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

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A History of Justice and Morality Research

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21 A history of justice and morality research

Tom R. Tyler

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Justice is an ancient topic of concern among those interested in the social dynamics of organized groups. For example, it appears in discussions of society by both Aristotle and Plato. In these and subsequent discussions by figures as diverse as Machiavelli and Marx, a consistent theme has been that people recognize principles defining what is appropriate and fair that are distinct from the ability of those with power and resources to do as they will and that people respond to whether other people are acting justly. While the idea of justice has been frequently mentioned by a wide variety of political, social, and religious theorists, there has been little effort to systematically articulate and test psychological models of justice.

Social psychology has only recently focused on justice and on the systematic empirical study of the social dynamics of justice. For example, the classic text in social psychology by Jones and Gerard (1967) contains no mention of the study of justice. And, prior to the fourth edition, the *Handbook of Social Psychology* did not have a chapter on the concept of *justice* (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The importance of justice to the field of social psychology has emerged only in the past several decades.

Areas of justice

The field of justice has developed in a series of waves of research that have defined four core justice areas: relative deprivation; distributive justice; procedural justice; and retributive justice. Each of those areas of justice will first be briefly reviewed to identify its core questions and research findings.

Each wave of justice research addressed some or all of a core set of questions about justice. Those include what justice means; whether justice influences people's thoughts, feelings and behaviors; the level at which justice should be considered (individual, group, and/or society); the reason that people care about justice; and the scope or range across which people consider issues of justice when dealing with others.

Relative deprivation

The idea of scientifically studying justice first became central in the social sciences after the Second World War with the development of the concept of relative deprivation. Prior to the Second World War, psychology paid very little attention to subjective experiences. For example, the classic volume *Frustration and Aggression* (Dollard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) was based on the premise that there is a direct connection between external events and behavioral reactions, i.e. poor economic conditions led to aggressive behavior. The subjective interpretation of experience was not a central concept.

Relative deprivation is the suggestion that people's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with outcomes is based on a comparison of those outcomes to some reference standard. It became a key idea within all of the social sciences (Merton and Kitt, 1950) in the years following the publication of the multivolume series *The American Soldier* (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star & Williams, 1949), and had an enormous impact on people's general thinking about such key social issues as why people are satisfied or dissatisfied and what leads to engagement in collective actions such as labor or political organizing to produce social change, or rioting to protest disadvantaged conditions.

A number of factors led to an intellectual climate in which people's interpretations of their experiences became a more central focus of study within social psychology. One factor was the large investment in psychology that was made by the military during the Second World War, which generated a great deal of empirical data on factors shaping morale and performance and created a cadre of trained and experienced social scientists to interpret it. A second factor was the widespread dismay over the emergence of despotic regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan. The cause of this emergence was viewed as being social in nature, for example as flowing from the ability of fascist governments to create and disseminate effective propaganda. Psychologists such as Kurt Lewin directed their research programs at understanding the dynamics of democratic and autocratic authority systems, emphasizing their influence on people's attitudes (Lewin, 1951). The search for understanding of the cause of the worldwide cataclysms of the 1940s led to openness to a more dynamic conception of the subjective understanding of experiences. This desire to understand social dynamics also led to other important movements in social psychology, including the study of group dynamics (Cartwright & Zander, 1960) and obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974).

One core justice issue which was first addressed in relative deprivation research is the issue of levels of justice. From its inception in the study of relative deprivation, studies of justice

and injustice have recognized two levels of analysis: individual- and group-based. This distinction between levels was first raised in the study of egoistical vs. fraternal deprivation (Runciman, 1966).

Walter Runciman's relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966) suggests that people can focus on personal outcomes (egoistic deprivation) or they can be concerned about the outcomes obtained by the groups of which they are members (fraternal deprivation). Subsequent research has suggested that this distinction is important because collective action, such as rioting or, in a more positive vein, the Civil Rights movement in the United States, is primarily motivated by fraternal deprivation. Egoistical deprivation triggers personal efforts at achievement or, when people see no feasible route toward improvement, toward behaviors such as alcoholism. Hence, the manner in which people interpret their experience is important. If people feel that they are relatively deprived as individuals, they react individually. If they feel relatively deprived due to group membership, their response is collective. And other judgments also matter, for example the feasibility of change.

Another core justice issue is the nature of the justice motive. Although highly influential, relative deprivation theory was not initially a "true justice" theory because, while it suggested that people compare what they have or what they want to a standard of reference, it did not argue that those comparisons were necessarily shaped by principles of justice, entitlement or "deservingness." An example of such a model is Helson's adaptation level theory, which postulates that people make comparisons but links the psychological dynamics underlying that process to physiological adaptation, not judgments about what is appropriate or inappropriate.

More generally relative deprivation models and the social comparison issues that flow from them have been studied in terms of when people make comparisons and why they do so, not in terms of the underlying psychological dynamics of comparison. The importance of temporal comparisons is reflected in work on collective unrest (Gurr, 1970), while work on social comparisons has become a literature of its own (Masters & Smith, 1987; Olson, Herman & Zanna, 1986).

The connection of comparison issues to justice emerges as a central theme in later discussions of relative deprivation. The work of Crosby in particular made deservingness a key antecedent to discrepancy (Crosby, 1976, 1982). Her work places a determination about what is appropriate, reasonable and just as one filter through which people react to individual- or group-based outcome discrepancies. Crosby's model is more complex and includes other conditions such as feasibility of attainment that people also consider when reacting to discrepancies. But its core feature is recognizing that people are guided by their sense of what they and others deserve to receive. It suggests that people do not necessarily view discrepancies as unjust. Their view is shaped by many issues, including whether such discrepancies are viewed as legitimate. It is only when a discrepancy is regarded as being undeserved, for example because it is not due to some reasonable criterion for difference, that people feel anger. While Crosby discusses deservedness, her work does not present a model of how deservedness is determined, i.e. what principles define it, something that is addressed by distributive justice models.

The idea of deservingness fit well with two important applications of relative deprivation: to racial inequality and race-based riots and to issues of gender inequity. In the 1960s there were a series of major urban "race riots" in the United States. In response the government created a commission that issued the Kerner report (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968), which discussed social science research on relative deprivation as an explanation for why the riots occurred and who rioted. At the same time academic researchers became concerned with issues of gender inequity. For example, Crosby (1982) used the concept of relative deprivation as a framework for understanding pay discrepancies between men and women.

The suggestion that deservingness is central to people's feelings and behaviors in social settings sets the stage for a core question that has been asked by justice researchers: whether people really care about justice and injustice. And a key contribution of the psychology of justice has been the demonstration that people's judgments, feelings, and behaviors in social settings are influenced by their views about what is just and fair, views that are distinct from evaluations of personal or group self-interest (Tyler & Smith, 1998). This literature indicates that people are not simply motivated by their assessments of what is beneficial or harmful to them, or to those they care about, or to the groups, organizations, and societies to which they belong. People also make judgments about what is just or unjust, using criteria that reflect justice-based evaluations, and those judgments shape their reactions in social contexts (Tyler, 2000; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1998).

Distributive justice

Theories of distributive justice supply the missing link connecting feelings to justice because they tie people's reactions to comparisons to issues of what people think is fair (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). They do so by arguing that people compare their outcomes to standards of what is a deserved outcome. In other words, people have a sense of what they are entitled to receive, and evaluate their outcomes against this standard (Walster et al., 1978). This involves distributive justice—the fairness of the allocation of desirable outcomes across people.

A number of prominent theorists discussed distributive justice from the late 1950s through the 1970s, including Blau (1964), Homans (1961) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959). These authors were primarily concerned with issues of exchange but recognized that exchanges were evaluated at least in part by reference to their fairness or unfairness. They recognized that people had implicit models for the appropriate relationship between inputs (ability, effort) and rewards and rewards. Their models—in particular the work of Homans (1961)—defined

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equity as the ratio of inputs to outputs. He indicates that: "the value of what a member of a group receives from other members should be proportional to his investments" (p. 237).

According to distributive justice models people express the greatest satisfaction when they receive a fair distribution, in comparison to receiving more or less in absolute terms but thinking that they are being given "too much" or "too little" in justice terms; that they will incur material losses to pressure others to distributive resources via principles of justice; and that they will leave situations they view as characterized by the unfair distribution of resources to move to situations where resource distribution is fairer, but in which they receive fewer rewards.

The central premise of distributive justice theories is that people react to what they receive in relation to what they deserve (Adams, 1965). As noted, there are two potentially unhappy groups: those who receive too little and those who receive too much. As might be expected, those who receive less than they feel they deserve are found to be angry and to engage in a variety of behaviors in reaction, ranging from working less to rioting. Justice researchers have studied many instances in which people have received less than they deserve, and have shown that this leads to a strong negative emotional reaction and to efforts to seek restitution. Among disadvantaged groups, complex psychological dynamics are unleashed because the disadvantaged often lack the power to compel justice and must therefore find ways to manage their feelings of unfairness.

Interestingly, and less intuitively, those who get too much are also found to be unhappy and to engage in efforts to either restore distributive justice by mechanisms such as working harder or giving resources away, or if those solutions are not practical, by leaving the situation. This latter distributive justice finding is especially important because it suggests that the desire to act fairly can influence the advantaged to take actions on behalf of others. It is the reactions of the "too much" group that reflects true justice based feelings. Becoming angry when one receives "too little" can be explained by self-interest as well as justice.

Adams (1965) played a key role in bringing attention to the idea of equity by arguing that equity was a model of justice helpful in work organizations. By paying employees fairly, he argued, satisfaction and productivity could be enhanced. For example, Adams (1963) studied the relationship between wage inequities, productivity and work quality. This connection between distributive justice and productivity suggested that social psychology could make an important contribution to solving a major workplace problem—pay dissatisfaction.

