


This article was downloaded by: 10.2.97.136

On: 10 Jun 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Handbook of the History of Social Psychology

Arie W. Kruglanski, Wolfgang Stroebe

The Social Dimension of Social Psychology: A Historical Analysis

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203808498.ch7>

Kenneth J. Gergen

Published online on: 01 Dec 2011

How to cite :- Kenneth J. Gergen. 01 Dec 2011, *The Social Dimension of Social Psychology: A Historical Analysis from*. Handbook of the History of Social Psychology Routledge

Accessed on: 10 Jun 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203808498.ch7>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

7 The social dimension of social psychology: A historical analysis

Kenneth J. Gergen

The concept of social psychology as a scientific discipline derives from two major traditions for describing and explaining human activity—one psychological and the other social. My goal in this chapter is to trace the relationship of these traditions in the recent history of the discipline, with a special emphasis on the social dimension. To be sure, there are numerous ways to describe and explain human activity, and such accounts shift significantly across time and culture. These two traditions of explanation are highly significant, however, as they are woven into many cultural institutions and activities. They are pivotal to our ways of life. In effect, our choices for describing and explaining human action are not trivial in consequence.

My chief concern here, however, is with academic consequences, and most particularly, the vicissitudes of social psychology as a scientific discipline. As I will propose, these two traditions have established a tension—both productive and destructive—that continues to channel and justify our theories, research methods, and professional identities within the field. However, given the substance of the preceding chapters of this volume, concerned with the cognitive, biological, and evolutionary basis of psychological functioning, the chief emphasis in the present chapter will be on the position of social explanation in the unfolding of social psychology. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first elaborates on these two forms of explanatory discourse, their variants, and their implications for the nature of social psychological science. In the second section I explore the trajectory of these discourses in recent history. This discussion will give rise in the final section to challenging questions concerning the future of the field.

A preliminary note of caution is appropriate. History is always written from within a particular historical and cultural location. There is no god's eye view of history, only history from within the swarm. In this sense it is important to note that the following account emerges from my own particular history as a North American scholar with a somewhat unconventional professional career as a social psychologist. There are other stories to be told on this subject, and indeed they should be articulated. For example, the present account largely represents an internalist history; it treats the unfolding of ideas and practices within the discipline alone. Other sources should be consulted for an appreciation of the cultural and historical conditions contributing to the development of the field (see, for example, Baumgartner, 1977; Farr, 1996; Jahoda, 2007), and

for accounts of the interpersonal and political dynamics in play (see, for example, Moscovici & Markova, 2006). Further, all of the concepts and events to which I will refer are open to multiple interpretations; there is no ultimate clarity in understanding our past. The major rationale for writing history should neither be to develop an archive of the dead nor a tablet of stone, but to animate the dialogue on our current and coming condition. It is not learning about history that is important, but using our assay of history to enhance our current deliberations and to chart the future.

Social and psychological worlds

Attempts to explain or understand social behavior are ancient in origin and have continued to multiply over the centuries. Of major significance in the contemporary Western world, we often describe and explain people's behavior in psychological terms (e.g., thoughts, attitudes, desires, values, wants, intentions, motives). The vocabulary of the inner or psychological world now approaches 3,000 terms, and with a significant contribution from the profession of psychology, continues to expand. At the same time, we also have available a rich vocabulary of description and explanation that foregrounds the social world in which the individual is a participant. Here we explain people's behavior in terms of the social worlds that they inhabit (e.g., peer group, family, religion, linguistic tradition, ethnicity, economic class, culture). One might trace the origins of both forms of discourse to early Greek accounts of human behavior. In the case of psychology, there are Aristotle's early writings—most prominently *De Anima*—in which the study of the “psyche” (variously translated as soul, mind, or spirit) included what might be translated today as love, hate, joy, pity and other similar states. In terms of social explanation there is also Plato's *Republic*, centrally concerned with various forms of public governance and social roles and their contribution to communal life.

As we understand Western history, it might be said that in the premodern world the discourse of social explanation was dominant. The individual was primarily viewed as a constituent of some social group (e.g., family, fife, principality, village, religion, or rank). It was not until the Enlightenment that the discourse of the mind—and most prominently human reason—became central (see, for example, McCarthy, 1998). The possibility of uniting these discourses was recognized at

least by the 18th century. In Giambattista Vico's *Scienza Nuova*, for example, we find an extended account of the communal development of both individual reason and value. These traditions also furnished a rich background for later developments in both Germany and France. In the former case, Wilhelm Wundt's (1921) 10-volume compendium, *Volkerpsychologie*, sometimes translated as "social" or "cultural" psychology, is often credited as the beginning of social psychology as a science. In France, the works of both Le Bon (1895) and Tarde (1898) led in similar directions. Le Bon, an amateur physicist, offered rich descriptions and classifications of crowds and their effects on individual psychological functions. Tarde offered laws of social interaction, focusing on repetition, opposition, and adaptation. For a superbly detailed account of this early history, the reader should consult Jahoda (2007).

We will return to the development of social psychology as a science in the next section. However, as a *précis*, it is significant to take note of the particular visions of social psychology enunciated at the close of the 19th century. For Wundt, Tarde, and Le Bon the discourse of the social world was prominent, with the discourse of the mental world playing a secondary or derivative role. One's psychological functioning was largely viewed as a reflection of, or integral to, one's social existence. At the same time, one rapidly discerns the possibility of reversing the emphasis, now laying stress on psychological processes, while viewing public or collective action as secondary. In effect, we must recognize the possibility of multiple accounts for allying the social with the psychological domains. This is not an insignificant matter; as we shall see, the 20th-century trajectory of social psychology can largely be written in terms of the rise and fall of these particular forms of elision.

