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

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A History of Intergroup Relations Research

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19 A history of intergroup relations research

John F. Dovidio, Anna-Kaisa Newheiser, and Jacques-Philippe Leyens

Because of psychology's traditional emphasis on the individual, the study of intergroup relations did not capture the sustained interest of the field until the 1930s. This chapter chronicles the history of the social psychology of intergroup relations, considering systematic social and political influences on the academic development of this scholarly topic. The chapter reviews, chronologically and intellectually, the development of the study of intergroup relations within psychology, from early work demonstrating the extensiveness of intergroup bias to the field's emphasis on the psychopathology of bias and then on normative influences, and finally on the ubiquity, and potential "normality," of intergroup bias. We discuss how North American and European intellectual traditions influenced different perspectives on intergroup relations. We conclude by suggesting how current developments in the field generally and within social psychology in particular may shape research on this topic in the future.

Intergroup relations

Throughout the history of psychology as a discipline, much of the emphasis has been on the individual. The early roots of psychology emphasized intraindividual processes such as perception, sensation, and learning. Moreover, despite sociology's interests in group membership and orientations in the early 1900s (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Simmel, 1908/1955; Sumner, 1906), little attention was paid to intergroup phenomena in the emerging discipline of social psychology. Yet, currently, the topic of intergroup relations is one of the most popular, and research on prejudice, stereotyping, and intergroup relations generally has rapidly expanded in both quantity and perspective. With respect to quantity, even when the term "discrimination" is omitted because of its alternative meaning in perception and learning, a PsychInfo search for entries with prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the title reveals a geometric progression, roughly doubling or tripling from each decade to the next, from only 29 works in the 1930s to 1,829 from 2000 through 2008. Of course, scientific information has generally accelerated. Taking this fact into account, Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, and Esses (2010) examined the percentage of articles in which prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping appeared in the abstract, relative to the total number of articles published, in four leading general-interest journals in social psychology: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, and *European Journal of Social Psychology*. Figure 19.1 presents the overall trend from 1965 to the present. Whereas from 1965 through 1984 only 1–2% of the articles in these journals examined prejudice or stereotypes, a dramatic increase in publication of research on these topics began in the 1990s.

Research on the dynamics of intergroup relations in general has shown a similar trajectory. A PsycInfo search for studies including the term "intergroup relations" in the title reveals no such publications before 1940, and only nine by 1949. There was a spike in interest (21 papers) in this topic in the 1950s, stimulated by public debates around legal decisions concerning racial desegregation in the US. However, these articles were published largely in sociological journals.

Although there was limited interest (nine papers) in the specific topic of intergroup relations across the 1960s, this decade was punctuated by significant conceptual developments on this topic, primarily from scholars in European social psychology or with European roots. Early in the 1960s, Muzafer Sherif, who was born in Turkey and came to the US first as a student in the 1930s and permanently in 1944, and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) published their classic volume, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*, which chronicled a series of studies on how competition and cooperation influence intergroup relations. In Europe, Serge Moscovici, a Romanian-born French social psychologist, was conducting his seminal work on minority influence in groups. Jaap Rabbie, a Dutch social psychologist, began to study the minimal conditions under which intergroup discrimination arises. And Henri Tajfel, originally from Poland but working at the University of Bristol in England, was investigating how categorization influenced perceptions of between-group and within-category differences. The interest of Moscovici, Rabbie, and Tajfel—all Jewish scholars—in intergroup relations likely reflected the profound impact of their experiences during the Nazis' rise to power in Germany and Europe. During the Second World War, Moscovici was interned in a forced labor camp, Tajfel was in a prison camp for French officers, and Rabbie was in hiding in the Netherlands. Stimulated largely by the theoretical advances based on the work of these European scholars and continuing



Figure 19.1 Percentage of articles in four leading social psychology journals that use the terms “prejudice,” “stereotypes,” or “stereotyping” in the abstract. From Dovidio et al. (2010). Copyright © 2010 SAGE Publications. Reprinted with permission

interest in race relations in the US, research on the topic of intergroup relations began to attract greater interest in social psychology. There were 24 papers with “intergroup relations” in the title in the 1970s, 49 in the 1980s, 76 in the 1990s, and 132 from 2000 through 2009 (350 with “intergroup relations” listed as a keyword).

In this chapter we review the history of social psychological research on intergroup relations. We consider the historical roots of research on this topic, discuss how work in this area has systematically developed and expanded theoretically as well as empirically, identify major shifts in the trajectory, and identify promising directions for future research. The history of the social psychological study of prejudice and intergroup relations can be framed in different ways, with scholars differing on the number of discrete periods and transitions in the process. Duckitt (1992; see also Duckitt, 2010) describes eight distinct periods in the way in which psychologists have understood prejudice and discrimination (see Table 19.1). Dovidio (2001), in contrast, discusses three general “waves” of research, moving from an understanding of prejudice as psychopathology to conceiving of it as rooted in normal thought processes and finally to considering the multidimensional (e.g., implicit and explicit) nature of prejudice and stereotyping. Regardless of these different conceptualizations of the development of the field, there is general agreement about the types of systematic shifts that have characterized social psychology’s

Table 19.1 Historical shifts in dominant theoretical and social policy approaches to prejudice. From Duckitt, 2010. Copyright © 2010 SAGE Publications. Reprinted with permission

Social and historical context and issues	*Concept of prejudice and dominant theoretical approach*	*Dominant social policy orientation to prejudice and discrimination*
Up to the 1920s: White domination and colonial rule of “backward peoples”	Prejudice as a natural response to the deficiencies of “backward” peoples: Race theories	Domination, discrimination, and segregation are natural and justified social policies
The 1920s: The legitimacy of White domination challenged	Prejudice as irrational and unjustified: Measuring and describing prejudice	Prejudice will fade as the social sciences clarify how wrong and unjustified it is
The 1930s and 1940s: The ubiquity and tenacity of White racism	Prejudice as an unconscious defense: Psychoanalytic and frustration theories	Gradual acceptance as minorities and colonial peoples become assimilated
The 1950s: Nazi racial ideology and the Holocaust	Prejudice rooted in antidemocratic ideology and authoritarian personalities	Democracy and liberal values will erode intolerance and prejudice
The 1960s: The problem of institutionalized racism in the American South	Sociocultural explanations: Racism rooted in social norms of discriminatory social structures	Desegregation and antidiscriminatory laws will erode and eliminate racism and prejudice
The 1970s: The problem of informal racism and discrimination in the North	Prejudice as an expression of dominant group interests in maintaining intergroup inequality	Reducing intergroup inequality through affirmative action and minority empowerment
The 1980s and 1990s: The stubborn persistence of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination	Prejudice as an expression of universal cognitive processes: Social categorization and identity	Multicultural policies to provide minorities with esteem, positive identities, and foster tolerance
Post-2000: Confronting a complex world of multiply based and often irrationally intense intergroup hostilities	Prejudice as complex, affective, and motivationally driven?	Broader approaches with strategies flexibly adapted to varying patterns of prejudice and situational dynamics?

general orientation to prejudice and intergroup relations over the years.

Importantly, the specific influence these systematic shifts had on the social psychological study of intergroup relations depended on whether they occurred in the American or the European context. In particular, early influences were embedded in cultural values and political events within the US, primarily centered around race relations and issues regarding interracial integration. In contrast, the unique European social and political events surrounding the Second World War and subsequent intellectual developments motivated a new European strand of research that aimed to move away from the earlier individualistic focus to instead consider larger-scale, group- or society-based influences on intergroup phenomena. Although the European influence was not immediately recognized internationally, both perspectives on intergroup relations have inspired impressive programs of research that have had a lasting impact on the ways in which social psychology has approached group-level phenomena. We begin the chapter by considering the American context and then move to describing the changes that followed from the birth of the European tradition.

Ignorance and involvement

By the beginning of the 20th century, sociology clearly recognized the importance of groups to the identity and existence of human beings. Cooley (1902), in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, wrote that "there is no individual who may not be regarded as a particular view of social groups. He has no separate existence . . . in his life a man is bound into the whole in which he is a member" (p. 3). Simmel (1908/1955) considered fundamental differences in interactions within groups of various sizes. Sumner (1906) is credited with coining the terms "ingroup" and "outgroup," and his pioneering work on ethnocentrism has had profound historical influence.

In contrast, perhaps because of the dominant cultural emphasis within the United States on individualism and the resulting empirical focus on processes within people rather than between groups of people, little attention was devoted within the emerging field of social psychology to intergroup relations. Brewer and Brown (1998) observed:

> A casual sampling of the first recognizable textbooks of social psychology, which appeared in the first three decades of the twentieth century, reveals that it [the topic of intergroup relations] was seldom, if ever, considered a legitimate field of inquiry . . . One can search in vain the indices and contents pages of McDougall (1908), Ross (1908) and F. Allport (1924)—to cite but three classic texts—for references to intergroup relations. Even in the 1935 version of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by Murchison, barely a page is devoted to intergroup prejudice in Allport's (1935) chapter on attitudes.
>
> (p. 554)

Although scholars who identified themselves as psychologists recognized the existence of psychological prejudices around the turn of the 20th century (Morse, 1907, 1912; Patrick, 1890; see Webster, Saucier, & Harris, 2010), psychologists in the early 1900s in the United States probably contributed more to the social and intellectual climate that emphasized "essential" (assumed to be genetic) group differences and a "natural" hierarchy of racial and ethnic groups than they did to understanding prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup relations. For example, armed with results from flawed IQ tests, psychologists concluded that 87% of the Russian, 83% of the Jewish, 79% of the Hungarian, and 79% of the Italian immigrants to the United States passing through Ellis Island were "feebleminded" (Goddard, 1913, 1917).

