through a series of phases of increasing self-knowledge, culminating in complete knowledge of itself. He sees the ‘world spirit’ manifest in historical epochs such as the

'Greek world', 'Roman world' and 'German world'. In religion, spirit comes close to self-knowledge but falls short because of its reliance on image and analogy. It is the role of Hegelian philosophy *inter alia* to close this gap. In absolute knowing, reality is self-consciousness: consciousness and what exists are absolutely identical.

Hegel's system is dense, complex, and contentious. However, he arguably has substantial importance for the philosophy of mind through his recognition of the social and historical aspects of consciousness, which may be cast also as recognition of intimate connections between subjectivity and objectivity. The idea that consciousness is social and historical (as well as cultural and political) defines later thinkers, such as Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault and Bourdieu, and has significant influence on discussions within the philosophy of sport.

The key move in Berkeley's idealism is his definition of physical objects as 'collections of ideas', which he reaches via shrewd criticism of his predecessor Locke. To exist is to be perceived (*'esse est percipi'*). God assures the regularity and coherence of our perceptions, Himself perceiving everything at all times.

Berkeley's recourse to God has a 'rabbit in the hat' quality. Also, he seems to confuse the vehicle and object of perception: we need mental content to perceive physical objects but does it follow that the physical objects are themselves mental content?

Double-aspect theory

Double-aspect theory is the theory that the mental and physical are properties of an underlying reality which is neither mental nor physical. Seventeenth-century philosopher Spinoza is one exponent, arguing that consciousness and size are the two aspects of one substance, which can be thought of as God under its conscious aspect and nature under its extended aspect.

Twentieth-century philosopher Russell proposed that the mental and physical are secondary to the more fundamental category of events (neutral monism). Mental events are events in the brain but can also be subsumed under psychological laws for the purpose of psychological explanation. They are intrinsically neither mental nor physical. These categories would be supplanted in a completed science by causal laws concerning events.

To accept that things happen but not to anything, for example, something physical or mental, is monstrously counterintuitive (albeit that would not falsify it). Also, Russell (1970: 292) argues that what we ordinarily perceive is a part of our own brain, which exposes him to an objection which echoes that faced by Berkeley: we might need our brains to perceive but is it our brains we are perceiving? (And what if we could perceive our brains on a screen? Is that perception of one's brain another part of one's brain?)

A more recent exponent of double-aspect theory is Strawson (1959). Here, the concept of the *person* is given logical primacy, with priority for neither the mental nor physical. The subject of consciousness is the whole person, which is essentially something to which mental and physical properties are equally applicable. Moreover, we may identify persons only if we can identify their bodies, and one can ascribe states of consciousness to one's self only if we can ascribe them to others. This echoes Wittgenstein's (1953: 243–358) private language argument – routinely regarded as a refutation of the preceding Cartesian model of human mental states – according to which the identification of conscious states in one's own case requires a public background ('an inner process stands in need of outward criteria'), otherwise the distinction between getting it right and merely seeming to get it right disappears. Strawson illustrates the nuances of his own position in the case of depression: there could not be depression if it was never shown but, equally, there could not be depression if it was never felt. Both first-person experience and third-person behavioural criteria are necessary for the concept to have a use.

Strawson takes questions about subjectivity and objectivity to be prior the traditional mind–body problem. This carries echoes of Hegel, noted above, and phenomenologists such as Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, which are discussed below.

Personhood, emotion, language and value

The (corporeal) person enjoys equivalent primacy in the work of Charles Taylor (1985, 1989). Here, it also has a normative import, in turn structurally related to human emotion, language, agency, intersubjectivity and a specifically human consciousness defined by the capacity for ‘strong evaluation’; that is, the articulation of the value attaching to our emotions, desires and volitions. This articulation may express affirmation or rejection of these emotions, desires and volitions, betraying commitment to the sort of person one is or wishes to become.

Sports philosopher McNamee (2008: 28–39) tries to iron out what he sees as a wrinkle or two in Taylor’s approach. For instance, is self-understanding and self-evaluation as strongly linked to articulacy as Taylor makes out? Might emotions genuinely open one’s conception of the good life, but without particularly robust, self-aware articulation? There are consequences for sport, some of which get mileage later.