In addition, it is useful to draw two more nuanced distinctions within the psychological and social orientations to explanation. Both the psychological and social orientations to explanation possess within them certain tensions, and both the history and future of the discipline depend on an appreciation of the internal divisions. In terms of a psychological orientation, one may distinguish between what may be viewed as a mental as opposed to a biological emphasis. On the social side, a fault line exists between those retaining a commitment to a psychological or mental world, and those who favor abandoning the dualism between an inner and an outer world. In discussing these explanatory orientations, it is important to note that these are analytic categories, as opposed to attempts at precise description. There are few lines of research or individual psychologists who are unequivocally committed to one or another orientation, and many will simply combine orientations without acknowledging the implicit tensions. However, these analytic distinctions are useful both in earmarking particular emphases in the history of social psychology and in deliberating on the future:

I. Psychological explanation

One may usefully account for human behavior solely in terms of psychological process. In common parlance, we talk about

the importance in people's lives of their feelings, intentions, and wants, for example, while social psychologists make more ample use of such terms as cognition, motivation, and emotion. Within this orientation it is typically held that human nature endows the individual with a set of fundamental or universal psychological processes, and individual behavior can be traced to the activation of these processes. A full understanding of the laws of mental functioning would facilitate precise prediction of human conduct, and form the basis for social policies and practices. On this account, the science of social behavior is essentially a subclass of individual psychology. Social behavior is not in itself a unique form of activity, but essentially reflects the activation of fundamental psychological processes in the context of other people (real or imagined). On this account, for example, one may argue that human beings are endowed with a basic or fundamental set of emotions, and emotional behavior can be understood in terms of the activation of these fundamental emotions. For the social psychologist the challenge is primarily to understand emotional process, and secondarily to demonstrate its role in human interchange. Interest in the individual takes precedence over the social.

It is also important to take preliminary note of a major tension within the psychologically oriented camp. In this case we may distinguish between exogenous vs. endogenous forms of explanation. In the former case, psychological processes are set in motion (or "stimulated") by events in the external world; in the latter, psychological processes possess inherent potentials for activation. Often the term "bottom up" is used to characterize theories of the former variety, and "top down" the latter. Thus, for example, classic attitude change research (e.g., Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, 1953) on the effects of communicator and message characteristics on attitude change exemplifies the exogenous orientation, while traditional balance theory of attraction (e.g., Heider, 1958) exemplifies an endogenous approach.

II. Biosocial explanation

From a purely psychological standpoint, little reference must be made to human biology. If laws of cognitive functioning could be demonstrated, for example, one could more or less presume that whatever is discovered about biology will be consistent with these laws. However, the presumption of fundamental psychological processes, intrinsic to human nature, stands as an open invitation to shift the emphasis from a psychological to a biological explanation. In this case the primary challenge for the social psychologist is that of understanding biological process. The research emphasis shifts from the mental world to illuminating the neural, hormonal, and/or genetically based grounds of human action. To illustrate, the psychologically oriented social psychologist might explore human understanding in terms of basic processes of inference (see, for example, Jones and Davis, 1965); in contrast, the biologically oriented social psychologist might focus on mirror neurons (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009). Whether the vocabulary of the mentally

oriented psychologist remains useful—in this case, the process of inference—becomes moot. However, in concert with the psychological orientation, the primary concern of the biological orientation is with individual functioning; the understanding of social behavior stands as a derivative of basic knowledge of biological determinants.

III. Sociocultural explanation

With this third orientation the locus of explanation shifts from the psychological to the social domain. In this case the chief focus is on social process, with psychological process standing as a derivative. In effect, the very functioning of mental life is shaped within the social milieu. Such an orientation is not to be confused with the endogenous orientation described above. In that case one presumes the existence of fundamental psychological processes or mechanisms that may be stimulated in various ways by environmental inputs. In the present case the very processes of mental functioning have their origins in cultural process. It is the difference between a focus on cognitive process with the content of such processes a secondary matter, and viewing the content—as absorbed from the social world—as the essence of whatever we might call “thought.” Exemplary is the early work of Lev Vygotsky (1934), in which higher mental functioning is said to be a mirror of social life; what is “in the mind” was first “within the culture.” In this case, the presumption of fundamental psychological processes, rooted in biology, is either muted or abandoned; human nature is flexible; the major characteristic of the brain is its plasticity; and the critical concern is with the shaping power of social or cultural conditions. In the case of emotions, for example, one might argue against the presumption of “basic emotions,” and view all emotional categories as developed and sustained (or not) within particular cultural milieus. The social is prior to the personal.

IV. Social explanation

At furthest remove from purely psychological explanation are explanations of behavior that are altogether centered in social process. Little or nothing may be attributed to fundamental psychological processes or biological dispositions. Social behavior emerges within processes that are inherently relational, that is, no more reducible to the actions of individual participants than attempting to understand the meaning of a sentence by examining the individual words. Thus, for example, one may understand the patterns of interchange in a dyad, a family, a team, a social group, or organization, *sui generis*. An individual’s actions, on this account, are intelligible only in terms of the overarching social patterns of which they are a part. Classic research that traces the effects of group outcomes to configurations of communication (e.g., Bavelas, 1948), or later inquiry tracing social behavior to gender roles in society (e.g., Eagly, 1987), or focusing on interaction rituals (Goffman, 1982) are illustrative. Or, in the example of the emotions, one might propose that courtship patterns specific to a given culture

may include the display of certain emotions at certain points in the development of the courtship. Outside this culturally defined pattern, such displays would be unintelligible. In effect, no distinction is drawn between an internal or psychological world, and an external or social world. Explanation centers on social process in itself.