During the early 1900s in the United States, social beliefs about the superiority of certain racial and ethnic groups were widespread (Haller, 1971) and often supported by "scientific evidence" (including Garth's review of research on race and intelligence published in *Psychological Bulletin* in 1925). McDougall (1921), for example, identified a number of psychological qualities that made for superior cultures—including introversion, strength of will, curiosity, intellectual capacity, self-assertion, and providence—which he assigned to Nordic "races." The opposite qualities—extraversion, sociability, persuasability, being closed to new experiences, low intelligence, low cognitive function, docility, externality, and impulsivity—he assigned to the Mediterranean "races." Detecting mental superiority and inferiority was the work of psychological testing, which he labeled "mental anthropology." For McDougall, deviations from the Nordic norm were signs of deficiency and a reason to restrict immigration by those inferior groups. From this perspective, prejudice and discrimination toward groups demonstrated to be inferior were not wrong morally nor a social problem meriting substantial empirical inquiry in psychology. Fortified by a growing body of scientific evidence, the Immigration Act of 1924, the Johnson-Reed Act, greatly curtailed immigration in the United States, particularly from Southern and Eastern Europe. This early period of the study of social groups in the US was therefore characterized primarily by ignorance regarding the potential problems arising from the stratified social structure that was backed up by research describing the assumed "essential" qualities of ethnic and national groups (Samuelson, 1978).

Later in the 1920s, however, psychologists began to question the validity of broad inferences about fundamental differences in human capacities based on race and ethnicity. Racial prejudice and bias came to be recognized more generally in US society as unfair and irrational. Duckitt (2010) attributes this shift in social and disciplinary perspective to two developments after the Second World War (see also Milner, 1975): the emergence of a Black Civil Rights Movement in the US and movements challenging White European domination of colonial peoples. Both of these movements attracted the attention, and very often the sympathies, of intellectuals and scholars. According to Milner (1975), Floyd Allport (1924) was the first social psychologist to explicitly draw scholarly attention in the field to the problem of racial discrimination. Allport wrote, "The discrepancy in mental ability is not great enough to account for the problem which centers around the American Negro or to explain fully *the ostracism* to which he is subjected" (p. 21; emphasis in original).

By the 1930s, the ways in which social psychologists looked at group-based disparities, particularly with respect to Blacks due to the rise of the Civil Rights Movement in the US, changed radically. Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination were widely recognized within psychology as important social problems. Part of the increased sensitivity to these issues was that the profession was also changing during this period. There was a notable increase in the number of "ethnics," particularly Jewish scholars, in the academy in general and in psychology in particular. Once the problem of intergroup bias was recognized, it was documented in earnest, with research focusing on measuring racial prejudice and delineating its extent. Bogardus published his research on the social distance scale in 1925, and in the next decade literally hundreds of studies were reported describing social distance patterns. Katz and Braly (1933) initiated a line of research using stereotype checklists to study the way that Whites (specifically White Princeton students) characterized members of different racial and ethnic groups and found clear evidence of pervasive cultural stereotypes and bias. Table 19.2 summarizes the way Blacks, Italians, and Jews were characterized by Katz and Braly's samples. Work using these same scales has tracked changes in stereotypes across the decades (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993).

Moreover, research also began to investigate intergroup attitudes and behavior and their relationship. For instance, LaPiere (1934) took a young Chinese couple on a 10,000 mile trip by car to visit over 250 restaurants, campgrounds, and hotels across the US. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred immigration from China, was still in effect, and there was strong anti-Asian sentiment at that time. Nevertheless, the Chinese couple was refused service only once. However, LaPiere found a vast discrepancy between what people did and what they said they would do. When he wrote to the establishments they had visited and asked whether they would serve Chinese customers, 90% of those who replied said they would not.

Table 19.2 Stereotypic traits of Blacks (Negroes), Italians, and Jews (% selected). From Katz & Braly, 1933. Copyright © 1933 American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission

Blacks (Negroes)		*Italians*		*Jews*	
Superstitious	84	Artistic	53	Shrewd	79
Lazy	75	Impulsive	44	Mercenary	49
Happy-go-lucky	38	Passionate	37	Industrious	48
Ignorant	38	Quick-tempered	35	Grasping	34
Musical	38	Musical	32	Intelligent	29
Ostentatious	26	Imaginative	30	Ambitious	21
Very religious	24	Very religious	21	Sly	20
Stupid	22	Talkative	21	Loyal to family ties	15
Physically dirty	17	Revengeful	17	Persistent	13
Slovenly	12	Physically dirty	13	Talkative	13
Unreliable	12	Lazy	12	Aggressive	12
		Unreliable	11	Religious	12

Although the particular methodologies of Katz and Braly (1933) and LaPiere (1934) have been called into question, these works made landmark contributions by reorienting the field to studying intergroup stereotypes, attitudes, and discrimination. Following changes in the political and social involvement of increasing numbers of Americans with the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement and developments in the study of prejudice and intergroup behavior represented primarily by the work of Katz and Braly (1933) and LaPiere (1934), the problem of prejudice and intergroup bias was well documented. The central question of interest in social psychology was no longer simply one about how much bias existed, but instead moved to consider *why* intergroup prejudice and bias exist.

Psychopathology and personality

By the late 1930s, Freudian psychodynamic theory, which was developed to understand abnormal forms of behavior, was beginning to fall out of favor in psychology and particularly in experimental social psychology, especially in the American context. Nevertheless, in this period of the development of intergroup relations research, Freud's ideas were not completely abandoned; some were adapted. Guided strongly by the psychodynamic approach and influenced by movements in other areas of psychology, such as the study of aggression that attempted to integrate psychodynamics, learning theory, and social psychology (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), the emphasis of research was on manifestations of unconscious psychological defense mechanisms and the expression of pathological needs as the underlying explanations for the existence of prejudice. In fact, both Dollard and Miller were trained in psychoanalysis. Whereas Freud attributed the basis of aggression to an expression of the death instinct, something within the individual, Dollard et al. (1939) proposed that aggression was stimulated by external causes that lead to frustration. Their frustration–aggression hypothesis proposed that frustration causes aggression, and all aggression can be traced back to some form of frustration. Borrowing directly from psychodynamic theory, these researchers also recognized that people were often inhibited from aggressing against the source of frustration, for instance because of fear of retaliation. When people are inhibited from expressing their aggression directly, it is often displaced, so that aggression that would normally be directed at the source of frustration is redirected to another more convenient, more socially acceptable target, commonly due to fear of retaliation, social norms, or other influences (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003).

From this perspective, these researchers argued that prejudice is often a form of displaced aggression arising from frustration. In this approach, known as the scapegoat theory of prejudice, the source of frustration for a White person may be unemployment and financial insecurity, but the target for aggression, because of his or her relative powerlessness, might be a Black person. Indeed, from 1882 to 1930, there was a substantial relationship between the economic conditions in 14 Southern US states and the incidence of lynchings of Blacks: As economic conditions for White Southerners deteriorated, the number of lynchings of Blacks increased (Hovland & Sears, 1940; cf. Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). The researchers' argument was that the lynchings of Blacks were not the result of frustration with or anger toward Blacks as Blacks, but rather the consequence of frustration caused by generally low and unstable cotton prices. The fact that Blacks were not the source of frustration, and were, in fact, much of the labor force supporting the cotton industry, illustrates the seeming "abnormality" of prejudice. This impressive demonstration of how adaptations of Freudian psychoanalytic theory could illuminate the origins of prejudice stimulated a highly productive wave of research identifying who becomes prejudiced and why, focusing specifically on prejudice as a form of psychopathology.

In addition to this growing focus on abnormal thought processes as the primary cause of prejudice, the vast destruction of the Second World War left a lasting negative impression on most people, not only historically but also in the field of psychology. In particular, the human atrocities of the Holocaust, which involved the genocide committed mainly against Jews, gypsies, and persons with a same-sex orientation, and the willingness of large numbers of citizens not to intervene to prevent them, led researchers to ask, and to try to answer, the question: "What kind of person is capable of such extreme prejudice and of acting so maliciously against others?" In the late 1930s through the 1950s, stimulated politically by the Nazis' rise to power in Germany, historically by the Holocaust, and intellectually by the classic work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; see also Fromm, Horkheimer, & Marcuse, 1936), prejudice and other forms of bias were seen not simply as disruptions in rational processes as in earlier work, but as dangerous aberrations from normal thinking.

Theodor Adorno, a German-born Jewish sociologist, philosopher, and musicologist who emigrated to the US in 1938, and his colleagues (some of whom had escaped from Nazi Germany) answered that question by drawing on psychodynamic theory in a large and intensively researched book, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950). This approach focused on a set of characteristics that made people susceptible to prejudice because of adverse parenting or circumstances that led to pathological personalities. On the basis of in-depth interviews and empirical tests, Adorno and colleagues identified a particular pattern of family experiences and personality structure that made people susceptible to extreme prejudice (also previously proposed by Fromm et al., 1936). These people tended to have parents who enforced strict discipline, often using harsh punishment. High authoritarians were described with the "bicyclist" metaphor, bowing their heads to those above them and kicking at those below them. In part as the result of this socialization, these people generally submitted to authority, adhered to conventional traditions and vales, and thought in rigid, all-or-nothing ways.

The prejudice of high authoritarians was believed to result from a projection of unacceptable impulses (e.g., anger) onto powerless outgroup members (Newman & Caldwell, 2005). For example, after being invaded by Germany during the Second World War, a number of Poles collaborated actively with the Germans in the extermination of Jews in Poland. Historian Jan Gross (2001) noted that many of these Poles explained their actions on the basis of their perceptions that Jews had, in the previous years, collaborated with the Soviets to oppress Poles in their brutal occupation of the country. Gross found that this perception was not based on fact; instead the "non-Jewish population projected its own attitude toward Germans in 1941 . . . onto an entrenched narrative about how the Jews allegedly behaved" (Gross, 2001, p. 104).