Functionalism and cognitivism

Functionalism is an approach which has had huge influence in recent years. It is the theory that a mental state is a functional state, individuated or picked out through its causal relations. For instance, a sensory input and behavioural output may be the respective cause and effect of a mental state, which is therefore identified through this cause and effect. (Mental states are also causally related to one another.) This definition obviously allows for unconscious mental states, to which functionalists are hospitable. It also allows for a range of ontologies of the mind; it is consistent with, for instance, dualism and materialism, since it is noncommittal with regard to the kind of stuff in which its functional states are realised. There are two sources of functionalism. One is the mind–brain identity theorist Armstrong (1980), who accepts the behaviourist connection between the mental and behaviour but denies that it is identity. Instead, mental states are the cause of behaviour. The other source is the development of artificial intelligence, which led Alan Turing (1950) to develop his ‘Turing test’ of intelligence: if one asks a human and a computer a set of questions, without being able to see either, then inability to distinguish the sources of the answers means that the computer is intelligent.

The immediately preceding idea generated cognitivism, sometimes called strong artificial intelligence, which is the theory that running a program is sufficient for having a mind. This was challenged by Searle (1981) in his Chinese room experiment. Here, a non-Chinese speaker sits in a room following a program in his own language, which tells him which answers, written in Chinese, to send out for each Chinese question sent in to him. He matches the input questions and output answers perfectly. But he has no idea what they are about. Therefore, there is, Searle asserts, no genuine intentionality in the Chinese room but only a simulacrum, which might serve purposes that we have. Searle thinks this demonstrates that running a program is not sufficient for having a mind. (For Searle, the biology of the brain matters, challenging the ontological neutrality of functionalism, and results in his approach being called biological naturalism.) The most popular counter-argument is the systems reply, which deems that complexity matters: if we make the system much more complex, then genuine mentality emerges out of the set of subsystems. This idea inscribes Dennett’s (1991) and Flanagan’s (1992) book-length treatments of consciousness.

A more fundamental problem with functionalism might be that it downplays the subjective, experiential aspect of mental states. For instance, could pain play its functional role if it did not hurt?

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is heterogeneous but is fairly conceived as an enquiry into essences, an attempt to return, in Husserl's slogan, 'to the things themselves'. Phenomenology asks what it is like to be human for the human. Husserl is usually regarded as the first phenomenologist. His approach is primarily descriptive, prescribing 'bracketing' ('*epoche*') of ourselves from the natural world and of our 'natural' beliefs about the latter (for example, its objective reality) in order to uncover, by 'transcendental reduction', a presuppositionless description of the contents of experience – a pure transcendental consciousness. This project echoes Hegel's attempt to describe consciousness (*Geist*) just as it appears to consciousness.

Some regard Husserl's 'pure transcendental' consciousness unattainable, because of the preceding dependence of consciousness upon more objective features. (Sociologically inclined phenomenologists are among them, as we see later.) This pressured Husserl to reorient towards a theory of intersubjectivity using the concept of the *Lebenswelt* – the common-sense life-world of everyday experience. The preceding concept of intentionality ('about-ness') is also key to Husserlian phenomenology, casting human subjectivity as essentially directed outwards towards something other than itself. Heidegger strengthens this perspective by defining the human being, *Dasein*, as 'being in the world', entailing that description of the contents of consciousness is fundamentally interpretative, in turn precluding the Husserlian ambition of 'bracketing'. Heidegger's approach is therefore sometimes called 'hermeneutic phenomenology'.

Existential phenomenology, articulated in Sartre, De Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, responds to a putative limitation in Heidegger by centralising the body in human experience. Here, man is a 'body-subject' or incarnate consciousness. Where Husserl focuses upon the intentionality of the mind, Merleau-Ponty highlights the intentionality of the body: 'my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is ... a spatiality of situation' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 114–15).

The supersized mind

Our trajectory so far starts with a putatively individual, immaterial, thinking consciousness, before enlistment of the brain, organism, person, other persons and the environment (including social and cultural elements). A recent approach to cognition extends this trajectory in an intriguing way. Influenced by recent, transformative technological developments, it is defined by the parity principle, which is that,

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process.