Core justice issues

Principles of distributive justice: What does distributive justice mean? Beyond demonstrating that distributive justice matters, researchers have also focused on the principles that people use to evaluate distributions. In their work on equity, Walster and others present equity as a general principle of distributive justice. This framing of equity theory is best reflected in the 1978 volume of *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. That volume describes equity as a general theory of social interaction. The core of this general argument is linking the concept of distributive justice to judgments of equity, a distributive principle by which people's rewards match their effort or contributions.

Morton Deutsch (1985) supported the argument that distributive justice is important, but suggested that it need not be defined in terms of equity. Instead, he noted, there are many standards of distributive justice. Deutsch presented three core principles of distributive justice: equity, equality and need (Deutsch, 1975). Equality involves giving everyone similar outcomes, while equity and need differentiate among people in terms of either their productivity or their needs.

Deutsch (1982) suggests that the use of each principle promotes different social goals: Equity leads to productivity, equality to social harmony, and need to social welfare. Hence, the principles used depend on the goals of the interaction. And, Deutsch suggests, the nature of the relationship shapes which goals people will seek and, consequently, which principles people will consider appropriate. This is the case because the underlying relationship among people shapes their goals in their interactions with others. Deutsch draws on research concerning the fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relations and defines four key dimensions: cooperative–competitive; equal–unequal power; task–social orientation; and formal vs. informal relations. He argues that the nature of the interdependence between people shapes the importance that they place on different principles of distributive justice. For example, equal relationships tend to use equality to divide resources.

Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) found support to Deutsch's argument and confirmed that both people's degree of concern with distributive justice and their use of particular principles of justice varied depending on the nature of their interdependence. And, as Deutsch hypothesized, such variations were linked to the fact that people in different types of social setting were pursuing different goals.

Several other core justice issues were also addressed within the area of distributive justice. One is the level of justice that is important. Most distributive justice research focuses on individual- or group-level judgments about personal outcomes. However it is recognized that people also make judgments about the overall distribution of outcomes in a group or society. This has been referred to as macrojustice (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981). Research on macrojustice reveals an interesting inconsistency between levels of justice judgments, with people viewing the macrolevel (i.e., group) distributions that result from microlevel (i.e., individual) principles as unjust. In particular, people strongly endorse rewarding people based on merit or productivity (the equity principle), but find the overall distribution of resources across society that results to be unfair. People generally want to create a floor below which people cannot sink, and sometimes view a lower level of inequality as fairer.

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Another question is whether distributive justice principles are distinct from self-interest. The prevailing assumption within the social sciences is that people act in their material self-interest. This assumption is a key starting point for early social exchange theories that have dominated our understanding of why people join groups, how they act when in groups, and why they leave them (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Hence, for justice to be important it is necessary to demonstrate that it shapes behavior in ways not understandable through self-interest. A parallel example is the theory of cognitive dissonance, which drew attention because it made the counterintuitive argument that under some conditions people would be more motivated when they received less compensation (Festinger, 1957).

Studies typically find that people balance between self-interest and principle in allocation situations. Although influenced by what is in their interest, people distinguish justice from self-interest and typically do not simply act in their own interest. A core aspect of shared social rules is that they do not reflect the self-interest of any single individual in the group. Rather, they are a collective effort to define reasonable principles for social interaction. John Rawls captures this quality of justice rules when he talks about the idea of rules developed "behind the veil of ignorance." People try to make rules, he argues, without referencing their own situation. We would, for example, decide if we should reward people for having skills of a particular type without knowing if we would have those skills ourselves (Rawls, 1971).

Of course, in reality people cannot separate their personal attributes and status from their thoughts, feelings, and preferences, so justice rules are a compromise between the interests of various people and groups, as are the rules and laws that guide them. However, the core argument is the same—justice principles are shared group assessments of what is reasonable as a compromise among competing self-interests within a given type of situation. As a consequence, distributive justice rules can help people make allocation decisions effectively but this is diminished to the degree that self-interest motivates justice judgments. If everyone defines justice in terms of their own self-interest, principles of justice will not be able to facilitate agreements across individuals.

Studies of distributive justice make clear that justice can motivate people to behave in ways that are not in accord with their sense of their own personal and group interests. For example, the advantaged may give resources to the disadvantaged. On the other hand, such justice motivations are never absolute. Typically people compromise between the motivation to act justly and the desire to act in their self-interest.

One of the best illustrations of such compromises is found in the literature on ultimatum games (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Wilke, & Vermunt, 2004). In the ultimatum game the proposers make offers about how to divide some set of resources. The responder can either accept or reject this offer. Studies suggest that proposers make, and responders accept, offers somewhere between an equal division and a division favoring the proposer. For example, if 10 dollars is to be divided the successful offers fall between zero and five dollars. In other words, both parties compromise between self-interest and fairness, with the proposer giving more than they would be rationally expected to, and the responder accepting less than an equal division. Further, studies show that responders will decline small gains rather than accept "unfairly" low divisions, illustrating that people are willing to incur losses to defend principles of fairness.

Of course, there are other ways to deal with conflicts about justice. Early work on distributive justice pointed to the possibility of motivated social cognition, i.e., that people might try to restore justice psychologically (Walster et al., 1978). That distributive justice research first developed the distinction between psychological and behavioral responses to wrongdoing. When someone receives too much or provides too little to others, a conflict is created between their behavior and the principles of justice. There are two types of response. One is for outcomes to be reallocated so as to be fair. The victim frequently advocates this response, while the harm-doer has mixed feelings—they believe in justice but are also benefiting from the unjust situation. Hence, harm-doers are motivated to psychologically justify the situation, coming to believe that they deserve the outcomes they have. For example, studies of distributive justice show that people who are "overpaid" find ways to justify their payment by increasing their sense of the difficulty of the task, and hence reframing the situation as one in which their pay is reasonable.

The motivation to justify advantage brings harm-doers and victims into conflict because the victim wants redistribution while the harm-doer seeks to justify their gains. An important function of social authorities is to lend support to victims, or at least avoid social conflict, by supporting the application of objective standards of fairness, which resolves conflicts, and by discouraging psychological justification, which leads to long-term hostility. More generally, there are a variety of social mechanisms through which the advantaged justify their advantages with the intention of keeping them without the negative emotions that they experience from feeling that they are violating principles of justice (Chen & Tyler, 2001; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).

The issue of the scope of justice was also addressed in distributive justice research. Some argue that justice is bounded or limited in scope. The possibility of a scope of justice has important societal implications, since that scope can shift with events so that both individuals and the members of groups can become included, or excluded, from the scope of other's moral community. Once outside it, people are no longer accorded the presumption of treatment with dignity and respect for rights that group members in good standing assume they will receive (Nagata, 1993; Opotow, 1990, 1993).

Deutsch (1985) argued that people do not extend their concern about justice to all living things, or even to all people. Rather their concerns have a clear scope and outside of that scope people do not act in accord with the principles of distributive fairness. What defines this scope of justice? To Deutsch it

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is the domain of productive social exchange relationships. In other words, people follow principles of distributive justice with those with whom they see the potential of beneficial social exchanges, rather than feeling some type of intrinsic justice-based motivation to act fairly. And those people or animals that are not viewed as candidates for productive social exchange are not treated with justice.

Finally, one of the most important questions raised by the finding that justice matters is trying to understand why people are motivated to act fairly, and this question is first addressed by distributive justice theories. Some writers present the motivation to act justly as a core and universal human motivation (Lerner, 1980, 2002, 2003). This argument receives support from studies of victims that involve measurement of their automatic reactions to injustice (Hafer, 2000, 2005). Studies suggest that the motivation to justify injustice by changing assessments of victim's deservingness is fundamental and widespread, if not universal.

Alternative perspectives emphasize justice in the service of particular needs. Instrumental views suggest that justice is important when people are seeking to make material gains or avoid material losses. Justice facilitates this objective when it defines rules of distributive or procedural justice that can maximize the effective distribution of resources in groups. In theories of distributive justice the answer is framed in social exchange terms (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). People are viewed as being concerned with developing effective ways to exchange resources with others, both within particular situations and over time, since such cooperation is generally recognized as being to everyone's advantage. The development of principles of fairness occurs, from this perspective, because it aids in resource exchange.

Shared principles of fairness aid resource exchange because they indicate the distribution of resources that constitutes a reasonable exchange. Having such rules facilitates material exchanges, since there are clear rules for what each person deserves and each exchange does not have to begin with an effort to define reasonable exchange principles. Such shared principles also facilitate the occurrence of exchanges since they allow people to alleviate their concerns that they are being disadvantaged in exchanges with others (acting like a "sucker"), or conversely that they are taking advantage of others. People can compare their outcomes to principles of justice to determine if what they are receiving in relationship to others is reasonable and appropriate.

This argument suggests that having principles of distributive fairness is a precursor to effective cooperation, and the ability to develop such shared principles may be a very fundamental aspect of people's social skills that has facilitated the evolution of humans into social beings who live in organized societies and cooperate. Recent research has supported this argument by demonstrating that animals that live in group settings, for example monkeys (Brosnan, 2006) and dogs (Range, Horn, Viranyi & Huber, 2008), also recognize and act in accord with principles of distributive fairness. It is particularly striking that the members of both these species share with humans the willingness to forgo rewards to defend principles of fairness.

Ironically, however, while these arguments support the idea that justice matters, they diminish the social psychological significance of justice findings because they suggest that people's motivation for caring about justice is their own material self-interest. Social exchange models, such as that of Rusbult, argue that people in groups have a long-range view of their self-interest, often investing their efforts in groups in anticipation of long-term payoffs (Rusbult and Van Lange, 1996). If the principles of distributive justice are accepted as instruments of coordination in the service of self-interest, they show a sophisticated ability on the part of both people and animals to develop coordinating rules and principles. But they do not suggest that people are motivated by intrinsic justice concerns when they act fairly.