One of the most significant influences of *The Authoritarian Personality* was its attempt to identify basic personality differences between prejudiced and less prejudiced people. Adorno and colleagues felt that prejudice varied so greatly from situation to situation that a broader concept, such as ethnocentrism, would be a better description of the type of prejudice they were exploring. To measure the type of personality that would be susceptible to ethnocentrism, they developed a questionnaire they named the F-Scale. "F" stood for susceptibility to Fascistic propaganda, a political ideology that emphasized strong leadership and a singular national identity to enhance national prestige and power, and became aligned with Hitler's Nazi Party in the Second World War. The F-Scale measured anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and antidemocratic feelings without mentioning specifically the groups toward which antagonism was expressed, and was considered to be more general and more broadly predictive than other measures of prejudice. The study of authoritarianism transformed research and ideas about prejudice for the next two decades. The F-Scale was a powerful instrument because those who scored high on it displayed antipathy to a broad range of groups, including Blacks, homosexuals, and elderly people.

Support for the F-Scale as the primary tool to measure prejudice began to wane by the mid-1960s. Particularly damaging were criticisms about the specific scales used to measure authoritarianism. Nevertheless, even though the instruments that Adorno and colleagues (1950) developed were largely abandoned, many of the ideas central to their work on the authoritarian personality, with contemporary modifications shaped by new evidence, continued to be influential. This shift marked a change in focus from the aberrant, psychopathological nature of prejudice to considerations of personality patterns within the normal range that resulted in susceptibility to prejudice. For instance, Rokeach (1960) recognized that extremists from the political left shared many of the same cognitive styles as extremists on the political right (which was the focus of authoritarianism). Whether they supported Stalin on the left or Hitler on the right, extremists were brutally oppressive toward members of other groups and tended to hold beliefs that were highly contradictory but isolated in such a way that they did not recognize the contradictions. They were strongly opinionated and held their beliefs rigidly. Rokeach measured these aspects of a person with a "closed mind" with his Dogmatism Scale, which assessed the tendency to adopt extremist views.

In addition, a number of the characteristics originally identified as aspects of the authoritarian personality were highlighted in new instruments designed to measure how people differ in their prejudice. One prominent measure, derived from a critical analysis of the work of Adorno et al. (1950), is the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988). Whereas Adorno and his colleagues believed that there were nine contributing components, Altemeyer found that three of them represented the core attitudinal cluster: authoritarian submission (an inclination to submit to those of greater authority or status), authoritarian aggression (general hostility toward deviants and members of other groups), and conventionalism (a strong commitment to the traditional norms and values of one's group). People higher in right-wing authoritarianism are both fearful and self-righteous (Altemeyer, 1988) and show intergroup biases toward a wide range of groups.

Ideas related to the original conceptions of authoritarianism proposed by Adorno and colleagues have also spawned a number of contemporary measures of individual differences that relate to a variety of intergroup biases. For example, consistent with the idea that high authoritarians are rigid in their thinking, recent work implicates the role of need for closure (Kruglanski, 1990) in stereotyping. Because people higher on need for closure tend to use cognitive shortcuts and limit the information they collect in order to make decisions quickly, they rely more heavily on stereotypes when thinking about groups, see members of other groups as more similar to one another, and apply stereotypes more when evaluating members of another group.

In summary, this period of research on intergroup relations concentrated on the prejudiced person, shifting its focus first from the psychopathological roots of prejudice to the aberrant and dangerous thought patterns of the high authoritarian, and finally to the closed-mindedness and cognitive rigidity of the prejudiced person falling within the normal range of psychological functioning. This period was, in its beginning, inspired by the work of Freud, who proposed that people often do not have simple positive or negative feelings about others. They are frequently ambivalent, which means that they may have a mixture of positive and negative feelings toward the same person, group, or object. Although Freud typically talked about ambivalence toward intimate others, such as one's father or mother, the principle of ambivalence has since been applied to how a person feels about members of groups that differ from one's own. These ideas about ambivalence were particularly influential when, as a consequence of interracial experiences during the Second World War and events that soon followed, norms of egalitarianism began to crystallize in the United States. As McConahay (1986) remarked, "Hitler [gave] racism a bad name" (p. 121). This period also marked yet another change in perspective on intergroup relations, giving way to the role of context in generating prejudiced responses to outgroup members.

Social context, norms, and bias

The United States, founded on the proposition that "all men are created equal," had traditionally struggled to balance that principle with the hypocrisy of racial oppression and segregation that marked its history. In the 1940s, the Carnegie Foundation commissioned Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, politician, and Nobel Laureate, to write a report on race relations in the United States. Myrdal's report offered a fresh and illuminating perspective on the issues and was published in 1944 as the classic book, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. Myrdal's study highlighted a fundamental dilemma—the American dilemma—which reflects the paradox between historical egalitarian values on which the country was founded and racist traditions in the United States. According to Myrdal, the dilemma involved:

> the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we call the "American creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts and, on the other hand, the valuations on the specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; consideration of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.
>
> (p. xliii)

However, stimulated by events surrounding the Second World War, laws supporting segregation between Whites and Blacks changed dramatically in the late 1940s. Specifically, although the armed forces of the United States were formally segregated during the war, the circumstances of war brought White and Black troops into close personal contact with heightened interdependence (Stouffer, 1949). Soon after the war, on July 26, 1948, US President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which mandated "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin." By 1953, 95% of military units were racially integrated.

What is more, one of the most pivotal moments in the history of civil rights in the US occurred in the mid-1950s. On May 17, 1954, in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, the Supreme Court declared that state laws that established separate public schools for Black and White students denied Black children equal educational opportunities. The unanimous ruling stated that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," thus ruling that *de jure*, or legal, racial segregation violated the 14th Amendment. This ruling overturned over 50 years of legalized segregation in the US.

The 1960s were generally viewed as a watershed period in US history. Young people and women rebelled against restrictions to their freedom to pursue the lifestyles they wanted. The 1960s included broad movements among the younger generation to assert their independence through "counterculture": In the US, it was the era of hippies, "flower power," and anti-Vietnam War protests. The movements were not just about individual freedom; they were also about promoting the rights of racial, ethnic, and other groups. The Civil Rights Movement, begun in the mid-1950s, matured and grew in size and impact in the 1960s. The violent resistance of the US South, the dramatic national television and newspaper coverage of that resistance, the use of state national guard units to enforce federal laws, the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy, the moral courage and leadership of Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, and the political mastery of US President Lyndon B. Johnson combined to ensure passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. The Civil Rights Movement brought about a fundamental shift in the nation's tolerance for overt, legal racial discrimination. Toward the end of the decade, affirmative action was enacted in the US through federal legislation.

These profound changes in US race relations had a strong impact on the ways in which intergroup relations were conceptualized and studied. Two developments stand out as particularly critical. First, the political and social changes provided insights into how intergroup bias could be eradicated through appropriately structured contact between members of different groups. Second, these changes showed how intergroup attitudes could be complex and ambivalent, as opposed to the old-fashioned biases that were much less complicated: Without norms or laws prohibiting discrimination, negative feelings and attitudes could translate easily and directly to the exclusion of people who were perceived as different. These two critical changes in intergroup relations research, coupled with a move away from the emphasis on the personality of the prejudiced person, allowed the field to mature and expand. At this point in time, the chronological aspects of the progression of the field of intergroup relations started to break down and lose meaning, as more developments began to occur in parallel, often in response to the rapidly changing societal circumstances in the US. Research on intergroup contact and the complexity of ambivalent intergroup attitudes marked the field's new focus on the social context in which people find themselves, and its fundamental impact on the prejudice and bias they may express.

Intergroup contact

For the past 60 years, intergroup contact has been considered to be one of psychology's most promising and effective strategies for improving intergroup relations and reducing bias and conflict (Allport, 1954; Minard, 1952; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008; Williams, 1947). The "contact hypothesis" proposes that simple contact between groups is not automatically sufficient to improve intergroup relations. Rather, for contact between groups to reduce bias successfully, certain features must be present.

Although Allport (1954) is commonly credited with introducing the contact hypothesis in his classic book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, the idea that intergroup contact could reduce bias was already in the literature by the mid-1930s (Horowitz, 1936; Zeligs & Hendrickson, 1933). By the mid-1940s, however, more attention was being devoted to the nature and context of interracial contact (Smith, 1943). Other works pointing to similar conclusions, often drawing on systematic studies and analyses of the experiences of American soldiers during the Second World War, were published soon after. The battlefield offered a natural laboratory. Although segregation of Black and White units was the formal policy of the US Army during the war, combat conditions often necessitated racial integration among troops. One significant consequence was that White soldiers who had integrated combat experiences had more positive racial attitudes than those who did not have such experiences (Singer, 1948; Stouffer, 1949). In addition, in the Merchant Marines, the more voyages White seamen took with Black seamen, under conditions of mutual interdependence, the more positive their interracial attitudes became (Brophy, 1946). These observations were being drawn into general principles soon after (Bramfield, 1946; Lett, 1945). Bramfield (1946), in his work on race relations in public schools, concluded that "where people of various cultures and races freely and genuinely associate, there tensions and difficulties, prejudices and confusions, dissolve; where they do not associate, where they are isolated from one another, there prejudice and conflict grow like a disease" (p. 245; see also Long, 1949).

A formal theory of intergroup contact began to emerge from work in several different disciplines. Williams (1947), a prominent sociologist, outlined a number of propositions and testable hypotheses about techniques for improving intergroup relations in his influential book, *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*. Williams observed, "In World War II recognition of the need for national unity in a warring world and the threat of 'divide and conquer' techniques called forth a strong emphasis upon common American values and destinies" (p. 2). One proposition (#78) identified the potential benefits of appropriately structured intergroup contact: "Lessened hostility will result from arranging intergroup collaboration, on the basis of personal association of individuals as functional equals, on a common task jointly accepted as worth while" (p. 69). Williams (1947) recommended specific research on this topic. He stated, "One feasible project, worthy of extensive repetition, is a comparative study of intergroup relations in segregated and mixed areas of the same community" (p. 91). Taking advantage of an opportunity to examine the effects of the assignment of apartments regardless of race in a housing project relative to more segregated housing based on personal preference at another housing project, Deutsch and Collins (1951) performed such a study. Deutsch and Collins found that White residents in the integrated housing project had more frequent and positive interracial contact than those in segregated units and subsequently displayed more positive racial attitudes and showed less racial stereotyping.