(Clark 2008: 222)

Therefore, props such as computers, phones and apps are part of the cognitive process and not mere causes of it. If the parity principle is sound, then a notebook in which a goalkeeper keeps notes of opponents' penalty-taking habits is part of the cognitive process, since we would immediately deem 'straight' memorising part of the cognitive process. The equivalent applies

to ‘epistemic actions’ (Clark 2008: 222): the golfer’s simulation of a putt (not Clark’s example) is part of the cognitive process, since we would count purely private rehearsals and re-rehearsals in the same way. The parity principle is therefore known as the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) or simply EXTENDED. It is challenged by those who think it goes too far and by those who think it does not go far enough. The former adhere to the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC), which in turn divides into BRAINBOUND (Adams and Aizawa 2001) and ORGANISMBOUND (Rupert 2004). The latter champion the cognitive significance of cultural practices (Hutchins 2011) (among which is sport). Clark (2011) has pleaded guilty to neglect of culture’s cognitive significance.

Emotion and strong evaluation in sport

Sport is apt for strong evaluation. Emotions, desires and volitions around sport may be interrogated and subsequently affirmed, modified or rejected. The recent flowering of alternative sport forms (sometimes called ‘lifestyle’ sports), for instance, results in part from rejection of putative psychological, emotional and ideological characteristics of conventional sport; for example, hyper-competitiveness, hypermasculinity, and a mechanistic paradigm. The extent, however, to which such evaluation must be articulated is, again, a moot point.

Many debates within the philosophy of sport are undetachable from strong evaluation. For instance, McNamee (2007) challenges the affirmation of the ‘genetically modified athlete’ (see Miah 2004). He asks: (i) How much attention should we devote to our bodies in the effort to optimise our capacities? (ii) How much control should we allow physicians to exercise over our bodies? (iii) What ends should determine what counts as a sufficiently healthy body? (iv) What limits should we observe in our efforts to improve our bodily performance and remove causes of suffering? (ibid: 191) These questions are obviously key to the question of performance-enhancing drugs too.

Sportspersonship is also undetachable in McNamee’s (2008: 37–9) view from strong evaluation. It is exemplified by the ‘athlete, player or contestant who is able to act in ways that are either: (1) the effects of strong evaluation; or (2) the product of strong evaluation’ (ibid: 37). Again, McNamee moderates the importance of articulacy, therefore allowing that young children and those of very limited capacity for self-critical awareness can be credited with sportspersonship. Indeed, McNamee relates an autobiographical anecdote which reinforces the aptness of emotion for rational evaluation and the perils of setting the bar of strong evaluation too high: invited to an international competition festival in the West of Norway for disability skiers, he found that pity for the athletes figured among his emotions. However, disability sport colleagues instructed him out of that emotion on the ground that it implied a wrongly privileged position of himself as able-bodied. Moreover, the disability skiers McNamee saw are, he asserts, capable of sportspersonship – ‘they may have appreciated, recognised, taken on board the exemplars of courageous, honest, tenacious competitors and imitated their conduct so as to make it their own’ (ibid: 38).

Fry (2003) also aligns himself with the preceding cognitivist view of emotion. We can, like McNamee (above), change our emotions by changing our evaluations of the relevant objects; conversely, we can ‘talk ourselves into’ emotions which do not tally with our sincere view of the object. Therefore, we can embody a lack of emotional integrity. Fry (2003) offers several examples from sport. The first concerns gymnastics coach Bela Karolyi, who, according to Joan Ryan, routinely feigned emotion by dramatically throwing tantrums over one’s gymnast’s score in the hope of influencing the score of the next (Ryan 1995: 199). These emotions were feigned – if Ryan is right – because Karolyi did not share the evaluative judgement constitutive

of the genuine emotion. The second involves Knute Rockne, coach of American football at the University of Notre Dame. Before a game in 1922, he pulled a crumpled telegraph message from his pocket and lied that it was from his 'hospitalised and very ill' son (and team mascot) and contained the plea 'Please win this game for my Daddy'. Notre Dame won the match and were debriefed at an Indiana train station by a rudely healthy Billy Rockne rushing up to greet them. The third involves the same coach and the 'win for the Gipper' speech. George Gipp was a former Notre Dame player and the speech, given at halftime in a game against the army eight years after his death, supposedly sketches a poignant deathbed scene between Rockne and Gipp. The players who heard Rockne's speech became feverish. Rockne, however, was not present at Gipp's death and we do not know if the purported conversation between Rockne and Gipp took place. Coherence is absent at several levels: reality versus story, truth versus evaluative judgement, and possibly actual mental state versus feigned emotion.