Distributive justice and cooperation

The core underlying assumption of justice theories is that people want to cooperate with others, but want to find ways to reach stable principles for cooperation that neither put them at a disadvantage by giving them too few outcomes relative to others nor produce unstable interactions by giving them too much and leading to anger among others. Justice principles should allow people to exchange resources with others over time in long-term relationships that are beneficial to all parties.

For justice rules to be effective as guides for social coordination, three things must be true. First, there must be consensus about what the principles of justice are. Second, people must be willing to follow those justice rules in the sense that they accept them as guides concerning appropriate compromises with others. Third, people must be willing to enforce these justice rules when others do not follow them. If others try to take "too much" or even "too little," people should be upset and take some form of action. We can first examine these ideas in the context of distributive justice. Rules of justice that pertain to the appropriate distribution of resources between people are referred to as *rules of distributive justice*. These rules tell us what a person is entitled to or "deserves" under particular social conditions.

Consensus is the first important idea underlying the social utility of justice rules. Justice is a social judgment. Unlike a table, a chair, or another person, there is no physical reality to justice. The concept of justice is created by people in a group to facilitate their interaction, and it only effectively fulfills that function when its meaning is shared among the members of a group. Justice is like a word in a language. A language spoken by one person has no communicative value—the meaning of words must be shared.

The principles of distributive justice are complex, and no single principle is used by people to reflect distributive justice in all types of setting (Deutsch, 1975). It is interesting therefore that evidence from studies conducted in the United States suggests that within a given context, there is a general social

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consensus about what principles govern. For example, in the United States people generally agree that work settings should be governed by equity, social settings by equality, and social welfare settings by need (Tyler, 1984). This consensus is crucial, because without it justice cannot effectively coordinate action.

Of course, there are many other possible justice principles (Reis, 1987). However, research suggests that equity, equality, and need are the three core principles most widely used, at least in the United States (Deutsch, 1985). It is not necessary that people within all societies agree about principles of distributive justice. Just as everyone in the world need not speak the same language, the only issue is whether people who interact have a shared social framework within which to coordinate their actions. Hence, cross-cultural studies show that different societies have different rules of distributive fairness within particular arenas, but that within those societies people tend to agree about a common rule (Tyler et al., 1997).

Evidence further suggests that people are willing to defer to the principles of distributive justice. In particular, they are most satisfied with outcomes if they think that the outcomes they are receiving are fair. So, a person is happier to receive $2 if they believe that $2 is the "fair" wage for a task. A typical example of this finding is the study by Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (1972). In that study, students were paid a given amount of money to perform a task. However, they were then told that the wage was fair, unfairly high, or unfairly low. Those who thought they were being fairly paid were the most likely to express satisfaction, whereas those who were told they were overpaid or underpaid were less satisfied.

Other studies have shown that people adjust their effort to reestablish justice. For example, if people are told they are overpaid, they work harder (Walster et al., 1978). This can involve higher levels of output and/or working longer hours. Whatever actions are taken, however, they are motivated by the desire to reestablish justice. Conversely, the amount that employees steal from their workplace has been shown to be linked to their judgments about pay unfairness, with workers stealing more to restore justice if they feel more underpaid. Finally, studies have suggested that people will leave situations in which they feel unfairly overpaid to go to situations in which they are paid less but feel that their pay is fairer (Schmitt & Marwell, 1972).

These findings all suggest that people accept principles of distributive justice. Of course, we need to recognize that in many of the experimental studies people are explicitly told that their allocations are fair or unfair. It is important, therefore, that there is also nonexperimental research to indicate that in field settings people's naturally occurring evaluations of the justice or injustice of their outcomes in groups shape their behavior within those groups, as well as their likelihood of leaving or staying (Tyler et al., 1997).

Finally, more recent research has also suggested that people will forgo personally beneficial outcomes in an effort to enforce adherence to fairness rules by others (Henrich et al., 2006). For example, Gurerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) gave people the opportunity to choose a setting in which they could enforce cooperative rules at a personal cost. They showed that many people chose this setting, and when they were in it, were willing to forgo personal gains to punish those people who deviated from cooperative choices. In other words, people were willing to pay costs to enforce fairness rules by punishing those who violated those rules. Recent research on such "altruistic" punishment suggests that personally rewarding neural processes are activated when people engage in behavior designed to protect group rules, suggesting that people's motivation to protect group rules may develop within fundamental human cognitive and emotional processes (Fehr & Gintis, 2007).

Another example of people's willingness to enforce rules of distributive justice is their willingness to support the redistribution of resources to make that distribution fairer for others. One example is the study of Montada and Schneider (1989), who demonstrated that West Germans were willing to redistribute resources to East Germans when they viewed themselves as unfairly advantaged. This is one of many examples showing that people who feel that they are unfairly advantaged are willing to voluntarily redistribute resources to benefit those whom they view as having too little. People also change their level of active effort on behalf of groups, working harder or slackening off when involved in collective efforts, again in response to justice judgments (Tyler & Blader, 2000). In either case, people incur personal losses to uphold principles of distributive justice.

Does justice work as intended? If it does, then relationships characterized by distributive fairness are more stable and long-lasting. This is the finding of studies of long-term relationships. Those relationships in which the parties experience the interactions as consistent with distributive fairness have a better psychological quality and last longer (Sprecher, 2001; Ybema, Kuijer, Buunk, DeJong, & Sanderman, 2001). Therefore, justice norms are found to have the desired effect of facilitating satisfying and stable long-term social interactions.

As these studies indicate, one important advance of distributive justice models is that they are concerned with how to build positive social dynamics using justice. The literature on relative deprivation, in contrast, focuses almost entirely on the anger that flows from perceived deprivation and the negative behaviors that flow from that anger; for example, riots and rebellion (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970), as well as employee theft, sabotage, turnover, and resistance to rules and authorities.

Problems with distributive justice

Despite the finding that distributive justice leads to long-term stability and viability in relationships, studies suggest that people also have difficulty using distributive justice principles in social interactions when the principles involved require evaluations that rank people by merit, contribution or need. Equality is a simple rule that requires minimal evaluations, so it is often used in social settings as an allocation heuristic. However, other

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principles, for example equity and need, require people to evaluate the particular abilities or deficits of those involved in interactions. Research shows that people tend to exaggerate their behavior in ways that encourage them to receive desirable resources, for example suggesting that they make important contributions to successful projects for which there will be rewards. As a consequence, it is often hard to allocate limited resources in ways that lead each person to receive an outcome that they feel matches their contribution to a collective project.

People may also differ in the appropriateness that they assign to different principles of distributive justice. Since most allocations in social settings involve tradeoffs between principles of distributive justice, people have to weigh equality vs. equity, etc. This is an addition situation in which self-serving biases can be involved, since people's weighting of principles of justice shapes their outcomes.

Walster et al. (1978) make the important point that people are motivated to view justice from a self-interested perspective, but that the degree to which they do so depends on social conditions. Walster et al. argue that one such condition is the degree to which there are societal authorities telling people what is right in some social setting. One role for authorities is to articulate rules about fairness, thereby facilitating the general willingness of everyone in an allocation setting to accept a given standard for making the allocation. Similarly, more recent research makes clear that people are less likely to be self-serving when the resources being divided are not amenable to a self-serving allocation.

The life course of distributive justice models

Recognition of the importance of feelings of deservingness linked to justice judgments was first found in several influential social exchange models (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). It was then more broadly articulated as a general theory of justice in the 1976 volume of *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* which was entitled “Equity theory: Toward a general theory of social interaction.” Unfortunately, this articulation of equity theory did not adequately distinguish between distributive justice and equity, something forcefully pointed out by Deutsch (1975). The recognition of multiple principles of distributive justice made models more complex and less able to generate *a priori* predictions. After a period of extensive research productivity, the field of distributive justice became less active during the 1970s.

In several thoughtful articles about justice, Leventhal articulated some of the problems associated with equity theory and proposed an expanded justice focus on procedural, as well as distributive, justice. One of these articles (1980) was titled: “What should be done with equity theory?” In it Leventhal notes several problems with equity theory but the one that has been most important is that distributive justice is only about outcomes, not the procedures that give rise to them. Leventhal suggested that both types of justice should be considered at the same time.

The theoretical arguments of Leventhal (1980) became impactful when they were combined with the research program of Thibaut and Walker (1975), who studied procedural justice in the framework of trial procedures for dispute resolution. This research program had a tremendous influence on the field of justice, providing a set of researchable questions and a methodology for addressing those questions.

Procedural justice

Procedural justice is the study of people's subjective evaluations of the justice of procedures—whether they are fair or unfair, ethical or unethical, and otherwise accord with people's standards of fair processes for social interaction and decision making. Procedural justice should be distinguished from subjective assessments of the fairness of outcomes (*distributive justice*). In most nontrivial situations some type of process is needed for gathering relevant evidence, deciding on and implementing decision rules, and managing the interpersonal processes of gaining acceptance for allocations or of resolving conflicts.

Leventhal (1980) identified seven such components: selection of agents for decision making; establishment of ground rules; mechanisms for information gathering; decision making structure; ways to safeguard procedures to ensure integrity; appeal mechanisms; and change mechanisms. The area of procedural justice focuses on understanding the fairness of such processes.

Studies in this area showed that people's choices among allocation procedures are influenced by their evaluations of their relative procedural fairness, as well as by the favorability and fairness of their outcomes; that people's satisfaction with and willingness to accept allocations and dispute resolution decisions depends on the fairness of the procedures used to make them; and that people's rule-following behavior and cooperation with others are shaped by the procedural fairness of groups, organizations and societies.