Further emphasizing the importance of the context in which intergroup contact occurs, in 1954, Sherif and his colleagues conducted a field study on intergroup conflict in an area adjacent to Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma, US (see Sherif et al., 1961). In this study, 22 12-year-old boys attending summer camp were randomly assigned to two groups (who subsequently named themselves Eagles and Rattlers). When the groups engaged in a series of competitive activities (a tug-of-war, and baseball and touch football games), intergroup bias and conflict quickly developed. Group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., "sissies," "stinkers," "pigs," "bums," and "cheaters"), and each group conducted raids on the other's cabins that resulted in the destruction and theft of property. Later, Sherif and his colleagues arranged intergroup contact under neutral, noncompetitive conditions. These interventions did not calm the ferocity of the exchanges, however. As previously hypothesized by many researchers and theorists (e.g., Allport, 1954; Watson, 1947; Williams, 1947), mere intergroup contact indeed was not sufficient to change the nature of the relations between the groups.

Only after the investigators altered the functional relations between the groups by introducing a series of superordinate goals—ones that could not be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups and which were successfully achieved—did the relations between the two groups become more harmonious, and intergroup bias was greatly reduced. Although the boys continued to acknowledge their separate group identities (Rattlers and Eagles), they regularly referred to members of both groups as "we" after achieving these superordinate goals. For instance, Sherif et al. (1961, p. 171) reported that after cooperatively pulling a stalled truck back toward camp, the boys celebrated: "Allen [a Rattler] shouted: 'We won the tug-of-war against the truck!' Bryan [an Eagle] repeated, 'Yeah! We won the tug-of-war against the truck.' This cry was echoed with satisfaction by others from both groups."

Within this theoretical and empirical context, Allport (1954) formulated his highly influential version of the contact hypothesis. Allport identified four prerequisite features for contact to be successful at reducing intergroup conflict and achieving intergroup harmony. These four features are (a) equal status within the contact situation; (b) intergroup cooperation; (c) common goals; and (d) support of authorities, law, or custom (see Pettigrew, 1998). Since Allport's (1954) formulation, the contact hypothesis has received extensive empirical attention. Both laboratory and field research have yielded substantial documentation of improvement in intergroup relations when the criteria outlined above have been met. In a review of 203 studies from 25 countries involving 90,000 participants, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) found that 94% of the studies supported the contact hypothesis. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) also provided an extensive meta-analysis of 515 studies involving 713 independent samples conducted in a variety of intergroup contexts that tested the effects of intergroup contact on attitudes. Their findings demonstrated that intergroup contact indeed reduces prejudice. Furthermore, they found that the beneficial effects of contact were greater when Allport's optimal conditions were present in the contact situation than when they were not (see also Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). There is impressive evidence, across a range of stigmatized groups other than racial and ethnic minorities, of the importance of appropriate intergroup contact for reducing bias.

Complex and ambivalent intergroup attitudes

By the 1960s, psychologists recognized sociocultural influences in prejudice, stereotyping, and bias; they focused on the role of social learning and norms in the development and maintenance of racial biases (e.g., Pettigrew, 1959) but also recognized how egalitarian social norms can inhibit the expression of bias. Thirty-five years after Myrdal's report on the American Dilemma, Irwin Katz fused Myrdal's observations with Freud's ideas about the dynamics of ambivalence to formulate his influential model of stigma (Katz, 1981). According to Katz (1981; Katz, Wakenhut, & Hass, 1986), a number of different traditionally stigmatized groups, including people with physical disabilities and Black persons, are associated with conflicted attitudes that contain both positive (e.g., sympathy) and negative (e.g., aversion) elements. From a psychodynamic perspective, both the positive and negative elements are energizing forces that can motivate a reaction. Responses toward groups for whom a person has conflicted attitudes tend to be amplified; that is, feelings may be expressed more extremely because the energy drawn from one impulse is added to the other. For this reason, people are more likely to respond either very positively or very negatively toward a member of a stigmatized group. The direction of the response depends on whether the behavior exhibited by the target is favorable or unfavorable.

A number of other theories also posit that ambivalence between negative feelings and personal standards or norms against bias characterize many forms of contemporary intergroup attitudes (see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Three forms of such biases, which operate more subtly and indirectly than old-fashioned prejudices, are symbolic racism, modern racism, and aversive racism. The symbolic and modern racism frameworks, which emphasize political behavior, are closely tied to the US context and Black–White relations in particular. However, the general principles underlying aversive racism have been applied more generally and cross-culturally.

Both symbolic racism theory (Sears & Henry, 2005) and modern racism theory (McConahay, 1986) were developed in response to a practical problem: the failure of traditional, "old-fashioned" racism scales to predict people's actual positions on race-relevant issues. However, they differ in their assumptions about the origins of intergroup bias. Whereas symbolic racism proposes that Whites' negative attitudes relate directly to the threat Blacks pose to Whites' worldviews by violating core principles of individualism, modern racism theory hypothesizes that a variety of types of negative affect (e.g., fear, disgust) that are acquired through early socialization persist into adulthood (see Henry, 2010). Both theories, though, assume that these feelings are expressed indirectly and symbolically, in terms of more abstract social and political issues.

Aversive racism represents yet another form of contemporary racism (Kovel, 1970). Aversive racists sympathize with victims of past injustice, support principles of racial equality, and genuinely regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but at the same time possess conflicting, often unconscious, negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks that are rooted in basic psychological processes (e.g., social categorization) that promote racial bias (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Like symbolic and modern racism, and in contrast to traditional forms of racism, aversive racism is hypothesized to operate in subtle, indirect, and often rationalizable ways (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009). Because the basic premises of aversive racism are not tied to specific scale items concerning the US political context, the principles of aversive racism are applicable to intergroup behaviors of dominant groups toward minorities in other nations that have strong traditional egalitarian values, such as Canada (Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008), the UK (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005), and the Netherlands (Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993).

To summarize, the changing social and political structure of US society from the 1940s to the 1960s and beyond allowed for increased opportunities for positive and interdependent contact between groups and encouraged new social norms that opposed the direct expression of prejudice. Intergroup relations research in this period began to focus on these new aspects of prejudice, stereotyping, and intergroup behavior, yielding a new understanding of the American Dilemma as that of the nonprejudiced who regardless harbor socioculturally learned negativity toward outgroups.

The European context: Moving beyond the individual

A major development in the study of intergroup relations had its origins in Europe, based primarily on European intellectuals' reaction against the heavily individualistic focus of the American strand of intergroup relations research. Perhaps because of the general cultural emphasis on individualism in the United States or, more proximally, the intellectual emphasis on traditions of egoistic motivation (cf. Batson, 2010) and the individual consequences for action that was the legacy of behaviorism and its emphasis on reductionism and observable behavior, social psychologists within the US had traditionally focused on intrapsychic processes, such as stereotypes and prejudice, as major determinants of intergroup behavior. In an influential article entitled "Whatever Happened to the Group in Social Psychology?", Steiner (1974) observed, "By the late 1950s social psychology turned inward. It had largely renounced or postponed its concern for larger social systems, and had centered its attention on internal states and processes: dissonance, attitudes, attributions" (p. 98). Steiner (1974) further noted that "by the 1960s social psychology had become much more individualistic. Interest in the group as a system had waned and research was generally focused on intraindividual events or processes that mediate responses to social situations" (p. 94). Steiner warned that such a strict individualistic focus could not capture the transcendent influence of group processes on social life. Indeed, Steiner's comments were especially prophetic for the field of intergroup relations. Empirically, prejudice is only modestly related to discrimination ($r = .26$ to $.32$) and stereotypes have an even weaker relationship to discrimination ($r = .16$; see Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996, and Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008).

Social psychologists in the US, enamored by the reductionalistic approach and the scientific precision of newly emerging techniques for studying the psychology of the individual, did little to heed Steiner's warning at that time. However, a new and vibrant interest in collective identity and intergroup behavior was arising in the European social psychology community. This work was stimulated predominantly by the ideas and research of Henri Tajfel during his tenure at the University of Bristol.

There had been only limited interest in intergroup relations within empirical social psychology in Europe before Tajfel began his landmark research on this topic in the 1960s. However, there was a rich history and intellectual tradition in areas relevant to the topic. The roles of culture and cultural differences, and relatedly the distinction between "we" and "they," have been enduring themes in European intellectual history. Jahoda (1986, 1990, 1999), for instance, described systematic changes in the ways foreigners were represented from antiquity through the Middle Ages, when "they" were caricatured into monsters. This type of characterization, distinguishing the humanity of the ingroup from the subhuman qualities of the outgroup, facilitated aggression (e.g., the Inquisition) and the oppression (e.g., slavery, colonialism) of people from other cultures. These ideas were supported by proponents of social Darwinism (e.g., Herbert Spencer in England, Gustav Ratzenhofer in Germany, and Ernest Renan in France). LeBon's work on the group mind and the psychology of crowds further emphasized the distinction between "we" and "they," and widely influenced racialized thinking by Mussolini and Hitler. Other European intellectuals, including Gobineau (*An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*) and Lévi-Strauss (*Race and Civilization*) drew more popular attention to racial differences, while others (e.g., Haeckel, *The History of Creation*) emphasized racial hierarchy. The distinction between "we" and "they" was prominent in philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and politics over an extended period of European intellectual history.

Social psychology was recognized as a formal discipline in Europe about the same time it as it was in the US. Paolo Orano wrote *Psicologia Sociale* (in Italian) in 1902. McDougall's (1908) social psychology text was written while he was in the UK. However, social psychology did not establish a solid foothold in academia in Europe until later in the century. For instance, social psychology was first taught in Belgium in 1942. However, as new research emerged within the European social psychology context, culture and groups represented prominent themes. Piaget (e.g., Piaget & Weil, 1951) and Jahoda (1964) studied ingroup favoritism and culture, Faucheux and Moscovici (1967) investigated minority influence, Deconchy (1971) examined religious orthodoxy, Mulder (1971) studied power, Merei (1949) explored leadership, and Flament (1965) focused on communication networks. Thus, Tajfel conducted his original studies on categorization and accentuation (e.g., Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) during a very vibrant and generative period in European social psychology that began in the 1960s.