Fry notes too that equivalent questions of emotional integrity apply to athletes who work themselves into hatred or anger towards opponents. To that one might add sport fans who cultivate a (culturally sponsored) poison and spite towards opposition players, fans, towns, countries, and so on.

Fry's final examples involve the intent of eliciting emotions of self-assessment, such as shame, guilt, humiliation and pride. By Ryan's preceding account, gymnastics coach Karolyi once gripped a pupil by the back of the neck and walked her to her mother's car, calling her 'pathetic' and 'no good'; called another a 'pregnant cow' as she began puberty; called another a 'pregnant spider'; and called another on 'overstuffed Christmas turkey'. Ryan accounts for this behaviour simply: it got results. Numerous hopefuls left 'disillusioned and often broken' (Ryan 1995: 206). Fry argues that while there might be a proper place for some cultivation and manipulation of emotion, such as positive imaging, encouragement and measured criticism, the preceding examples are unacceptable, since they involve 'a shallowness, which itself displays a lack of integrity' (Fry 2003: 33).

Consciousness in sport performance

Consciousness is, again, a key topic in the philosophy of mind, with functionalism in particular enthusiastic about unconscious mental processes. Particular ideas and contributions, for example Ryle's dispositional treatment, Polanyi's theory of tacit know-how, Dreyfus' model of skill development, theories of 'being in the zone', 'peak experience' and the flow theories of Csikszentmihalyi and Jackson (1999) dovetail with this perspective and suggest that, at the elite level in particular, there is no room for conscious thinking. McNamee (2008: 31) touches on the implausibility of this, and Breivik (2013), following Birch (2011), argues that the truth is much more complex and involves elite athletes who are conscious and consciously thinking during performance. Breivik powerfully argues, specifically, that: (1) conscious and deliberate practice goes on at the expert level; (2) decisions about 'next moves' can be made consciously or unconsciously, with pivotal decisions sometimes accompanied by a heightened consciousness; (3) conscious attention counters the hazards (such as self-indulgence) of the 'flow'; (4) in some sports there are attentional control points that need to be regularly checked; for example, in river kayaking, one needs to look for waterfalls and drops; (5) elite athletes often have crucial mental pictures of movements ('gestalts') and recognise the 'proper feeling' when they conform to it; and (6) when athletes go on 'automatic pilot', consciousness moves to a higher level, overseeing patterns and decisions. Breivik's treatment in fact echoes Sutton's (2007) compelling account of the diffuse saliences of consciousness for batting in cricket. The former concludes that 'the feeling of what it is like to give a good performance ... is one of the most

phenomenal feelings one can have' (ibid: 104). In this, Breivik slightly outruns Arnold's observation that 'each sport's own distinctive structure offers different experiential possibilities, e.g. contrast tennis and cycling; for many competitors, these awakening and excitatory psychosomatic rhythms become part of the contest's intrinsic enjoyment' (Arnold 1985: 6).

The immediately preceding discussion reflects some key discussions in the philosophy of mind, evoking (among others) Descartes, Wittgenstein and Dennett.

Phenomenology in the philosophy of sport

Klaus Meier laments in a seminal philosophy of sport anthology (Morgan and Meier 1988) that 'the philosophy of sport is replete, both in theory and practice, with implicit and explicit affirmations of Cartesian dualism, despite occasional assertions to the contrary' (ibid: 97). He, in turn, elevates the method of (existential) phenomenological analysis and the figure of one of its seminal exponents, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Twenty-three years later, an issue of *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy* (in 2011) is devoted to phenomenology and dotted with Merleau-Ponty, as well as early phenomenological co-excavators Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. (For brief summary of phenomenology's strands and illustrations of their applications to sport and physical culture, see Allen-Collinson 2011: 300–3.) Studies within sport and physical culture influenced by the approach include Morley's (2001) study of breath control in yoga and Moe's (2004) exploration of the processes of skill acquisition in sport. And the title of Nesti's (2011) essay in the 'phenomenology' issue of *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy* paraphrases Husserl's imperative about the 'things themselves'.