Subjective procedural justice judgments have been the focus of a great deal of research attention by psychologists because they have been found to be a key influence on a wide variety of important group attitudes and behavior (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2000). Procedural justice has been especially important in studies of decision acceptance and rule following. One reason that people might comply with rules and authorities is that they receive desirable rewards for cooperating and/or fear sanctioning from the group for not cooperating. Such instrumental motivations can be effective in motivating compliance in a wide variety of social settings. An alternative reason that people might comply is that they are motivated by their sense of justice to accept what they feel is fair, even if it is not what they want. A key question is whether justice is effective in resolving conflicts and disagreements when people cannot have everything that they want. To the degree that people defer because allocation decisions are seen as fair, justice is an important factor in creating and maintaining social harmony. Research

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suggests that social justice can act as a mechanism for resolving social conflicts, and that procedural justice is especially central in such situations.

John Thibaut and Laurens Walker conducted the first experiments designed to show the impact of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Their studies demonstrated that people's assessments of the fairness of third-party decision-making procedures predicted their satisfaction with outcomes. This finding has been widely confirmed in many subsequent laboratory and field studies of procedural justice—studies which show that when third-party decisions are fairly made, people are more willing to voluntarily accept them. What is striking is that such procedural justice effects are widely found in studies of real disputes, in real settings, involving actual disputants and are found to have an especially important role in shaping adherence to agreements over time.

Beyond the acceptance of decisions, procedural justice also shapes the legitimacy of the authorities and institutions with which people deal, and through such attitudes, their willingness to defer to those authorities and institutions. Studies of the legitimacy of authority suggest that people decide how much to defer to authorities and to their decisions primarily by assessing the fairness of their decision-making procedures (Tyler, 2006a).

Using fair decision-making procedures is the key to developing, maintaining and enhancing the legitimacy of rules and authorities and gaining voluntary deference to social rules. Beyond issues of rule following, studies of procedural justice indicate that it plays an equally important role in motivating commitment to organizations. As a consequence, procedural justice is important in encouraging productivity and extra-role behavior in work organizations (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Procedural justice is a key antecedent of a wide variety of desirable cooperative behaviors in groups, organizations and societies.

A large number of studies of procedural justice followed the publication of Thibaut and Walker (1975). There were several reasons for this proliferation of empirical examinations of justice. First, as Leventhal (1980) makes clear, distributive justice research was declining in volume and justice researchers were looking for new approaches. Second, Thibaut and Walker (1975) provided a clear and compelling research paradigm that made it clear how to study procedural justice. The Leventhal approach, while theoretically richer, lacked a clear research approach and, as a consequence, has generated fewer studies. The control model, in particular, has been central to discussions concerning the meaning of procedural justice findings ever since 1975.

Core procedural justice issues

Defining the meaning of procedural justice

Early work on procedural justice was guided by the influential research program of Thibaut and Walker (1975). They centered their procedural justice studies on procedures as mechanisms for settling disputes about the allocation of outcomes. In particular, they focused on formal trial procedures that related to decision-making processes in legal settings. Thibaut and Walker linked their discussions of procedures primarily to issues of decision-making, and in particular to issues of decision making about allocation decisions. Since their procedural models were rooted in an era where distributive justice dominated, their focus was natural. This context also influenced their theory development, since they linked people's desire for fair procedures to their desire to achieve equitable outcomes.

Thibaut and Walker (1975) proposed that people value procedural justice (operationalized in their research as voice or process control) because it facilitates decision-makers' ability to make equitable judgments. In other words, procedures are valued insofar as they affect the outcomes that are associated with them. In disputes the parties can best assure fair decisions by providing evidence to a neutral third party who then makes decisions.

This focus on decision making in allocation contexts is no longer true of procedural justice research. Researchers have increasingly moved their attention away from an exclusive focus on the decision-making function of procedures to include more attention to the interpersonal aspects of procedures. Those interpersonal aspects of procedures arise because procedures are settings within which people are involved in a social interaction with one another. This is true irrespective of whether the procedure involves bargaining, a market exchange, team interactions among equals, or a third party procedure with a decision-maker, such as mediation or a trial.

While subsequent research has strongly supported a focus on procedural justice, it has not supported the social exchange-based voice focus in the original work of Thibaut and Walker (1975). Instead, it has supported the broader procedural model of Leventhal (1980), who identified six principles of procedural justice: consistency; bias-suppression; accuracy; correctability; representativeness; and ethicality. Of these, representativeness is the element reflecting participation and voice.

Subsequent studies indicate that people care about all of Leventhal's issues (Tyler, 1988). Further, people still care about voice when they cannot influence decisions (Tyler & Lind, 1992), suggesting that their motivations for speaking involve more than the desire to shape decisions. Later studies suggest that people value social links and their identity in social contexts more than the original work suggested. This is true in their definitions of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988); their decisions about whether to accept third-party decisions (Tyler & Lind, 1992); and their decisions about whether and how much to cooperate with others in groups, organizations and societies (Tyler & Blader, 2000).

One particularly important new aspect of studies of procedural justice is quality of interpersonal treatment. In social interactions there is considerable variation in the manner in which people treat one another. They can act politely, rudely, respectfully, with hostility, etc. These aspects of the

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interpersonal experience of a procedure—which occur in the context of an interaction whose overt purpose is to make a decision to allocate resources or resolve a conflict—may also influence those who are involved.

These interpersonal aspects of procedures have been found by recent studies to be so powerful in their impact that some researchers have argued that they might potentially be treated as a separate type of "interactional" justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Irrespective of whether the quality of the treatment that people experience via procedures is actually considered a distinct form of justice (see Blader & Tyler, 2003), justice researchers have again followed their findings about what impacts the people they study. This has led them to increasingly turn their research toward exploring interpersonal or interactional aspects of procedures—which are reflected in judgments about the quality of one's treatment by others.

Recent discussions of procedural justice recognize four elements of procedures as the primary factors that contribute to judgments about their fairness: opportunities for participation, a neutral forum, trustworthy authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect. Blader and Tyler (2003) refer to the first two elements as involving the quality of decision making, while the latter two elements are concerned with the quality of interpersonal treatment.

The voice effect indicates that people feel more fairly treated if they are allowed to participate in the resolution of their problems or conflicts. People are primarily interested in presenting their perspective and sharing in the discussion of conflicts that affect them, not in controlling decisions about how to handle such conflicts. Instead, people often look to authorities for resolutions. They expect authorities to make final decisions about how to act based on the arguments those who are affected by those decisions have presented.

People are also influenced by judgments about neutrality—the honesty, impartiality, and objectivity of the authorities with whom they deal. They believe that authorities should not allow their personal values and biases to enter into their decisions, which should be made based on rules and facts. Basically, people seek a "level playing field" in which no one is unfairly disadvantaged. If they believe that the authorities are following impartial rules and making factual, objective decisions, they think procedures are fairer.

Another factor shaping people's views about the fairness of a procedure is their assessment of the motives of the third-party authority responsible for resolving the case. People recognize that third parties typically have considerable discretion to implement procedures in varying ways, and they are concerned about the motivation underlying the decisions made by the authority with which they are dealing. Important assessments include whether that person is benevolent and caring, is concerned about their situation and their concerns and needs, considers their arguments, tries to do what is right for them, and tries to be fair.

Studies suggest that people also value having respect shown for their rights and for their status within society. They want their dignity as people and their rights as members of the society to be recognized and acknowledged. Surprisingly, such assessments of respect are largely unrelated to the outcomes they receive. Thus, the importance which people place on this affirmation of their status is especially relevant to conflict resolution. Unlike the outcomes that determine distributive justice, dignity and respect is something that authorities can give to everyone with whom they deal.

Two distinct forms of justice have been outlined—distributive and procedural justice. However, these forms of justice do not address the same issues. Distributive justice addresses the allocation of resources or status and includes both the acceptance of distributions within the context of particular relationships and the broader acceptance of principles for allocating resources in groups. Procedural justice examines the procedures used to make allocation and resolve conflicts.

Studies of justice in allocations and dispute resolution indicate that people focus less on issues of distributive justice than they do on two other issues: the procedures used to make allocation decisions and their interpersonal treatment within those procedures. These two issues have been collectively referred to as procedural justice. These findings emerge both from studies that look at the weight placed on these different issues (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Tyler & Caine, 1981) and from studies that look at what people talk about when asked to describe situations in which they feel that injustice has occurred (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990). In the latter type of study people are especially likely to mention instances of poor interpersonal treatment, i.e., the lack of courtesy and treatment with dignity that they have experienced from others. In both of these types of study the minimal role played by actual outcome distributions in experiences of injustice is striking. Hence, in allocations people's focus is found to be on procedural and interpersonal issues.

Huo (2002) uses a different approach to addressing this issue, but reaches a similar conclusion. She creates a framework in which participants are asked about what should be given to a disliked group. Three issues are considered: monetary resources, procedural protections, and/or treatment with fairness and respect. Her results indicate that people consider denying members of the disliked group various things; denial of interpersonal treatment with dignity and respect is considered the most serious denial, while the denial of monetary resources is the least serious. Denial of procedural protections is intermediate. These findings are consistent with those already presented in that they suggest that people view procedural issues as more important than outcomes, with the quality of interpersonal treatment being especially central to the connection between people.

The conclusion of these studies comparing people's focus on different forms of justice is that people are most strongly affected by issues of procedural justice. And, within procedural justice, both the fairness of decision making and the quality of interpersonal treatment are found to have an influence on

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people's reactions. Hence, the original focus of theories of relative deprivation and distributive justice on the allocation of outcomes seems misplaced. It does not mirror the type of justice concerns that preoccupy people in social settings. Because it is found to be so central to people's concerns in allocation and dispute resolution, this discussion will focus primarily on issues of procedural justice. Of course it is important not to forget outcomes, both because procedures and outcomes often interact (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) and because outcomes can indirectly shape reactions to injustice (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000).