Perhaps based on his own experiences growing up in Poland, serving in the French army, being interned as a prisoner of war by the German army in the Second World War, and establishing an academic career in England, Tajfel's ideas about social identity crystallized in the late 1960s and 1970s. Tajfel's work innovatively investigated the role of category-based perceptions and collective identity, as opposed to individual identity, on group and intergroup behavior. Tajfel and his colleagues reasoned that if categorization automatically produces perceptual discrimination, it might similarly elicit behavioral discrimination.

This major development occurred in the context of a broader European call for an advance beyond the individualistic US approach to the study of intergroup relations, voiced by several leading social psychologists. This perspective was articulated by a range of European social psychologists in Tajfel's coedited (Israel & Tajfel, 1972) volume, *The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment* in the European Monograph series. This volume was extremely influential in the European social psychological community, but was rarely cited by North American social psychologists at that time. In Tajfel's (1972) chapter in this volume, "Experiments in a Vacuum," he emphasized the need to overcome the shortcomings of individualistic theories of prejudice developed in the US (including work on the authoritarian personality). Over the next several years, until his death in 1982, Tajfel further refined and articulated his position that there was a prevailing bias in social psychology in favor of individualistic approaches and that a group-level perspective offered qualitatively distinct and valuable insights that were critical for understanding intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1979).

Tajfel's work on the minimal intergroup paradigm revolutionized how the field of social psychology understood intergroup relations (see Robinson, 1996). Whereas previous work considered the importance of distinguishing ingroups from outgroups (Allport, 1954) and whether groups were cooperatively or competitively interdependent (Sherif et al., 1961), Tajfel demonstrated that the mere classification of people into ingroups and outgroups was sufficient to initiate intergroup bias. In fact, this demonstration occurred somewhat unexpectedly. Tajfel wanted to find baseline conditions from which he could determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the development of intergroup bias. He worked with schoolmates who had spent years forming a coherent and unified group. Tajfel disturbed the unity of the class by separating it into two groups based on arbitrary criteria (e.g., preference for an abstract and unknown artist or tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots presented). Tajfel initially thought it would be necessary to add further elements to this minimal group situation in order for intergroup bias to develop. However, this turned out to be unnecessary; mere arbitrary assignment of people into social categories was sufficient to elicit intergroup bias. That is, bias appeared under even the most minimal conditions of group assignment. Tajfel's work represented a highly novel approach to the study of intergroup relations, given that past work in this field was primarily inspired by the history of race relations in the US.

Other European researchers at the time also investigated the conditions that were necessary for intergroup bias to occur and that facilitated intergroup bias (e.g., Doise & Sinclair, 1973). For example, although Tajfel (1982) credits Jaap Rabbie with the first empirical demonstration of the minimal group effect (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; see also Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982), Rabbie, who was an intellectual rival but a friend of Tajfel, emphasized the role of functional relations between and within groups on intergroup relations (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). Stimulated by Rabbie's work on the role of interdependence on intergroup relations, researchers attempted to determine the potentially separable effects of two different types of functional relations: interdependence within one's group and competition against another group (see Gaertner & Insko, 2000). Indeed, Rabbie's behavioral interaction model (see Rabbie & Lodewijkx, 1996; Rabbie & Schot, 1990) argued that either intragroup cooperation or intergroup competition can stimulate intergroup bias.

Tajfel's ideas about the importance of social identity in intergroup relations crystallized in the mid-1970s. He outlined a new theory of intergroup relations, one in which collective identities were central, in his Katz-Newcomb Lecture at the University of Michigan in 1974 (Tajfel, 1974). These ideas were developed in close collaboration with John Turner, whose 1975 dissertation from the University of Bristol represented key elements of the theory. Many of these ideas appeared within chapters by Tajfel and Turner in Tajfel's 1978 edited volume on differentiation between groups. However, the classic, fully articulated version of social identity theory first appeared in Tajfel and Turner's (1979) chapter. Tajfel's work on social identity and intergroup bias began to attract international scholarly attention (Brewer, 1979), and recognition of the importance of his work rapidly accelerated in the 1990s (Dumont & Louw, 2009).

Social identity theory differentiates personal identity, the elements of self-identity derived from individual traits and interpersonal relationships, from social identity, the elements of self-identity derived from social group membership. According to social identity theory, individuals have a repository of personal and social identities available to them, with each identity informing the individual of who he or she is and what the respective identity entails. This perspective suggests that a person defines the self along a continuum that ranges from, at one extreme, the self as a distinct individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements, to the self as the embodiment of a social collective or group at the other extreme. At each extreme, self-interest is represented by the pronouns "I" and "we," respectively. When personal identity is salient, the individual relates to others on an interpersonal level. However, when social identity is salient, the behavior between individuals assumes an intergroup quality, because each person serves as a representative of his or her respective ingroup.

A key premise of social identity theory is that people's context-specific attention to their personal and social identities is driven by their motivation to feel positively about themselves. One way to achieve this end is to join social groups that elicit a positive identity; another is to increase the perceived worthiness of the social groups to which one already belongs. To the extent that people are motivated to regard themselves positively, they will also be motivated to differentiate themselves from outsiders; that is, to see as much difference as possible between their ingroups and those groups to which they do not belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The implications of the fundamental premise of the motivation to seek positive distinctiveness for enhancing personal esteem go beyond the arousal of bias in minimal group contexts. Social identity theory, perhaps influenced by Tajfel's personal experiences during the Holocaust, also deeply considered how members of minority groups dealt with their disadvantaged situation. According to social identity theory, members of minority groups can use one of three different strategies to enhance their social identity (Ellemers & van Laar, 2010; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979): One option is to leave an existing social group and join one that is more positively valued (i.e., social mobility). Alternatively, one's ingroup can seek positive distinctiveness by emphasizing a basis for social comparison that differs from the one that defines the status relationship to outgroups—one on which the ingroup appears superior (i.e., social creativity; see Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992, for a review). Finally, a person's social group can strive to distinguish itself positively through direct opposition with outgroups (i.e., social competition). Thus, increasing the salience of social identity in itself can increase motivations to compete against other groups.

Tajfel maintained that the minimal group studies and social identity theory should not be interpreted in reductionist terms. Tajfel's goal was to reveal how psychological processes operate to create and maintain ideological and structural realities. According to Reicher (2010), "The process of differentiation was not an end point, but a starting point for his analysis. The fundamental question was, if people seek positive social identities, what do they do if they are defined negatively in an unequal social world . . . In other words, social identity theory is more a theory of social change than social discrimination and the concept of social identity is primarily intended as a mediating concept in the explanation of social change."

System justification theory, which was introduced by Jost and Banaji (1994), relates to one implication of social identity theory—the fact that low-status group members often come to support the societal status quo—with a strong emphasis on understanding the intraindividual processes that account for this phenomenon. Although members of groups disadvantaged by the status quo are generally more likely to perceive the system as unfair than are members of advantaged groups, they are still susceptible to adopting system-justifying ideologies. These beliefs affirm a stable social system and, in a relatively immediate way, relieve members of disadvantaged groups of uncertainty and associated threat and negative affect (see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). The short-term benefits of adopting system-justifying ideologies, however, have the longer-term consequence of reducing the likelihood of social change and remediation of structural inequality between groups. As noted by Rubin and Hewstone (2004), social identity theory represents a general explanation of the different behaviors that members of nondominant groups engage in, whereas system justification theory supplements these core ideas by elaborating on the intraindividual mechanisms that contribute to system-justifying motivations.

Within a little more than a decade after the classic Tajfel and Turner (1979) paper outlining the theory was published, social identity theory developed into the field's most comprehensive framework for studying intergroup relations—one largely responsible for the unprecedented interest of psychologists in intergroup relations. The social identity approach has been one of the most important theories in the history of social psychology; it has stimulated generations of research and thousands of empirical studies. Before 1970, there were only four papers in psychology with "social identity" in the title; from 2000 through 2009, there were approximately 600.

Self-categorization theory, which evolved from social identity theory, emphasizes how categorizing oneself as a member of a group depersonalizes self-perceptions and systematically alters the way in which people relate to members of other groups (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2010). Categorizing the self and others into groups produces prototype-based perceptions, leading people to see themselves in terms of the defining properties of the ingroup and to view themselves and others in the group as interchangeable exemplars. As a consequence, people experience depersonalized attraction to other ingroup members, become compliant to group norms, and act in accordance with group-based motivations and goals. That is, when group identities are salient, category-based depersonalization produces self-stereotyping, in which people come to embody ingroup attributes. Individuals categorized as members of an outgroup are seen in strongly homogeneous and stereotypic ways, accentuating differences between the groups. These processes promote ethnocentric motivations, which in turn lead to competitive, discriminatory, and exploitative intergroup relations.

Self-categorization theory recognized that people have multiple social identities and that they can categorize themselves in many different ways in a given situation. Accessibility and fit determine which social identity becomes primarily salient (Oakes, 1987). Categorizations are more accessible if they are regularly activated (chronic accessibility) or are relevant to a particular context (situational accessibility). Fit relates to how well a particular social identity accounts for relevant similarities and differences in a given situation. The fit of an identity to a situation is greater to the extent to which it accounts for differences between groups and similarities within the different groups. The ratio between the average intercategory differences and the average intragroup differences is known as the metacontrast ratio (Rosch, 1978). Greater fit of an identity produces stronger intergroup biases on dimensions relevant to the identity.