Breivik (2008) details Heidegger's conception of being in the world and asserts its preceding putative limitation. The human subject is tied to the world in a primordial manner ('originary transcendence'), the most primary of which is 'the practical mode where things are discovered in their functionality or instrumentality' (ibid: 340). Heidegger writes that 'in our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement' (Heidegger 1962: 97). This quality of objects is their 'equipmentality'. We immediately see whether things can be used for some purpose. This quality in objects is sometimes called their 'affordances' and is, according to Gibson, what an infant begins by noticing (Gibson 1986: 134). Heidegger's next step is to observe the contextual quality of equipmentality, by which a piece of equipment is dependent upon 'a totality of equipment' (Heidegger 1962: 97). This entails an outward reference to an equipment structure, such as 'ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room' (ibid: 97). Breivik illustrates this in the case of football:

In the street the football pitch refers to the uneven loosely demarcated field, the improvised goal posts, the players on the two teams. From this ... we can move up to the ... Champions' League game ... But in both cases the football itself ... is meaningless unless understood in relation to other pieces of equipment, to feet and goal posts, in a larger reference structure.

(Breivik 2008: 340–1)

Heidegger's next step is to show how equipmentality is constituted essentially in relation to a practice. For instance, the carpenter uses the hammer to hammer in nails to fasten the planks, and so on, and to finish the house so that people can live the life they want. We end up with the deepest life goals (*Sorge*). Heidegger's picture of instrumental justification in the ultimate service of intrinsically valuable goods echoes Aristotle centuries earlier (Aristotle 1998: I.1), and finds echo in the philosophy of sport through Suits' reflections on sport, leisure and seriousness

(Morgan and Meier 1988: 46–8). Breivik again reinforces the point with an example from football:

The football ... goalposts ... corner poles, the other players and so on get their meaning ... as part of the practice of playing football. The football player kicks the ball *in order to* pass it to the other players ... *in order to* get closer to the opponent's goal ... *in order to* score more goals than the opposing team ... *in order to* win the match ... *in order to* become the best team over a season, *in order to* succeed in a career as a football player, *in order to* lead a good life.

(Breivik 2008: 341)

Heidegger and his inflections of phenomenology have formidable influence in the philosophy of sport. Prior to the immediately preceding tribute, Breivik offers a critical examination of the application of Heidegger's views on skilful coping to everyday life and sport (Breivik 2007). The same contributor offers a Heideggerian analysis of skydiving, which sees it as a condition of 'being in the void' (Breivik 2010) and sustains his Heideggerian bent in taking us towards a phenomenology of risk sports (Breivik 2011). Again, the preceding issue of *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy* contains an essay by Irena Martinková (2011) on Heidegger and human movement, and hermeneutic phenomenology is employed by Ryba (2008) to examine young athletes' experiences of figure skating. The Heideggerian Dreyfus, in turn, figures in Breivik (2007) and Moe's (2005) critique of cognitivism in sport, to which we return.

The deficit in Heidegger's analysis, as Breivik (2008: 341–2) asserts, is the concrete human body, which presents itself only indirectly. Heidegger describes how the hammer is possible only against the background of purposes, 'but he does not discuss how the hand that holds the hammer likewise is possible only on the background of a body with its postures, capacities and tasks' (ibid: 341). Breivik sees a double background: a bodily *Dasein* and a world of equipmentality. Extending his football illustration, Breivik notes that it is not enough to document the in-order-to references of purposes and goals but that it is 'also necessary to take notice of the foot as part of a body with its structure, postures and capacities' (ibid: 341). Breivik urges that the body is discovered equiprimordially with the world.

This is where existential phenomenology comes in. As Meier puts it,

man's mode of insertion into the world is the body; it is his foundation in existence ... The body is not simply another object in the world, rather it is 'an anchorage in the world'; it is man's mode of communication and interaction with it.

(Morgan and Meier 1988: 96)

Breivik illuminates with another football illustration: players' movements and positions are defined by the movements of the ball and other players, and good players can read the situation before the ball is played (Breivik 2008: 342). This species of engagement leads Merleau-Ponty to talk of 'motor intentionality', a dynamic attitude in which it sometimes feels as if the task to be performed autonomously generates the action. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty considers that we 'transcend into' equipment, a characterisation recognisable to the elite sport performer, described by Breivik as 'totally unified with their equipment' (ibid: 344). The epistemic ramifications of wielding a tennis racket figure in a Merleau-Ponty-seasoned essay (Morris 2002).