These disparate forms of explanation are not only important in terms of understanding the complex tensions that have marked the development of 20th-century social psychology. They also carry with them significant implications for how we are to understand the potentials of the discipline and how we may chart its future development. To sharpen the focus on the historical development, and the choices we make for the future, it is important to foreground four outcomes potentially affected by these explanatory preferences. In each case attention is drawn to potentially divisive consequences.

Explanation and the roots of conflict

It is first important to note the potentials for any one of these visions for monologic expansion, that is, for providing a full and complete explanation of social life in its own terms. The unchecked expansion of any of these views would render all the alternatives unnecessary or irrelevant. Thus, one may view all human activity as issuing from fundamental psychological processes, including all behavior toward or with other persons. Nothing need be said about biology, culture, or social process. Similarly, at the extreme, all social behavior may be viewed as the byproduct of biological dispositions, with no reference to psychological process. This is the view of the “eliminative materialist” (e.g., Churchland, 1986), who argues that virtually all of the psychologist’s vocabulary of the mind is little more than formalized folklore. This is to say that an expansion of biological explanation in social psychology ultimately threatens its psychology. Similarly, from the sociocultural viewpoint, there is little need for a basic psychology or neuro-based explanations of behavior. Little is gained by either investment. And, from the purely social standpoint, one may dispense with all attempts either to “explore the internal world” or to explain social life by summing up the behavior of individuals (as in social *interaction*). Relational phenomena can be studied in themselves, without reduction.

In realizing the multiple potentials for explanatory dominance, we also see the possibilities not only for disciplinary conflict, but for mutual dismissal and oppression. Once committed to a given perspective, the alternatives may appear misdirected, irrelevant, or threatening. It is also important to note that these different approaches are, in principle, neither convergent nor complementary. That is, a complete account of human behavior does not require the summing of the orientations. In a Kuhnian (1962) sense, they are different paradigms. We are not confronting here the case of blind men examining the same elephant. Rather, each of these explanatory orientations can effectively “create the elephant” in its terms.

The eternal vs. the ephemeral

It is possible to view the world both in terms of durable patterns and as a continuous stream of passing events. Consider Plato's "universal forms" as against Heraclitus' "infinite flux." In the case of the social world, our orientation may importantly depend on our explanatory preferences. In particular, as we move from a psychological to a social base of description and explanation, there is a strong (though not inevitable) tendency to shift from interpreting phenomena in terms of their fundamental lawfulness (or durability), as opposed to their historical or cultural dependency (an infinite flux). The researcher concerned with fundamental or biologically based psychological processes is likely to see the passing parade of social life as a manifestation of underlying laws of behavior. The surface characteristics (e.g., customs, mores) may change, but the laws remain eternal. However, the researcher who sees individual behavior in terms of social process may explain the same phenomena in terms of the cultural conditions of the times. Underlying principles are largely irrelevant or obfuscating. By the same token, researchers committed to underlying laws may find the social researcher's gaze superficial, while the social researcher may see the psychological researcher as wrapped up in "psychologizing." The former may find in the behavior of college sophomores manifestations of universal human nature, while the latter may see such behavior as simply reflecting the mores of a particular subculture at a particular time in history. It is important to note that these are interpretive preferences, and not fundamentally subject to empirical test. If behavior patterns shift over time, the universalist can claim that they are simply variations on a universal theme; if patterns remain durable, the socially oriented theorist will claim that certain traditions are strong or have continued support.

Societal relevance of research

Choices of explanation also favor differing orientations to the societal relevance of one's inquiry. For those favoring the search for universal psychological or biological processes, there will be a strong leaning toward "pure research," that is, research that attempts to establish the fundamental nature of human behavior. A belief in the accumulation of basic knowledge is sufficient rationale for mounting a research program. To be sure, the researcher may sometimes make inferential leaps from research findings to social events of the times, but these are typically secondary or irrelevant to the research process itself. If there are applications to be made of fundamental knowledge, these can be left to practitioners. In the case of socially based explanations, however, there is a strong tendency to use ongoing events in the social world as touchstones for research. Concerns with crowds, authority, prejudice, conformity, deteriorating morality, and the like serve as the guiding reason for conducting research. In the extreme case, the research may be aimed at solving social problems or generating social change. One may also view this difference in orientation in

terms of defining one's role as social psychologist. An investment in scientific laws will tend to support a more politically neutral self-definition. One's task is to determine "what is the case" as opposed to "what ought to be." When the social world is malleable, one more readily asks, "How can we create a better future?" One's professional role is more akin to the political activist. Again, the potentials for alienation are considerable. For the more politically inclined social psychologist, "pure research" often seems irrelevant and artificial, "fun and games" of little value to society. For the researcher committed to foundational laws, socially relevant research may seem both politically inconsequential and value biased.

Methods of research: From rigor to realism

Commitments to explanation also have relevance to preferences in research methods. If one is committed to a view of fundamental psychological or biologically based processes, a premium may be placed on rigorous methodologies. It is of greatest importance to be precise about the nature of cause-effect relations, and given the enduring nature of the subject matter, one may continuously return to the phenomena to increase the precision of prediction. Inaccurate hypotheses can be discarded; new research can add further dimension to understanding; knowledge accumulates. The controlled conditions of laboratory experimentation and reliable measuring instruments are thus preferred. However, as one moves toward the relational sphere of explanation, and the concern with relevance gains priority, rigorous methodology loses its luster. The major challenge in this case is to speak significantly to issues of contemporary importance. This may often require moving out of the laboratory and into the field. Interviews, surveys, participant observation, visual and voice recording, historical records, and so on may all be useful. Further, because the subject of study is in continuous process, one cannot often return to "the phenomenon" for refinement of understanding. Today's race prejudice, religious fundamentalism, sexism, abortion conflict, crime, terrorism, and so on may be tomorrow's history. Because the social world is in continuous flux, the natural science model of accumulating knowledge is misleading. The challenge, then, is to provide a full sense of "what is now taking place," which may be obscured by the kinds of artificial conditions and instruments required for rigor.