Why is procedural justice so central in social settings? While research suggests that distributive justice rules facilitate stable social interaction, there are problems with using distributive rules as a solution to social coordination problems. As already noted, people tend to exaggerate their contributions to joint efforts, making it difficult to allocate limited resources. Further, there are multiple principles of distributive justice. No single rule can cover all situations. Hence, there are conflicts among rules. A worker with a sick child invokes the principle of need to justify leaving their job, whereas the manager invokes equity to argue that the lost productivity should be held against them. No single rule is sufficiently complex to handle the problems and issues arising in social interactions. Rules are not as flexible, for example, as appointing someone and giving them discretion to do what is right in whatever situation arises. Hence, the creation of rules is only one of the mechanisms that groups have for creating stable social interactions. A second approach is the creation of institutions and authorities with discretion to do what is right within the situation (Messick et al., 1983; Tyler & Degoey, 1995).

Authorities have the advantage of being able to exercise discretion—that is, they can adapt to unique or changing situations by deciding to apply different rules or even by changing what the rules are. Hence, it is not surprising that one commonly chosen approach that groups adopt to determine "fair" approaches to allocation is to choose an authority and then let that authority exercise discretion. That discretion provides a mechanism through which equity, need, or other similar principles can operate in complex situations (Tyler & Degoey, 1995).

An example of this view of leadership is contained within the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975). That research examines the use of authorities to resolve disputes. The authors argue that the key issue in the fair resolution of disputes is understanding how to apply the principle of equity. However, giving the parties what they deserve requires an understanding of their relative contributions to the relationship. To understand those contributions, Thibaut and Walker recommend that leaders use a procedure in which they allow the parties to provide evidence before they make a decision. By providing evidence of their contributions, the parties enable the authority to exercise their discretion and make a decision that gives each party to the dispute the outcome they "deserve." Additionally, the authority can better apply a justice rule (equity) that requires estimation of each person's contribution because they can apply that rule without self-serving exaggerations. The ability of authorities to apply principles such as equity and need, which require evaluations of people's unique situations, without self-serving biases is one of the reasons that authorities are important in resolving conflicts and are better able to do so effectively.

The use of authorities to make discretionary decisions helps make social life more flexible but also raises additional problems for groups. There have to be mechanisms for determining who will be the authority and for evaluating whether the decisions made by the authority are reasonable and fair. The first question, establishing an authority, lies at the heart of early work by Lewin on elected leaders (Gold, 1999), as well as being central to more recent studies of political leadership. Studies consistently find that people are more likely to defer to leaders elected to authority via fair procedures. Hence, people are sensitive to how authorities are empowered.

The second issue, the fairness of the manner in which authority is exercised is at the heart of most recent procedural justice research (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2000). Research on both questions comes to strikingly similar conclusions. Authorities are more likely to be deferred to when they make their decisions using fair procedures. Of course procedural justice involves many types of procedures, not just those dealing with conflicts. For example, when resources are allocated or burdens are imposed, then procedures are used. In fact, studies show that even procedures that do not involve authorities, such as bargaining and market transactions, are evaluated in terms of procedural justice (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, 2008; Sondak & Tyler, 2007).

To distinguish procedural justice from distributive justice, we should consider core features of procedural justice. There are two central features. First, decisions should be made in fair ways. This includes allowing people to state their arguments; consistently applying neutral rules; using facts; and avoiding personal biases. Second, people should be treated fairly. They should be respected as people; treated with dignity and courtesy; shown respect for their rights; and dealt with by authorities who are sincerely trying to make decisions that are good for the people involved.

The existence of consensus about distributive justice rules has already been mentioned. There is also found to be widespread consensus about fair procedures for resolving conflicts. This does not mean that there is a universally fair procedure. As was the case with distributive justice, people view different procedures as fair ways to resolve different types of problems (Tyler, 1988). For example, they suggest that a procedure with opportunities for input is particularly important with disputes. When rule violations are involved, having a trustworthy authority to evaluate the wrong reflected in the violation is viewed as key. So, mediation is a good procedure for dispute resolution but adjudication is desirable for deciding how to punish criminals.

Although people's views about the fairest procedure for managing different types of problem differ, for any particular

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type of problem there is general consensus about what a fair procedure is. There are usually no differences linked to ethnicity, gender, class, income, education, ideology, or political orientation. In other words, the type of consensus is the same as that found with distributive justice. Additionally, it is the type of consensus required for justice to work for social coordination. The parties to a particular social situation will agree about whether the procedure being used to make decisions is a fair one, even when they differ in their social characteristics.

The finding that people will defer to fairly made decisions is strong (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Numerous studies have shown that people are more accepting of decisions made by third-party authorities when those authorities use fair procedures (Tyler, 2000). Further, in groups and organizations, people adhere to rules when those rules are fairly made and implemented. This is true of workplace rules (Tyler & Blader, 2000) and of laws (Tyler, 2006a). Additionally, as noted, people are also sensitive to procedures in relationships that do not involve authorities (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986).

Will people incur costs to preserve procedural justice rules, as they have been shown to be willing to do with principles of distributive justice? There is no equivalent to the behavioral economics literature, in which people are asked to incur personal costs to preserve a rule. However, there is a general finding that people will more willingly defer to those leaders who uphold principles of procedural justice in their actions. Hence, people do show a willingness to support systems of authority that are procedurally fair, even when they do not personally gain from those systems (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). In fact, when people lose—for example, by having to pay a fine after being convicted of violating a rule—they do so more voluntarily when procedures are fair. In this sense, people will incur costs to support rules, because they pay even when they could realistically avoid payment or at least try to subvert it.

Procedural justice research also considers the level of justice that is important and studies procedural justice both on the personal level and on the group/organizational level. Studies suggest that procedural justice matters on the individual (see Tyler & Smith, 1998) and the group level (Jacobs, Christensen, & Prislin, 2009; Leung, Kwok-Kit, & Lind, 2007). A number of studies suggest that the procedural justice "climate" in a group shapes individuals' behaviors within that group (see Naumann & Bennett, 2000).

The already outlined studies on procedural justice further suggest that it has an impact distinct from that of self-interest. However, studies also suggest that procedural justice judgments can be distorted in ways that support self-interest. Most recently Blader (2007) has demonstrated that such motivational judgments occur when the justice of procedures is ambiguous. Using experimental designs, Blader showed that when the nature of a procedure is clear, procedural elements shape perceived procedural justice. However, when procedures themselves were unclear, justice judgments were influenced by identification with the group and outcome favorability. In other words, nonfairness-related judgments became important in making justice judgments primarily when the justice of the situation was unclear.

The literature on procedural justice provides considerable insight into the nature of the justice motive. As has been noted, research has demonstrated that in social settings issues of procedural justice are especially important in shaping people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Does this focus on procedures, rather than outcomes, suggest a need for a shift in our understanding of the psychology of justice away from the model outlined above? The earliest psychological model of procedural justice is the control model presented by Thibaut and Walker (1975), which is based on the same ideas of social exchange that are presented in earlier discussions of distributive justice. Thibaut and Walker assume that people's goal when dealing with others is to achieve a distributively fair solution for themselves.

To achieve distributive fairness people need a procedure in which they can present evidence to a neutral third-party decision maker. Hence, they define the fairness of procedures in terms of the provision of opportunities for the parties to control the presentation of the evidence received by the decision maker (process control). The parties believe that through control of evidence presentation they can influence the decisions that were made by the third party (decision control). And, most importantly, Thibaut and Walker suggest that fairness judgments are linked to this outcome-based judgment, with people only viewing procedures as fair when they provided a mechanism that indirectly leads to "decision control." In other words, the reason to talk to authorities is to convince them to take account of your position and, in the absence of that linkage, procedures allowing process control will not be judged to be fair.

The arguments advanced by Thibaut and Walker in the context of procedural justice are similar to those outlined within the field of distributive justice—justice in the service of obtaining desired outcomes. However, in this case, procedures are fair if they facilitate the attainment of just outcomes. A similar argument about the development of procedures is found in the work of Thibaut and Faucheux (1965) on the development of rules. Their argument is that rules develop to guide interactions when there is a risk that, without rules, a mutually beneficial exchange relationship will collapse. Hence, procedures/rules develop to facilitate productive resource exchanges.

In the case of procedures, Thibaut and Walker suggest that people prefer to keep control over their decisions, i.e., to negotiate with others, and only turn to third-party procedures when necessary to protect productive social exchanges. Even then, people try to retain as much control as possible, for example preferring mediation to arbitration. This instrumental view of procedures is illustrated in Thibaut and Faucheux's argument that procedures only develop when both parties have countervailing power. People are not viewed as intrinsically motivated to enact fair procedures, any more than they are intrinsically motivated to give others fair outcomes. They do so when they need to have rules or procedures to facilitate productive social exchange. In a situation in which relationships are vulnerable to

disruption, people care about issues of justice (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986).

Subsequent studies have not supported this instrumental view of justice. They have supported the argument that people want the opportunity to present their arguments to the decision maker, a procedural feature often labeled “voice.” However, they have not supported the argument that people link voice to decision control and only value the opportunity to address the decision maker when they believe their arguments are shaping the outcome. Studies indicate that people value voice even when they do not believe that their voice leads to decision control (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).

These studies of voice suggest that having the opportunity for “voice” has interpersonal or “value-expressive” worth that was not linked to any influence over the decisions made (Tyler, 1987). These studies show that people still rated a procedure to be fairer if they had voice, even if they knew that what they said had little or no influence on the decisions made (Tyler et al., 1985). This was true even when the opportunity for voice came after the decision was already made (Lind et al., 1990). These findings suggest that voice has value beyond its ability to shape outcomes. This value is linked to the social connection between people and authorities. Of course, people do want to shape outcomes, but this is only one aspect of why they want voice.

What factors were driving the influence of voice, even when it clearly could not affect the eventual outcome or decision? If an authority listens to people’s arguments the authority is conferring interpersonal respect on that person because they are acknowledging their status in the group and their right as a group member to call on the group about their needs and concerns. This argument is supported by the finding that people only value voice opportunities if they feel that the authority is “considering” their arguments (Tyler, 1987). This suggests that people focus on whether or not their concerns and needs in the situation are treated respectfully by the decision-maker, who takes them seriously by listening and considering what they have to say, independently of whether or not the course of action the authority recommends to resolve the problem reflects their desired course of action.