Yet, for Merleau-Ponty, the body in a sense disappears: it is 'the darkness needed in theatre to show up the performance' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 115). The body is the 'silent cogito'. And this might signpost a limitation, of interest to sport philosophers particularly, in

Merleau-Ponty's oeuvre. Shusterman has pointed out that Merleau-Ponty has very little to say about conscious somatic sensations, such as kinaesthetic or proprioceptive feelings (Shusterman 2005: 151). Neglect of these would be an oversight for the philosophy of sport.

Sociologically inflected phenomenology: commerce, nation and media

Critical sociologists Hughson and Inglis (2002) had, six years before the preceding Breivik essay, moved towards a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of 'soccer play'. In the process, they affirm an augmentation of Merleau-Ponty different from and complementary to that suggested by Shusterman and Breivik. Any notion of a 'pure' phenomenological account of experience is misplaced (Hughson and Inglis 2002: 9–13). Footballers and the game of football, for instance, are 'always submerged within conditions of socioeconomic power'. Therefore, an account of power must be built into a phenomenological analysis. Hughson and Inglis acknowledge that others have already begun this augmentation. Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Bale, Eichberg and Giulianotti help Hughson and Inglis to conclude that,

the phenomenology of the soccer experience today is ... necessarily an exercise in analysis of the development of capitalism in a globalizing epoch, as much as it is concerned with the minutiae of play embodied within the corporeal frames of single players.

(Hughson and Inglis 2002: 12–13)

Hemphill (2005) alerts us to the intra-team relational quality of a footballer's on-field subjectivity, suggesting that Hughson and Inglis' 'player-body-subject' is the 'team-player-body-subject' (Hemphill 2005: 111). Hemphill also heightens Hughson and Inglis' sociological inflections of footballer phenomenology with the help of MacIntyre's (1981) practice/institution distinction and recognition of how commercial, national and media pressures might inscribe the lived subjectivity of the elite player in particular (*ibid*: 112–13). The latter pressures, indeed, might come into tension with the elite player's identity as team player.

Sociologically inflected phenomenology: gender

Another influence upon the sociological augmentation of Merleau-Ponty is Iris Marion Young (1980). Young argues, in a classic essay, that the different movement patterns and body compartments of males and females are social facts to be explained in terms of gendered power. The male is socially constituted to be the active body-subject of Merleau-Ponty's casting, while the female is socially constituted to be a passive body-object. This results in radically different ways of experiencing one's body in space and explains the fact that the male's act of throwing involves projection of the entire body into space, while the equivalent female act uses far less of a body which is not projected into space. Hughson and Inglis transfer this account to football by contrasting the heading of the typical male and female player: the former will move forward relatively fluidly to meet the ball, while the latter is liable to move awkwardly towards the ball or even avoid taking the ball on the head through an expectation of pain which the male is more liable to discount (Hughson and Inglis 2002: 10–11).

Young, Hughson and Inglis help to scaffold Allen-Collinson's (2011) feminist phenomenological treatment of the woman in the running body. Allen-Collinson swiftly distances feminist phenomenology from any 'pure' experience, by asserting, like Young, that it acknowledges 'the powerful influences and constraints of social structure upon lived experience, and the corporeal

specifics of bodies that are located in time and culture' (ibid: 299). Allen-Collinson uses a feminist sociological phenomenology to give a phenomenological account – contoured by the flagship concepts of description, epoche, reduction, essences and intentionality – of the physically and symbolically vulnerable female runner.

Phenomenology, Searle and classical cognitivism in sport

The phenomenological approach is fused with the more analytical approach of Searle in Moe's (2005) philosophical critique of classical cognitivism in sport. The computer processes information according to certain program or rule structures and cognitivism argues, again, that the human mind operates similarly. This has led to the cognitivist notion of the 'cognitive unconscious', supported within the cognitivist paradigm by contemporary research on, as Moe again puts it, 'the automaticity of perceptual-cognitive and motor skills, subliminal perception, implicit memory and hypnosis' (ibid: 162). And, again, Baars' analysis suggests that conscious processes are comparatively 'computationally inefficient', since they show a high number of errors, low speed and mutual interference when set against their unconscious counterparts (Baars 1998: 74ff.). This model has heavily influenced sport research and sport coaching. In sport psychology, the preceding conscious processes are referred to as controlled processing and the latter automatic processing. This distinction, which seemed to account for expert behaviour in terms of automatic, unconscious processes (contrast Breivik's preceding treatment of consciousness in performance), naturally became vital to sport scientists and coaches, who were concerned to understand how movements became automatic. Enter the notion of a motor programme, which can be conceived as an abstract representation, which is more sophisticated in more skilled athletes, and which fades from consciousness as the athlete reaches a certain skill level. Coaches were therefore liable to see their role involving the facilitation of unconscious motor programmes.