Theory and fact

Related closely to the preceding is a final difference worthy of note. To the extent that one is invested in rigorous research, there is typically strong emphasis on the process of gathering data. The quality of the fact is not only significant in terms of illuminating fundamental processes, but the key to scientific respectability. Thus, for those committed to psychological explanation, curricula requirements are invited in research methodology, measurement, and statistical procedures. However, when ephemeral social process is in question, and the rigor of

research may be less important than the societal significance of one's efforts, then conceptual issues become increasingly focal. Issues of justice, social change, power, and human rights may all cry out for attention. And to explore such issues rapidly invites exploration of history, philosophy, culture critique, and so on. In effect, issues of theory become paramount in importance. Methods-centered curricula become burdensome; courses in history and theory are essential to socially significant inquiry.

As we thus find, choice of explanation in social psychology is no mere matter of intellectual taste. Such choices can grant to one a particular sense of personal significance and offer an entire array of supporting values and companions. Challenges to one's choice can be deeply threatening. This is also to say that there is little way a historical account such as this can convey the intensity of the conflicts that have often accompanied the shifts in investment, policies, and practices over the decades. I can only allude to the alienation, antipathy, rancor, and exclusionary tactics that have occasionally marked this history. In any case, with these explanatory distinctions and their accompanying orientations now in place, we may turn to the vicissitudes of social explanation within the past century.

Trajectories of social psychological inquiry

As outlined earlier, by the turn of the 20th century the stage was set for the flourishing of a science of social psychology. However, in the following decades the developmental trajectory of this science proved to be neither linear nor tranquil. To invite deliberation on future potentials of the science, it is useful to divide the 20th-century development into three major periods, the first emphasizing equanimity across the various forms of social psychology, the second narrowing the forms of explanation to the psychological, and the third representing the beginnings of a radical return of social explanation.

Early equanimity: Faith in fact

Within the first three decades of the 20th century the tracks were laid for exploring both the psychological and social forms of explanation, in all their variations. As described, contributions of the preceding century had already made apparent the social nexus of behavior. These visions were extended by the simultaneous publication in 1908 of two radically different textbooks in social psychology. On one hand, Edward Alsworth Ross' textbook *Social Psychology* was deeply committed to a sociocultural view of the field. For Ross, "Social psychology . . . studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association" (p. 1). Thus, Ross focused his major attention on the effects of crowds, fashions, and conventions on the individual. For Ross, biological foundations were of marginal significance. In striking contrast, in William McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* biology was the central determinant of social behavior. With little concern for psychological process in itself, McDougall traced the vast share of social behavior to

biologically based *instincts*. Inherent instincts governed such wide-ranging activities as parenting, pugnacity, gregariousness, acquisition, and habit. The social surrounds were given little explanatory role, and whatever their influence was said to result from a more primary, instinctual basis. In effect, the grounds were laid for a vision of a biologically based psychology of social life. With such tensions in place (Britt, 1937), it is not surprising that the move toward a scientific discipline of social psychology was to be complex and convoluted. To appreciate some of the most significant turns in the immediate decades to follow, we may roughly demarcate three specific phases.

The positivist empiricist entry

Importantly, however, both these texts were published prior to the flourishing of an empiricist philosophy of science on one hand, and conditioning research on the other. Already in 1844 August Comte had outlined a theory of universal development of society that placed positivism at the pinnacle. Positivism in this case elided the value of individual rights with a science of reason and observation. Every individual is entitled to his or her view of the world, argued Comte, but through the application of reason and publicly available observation, disputes may be resolved. As Gordon Allport (1954) later claimed, these views granted to Comte the title of "father of social psychology." However, Comte's positivist philosophy was scarcely alone in its impact. In the 1920s, in what came to be known as the Vienna and Berlin Circles, a band of philosophers—including Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Gustav Bergmann, and Herbert Feigl, among others—generated the outlines of a foundational philosophy of science. The importance of the work—often termed logical-empiricist—cannot be overestimated. Not only did it unite the long-warring schools of rationalist and empiricist epistemology, but it paved the way for the unification of all empirically based sciences. As there is but one empirical world, it was argued, all carefully controlled, objective research findings should not only accumulate, but ultimately converge into a full unity of all science. For psychologists, whose shallow roots were buried in philosophical speculation, this was an invitation to full legitimacy as a scientific discipline. And in terms of the explanatory orientations in social psychology, all were included. So long as one's truth claims were lodged in empirical evidence, ultimate convergence could be anticipated.

Yet, while such reasoning might have functioned as an open invitation to all forms of social psychology, other forces emerged that were ultimately to narrow the scope. Of prominent importance, the work of Nobel Prize winning physiologist, Ivan Pavlov (1927) effectively demonstrated that through controlled manipulation of laboratory "stimuli," a dog's salivary activity could be brought under control. The manipulation of stimuli, it was proposed, altered the associative activity of the dog's cerebral cortex, which in turn altered the animal's behavior. In effect, Pavlov had brought under laboratory control the process of knowledge acquisition. For psychology, the implications of this research were profound. First, it provided a

highly visible and respected exemplar of how the discipline of psychology could become a fully-fledged science. Its focus was essentially on observable behavior. Second, it defined ideal science as one based on controlled, laboratory experimentation. And finally, it placed the research focus solely on the behavior of the individual organism.