These findings lead to the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), which focuses on the antecedents of judgments of procedural justice. The group-value model argues that non-instrumental factors influence procedural justice judgments, a prediction confirmed both by the findings of noninstrumental voice effects already noted (Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1987) and by demonstrations that people care more about a broader set of issues of procedural justice when dealing with members of their own groups; issues including how they are treated, and whether their rights are respected. These noninstrumental issues are important because they communicate information to people about their status within groups; i.e., because they carry an important social message (Lind & Tyler, 1988). This argument is supported by recent experimental studies by van Prooijen and colleagues (van Prooijen, 2005, 2009; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004a, 2004b).

Studies demonstrate that it is possible to prime people so that they are focused on instrumental or relational issues. As would be predicted, instrumental priming leads people to focus on the anticipated outcomes of third-party decisions, reacting to what they receive. Relational priming, on the other hand, leads people to focus on the fairness of decision-making procedures (Stahl, Vermunt, & Ellemers, 2008). Hence people care about both outcomes and “relational” issues, and the importance of each depends on situational factors.

Overall, one important contribution of procedural justice research is that it has provided a different image of why people care about justice. Concerns about procedural justice are linked to people’s social connections and concerns about status and identity. This is a shift from the more instrumental view of justice central to distributive justice. Hence, the findings of procedural justice research have been important in shedding light on why people join and stay in groups. While they do so in part for resource gains, they are also motivated by the desire to have connections with others and to use those connections for self-definition and self-evaluation.

Finally, the relational model of procedural justice argues for a scope of justice. In this case that scope is defined by the range of people or groups that are relevant to people’s definitions of their status; i.e., to the range of their social connections and by group boundaries. For example, people are less concerned about justice when they are dealing with outsiders (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998). Further, those people who are less concerned about issues of their status—i.e. the quality of their social connections—are generally less influenced by information about justice (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). A typical American, for example, is likely to be relatively indifferent to their status in Japanese society, so they are unaffected by variations in treatment by Japanese authorities since that treatment does not communicate information about their status in their own group. Similarly, those people who define themselves less strongly through the views of others are less influenced by how they are treated.

Cooperation as a procedural justice concern

The focus of Thibaut and Walker’s work on procedural justice includes judgments about procedural justice, as well as other personal reactions; for example, outcome satisfaction. It is striking that they did not even consider evaluations of the authority, nor do they explore the willingness to accept decisions. The relational model of procedural justice expands concerns of the consequences of procedural injustice and examines the behavioral consequences of fairness judgments in the context of third-party dispute resolution—consequences such as decision acceptance and the evaluation of authorities and institutions. The relational model predicts that procedural justice will influence reactions to authorities, as has been

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subsequently found by studies of legal, political, managerial, familial, and educational authorities (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The primary focus of this work is on compliance.

Recent research on procedural justice has increasingly focused on more prosocial outcomes, such as how to build trust, encourage responsibility and obligation, generate intrinsic motivation and creativity, and stimulate voluntary cooperation with others (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Similarly, there has been increasing attention to exploring when justice motivations encourage people to provide resources to the disadvantaged (Montada, 1995). Interestingly, this shift is consistent with a shift that has been taking place within psychological research more generally (Snyder & Lopez, 2002).

This new focus of justice research is addressed by the group engagement model, which discusses the antecedents of cooperative behavior in groups, organizations, and societies (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000). The argument of the group engagement model is that justice theories provide a basis for understanding people's general relationship to groups. That includes both people's negative reactions to injustice and the ability of experiencing justice to promote engagement and cooperation. Society, after all, does not just want people not to riot or destroy. It also wants them to be happy, creative, and productive.

How does the group engagement model expand earlier models? First, the objective of the model is to identify and examine the antecedents of attitudes, values, and cooperative behavior in groups. Hence, the group engagement model broadens the focus of justice studies and its predecessor models of justice by positing a general model of the relationship between people and groups. In trying to understand the precursors of people's engagement in their groups, it identifies and examines a much broader set of variables—and dynamics between those variables—than earlier justice models. Rather than focusing simply on what shapes views about justice, the model is concerned with the role of justice in social systems.

As noted, the key objective of the group engagement model is to understand what shapes the relationships that people form with their groups. People have considerable discretion about the degree to which they invest themselves in their groups by working on behalf of the group. To examine this issue, the group engagement model distinguishes between two classes of cooperative behavior: mandatory and discretionary. Mandatory cooperation is behavior that is stipulated by the group, while discretionary cooperation originates with the group member. The model argues that each of these forms of cooperation is differently motivated.

Of the two types of cooperative behavior, mandatory behaviors are more strongly affected by incentives and sanctions, since they are behaviors required by the group and thus the group specifically structures incentives and sanctions to encourage these behaviors. Discretionary behaviors are more strongly under the influence of people's internal motivations (their attitudes and values), since they are behaviors that originate with the individual. Since discretionary cooperative behaviors are especially valuable to groups (see Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000), the precursors of such behavior are especially central to discussions of the motivation of group members (Tyler, 2011).

Further, people do not only have leeway as to how they act on behalf of their groups. They also have discretion in the degree to which they hold positive attitudes and values towards the group. Attitudes can serve as internal motivations that encourage people to engage in behaviors that benefit the group and that they find personally rewarding (i.e., behaviors they "want" to do). Values are feelings of responsibility that shape people's sense of behaviors that they "ought" to do, and can thus also serve as internal motivations. For instance, they may reflect feelings of responsibility and obligation to follow group rules and the orders of group leaders. They can be rooted in either their moral values or their views about the legitimacy of group rules and authorities, both of which are at the discretion and control of the individual group member (Tyler, 2011).

Both attitudes and values are important because they lead people to be internally motivated to engage in and cooperate with the group. To the degree that people are internally motivated, they engage in cooperative behaviors for personal reasons, and they do not need to receive incentives (rewards) or to face the risk of sanctions (punishments) to encourage their group-related behaviors. This benefits groups, which are then free to deploy their assets in other ways that benefit the group.

The group engagement model argues that groups benefit when the people within them engage themselves in the group, and groups are particularly benefited when that engagement is based on internal motivations because cooperation does not then depend on the ability of the group to utilize incentives or sanctions. This leaves open the question of how to best encourage such internal motivation. Tyler (2011) addresses this question more broadly, arguing that justice is one of a set of social motivations that reflect internal desires and that such motivations are the core antecedents of voluntary cooperation within managerial, legal, political, and community settings. One of those social motivations is the justice of the group, in particular the justice of its procedures.

The group engagement model argues that the central reason that people engage themselves in groups is because they use the feedback they receive from those groups to create and maintain their identities. In other words, the group engagement model hypothesizes that of the two types of motivation, it is the development and maintenance of a favorable identity that most strongly influences cooperation. The model predicts that people's willingness to cooperate with their group—especially cooperation that is discretionary in nature—flows from the identity information people receive from the group.

The core argument of the group engagement model is that people want a favorable identity, and use group membership as one source of identity-relevant information. That identity information, in turn, is hypothesized to emanate from evaluations of the justice experienced in the group—including judgments of procedural and distributive justice, as well as

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evaluations of outcome favorability. This suggests that identity evaluations and concerns mediate the relationship between justice judgments and group engagement. This is the *identity mediation hypothesis*.

Why might this be so? Using social identity theory as a framework, the model argues that an important function of groups is to provide people with a way of constructing a social identity. It is widely recognized that groups shape people's definitions of themselves and their feelings of wellbeing and self-worth (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). In particular, group memberships shape people's conceptions of their social selves—the aspect of the self that is formed through identification with groups. The groups that people belong to help to define who they are and help people to evaluate their status. The first part of this process involves social categorization, the taking on of the categories that define one's group and using them to construct one's self-image. The second part of the process involves linking views about self-worth and self-esteem to group memberships.

Thus, to some degree people's sense of their own worth is linked to the groups to which they belong. Several new ideas and hypotheses flow from the group engagement model. First, it predicts that identity judgments will be the primary factors shaping attitudes, values, and cooperative behaviors in groups. Second, it predicts that resource judgments will most strongly influence attitudes, values, and discretionary cooperative behaviors in groups through their indirect influence on identity judgments, rather than directly. Third, it predicts that the primary antecedent of identity judgments will be judgments about the procedural justice of the group. Fourth, it predicts that status judgments about pride and respect will shape identification with the group.

The focus of the group value model of procedural justice; the relational model of authority; and the group value model of engagement is on the psychology of justice—i.e. on why justice matters. All three models argue that procedural justice, the form of justice that is central to people's connection to groups, is linked to issues of status and identity. Because of this centrality of issues of identity, this discussion of justice involves attention to identity and its role in people's behavior in groups.

The identity-based model of cooperation can be contrasted to a resource-based model of cooperation. Guided by social exchange models, many social psychological discussions of people's relationships to groups have argued that this exchange of material resources is the fundamental reason that people engage in groups. The social exchange perspective is the basis of several more recent resource-based models, including the investment model, which focuses on exit and loyalty to groups (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996); realistic group conflict theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972); models of leader–member exchange (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975); models of in-role behavior (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson, & Sowa, 1986); goal theories of motivation (Locke & Latham, 1990); and sanction-based models of regulation (Nagin, 1998).

The group engagement model proposes that the identity model prevails over the resource model in predicting engagement and cooperation. It argues that resource judgments do not directly shape engagement. This is not to say that the group engagement model argues that resource judgments have no influence on engagement. Instead, the model hypothesizes that resource judgments indirectly influence most forms of engagement by shaping identity. That is, to some degree, people evaluate their identity and status in a particular group by the level of the resources that they are receiving from that group. To the extent that having more resources in a group leads people to feel better about their status in the group, they will engage themselves more in that group. The group engagement model argues that material rewards primarily influence engagement indirectly, by influencing status.