Moe's critique of cognitivism in sport comes down to two questions. First, do athletes process information? Second, are the intentional movements of athletes governed by motor programmes; that is, by abstract representations in the form of internalised rules or muscle commands? Moe answers that considerations from phenomenology and Searle suggest negative answers. The former considerations invoke Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Dreyfus. For Dreyfus, there is nothing in our everyday consciousness to suggest humans process atomistic bits of information. As Moe paraphrases, 'the carpenter and the soccer player experience immediately what the hammer and ball are and how they can be used, because these objects are, to quote Heidegger, "always already" an integrated part of their background' (Moe 2005: 164–5). Is the brain an information-processing device, then? Searle, again, has argued that 'information processing' is a humanly created, observer-dependent abstraction: 'a physical state of a system is a computational state only relative to the assignment to that state of some computational role, function or interpretation' (Searle 1992: 210). If Searle is right, the brain does not *intrinsically* process information.

Cognitivism might also court an infinite regress. Dreyfus offers the example of language skills: if the human is a system that processes bits of information in relation to program or rule structures,

one must not only have grammatical and semantic rules but further rules ... to recognise the context in which the rules must be applied. Thus there must be rules for recognising the situation ... But if the theory then requires further rules in order to explain how these rules are applied ... we are in an infinite regress.

(Dreyfus 1991: 203–4)

And Moe applies this insight to soccer: if cognitivism is true, then the player needs rules for how to kick and run, but also rules to show where the rules are applied, and further rules to show ... (Moe 2005: 169). Dreyfus stops the regress by situating our skills in an immediately meaningful practice and coping bodily background that cannot be rule governed. The background of Searle has affinity with the coping bodily background of the phenomenologists. The background is neurophysiologically caused and defined by Searle as 'the set of non-intentional or pre-intentional capacities that enable intentional states to function' (Searle 1995: 129). The background can, therefore, be 'causally sensitive to the forms of rules ... without actually containing any beliefs, desires or representations of those rules' (ibid: 141). Searle returns to sport, providing the case of the improving baseball player who begins by learning a set of rules, principles and strategies, and eventually 'develops skills and abilities that are ... functionally equivalent to the system of rules without ... containing any representations or internalisations of those rules' (ibid: 142).

Moe commends the marriage of phenomenology and Searle for its abolition of the cognitivist's regress, its abandonment of representation in the performance of high-level skill, and its reinforcement of the fact that embodied human beings have the tendency to get 'a maximal grip on the situation' (Moe 2005: 176–7). It is wise to juxtapose this approach with Breivik and Sutton's preceding discussions of the role of consciousness in performance.

The future

This contribution is an inevitably limited discussion of the philosophy of mind in the philosophy of sport. There are significant omissions, for example, free will (see Carr 1999 and Davis 2001), bad faith (see Culbertson 2005) and religion (see Scarpa and Carraro 2011). Of the areas covered, there is reason to expect the influence of existential phenomenology to continue. This might be particularly so in the case of its sociologically inflected applications. Commerce and gender are among the sites of exploration and might we expect to see, for instance, race and disability figure in phenomenological treatments?

The thorny status of consciousness in the philosophy of mind, alongside the preceding recent contributions to the philosophy of sport literature, probably portends further discussion of consciousness in the philosophy of sport. Slightly overlapping discussions are those defined by strong evaluation and emotion, which – naturally and healthily – never go away. Unexamined sport is, like the unexamined life, not worth it, and there is never a shortage of qualities in sport in need of the probing lens of strong evaluation.

One topic which has involved some strong evaluation in the recent literature is that of sport fandom (see, for instance, Dixon 2001; Russell 2012). One recent contribution (Mumford 2012) has also proposed a theory of unconscious mental oscillation, to account for the capacity of partisan spectators to appreciate opposition excellence and has also published a book-length treatment of watching sport (Mumford 2011). We can expect the constellation of discussions about fandom to continue apace. More specifically, a sociologically inflected phenomenology of fandom seems viable.

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