It was within this intellectual context that Floyd Allport's (1924) textbook, *Social Psychology*, was born.¹ Congenial with both empiricist philosophy of science and Pavlov's physiologically based inquiry into basic laws of learning, the volume essentially defined social psychology in terms of individual psychology. As Allport reasoned, the wellsprings of human behavior are biological, and specifically the biological need for survival. However, survival depends on learning, and thus, a responsiveness to environmental fluctuations. In effect, human behavior is lodged within a chain of cause and effect, leading from the stimulus world to biologically based psychological processes, and then to behavioral outcomes. On these grounds, social psychology functions as an extension of individual psychology. Or in Allport's terms, "Biological needs are the ends toward which . . . social behavior is a developed means . . . There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals" (p. 4). Although eschewing a long tradition in which the social world is *real* (and "individual minds" are less so), Allport's vision was later to become dominant.

Well into the 1960s, however, there was a flourishing of inquiry in all of the explanatory paradigms, save one. So rapidly did Allport's behaviorist orientation develop and expand in American psychology that bio-centered theories of instinct—such as those of McDougall—were virtually extinguished. On the behaviorist account, the major focus of research is on charting the causal linkages between observable, environmental stimuli and resulting behavioral effects. The idea of an instinctual basis of behavior was essentially that of an uncaused cause. Also from the instinctualist perspective, experimental method was largely irrelevant, with the scientific aim of prediction and control largely replaced by post-hoc explanation. Further, to focus on instincts was akin to pulling an explanatory rabbit out of a hat—with one rabbit for every major form of social behavior. Later, however, instinctualism was also to make a robust return.

The flourishing of social interest

For the most part, a pervasive faith in the ultimate convergence of scientific inquiry set the stage for a broad and uncontentious flourishing. It is in this context that one can appreciate the ability of Kurt Lewin, another "founding father," to move across explanatory realms with relative ease. Lewin's work contributed significantly to both psychological and social orientations to social behavior. His field theory of the mind (Lewin, 1936), with its elucidation of hodological space, gave primacy to psychological process in understanding social behavior. His investment in action research, a process of continuous learning through social action and reflection, was lodged in a sociocultural view, based as it was on the assumption of the individual

constituted within relationships. His work on prejudice and group structures of decision-making was similarly located. Behavioral tendencies could be empirically demonstrated, but with the hope that such illumination might yield social change. And Lewin's contributions to group dynamics—with their emphasis on communication, intergroup relations, and group productivity—largely reflected a concern with relational process (Lewin, 1946). Investments in all three paradigms were possible without conflict, as all were both plausible and fortified by a vision of a unified body of empirically based knowledge. In the decades immediately following, inquiry flourished in all three orientations to understanding. Indeed, optimism as to the productivity of interchange among these orientations gave rise to major interdisciplinary centers, including Harvard's Department of Social Relations, Michigan's Center for Group Dynamics, and Yale's Institute for Human Relations.

During this early period, George Herbert Mead's (1934) theory of symbolic interaction also commanded widespread attention. Mead is a quintessential representative of the socio-cultural paradigm discussed above. As he proposed, the world of psychological meaning comes into being only within a milieu of relationships. In this sense, there are no "independent minds"; all thought emerges from a process of social sharing. Although situated in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, his ideas were to see their major flowering in sociology. Owing importantly to Herbert Blumer's (1969) elaboration, they came to be the cornerstone of the symbolic interactionist perspective. In turn, symbolic interactionism featured importantly in the development of what came to be known as the Chicago School of sociology, a dominating force in the discipline and one that emphasized qualitative methods (e.g., natural and participant observation), social change, and rich theoretical deliberation. In France, Ignace Meyerson developed a historically based psychology of collective representations (Parot, 2000). As we shall later see, these particular emphases later contributed to a schism between social and psychologically oriented social psychologists.

Within psychology, early attempts to conjoin the social and the psychological took many forms, not all of them falling neatly into the explanatory categories described earlier. For example, in much research social process served as the major focus, with psychological process simply used as a secondary, explanatory fulcrum. In effect, there was little interest in testing hypotheses about psychological processes in themselves; social life was the prevailing concern. This dual focus is represented, for example, in such classic work as research in social cohesion (Festinger, 1950), informal communication in groups (Schachter, 1951), intergroup discrimination (Tajfel, 1970), group polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), social memory (Bartlett, 1932), social exchange (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), and the risky shift phenomenon (Cartwright, 1971). All employ psychological concepts, but the focal interest is in social processes. The same may be said of much research on group dynamics. Social process was the chief focus. However, in this case, investigators wavered between psychological and purely social explanations.

Thus, group dynamics researchers could speak of power in terms of an individual's "perception of power," (e.g., Levinger, 1959) alongside structural or organizational power (French and Raven, 1959).

Although satisfying in their ability to include both social and individual processes, these early hybrids were not unproblematic. Of major importance was the problem of mutual reducibility, either social or psychological. For example, if we view a social pattern in which people reciprocate benefits (the reciprocity norm), nothing is gained by positing a psychological process (an internal norm) by which they function. The resort to psychological explanation is redundant. Or, if we posit something like an internal need for reciprocity, documenting the social norm adds very little. It would be akin to saying that people have a need to breathe, and lo and behold, we find that the general norm in society is that of breathing. Because each language is reducible to the other, they render each other expendable. To illustrate in the case of research on group cohesion, psychologically oriented researchers defined cohesion as the sum total of each individual's attractions to the group. Yet this definition creates the difficulty of recognizing another reality that could be called "the group." The result was a tendency to view the group as concept held by individuals, and thus the group ultimately ceased to be recognized as a reality *sui generis*.