As illustrated by research on self-categorization theory, collective identity and individualistic approaches represent complementary, rather than competitive, approaches to understanding intergroup relations. For example, recent research that aims to understand how intergroup contact reduces intergroup bias integrates elements of both perspectives (see Pettigrew, 1998). These approaches generally target the ways in which people categorize others as a pivotal process determining intergroup relations. Specifically, although category-based responses are the cognitive default, people engage in more individuating processes when they are in interdependent relationships with members of other groups or possess both the motivation and the necessary cognitive resources to form accurate impressions (Fiske, 1998, 2000). Moreover, the many social groups to which people belong are often hierarchically organized, with higher-level categories (e.g., nations) more inclusive of lower-level ones (e.g., cities). Modifying either the functional relationship between groups or an interactant's goals, motives, and expectations can alter the level of category inclusiveness that will dominate a particular context (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). This malleability of social categorization and, consequently, of social identity is important because of its implications for altering the ways that people think about members of other groups and, accordingly, how positively they feel about them. Three main approaches in this area involve degrading perceptions of intergroup boundaries (Wilder, 1986) and facilitating personalized interactions (Miller, 2002); recategorizing members of two groups within a common, superordinate ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2009); and continuing to highlight distinctive group identities but in the context of cooperative relations, often involving complementary group contributions (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).

As a response to the individualistic and frequently personality-based work coming from the US, the social identity approach was highly effective (see Fiske & Leyens, 1997). In fact, it was only after 1985 that the field of intergroup relations saw a significant boost in productivity, with the number of published articles rising rapidly after this period (see Figure 19.1). The introduction of the theoretical and empirical perspectives of social identity theory and self-categorization theory transformed intergroup relations into an issue that expanded far beyond the race relations of the American context. Although social identity theory was firmly grounded in experimental social psychology and can explain the processes underlying prejudice and stereotyping, it is a broad, generative framework that extends significantly further than the individualistic approach that had traditionally informed the field.

The ubiquity of prejudice: Cognitive and social processes

Simultaneously with the development of the social identity approach in Europe, further advancements took place in the American context. As discussed above, the landmark US Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965 had been strong statements that discrimination against people with certain social identities—based on race, ethnicity, religion, and gender—would no longer be tolerated under the US law. In addition, concerns about civil liberties were spreading widely, beyond Black–White relations in the US. For example, although it had a much longer history, the women's movement gained significant momentum in the 1960s. The President's Commission on the Status of Women, established by President Kennedy and chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, documented significant discrimination against women in the workplace and recommended large-scale legal and social changes. In 1965, the National Organization of Women, an activist organization that attempted to end gender discrimination through legislation, lobbying, and public demonstrations, was founded by Betty Friedan. A series of key legal decisions throughout the 1960s and 1970s enforced unprecedented rights for women. The impact of both the Civil Rights Movement and the women's movement reverberated internationally. For instance, opposition to apartheid was growing rapidly both within South Africa and internationally. In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly formally condemned apartheid in South Africa, and in 1963 an international trade embargo against South Africa was initiated.

Within the United States, widespread racial disparities and other forms of group-based inequality, along with a liberal political shift in the country, began to place greater emphasis on system-based forces that perpetuated discrimination. Awareness of institutional racism, racially disparate treatment by law or custom that can operate without specific individual action or antipathy (Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967), was rapidly increasing. The 1968 US government Kerner Commission report (Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968), which investigated a wave of race riots in major US cities, is credited for popularizing the term "racism," referring to biases embedded not only in the attitudes of individuals but also in the structure of society. These historical changes in the conceptualization of racism implied that remedies had to go far deeper than prohibiting individual discriminatory acts. Political solutions shifted attention to system-oriented interventions.

Recognizing that the pervasiveness of discrimination produced sweeping legislation to combat systemic bias, US President Lyndon B. Johnson outlined the challenge of racism to a fair society with this analogy:

> Imagine a hundred yard dash in which one of two runners has his legs shackled together. He has progressed ten yards, while the unshackled runner has gone fifty yards. How do they rectify the situation? Do they merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they could say that "equal opportunity" now prevailed. But one of the runners would still be forty yards ahead of the other. Would it not be the better part of justice to allow the previously shackled runner to make up the forty yard gap; or to start the race all over again?
>
> (Franklin & Starr, 1967, p. 226)

Thus, the political climate of the late 1960s brought with it the realization that fairness involves more than just the absence of immediate discrimination. To create fair outcomes, justice needs to be considered broadly. Accordingly, rather than targeting willful individual acts of discrimination as the earlier civil rights legislation did, the affirmative action legislation of 1968 focused on compensatory efforts to achieve equality. Moreover, affirmative action proposed that evidence of systematic disparities based on race, ethnicity, religion, or gender would be sufficient to initiate remediation. In stark contrast to the earlier emphasis on prejudice as a manifestation of individual psychopathology or personality, intention was no longer considered a necessary element to intervene to address bias.

Within social psychology, work on contemporary forms of racism, and related research on sexism (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), similarly pointed to the idea that bias could occur without intention or even awareness. Furthermore, this new work emphasized the widespread existence of social biases even among people who were consciously egalitarian and often insisted that they were nonprejudiced. These approaches, however, primarily considered the consequences of subtle biases, rather than directly exploring the underlying causes of widespread negative beliefs, attitudes, and feelings toward Blacks and other outgroups. In contrast, from the late 1960s into the 1980s, two dominant strands of research emerged within social psychology that converged, in complementary ways, to document the sources of bias in human social cognition and motivation. Demonstrating how fundamental, adaptive, and "normal" psychological processes promote intergroup bias helps to account for both the widespread existence—the virtual universality—of intergroup bias and its ability to operate in effortless and seemingly automatic ways.

In this section, we consider two significant developments in the psychology of intergroup relations that illustrate the ubiquity of prejudice and have been used as support for the "normality of prejudice" perspective that emerged from the political, social, and empirical developments in the US beyond the late 1960s. We discuss (a) the impact of the social-cognitive revolution, and (b) the influence of perspectives associated with political psychology that emphasize the role of social ideologies that perpetuate group-based disparities and discrimination.

Social cognition

As a field, in the late 1960s psychology moved from the constraints of behaviorism, which made the study of directly observable responses the focus of psychological inquiry (Skinner, 1972), to greater attention to intervening complex cognitive processes (Neisser, 1967). The cognitive revolution within psychology quickly spawned an explosion of social cognitive research in social psychology. The foundation of much of this work was laid by Gordon Allport (1954) in his classic volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*. Allport argued that prejudice can be entirely normal (see Chapter 2, "The Normality of Prejudgment") and thereby anticipated psychology's cognitive revolution by positing prejudice as a product of normal categorization processes. Allport (1954) wrote: "The human mind must think with the aid of categories . . . Categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process" (p. 20). He further explained, "The category enables us quickly to identify a related object"; categories' "whole purpose seems to be to facilitate perception and conduct—in other words, to make our adjustment to life speedy, smooth, and consistent" (1954, p. 21). Social cognition research in the following three decades built on Allport's insights by documenting the range of ordinary mechanisms of perception and interpretation that often lead to biases against outgroups (see Fiske, 2005).

In particular, from the perspective of social cognition, prejudice, stereotyping, and bias were conceived as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information people encounter daily (see Hamilton, 1981). The function of cognitive biases in simplifying a complex and cognitively demanding environment produced an explosion of research on social stereotyping. More research was published on social stereotyping in the decade of the 1970s than in the 60 years before (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). Recent work has focused on a range of general cognitive mechanisms that underlie social stereotyping (Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009).

Moreover, considerable attention was devoted to social categorization, an initial step in this process (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Again, Allport (1954) presaged this movement. According to Allport, this tendency to think in terms of category membership makes group-based distinctions of primary importance to people, and these distinctions guide perceptions, beliefs, and reactions in important ways. Allport (1954) observed that "the category saturates all that it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavor" (p. 21). Moreover, the distinction between groups containing the self (i.e., ingroups) and all other groups (i.e., outgroups) is of great relevance and consequence. Allport proposed that this differentiation represents the foundation for the development of prejudice. He noted that "in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required" (p. 42).

Since the late 1960s, social psychologists have documented the profound effects of social categorization and differentiation between ingroups and outgroups on intergroup relations. When people are categorized into groups, differences among members within a group tend to be minimized and distinctions between members of different categories tend to be exaggerated (Tajfel, 1969; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). Because the self is the nucleus of social perception, categorizing people fundamentally involves a distinction between the group containing the self and other groups, resulting in a number of ingroup/outgroup biases (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). People (a) process information more deeply for ingroup than for outgroup members, (b) favor ingroup over outgroup members in evaluations, (c) are more generous and forgiving in their behavioral attributions of ingroup versus outgroup members, (d) exhibit a physical readiness to approach ingroup members and avoid outgroup members, (e) are more helpful toward ingroup versus outgroup members, (f) are more cooperative toward and trustful of ingroup versus outgroup members, and (g) exercise more personal restraint when using endangered resources with ingroup versus outgroup members. Such ingroup favoritism is often, though not necessarily, accompanied by outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999). This dual perspective is evidenced by research on infrahumanization. Because people tend to believe that ingroup members are more fully human than outgroup members, ingroup members are perceived to be more capable of expressing uniquely human emotions than outgroup members (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007).

Social categorization is thus a key concept that bridges the focus on microlevel processes in social cognition with more macrolevel processes in social identity approaches to intergroup relations. Indeed, newer theories and approaches, originating from scholars in North America, Europe, and Australia, commonly draw on processes related to social categorization and seamlessly integrate key elements of social identity and social cognition perspectives to understand how bias is aroused and how it can be reduced. For example, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; see also Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010) proposes that people prefer membership in small groups in order to satisfy their competing motives for differentiation and assimilation. Achieving this balance between motives enhances one's feelings of connection to the group, reduces feelings of uncertainty, and increases group cohesiveness (Hogg, 1996).

Complementing the work on cognition, recent research has considered the role of emotions in intergroup relations. How groups are perceived in terms of the dimensions of competence and warmth determines not only the content of stereotypes about those groups but also how people respond emotionally to them (e.g., admiration, contempt), which in turn influences intergroup behavior (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). The emotional reactions that people have to events are intimately tied to their social identities (Smith & Mackie, 2010). For instance, feelings of collective guilt aroused by recognition of the moral transgressions of one's group in the past can motivate people to make reparations to members of victimized groups in the present (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).