Are the hypotheses of the group engagement model valid? Tyler and Blader (2000) tested the model using survey data from employees drawn from a variety of work organizations. Using causal modeling, they tested several of the key hypotheses of the group engagement model and found support for all of them (see Tyler & Blader, 2000, p. 196). First, they found that identity judgments shaped attitudes, values, and cooperative behaviors. Consistent with the predictions of the model, they found a greater influence of identity judgments on discretionary, as compared to mandatory, behavior. Second, resource judgments are found to influence attitudes, values, and discretionary cooperative behaviors indirectly, through identity judgments, but not directly. Third, procedural justice judgments are found to be the primary antecedent of identity judgments (Tyler & Blader, 2000, p. 136).

More recently DeCremer and Tyler (2005) have broadened the framework within which identity is studied in the procedural justice literature. In particular, they demonstrate that whenever people link their identities to a group, the justice that they experience in the framework of that group has a stronger influence on their sense of self. Hence, they provide evidence that identification moderates the influence of justice on group-related behavior. This set of findings complements the evidence of mediation already outlined. It supports the argument that justice is linked to identity and, therefore, justice matters more when identity is more relevant.

Irrespective of whether people are viewed as linked to groups via concern with resources, obtained in the long term, or with creating and maintaining a positive identify and sense of self, the argument is that people develop long-term links to groups. And, coincident with those links, they develop supportive values that lead them to link the group to themselves, so that their actions are no longer linked to immediate calculations of gain and loss. Instead, people become focused at the group level and their perspective becomes long-term. But, of course, people are also concerned about their own wellbeing, and they use justice to monitor the health of groups. If groups are managed fairly, people are confident in their loyalty. Unfairness leads to withdrawal. Hence, fairness becomes a signal about the advisability of adopting a long-term orientation

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toward groups. It facilitates the identification with groups, which permits an orientation that is valuable to people's wellbeing. In essence, the ability to live a group life depends on experiencing justice in dealings with others.

It is possible to separate two issues: what people want from groups and how they utilize justice judgments. Drawing on the idea of cognitive shortcuts or "satisficing" mechanisms for estimation that has been central to the field of judgment and decision making, van den Bos and Lind (2002, also see Lind, 2001, 2002) argue that justice is a heuristic that allows people to quickly estimate whether their situation is satisfactory. In other words, evaluating procedural fairness is an easy way to reduce uncertainty in social situations (van den Bos, 2001). However, if people are first given information about distributive fairness, they use this to resolve their uncertainty and, if later given procedural justice information, are no longer influenced by it (van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). This heuristic argument is consistent with the more general suggestion that people use justice as a framework for evaluating their relationships with others, drawing themselves closer to groups and relationships that are fair and moving away from unfair groups and relationships.

The uncertainty management argument transcends disputes about whether people's use of justice is to evaluate their material outcomes or to evaluate their relationships and/or status and identity. Irrespective of what it is that people want from groups, the van den Bos and Lind argument is that they use justice cues to tell them about whether they should increase or decrease their connection to others. Injustice is a signal that activates a reevaluation of relationships. Hence, as these authors have argued, people focus more heavily on justice when they are more uncertain; utilize whatever form of social information (i.e., justice, trustworthiness) is available; and make quick "heuristic" judgments about their social situations.

Retributive justice

A core feature of organized groups is that they create rules and enforce those rules by punishing those who break them. While societies differ widely in what their rules are and in how they punish those who transgress, punishment for rule breaking is central to the maintenance of social order and is found in all societies (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The nature of these punishments and when they are enacted is the central focus of the study of retributive justice, which involves the principles defining appropriate punishments for wrongdoing (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Darley & Pittman, 2003).

It is a general characteristic of social relationships and organized groups that formal or informal rules develop that define appropriate conduct. When such rules are violated, people feel the need to punish the violators and this motivation does not only involve those personally harmed by wrongdoing. Other members of the community also act to defend group rules, even when not personally involved in a crime. Studies of retributive justice demonstrate that people are motivated to punish those who break rules and will incur personal costs to uphold social rules, even when they are not the victims of the rule-breaking behavior (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002).

Why do groups view enforcing rules as so important? As already noted, justice principles and the rules that enforce them are developed to facilitate long-term cooperation by defining reasonable conduct. Taking too much destroys relationships, so taking too much is viewed as unfair. However, such rules can only successfully fill this facilitative role if they are followed. If someone breaks a rule without cost, others will also do so and the ability of the rules to help people cooperate will be lost. Hence, everyone in society has a stake in defending the principles and rules that guide social conduct. This is true of both moral principles and justice rules, since they are all principles of correct conduct that enable group life.

A beginning element in reacting to rule breaking is an effort to restore the prior material balance between people. The simplest way to do so is to right a wrong by compensating the victim(s) for harm done. When people react to rule breaking that is judged to be unintentional or without malice, and where it is possible to do so, they often endorse such an approach to righting wrongs. Such compensation can be understood in the distributive justice framework already outlined. However, when people are viewed as having deliberately broken rules, either intentionally or because of negligence, their victims and society more generally are found to feel that some type of punishment beyond compensating victims is appropriate (Darley & Pittman, 2003), and in such situations retributive justice departs from the principles of distributive justice. If someone hits a person, that person does not just hit them back; they hit them harder, reflecting an additional punishment for rule breaking.

Studies exploring the nature of the motivation to punish often link punishment to issues of deterrence and incapacitation. It is argued that people punish to prevent future wrongdoing. Other studies suggest that the desire for revenge is a key issue. Recent studies have suggested that, on the contrary, people's primary reason for punishing is to uphold societal values. Rule breaking is viewed as a threat to those values, and appropriate punishment restores them (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Evidence suggests that people are motivated to punish when they view wrongdoing as undercutting a group's moral and social values, and that they choose the type and severity of punishment to restore an appropriate moral balance. A consequence is that those people whose actions and demeanor show a defiance of or disrespect for society, social values, and/or the social status of their victims are both more likely to be punished, and likely to be punished more severely.

Why has the study of reactions to rule breaking emerged as a central area in justice research? The study of reactions to wrongdoing has been recognized as an area of justice research for several decades (see Hogan & Emler, 1981; Miller & Vidmar, 1981). However, the retributive policies that define most penal systems have increasingly been recognized as dysfunctional, leading to the destruction of social values,

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alienating communities from societal authorities, and leading to widespread imprisonment and other types of punishment. As a consequence, there has been increasing attention to alternative ways to react to rule breaking, including studying restorative justice, mediation, compensation, and apologies (see Darley & Pittman, 2003; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel, 2004).

Core justice issues

Retributive justice research discusses the issue of levels of justice. Robert Boeckmann's dissertation studies levels of justice in the context of retribution. Boeckmann (1996) presented people with scenarios involving wrongdoing varying along two dimensions: The harm was personal or societal, and the harm was material or status-linked. He found variations in people's retributive responses linked to both dimensions. In particular, he found that societal harms were viewed as more important to respond to than personal harms. And, at both levels, status-level harms were more important to respond to than were personal harms. To take an example, spitting on the flag (a symbolic harm) was viewed as more serious than despoiling a national park (a material harm).

And retributive justice contributes to the discussion of why people care about justice. People are not found to punish to achieve instrumental gains such as preventing future wrongdoing. Rather, they view offenses in terms of their impact on individual and group values and respond in ways that are motivated by the desire to restore status to the victim and to the group. This supports the more social conception of the justice motive originally articulated in the procedural justice literature.

Summary

The different aspects of the psychological study of justice outlined are united by the finding that people are very sensitive to issues of justice and injustice in their dealings with other people in social settings. In fact, such justice-based judgments are found to be key drivers of a wide variety of reactions, including attitudes, emotions and behaviors. John Rawls famously argued that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (Rawls, 1971), and the findings of psychological research on justice strongly support the parallel suggestion that people view justice as a pivotal evaluation shaping their relationships with one another. Hence, while people might react to their experiences in social settings in terms of personal self-interest, in fact they do not. Instead, they react to their sense of what is just.

Further, when groups, organizations or societies are seeking to organize themselves, they become centrally preoccupied with issues of justice, and the ability of authorities and institutions to be viewed as legitimate and to, consequently, call on group members for voluntary cooperation is linked to whether they are viewed as just. This argument is summarized by the argument that people in social settings use the presence or absence of justice as a key heuristic for managing their decisions about whether and in what ways to engage themselves with others (van den Bos & Lind, 2002).

If we look at the field of justice research historically it appears as a series of waves, moving from relative deprivation to distributive justice to procedural justice and, most recently, to issues of retributive/restorative justice. Each wave has been preceded by a theoretical model followed by a period of empirical research.

While the intellectual center of justice research has changed over time, the field of justice itself has become increasingly institutionalized. The central justice researcher responsible for that institutionalization has been Melvin Lerner. An edited volume by Lerner & Lerner (1981) is one of the first integrations of the field and contains a number of classic justice papers. That volume is also the first in the Plenum series of books on justice, an important series that has published a series of key books about social justice, including *The Sense of Injustice* (Folger, 1984); *Justice in Social Relations* (Werner Bierhoff, Cohen, & Greenberg, 1986); *Justice: Views from the Social Sciences* (Cohen, 1986); and *Social Justice In Human Relations* (Steensma & Vermunt, 1991). Another early edited volume with widespread influence was Mikula (1980), while core themes in the field of justice have also been articulated by Deutsch (1985) and his students (Bunker & Rubin, 1995).

Lerner was also instrumental in beginning the International Society for Justice Research (ISJR), aided by Gerald Mikula and Leo Montada. The ISJR held its first meeting in Leiden in 1986 and its 13th meeting in Banff in 2010. That society began the publication of *Social Justice Research* in 1987 and is currently publishing Volume 23. Lerner's role is recognized in a *Festschrift* (Ross & Miller, 2002). The existence of a society, a book series, and a journal have ensured that as intellectual content has shifted, the field of social justice research itself has continued to develop.