It should be noted that much of the socially directed research just described, while de-emphasizing the psychological dimension, did accept the possibility of fundamental laws, but these were to be laws of *social* behavior (e.g., intergroup relations, communication to a deviant). At the same time, one may locate important forms of research that were more fully sociocultural in orientation. Here I include forms of study in which systematic patterns of social behavior are charted, but in which the prevailing assumption is that, with knowledge of the research findings, such patterns could (and possibly should) be abandoned. Perhaps the most celebrated case of this kind is Asch's (1956) famous experiments on social conformity. Similar to Milgram's (1963) later work on obedience to authority—along with research on threat and collaboration (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960), and bystander intervention (Darley & Latané, 1968)—a social pattern is illuminated, but with little elaboration of psychological process. In all cases, the research was saturated with political value. It was not offered as basic knowledge, but derived its purpose from the way in which it opposed social conformity, obedience, the use of threat, and callousness. Arguably, one may also view the classic work on attitude change (see, for example, Hovland et al., 1953) in a similar light. Here researchers could empirically demonstrate law-like forms of human behavior, but with little elaboration of the psychological processes at stake. Further, it was commonly presumed that knowledge of such processes could (and should) insulate individuals against influence attempts, a case made most directly in McGuire's (1969) research on attitudinal inoculation.

Although less common, one could locate significant studies relying almost entirely on social explanation. For example,

Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) employed field research to document the way in which two groups of adolescents formed group norms and developed an internal hierarchy. Such group formation then laid the grounds for intergroup conflict. Psychological explanation played little role in understanding. Similarly, Bales (1950) and his colleagues developed an elaborate form of interaction process analysis, and carried out extensive research on phases of group problem solving. Janis' (1972) monograph on "groupthink," and Kerckhoff and Back's (1968) volume on social contagion also made signal contributions to inquiry into social process, but with little reliance on psychological explanations. Similarly, the pioneering work of Bavelas (1948) on group structure, and Moreno (1951) on sociometric measurement, formed the beginning of a lively tradition that evolved over time—largely within sociological enclaves—to become what today we view as network analysis (Brandes & Erlebach, 2005). There was also lively interest in qualitative research emerging from sociology. Volumes such as Whyte's (1955) *Street Corner Society*, and Willis' (1977) *Learning to Labour* could capture lively interest among psychologists.

Real/izing the mind: The continental turn

As we have seen, in these early years social psychologists moved very slowly toward an elaboration of psychological process in itself. In large measure the reason for this delay can be attributed to the behaviorist paradigm dominating psychology within the US. As noted, the behaviorist orientation emphasized universal laws based on observable phenomena. Because of their lack of observability, the status of "psychological processes" was thus shaky. Clark Hull (1943) and other major researchers spoke of mental events as "hypothetical constructs"; others, such as B. F. Skinner (1938) eschewed psychological language altogether. To rest one's scientific credentials on propositions about mental process was risky.

Yet, with time, the center of gravity in social psychology moved in precisely this direction. The roots of this shift were planted by psychologists who shared in what is often characterized as the Continental European tradition, one in which the individual's "inner life" is viewed with respect and curiosity.² Philosophically the tradition is often traced to Immanuel Kant, and for present purposes, his elaboration of *a priori* knowledge (mental knowledge prior to observation). Closely allied was the subsequent philosophical movement characterized as Romantic Idealism, and closely identified with German culture. Central to the idealist philosophy of such figures as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher was a belief in the significance of an inner life—beyond what is given to us by experience. At the extreme, there is no "real world" outside of our subjective experience of it. As can be seen, the Continental tradition contrasts quite well with the empiricist tradition typically traced to the writings of Locke and Bentham. In any case, it was the Continental tradition that later gave birth to the theories of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, and the Gestalt school of

psychology. The latter school, led by such figures as Wolfgang Kohler (1930) and Kurt Koffka (1935), was already generating active resistance to behaviorist psychology (and its empiricist-centered view of human behavior). And it was within this alternative tradition that immigrant psychologists such as Lewin, Krechevsky, and Heider could write freely about the dynamics of mental process. The prospects of exploring the psychological sources of social behavior were exciting, and provided the major challenge for a new generation of social psychologists. Most significant in their effects were the writings of Lewin's students, including Leon Festinger's theories of social comparison (1954) and cognitive dissonance (1957), and Stanley Schachter's inquiries into affiliation (1959) and the cognitive construction of emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Fritz Heider's (1958) theory of cognitive balance not only gave rise to an extensive body of research, but was influential in launching the field of social perception (see, for example, Jones, 1990) and social attribution (Kelley, 1967; Jones & Davis, 1965). For present purposes, it is most important to note the form of inquiry represented in this movement. Essentially the researcher posits the existence of a psychological process, and research is devoted to validating, modifying, extending, or limiting understanding of its functioning. The research focus is essentially on the individual's mental process, and the implications for social life often become secondary or irrelevant.