The ingroup projection model, developed by Amelie Mummendey and her colleagues (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) during the period of reunification of East and West Germany, further demonstrated how making a common, inclusive identity (e.g., Germany) salient can sometimes exacerbate intergroup bias between subgroups (e.g., East and West Germans). When a common identity is salient for members of different groups, subgroup members (particularly those from the higher status subgroup) regard their group's characteristics (such as norms, values, and goals) as more prototypical of the common, inclusive category compared to those of the other subgroup. When this occurs, the outgroup is judged as substandard, deviant, or inferior, leading to greater bias between the subgroups (e.g., Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004).

Focusing on how intergroup contact reduces bias, Hewstone and his colleagues (see Tausch & Hewstone, 2010) have demonstrated that the effect of positive and frequent contact between groups on bias is moderated by category-related processes (e.g., the perceived typicality of outgroup members of their group) and intraindividual factors (e.g., lower levels of anxiety and higher levels of empathy). This work has examined a range of intergroup contexts, including Northern Ireland, India, and Cyprus. In addition, Spears (2010) emphasizes how group identity relates to functional strategies for managing group-level threats, whereas intraindividual processes (e.g., the experience of group-based emotions) augment rational assessments and appropriately constrain intergroup reactions. Thus, social categorization represents a foundation for blending American and European traditions in the study of intergroup relations in creative, conceptually encompassing ways.

Recent research in social cognitive processes in intergroup relations, stimulated by research in the 1980s in cognitive psychology and social psychology (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), has also explored additional microlevel elements, such as the influence of automatic (and often unconscious) processes, as a function of social categorization. Considerable attention has been devoted to implicit biases. In contrast to explicit processes, which are conscious and deliberative, implicit processes involve a lack of awareness and intention. The mere presence of the attitude object is often sufficient to activate the associated stereotype and attitude automatically. Implicit biases arise through overlearned associations (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000), which may be rooted in repeated personal experience, widespread media exposure, or cultural representations of different groups. For example, in the US, people automatically categorize others based on race, gender, and age, and these categories immediately elicit implicit evaluations and beliefs about members of the group (Blair, 2001) that systematically influence thoughts and actions in biased ways (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).

This line of research on implicit biases complements research on contemporary forms of intergroup bias and racism that posited the existence of unconscious bias but lacked the tools for directly assessing implicit prejudice and stereotypes. As a whole, the advancement of social cognition research pushed the field of intergroup relations forward to include a variety of new aspects of bias. Even further removed from the early emphasis on the prejudiced personality, these developments moved intergroup relations research also beyond the role of the social context to include the adaptive processes rooted in thought processes and motivations not always obviously or necessarily associated with prejudice and bias.

Social ideologies

To help understand the ubiquity of prejudice, social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) proposes that, because of the evolutionary advantage of vertically organized (i.e., stratified), as opposed to horizontally organized (i.e., limited status differentiation) social relations, groups are hierarchically organized within societies and are motivated to maintain their higher status and power over other groups. Group-based hierarchies are also self-perpetuating: Groups that are higher in the hierarchy develop mechanisms, such as laws, cultural values, and social norms, that reinforce their position of greater influence and resources in society. Thus, people appear readily able to rationalize social arrangements that promote their group's advantage and suit their purposes (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov & Duarte, 2003). From the perspective of social dominance theory, most forms of group conflict and oppression are manifestations of this predisposition to believe in and support social dominance. Prejudiced beliefs associated with racism, sexism, and other types of "-ism" are all consequences of social hierarchies and system-justifying ideologies.

Although the ubiquity of these processes suggests the "normality of prejudice," social dominance theory further proposes that there are systematic differences in the extent to which individuals endorse and support hierarchical relations between groups. People who endorse this ideology more strongly—those higher in social dominance orientation (SDO)—also believe more strongly that group hierarchies are inevitable and desirable and see the world as involving greater zero-sum competition between groups for resources. People higher in SDO tend to be more sexist, racist (e.g., toward Blacks, Aboriginals, Indians, Arabs, Asians), and more prejudiced toward immigrants, lesbians, gay men, feminists, housewives, and physically disabled people (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Moreover, people who score high on SDO are expected to favor hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and policies; people who score lower on SDO tend to favor ideologies and policies designed to create equalities and not hierarchies. High-SDO individuals are particularly likely to pursue college majors that are related to hierarchy-enhancing occupations, such as criminal justice, and careers as police officers or prosecutors, whereas low-SDO people are more prevalent in occupations such as social worker or public defender (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994). Social dominance theory thus offers an alternative perspective (e.g., to work on right-wing authoritarianism) on the prejudiced personality by explaining how people may exhibit abnormally high levels of intergroup bias that is rooted firmly within the context of social and societal structures.

Because they are often cloaked by cultural ideologies that legitimize one group's status over another's, many forms of group-based inequality are not fully recognized by members of the targeted groups. Social dominance theory, for example, argues that under some conditions (such as when they endorse system-justifying ideologies or invest in historical narratives manipulated by dominant groups), both high- and low-status groups tend to defend and reinforce the hierarchical status quo. System justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), described earlier, explains this phenomenon by positing that people aim to hold favorable attitudes not only about themselves and their ingroups but also about the overarching social system they inhabit.

Minority groups adopting cultural ideologies that disadvantage them may seem counterintuitive, but there are several reasons why targets of intergroup bias may not recognize unfair treatment. First, individuals cannot serve as their own control group and test whether they would have received better treatment as a member of a more privileged group (Fiske, 1998). Second, discrimination is easier to detect with aggregated evidence than with single cases because lone incidents are easy to explain away (Crosby, 1984). Third, individuals may deny discrimination to avoid feeling that they are being mistreated or that they do not have control over a situation (Major & Sawyer, 2009). As a result, people are more likely to perceive discrimination against their ingroups on the whole than against themselves as individuals (Crosby, 1984).

Summary

The shift from a focus on the psychopathology of prejudice, which was the predominant view of intergroup bias from the 1930s into the 1950s, to the perspective of intergroup bias as ubiquitous and often embedded in normal, typically functional and adaptive motivational and cognitive processes transformed the nature of social psychological research on intergroup relations. This perspective produced an explosion of research in this area beginning in the 1980s, fueled by two different traditions. One approach, which focused on collective identity, originated in Europe and emphasized the motivational influences associated with group membership. Social identity theory brought the group back into social psychology in full force. Moreover, it represented a comprehensive approach to intergroup relations, considering both intergroup bias and potential responses to bias (e.g., collective action). This approach moved the field from a focus on individual attitudes and actions to a richer appreciation of group dynamics and intergroup relations. Social dominance theory further highlighted, beyond group distinctiveness, the critical effect of hierarchical group relations on intergroup relations in general.

The cognitive revolution in psychology, which began in the 1960s, recruited social psychologists interested in intergroup relations. First largely in the US and then internationally, the emphasis of work on intergroup relations from this perspective was on intraindividual processes, such as stereotyping, and on more microlevel cognitive mechanisms, such as categorization. Thus, whereas social identity theory broadened the scope of research from individual influences (e.g., prejudice) to intergroup dynamics and more societal-level factors, social cognition drew attention to processes within individuals (e.g., information processing) that formed the building blocks for individual and group biases. In recent years, considerable attention has been devoted to the role of implicit cognition in intergroup relations, including the unconscious or automatic biases people commonly hold against members of outgroups. Moreover, perspectives such as social dominance theory and system justification theory, which emerged in the 1990s, emphasized how group-based motivations shape cultural ideologies that rationalize the advantage of dominant groups and perpetuate the stratified intergroup relations reflective of the status quo. Understanding the pervasiveness of intergroup bias also stimulated more work on the experiences and perceptions of *targets* of intergroup discrimination.

Consequences of and responses to intergroup bias

Despite the strong cognitive, social, and cultural forces that reinforce traditional hierarchical relations between groups, social psychologists began to focus more on the consequences of being the target of discrimination and the variety of different responses to being victimized by intergroup bias. Although earlier work (e.g., Allport, 1954) considered a range of possible responses of targets of intergroup bias, the emphasis was on the internalization of one's lower status and social disadvantage. For example, the classic study of Clark and Clark (1950), which showed that Black children preferred a White doll over a Black doll, was cited as key evidence of the detrimental effects of segregation on the self-esteem of Blacks in the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) Supreme Court decision for desegregation. Allport (1954) posed the question, "What would happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood?" (p. 42). And then he answered, "Group oppression may destroy the integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its normal pride, and create a groveling self-image" (p. 152).

Indeed, more recent research confirms that being discriminated against has significant negative consequences for one's psychological and physical health and material wellbeing. For instance, discrimination experienced by Black Americans is associated with self-reported ill health, low psychological well-being, and health-related work absences (see Pascoe & Richman, 2009). Perceived discrimination is also associated with hypertension, breast cancer, obesity, high blood pressure, and substance abuse (see Williams & Mohammed, 2009, for a review). In addition, internalization of negative stereotypes about one's group (Johnson, Trawalter, & Dovidio, 2000) and simple awareness of negative cultural stereotypes of one's group, which can be activated in the absence of direct discrimination (i.e., stereotype threat; Quinn, Kallen, & Spencer, 2010; Steele, 1997), can impair cognition and performance of members of socially stigmatized groups and also have longer-term negative consequences.

Goffman's (1963) seminal work, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, began to shift attention to the active role that targets have when they encounter intergroup bias. However, although Goffman's ideas attracted substantial attention within sociology on the experiences of victims of stigma, work on this topic within psychology remained quite limited until the late 1980s (see Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 2008).