Within social psychology, one of the primary shifts in the locus of justice studies has occurred as social psychology within psychology departments has become increasingly linked to issues of cognition and neuroscience. The study of social dynamics generally and social justice in particular has increasingly become centered in business schools, within departments of organizational behavior and management. As a consequence the field of organizational justice has become an increasingly prominent area of study (see Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005).

Within the social sciences social justice has remained a decidedly interdisciplinary area of research, with robust literatures in psychology, sociology, political science, and economics. These literatures have been linked to management, law, and public policy. The centrality of justice to politics and social relations, noted since the earliest social and political theories has continued with the advent of empirical research. In the period following the Second World War many of the social sciences, particularly economics, were heavily influenced by the rational choice approach, which views people as motivated by calculations of personal material gain and loss. This approach

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parallels early social exchange perspectives on distributive justice. As this approach has been increasingly questioned in recent years (Mansbridge, 1990), social scientists have found it difficult to address intellectual issues related to social dynamics—as well as issues of public policy, management and governance—without reference to empirical findings about subjective justice (see Sanders & Hamilton, 2001).

Morality

In contrast to the idea of justice, social psychology has a longer history of concern with issues of morality and moral values. This concern was rooted in the work of Freud, for whom the development of functionally autonomous moral motivations is an important aspect of the overall childhood socialization process. For example, Jones and Gerard (1967) address the acquisition of values in three chapters of their social psychology textbook, focusing particular attention on the internalization of values during childhood. Through this internalization process children become internally motivated to act in ways that are consistent with their sense of right and wrong. The core point made by Freud and others is that such values, once acquired, shape people's behavior in social settings, leading them to act in ways that differ from their material self-interest based on the motivation to adhere to principles of right and wrong.

Following on the work of Freud, research on the acquisition of moral values focused on mechanisms through which such acquisition might occur. One mechanism was identification. Often labeled the "loss of love" model, identification suggests that children take on their parents' values to build a psychological connection with their parents. Morality is intertwined with empathy for others and the ability to build emotional bonds. This leads to the strategy of contingent affection, with parents withholding their love when their children do not act appropriately. Freud argued that as children become older their need for their parents' affection diminishes, but their values become functionally autonomous and have become incorporated into their own value system (Hoffman, 2000).

A second model is the internalization model. This model suggests that values are acquired through reasoning and thought. As children age they encounter social situations that lead them to reason about what is right and wrong, promoting the development of personal values. The strategy of parenting associated with this model involves reasoning through moral problems with children and encouraging them to think about their behavior and the behavior of others in a moral framework. Cognitive models of this type lead directly to the work of Kohlberg, who emphasizes the development of moral reasoning skills as a precursor to the evolution of moral values and styles of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969).

Irrespective of how it is acquired, morality is commonly defined as a desirable end-state that motivates actions (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Schwartz, 1992). In particular, morality is a value that is linked to responsibility and obligation to engage in conduct that conforms to principles of right and wrong. The core argument is that people develop such values and are motivated to act in ways to adhere to values reflecting their views about what they ought to do, even when such values conflict with what they want to do or view as being in their self-interest. A number of studies by psychologists now support the basic premise that morality shapes action (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Turiel, 2002).

In an influential APA Presidential address, Donald Campbell provocatively argued that the development of moral and social values could be viewed as an example of social evolution (Campbell, 1975). He suggested that these values, and the institutions that maintain them, serve the useful function of helping people to control "human nature"—that is, the biological tendency to act in one's immediate self-interest. Campbell suggested that behavior arising from self-interest was not adaptive in many situations and that those people who live in social groups that have developed effective mechanisms for minimizing such behavioral tendencies will be more likely to flourish. Those groups have taught their members to identify with their group and to hold group values and norms. Increasingly, such socially superior groups dominated over others, leading to our present highly socialized world. This culture-based view of values is consistent with recent arguments that values are not universal (Fiske, 1992; Schwartz, 1992) and evolve as cultures change (Baker, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

This argument draws morality and justice together by suggesting that both are socially created and transmitted mechanisms for managing problems of coordination in groups, organizations, and societies. Principles of justice and the development of supportive values both facilitate people's efforts to control their motivation to pursue short-term self-interest, a motivation that may well have a biological basis but that nonetheless is an inferior way to approach interactions with others. Put simply, social motivations function to overcome biological tendencies.

While one line of research has emphasized the commonality of morality and justice, another has focused on the distinction between morality and empathy. In a series of studies, Batson has demonstrated that people can experience conflicts between following abstract principles of morality and their empathetic liking for particular individuals. For example, while people may want to allocate scarce resources using general principles of morality, they may also want to ignore those rules and give resources to people that they find particularly likable and sympathetic (Batson, 1999, 2003, 2005).

There is a renewed interest in morality in recent social psychology, motivated in large part by the work of Haidt (2001, 2007). Consistent with the general theme of this chapter, Haidt views morality from the perspective of social functionality. Haidt argues that moral values are sensed intuitively, which is consistent with an evolutionary view of values. And they develop to meet social needs, something that James articulated in his argument that "thinking is for doing." In other words, "moral reasoning is not like that of an idealized scientist or

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judge seeking the truth, which is often useful; rather, moral reasoning is like that of a lawyer or politician seeking whatever is useful" (Haidt, 2007, p. 999). One way that morality works is similar to the general argument made here about justice: It creates groups and binds them together. In other words, morality facilitates cooperation by creating shared norms of appropriate behavior. This argument places morality and justice in a similar position and role within society. Both are principles of appropriateness, developed by groups to manage their interactions and facilitate long-term gains through cooperation.

The other new direction in research on morality has been the increasing connection between psychological research and studies of ethical decision making. Traditionally the study of ethical reasoning has been nonempirical in nature and has focused on reasoning about moral dilemmas (Sandel, 2009). However recent discussions of ethics have reflected a more direct connection between reasoning and empirical evidence about psychology (Appiah, 2008). One example of this connection is the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging technologies to explore the role of reasoning and affect in the resolution of ethical dilemmas (Greene & Darley, 2001).

Morality has also become more centrally connected to issues of ethics as ethics has been applied to organizational settings in the form of behavioral ethics. This work has drawn on psychological studies of moral reasoning, for example the work of Rest on moral awareness, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral behavior (Rest, 1986), as applied to organizations (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Moral awareness involves the ability to identify the moral elements in decisions. Moral judgment is based on Kohlberg's studies of the stages of moral reasoning and examines how people reason about ethical dilemmas. Moral motivation is concerned with whether people are motivated to do what they or others believe is the morally right thing in particular settings. And finally, moral behavior examines the degree to which people actually behave morally in particular organizational situations. As ethics has emerged as an important element in studying groups and organizations, the empirical study of the ethical climate of organizations has become an increasingly central focus for ethics.

Conclusion

The findings of justice research are important for several reasons. First, they contribute to the demonstration that people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are determined by their internally held values concerning what is just or fair. These values play an important role in making social life possible because they provide a basis for cooperation among people in groups, organizations, and societies. And, as the literature on social justice makes clear, they provide an important confirmation that the social ties between people are central to their actions in social settings. People in social settings do not act simply as self-interested actors, pursuing individual or group gains and losses. Rather their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors are shaped by their judgments concerning what is appropriate and fair.

The demonstration that people are value-based actors shows clearly the centrality of social motivations to people's actions in groups, communities, organizations, and societies. Justice and morality are both found to be important social judgments that influence how people act when dealing with others. And, since both reflect a sense of what is appropriate within a given setting, their influence shows that people are concerned with questions of right and wrong. Their actions do not simply reflect gain/loss judgments.

Beyond the overall finding that values matter, demonstrating the importance of procedural justice is a distinct contribution of this literature. It is not obvious that people's engagement in groups would be the result of procedural justice judgments. People could potentially consider a wide variety of aspects of their relationship to their group when they are evaluating the degree to which they want to engage themselves in a group. One thing that we might expect people to consider is reward level—i.e., people might consider their salaries, the number of resources they are given to manage, and/or the size of their office, their car, or their home as key inputs into their judgments about how much to engage in a group. Or, at least, they might consider outcome fairness, as suggested by Thibaut and Walker (1975).

Because an outcome focus is intuitively obvious, the finding that procedural justice is so central to people's thinking is striking. It is especially striking because, of the procedural elements considered, questions of interpersonal treatment consistently emerge as important. In other words, people's focus is on those aspects of their experience that communicate messages about status, rather than on those more directly related to issues of decision making. This supports the argument that it is status issues that define people's relationship to groups, and procedural justice that provides information about status.

Overall, the literature on justice contributes to a social vision of the person on several levels. First, because people care about justice, a socially constructed idea, and view it as the core element of social groups. Second, because people think of justice in very relational terms. And, third, because studies of how justice influences people's behavior suggests that the key connection between people and groups, communities, organizations, and societies is rooted in their concerns about self and identity. In all of these ways, people show themselves to be fundamentally social animals.

Following the Second World War the field of social psychology was infused with excitement and energy by the sense that many of the aspects of the recent conflict could be understood in terms of social dynamics. This led to the social psychological study of authoritarianism/prejudice, propaganda/attitude change, and group dynamics. Of particular relevance to the field of justice was the work of Kurt Lewin and his efforts to understand and explain authority structures and styles of leadership (Lewin, 1951).

This socially relevant element of social psychology, with its emphasis on the psychology of group functioning and authority dynamics in groups, led to the field of social justice. In turn, the

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literature on justice has strongly supported the image of the person as a social being who reacts to social experiences in terms of their values concerning what is just and morally right, values that are socially created and collectively held. As the field of social psychology has moved in an increasingly intrapersonal direction in the intervening years through successive focuses on cognitive dissonance; attribution; social cognition; and recently social neuroscience, the richness of the findings within the field of social justice is a reminder of the value of group-related aspects of the field of social psychology.

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