By the closing decades of the 20th century, there occurred what many see as a radical narrowing of the field, one that increasingly centered on psychological process and the experimental method. It was thus that in 1974, Ivan Steiner could write his signal article, "Whatever happened to the group in social psychology?" Where strong forms of socially centered psychology had been possible, they were now more often located in the field of sociology. In effect, one could recognize "two social psychologies" (Stryker, 1977), one lodged within departments of psychology and the other in sociology. In Graumann's (1986) terms, in psychology there was an "individualization of the social and the desocialization of the individual." In Gantt and Williams' (2002) terms, "social psychology is not genuinely or importantly *social* psychology at all" (emphasis in original). Or, as philosopher John Greenwood (2004) described the condition, "American social psychology . . . virtually abandoned the study of the social dimensions of psychological states and behavior" (p. 1). It is this trajectory that now demands attention.

The growing divide: Unity and dispersion

In my view, from the closing decades of the 20th century to the present, there has been a strong movement toward the individualization of social psychology. It is a movement largely within the discipline of psychology, and it is one that has come to dominate the major journals, granting bodies, and curricula. As E. E. Jones (1998) put it in his history of social psychology, today "we accept G.W. Allport's definition of social psychology with its emphasis on 'the thought, feeling, and behavior of

individuals' as shaped by the 'actual, imaginary, or implied presence of others'" (p. 3). In their 1999 review, Rodrigues and Levine made a case for a century-old, free-standing discipline of "experimental social psychology"—in effect, a social psychology of the individual. This has not meant the death of more social orientations. However, even when concerned with social process, research in such areas as social interdependence and intergroup conflict takes "the individual as the unit of analysis" (Levine & Thompson, 1996, p. 767). At the same time, this gathering of forces within the central institutions of psychology has also led to a splintering of the discipline; for present purposes, one in which the more fully social perspectives were marginalized. The frequent result was that new, smaller, and relatively isolated centers of inquiry began to emerge. Before describing this fractionation in more detail, it is important to consider several major reasons for the prioritizing of psychological explanation.

- *The cognitive movement in psychology.* Within experimental psychology more generally, the early and mid decades of the 20th century were largely dominated by a behaviorist conception of the organism. Such a conception was fully congruent with positivist/empiricist philosophy of science (Gergen, 1994). However, with Chomsky's (1968) Kantian-like challenge to behaviorist theories of language development, along with a growing interest in artificial intelligence, the door was opened for what is often viewed as "the cognitive revolution in psychology." In effect, the vision of human functioning shifted from an empiricist or "bottom up" conception of human functioning to a "top down," psychological orientation. With the behaviorist insistence on an observational grounds for theorizing now thrust aside, theorists were free to reify conceptions of mental functioning. From early research on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), to recent inquiry in such areas as cognitive priming (Aarts, Custers & Marien, 2009), regulatory fit (Higgins, Cesario, Hagiwara, Spiegel, & Pittman, 2010), and attachment anxiety (Mikulincer, Shaver, Bar-On, & Ein-Dor, 2010), the mental world has slowly become a domain of objective palpability. One is not using a "hypothetical construct" as a means of explaining social behavior so much as pursuing knowledge of what is taken to be a fundamental reality.
- *The dominance of the experimental method.* In the early 1960s, a small group of highly active and influential social psychologists met to deliberate on the future of the discipline. Among their concerns was the reputation of the specialty within the field of psychology more generally, and particularly the common criticism that social psychology was less rigorous, more conjectural, and less central to the aims of pure science than was proper for legitimacy. The ultimate result of these discussions was the formation of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology. The society was to

function as the wave of the future, establishing social psychology as a rigorous, empirically grounded discipline. And, because laboratory experimentation was viewed as the most rigorous means of testing hypotheses, lending itself most fully to tracing cause/effect relations, the experiment was to be the chief means of solidifying scientific status (see also Danziger, 1992). Slowly, method began to take precedence over content; if a given topic of study could not be subjected to experimentation, it was in danger of dismissal. The impact was subtly divisive: The rigorous experiment necessarily confined itself to psychology of the individual subject. Having no way of controlling the unfolding of group process over time, such research was subject to increasing critique.

- *Disciplinary divisioning.* This closing of the ranks also reflected a national trend toward the disciplining of knowledge making. As the social sciences expanded its ranks, and the number of subdivisions began to grow exponentially, it was no longer possible to read effectively across the domain of potentially relevant knowledge. Because of the sheer volume of material to be mastered, expert knowledge necessarily became confined to a smaller domain of inquiry. As the divisions in knowledge communities increased, so did the publication outlets, reputations, and research funding become more specialized. The result of such forces meant that a degree in psychology largely restricted the student's education to a view of human behavior in which psychological primacy in explanation was presumed. The more social orientation to social psychology, represented in sociology and communication departments, was largely removed from the curriculum. Issues in symbolic interaction, labeling theory, dramaturgy, ethnomethodology, racial and gender identity, mass communication, interpersonal relations, social networks, and the new media, for example, were largely obscured from view.
- *The development of neuropsychology.* A fourth contribution is more recent, and its ultimate implications remain unclear. However, the cognitive movement in psychology was readily coupled with the growing field of artificial intelligence, along with the compelling metaphor of the brain as a computational system. Thus emerged a powerful assemblage of scientific movements, all of which traced human behavior to neurological origins. Given the embrace of cognitive explanations, it was only natural for social psychologists to begin exploring the possibilities of neurological underpinnings (see Cacciopo & Bernston, 2004, for representative contributions). Further support for the shift toward neural explanations was provided by social psychologists who had embraced evolutionary theory, with its attempts to trace social behavior to species survival (see, for example, Buss, 2005). These combined forces lent further credibility to beliefs in the reality of mental

process. The emergence of multiple brain scanning methods also played an important role. Although wholly misleading, such methods seemed to demonstrate the objective existence of psychological processes (see Gergen, 2010). The concept of hypothetical constructs sank into history.