Three developments within social psychology simulated a dramatic increase in the amount and conceptual breadth of research in social psychology on the target's perspective on bias. Theoretically, social identity theory, which was beginning to be much more influential internationally in the late 1980s and 1990s, offered a comprehensive conceptual foundation for understanding the diversity of responses that targets of bias could adopt. In addition to suggesting processes related to system justification, social identity theory identified a number of different responses commonly pursued by members of low-power groups, such as individual mobility, emphasis on the positive distinctiveness of one's group, and collective action to improve psychological and material welfare (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Empirically, evidence was accumulating on the psychological resilience of members of disadvantaged groups. For instance, Crocker and Major (1989) found that, in contrast to the popular assumption of internalization of stigma, Black and Latino Americans did not have lower self-esteem than White Americans (see also Twenge & Crocker, 2002). And finally, socially, there was a significant demographic shift in the profession. The number of women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups receiving advanced degrees in social psychology has increased dramatically since the 1980s. Women now constitute a significant majority of recipients of doctoral degrees in social psychology. Together, these elements broadened the perspective, provided new insights, and substantially altered the course of research on intergroup relations.

Today, the consequences of stigmatization are understood to be more dynamic and complex. Targets of prejudice and discrimination are no longer considered to be passive victims of bias. Attributions of personal failure to the bias of others can inhibit the internalization of stigma because it provides an external explanation for such events, and stronger ingroup identification can buffer group members against the negative psychological consequences of personal discrimination and bias against their group generally (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). In addition, beyond studying general processes that influence a range of intergroup relations, new approaches recognize the vulnerability of members of particular groups to specific forms of biased treatment (e.g., objectification; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Research on the reactions to, construals of, and personal and collective action in response to actual and perceived intergroup bias represents one of the most generative areas of work on intergroup relations in contemporary social psychology.

Future directions

As the previous section documents, the study of intergroup relations within social psychology has diversified remarkably in its perspective. Given the momentum of various lines of inquiry, this diversification is likely to continue. The current approaches, which rely on different methodologies and levels of analysis, however, also show signs of maturing conceptually in ways that will offer the potential for producing a coherent multilevel analysis of intergroup relations and a promise of further integration with other areas of psychology and behavioral science.

The momentum to understand the processes underlying intergroup relations and bias at more micro levels has intensified with the emergence of social neuroscience. Interest in this area has been stimulated by rapid technological advancements, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) techniques in the study of brain function. Heatherton (2004) wrote, “The neuroscientific study of social cognition reflects a new interdisciplinary and dynamic approach that is providing crucial insights into longstanding social psychological questions” (p. 1681). The recent scholarly progress in this area indicates a new era of exceptional empirical and theoretical potential and excitement.

However, progress in integrating neuroscience into mainstream social psychology started slowly (see Dovidio, Pearson, & Orr, 2008). One general issue concerns the fact that although neuroscience may be very useful to social psychology at some levels of analysis (e.g., social cognition), attempting to reduce other types of complex social phenomena to specific brain structures and processes may not be helpful and may distract researchers from pursuing more molar explanations for social behavior. Relatedly, Harmon-Jones and Devine (2003) cautioned that “some issues and phenomena examined by social psychologists may not be reducible to a neuroscience (and hence more molecular) level of analysis” (p. 590).

At some levels of analysis, however, the integration has been effective and mutually informative. For instance, a growing body of empirical evidence now consistently links implicit activation of intergroup bias, typically as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), with changes in activation in the amygdala, a structure often associated with threat responses. In general, amygdala activation is greater when people view members of another race than of their own race, and this activation is greater among people with more negative implicit racial attitudes (Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). Moreover, beyond offering additional validation of implicit measures of bias, neuroimaging can yield new theoretical insights into why prejudice and stereotyping are only moderately related and how they represent distinct processes (see Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Amodio and Devine (2006) explain:

> An examination of anatomical and neurochemical connectivity of the amygdala and surrounding structures reveals strong direct links with neural regions associated with . . . mobilizing fight or flight responses . . . By contrast . . . semantic associations are likely embedded in distributed networks in association cortex and thus may influence social cognition by biasing higher order information processing, such as when inferring the beliefs and intentions of another person . . . Although systems for affect- and semantic-based associations typically function in concert, and thus tend to appear blended in outward verbal and behavioral responses, a consideration of their distinct operations is critical for understanding the behavioral effects of implicit stereotyping and evaluation.
>
> (p. 653)

In an elegant series of studies using only behavioral measures (response time measures, self-reports, and seating distance), Amodio and Devine demonstrated the cognitive and behavioral independence of prejudice and stereotyping. Thus, when used in combination with traditional social psychological techniques for studying intergroup relations, neuroscientific methodologies can help test existing theory and assist in creating novel, more comprehensive theories of intergroup relations.

The social psychology of intergroup relations will also likely be enriched by greater incorporation of statistical techniques, such as dyadic analyses and network analyses, that have been developed in the area of interpersonal relations. For instance, despite the importance of intergroup contact and friendships for improving intergroup relations in general (Pettigrew, 1997; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997), to date there has been limited research directly examining the complex nature of actual intergroup interactions (see Richeson & Shelton, 2010) and intergroup friendship formation, and how these processes may differ from those underlying intragroup relations. The studies that do exist in this area (see West & Dovidio, 2010, for a review) reveal that interracial dyads in sustained interaction (e.g., college roommates) display more negative trajectories of friendship formation over time than do dyads composed of members of the same racial or ethnic group. These interactions, in turn, can reinforce existing intergroup biases, creating intractable conflicts. Future research, drawing on the theories and tools from the area of interpersonal relations, can productively consider the characteristics, situational influences, and emergent properties of the interactions that shape the ways in which intergroup interactions and friendships develop and influence intergroup relations more generally.

In addition, building on provocative findings generated by social dominance theory and the role of power in intergroup relations and reconciliation, another fertile area in the future study of intergroup relations involves the ways in which group status and power shape the needs and motivations of members of different groups and how these influence intergroup interactions, outcomes, and ultimately relations. In general, groups low in power are motivated to achieve greater power and status, whereas groups high in power are motivated to support the structural status quo, which sustains their group's advantage. As a consequence, members of low-power groups are motivated during intergroup interactions to be respected and empowered, whereas members of high-power groups are motivated to be liked and accepted (Fiske, Harris, Russell, & Shelton, 2009; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). Thus, interventions that reduce prejudice and promote intergroup harmony by diverting attention away from group-based inequalities may meet the immediate needs of members of high-power groups to be liked but may not translate to enduring efforts to challenge the status quo to create structural social change toward group equality (see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009).

The unprecedented immigration that is occurring globally is also prompting more differentiated views of intergroup perceptions and relations. Simple two-group, ingroup–outgroup models have historically characterized the study of intergroup relations. Within the United States, much of this work has been dominated by a particular form of two-group relations, Blacks and Whites. What is more, in this work groups are often reduced to two individuals. Considering more complex relationships among multiple groups will likely produce alternative frameworks for understanding intergroup relations. For instance, recent research suggests that more than one dimension may be involved in national definitions. Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown (2009) identified two dimensions of national inclusion, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism defines national inclusion in terms of shared ancestry, often reflected by physical appearance and language as well as by formal heritage. From this perspective, group membership has a strong essentialist quality, in which ethnic and racial groups are often differentiated along a "biological" continuum (Jost & Hamilton, 2005). Civic nationalism, in contrast, defines national group membership in terms of commitment to the ideals and standards perceived to define a nation. Ideology rather than biology represents the defining basis for national inclusion. Although these dimensions are sometimes perceived as oppositional, more recently they have been conceptualized as separate, independent dimensions underlying nationalistic expressions (Pehrson et al., 2009). How different groups are perceived on these different dimensions is likely to shape the ways people respond to other groups and potentially influence coalition formation and social hierarchy between groups.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the present chapter outlines the historical evolution of research on the social psychology of intergroup relations. We emphasize that intellectual history is intimately related to social, economic, and political history. The psychology of intergroup relations was largely neglected within social psychology for the first quarter of the 20th century, as the discipline appeared to accept the doctrine of the superiority of the White race, which was the legacy of slavery in the United States and a justification for colonialism globally. Initial recognition of unfair group-based biases stimulated interest in documenting the extent of stereotyping and prejudice. This documentation, along with the increasing ethnic and religious diversity in the profession and the rise of the Nazis to power, led psychologists to instead focus on identifying who was prejudiced and conceptualizing intergroup bias as a manifestation of individual psychopathology. Although the "prejudice as psychopathology" approach brought considerable attention to the study of intergroup relations in social psychology, it resulted in a narrow individual-based perspective on combating intergroup bias. From this perspective, bias was a social cancer (Dovidio, 2001), and removing the abnormal individuals who were prejudiced from positions of power and influence was thought to be largely sufficient to alleviate the social problem.

Experiences during the Second World War and a growing European recognition of the limitations of the individualistic approach to the study of intergroup relations inspired the social identity perspective, which made collective identity a central construct in social psychology and demonstrated the profound effects of group-based motivations on intergroup relations and bias. At the same time, the growing awareness of the civil rights of Blacks in the United States after the war heightened awareness of the pervasiveness of intergroup bias and underscored how systems, not simply individuals, could be unfairly biased. Shifts in legal focus from punishing acts of individual discrimination to recognizing and compensating for systemic bias were paralleled by an emphasis on the "normality of prejudice." Research in social cognition considered how biases in the ways people perceived others and processed information provided the foundation for intergroup biases to develop. These biases were further shaped by the hierarchical organization of groups within societies and individuals' endorsement of hierarchical relations between groups. Finally, as women and racial or ethnic minorities entered the field of social psychology in the 1980s, the study of the experience of members of disadvantaged groups, which was an important component of social identity theory, expanded in significant new ways.

The study of intergroup relations is currently one of the most active, dynamic, and important areas of scholarly activity within social psychology. The momentum of the different threads of research will likely continue to yield different research tracks employing various levels of analysis. Yet the maturity and scholarly security of the field promises the potential for consolidation of different perspectives and an eagerness to incorporate the ideas and perspectives of other disciplines and subdisciplines to create a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of intergroup relations, both theoretically and practically.

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