To be sure, there are other processes at play in the hegemony of psychological explanations in social psychology. The fact that the elite organization of the field, the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, was committed to an individualist orientation, and that its members served in key editorial positions for the major journals of the field, along with evaluation committees for the major funding organizations, was surely significant. To seek a career as a social psychologist without embracing a psychologically centered, experimental approach would indeed be dangerous. At the same time, although robust in its development, the move toward psychological primacy did not mean the disappearance of more socially oriented inquiry. Such inquiry was certainly pushed to the margins of the discipline, but this marginalization simultaneously encouraged the development of smaller and often highly dedicated enclaves of scholars. Several of these enclaves were well prepared for a renewal of interest. The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) and the International Society for Political Psychology provided collegueship and publishing opportunities for social psychologists whose primary concerns were in social issues as opposed to psychological principles. Social psychologists interested in interpersonal relationships began to join with sociologists and communication scholars to create a new tradition of inquiry (see, for example, Vangelisti & Perlman, 2006). In support of these various efforts, smaller journals such as *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *Journal of Social Issues*, and *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* offered outlets for many who were centrally concerned with social processes and the pressing issues of society. Three additional splinter movements deserve special attention.

- *Cultural psychology.* The small discipline of cross-cultural psychology had always occupied a marginal position in relation to mainstream social psychology. However, as this small discipline turned its focus on cultural differences in social behavior (see, for example, Triandis, 2005), there simultaneously emerged an implicit threat to the more general attempts of social psychologists to establish universal laws or principles of psychological functioning. To the extent that cultural variations can be documented, claims to universal, biologically based processes begin to pale. The typical means of defusing this threat is to make claims to universals (e.g., in cognitive processes, emotions), but to view cultural differences as local and artificial modifications (e.g., expression rules) of basic functioning. However, especially with the work of Markus and Kitayama

(1991), a new and more social view of cultural psychology began to take shape. As they argued on the basis of their research, psychological process itself (in this case conceptualizations of the self) is fashioned within cultural interchange. This view of a socialized psychology also resonated with the views of Vygotskian developmentalists and many cultural anthropologists (see, for example, Lutz, 1988). Further, such views of psychological process also contributed to the emerging movement in *indigenous psychology*. Here social psychologists in varying cultures took issue with Western conceptions embodied in its research traditions and began to develop concepts and methods more congenial to their own cultural traditions (see, for example, Kim, Yang & Hwang, 2006). Western psychologists were put on notice that indeed their psychology was Western in theory and fact.

- *Feminist social psychology*. Prominent among the social movements of the 1970s was the emergence of a feminist orientation to psychological study. Although much early feminist inquiry was concerned with the manner in which women were portrayed or ignored within psychological research, Gilligan's (1982) volume, *In a Different Voice*, helped to launch a more sociocultural view of the person. In her challenge to Kohlberg's universalized view of human development, Gilligan argued for gender differences in preferred forms of moral decision making. In effect, men and women tended to differ in the very forms of psychological process by which they lived. Similarly to developments in cultural and indigenous psychology, feminist psychologists began to elaborate on alternative views of ideal psychological functioning, and to explore alternatives to methods of experimentation (see, for example, Morawski, 1994; Gergen, 2001). As argued in the latter case, impersonal, experimental manipulation is antithetical to feminist values. Such journals as *Sex Roles*, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, and *Feminism and Psychology* began to open new paths for women in social psychology. Tensions remain, however, as many feminists argue that unless traditional methods are employed, feminist psychology will not be taken seriously.
- *Social representation*. Perhaps the most fully developed challenge to a psychologically centered social psychology to emerge in the latter decades of the century was embodied in social representation theory and research. In developing the theory, Serge Moscovici (1961) drew from the sociological tradition, and the writings of Emile Durkheim in particular. In his seminal work on the way in which psychoanalysis was publicly represented in various sectors of society, he reasoned that as people communicated with each other, they developed shared understandings that enabled them to orient their actions and master their environment. Within various communities these shared understandings

essentially constitute common sense. In effect, while representations are incorporated into one's cognitive sphere, human action is essentially derived from the social process of communication (see Moscovici, 2001). The research fostered by this orientation—both in Europe and elsewhere—has been voluminous. Jodolet's (1991) disquisition on the social representation of madness is exemplary. Others have explored the social representation of nature, Europe, ecstasy, art museums, AIDs, gender, sexuality, time, fair trade, telecommunication, and so on. Further work may be found in the online international journal *PSR*. Such work has not been without controversy; basic concepts are open to conflicting interpretations, the orientation is said to approximate a social determinism, and the theory harbors difficulty in articulating the relationship between the individual agent and larger social structures (see Voelklein & Howarth, 2005). However, social representation theory and research remains robust, and within recent years there have been substantial attempts to link these efforts with other socially based orientations in psychology (see Deaux & Philogene, 2001; Sugiman, Gergen, Wagner, & Yamada, 2008).

Other scholars who identified themselves as social psychologists came to work more independently. For example, Karl Weick, a significant figure in 1960s social psychology (see Weick, 1969) went on to become one of the most important organizational theory scholars of the 20th century (see, for example, Weick, 2001). Irwin Altman and Daniel Stokols (1987) moved out to develop the field of environmental psychology. Herb Kelman (1968, 1997) became almost a singular voice in the development of conflict-reducing practices. In the realm of racial prejudice, Thomas Pettigrew (1979) became one of the few social psychologists who could integrate sociological, historical, and social policy issues in his work. Much the same could be said of Ervin Staub (1992) in his inquiries into genocide and group violence. Further, other disciplines began to make claims to topics that might otherwise have been mainstays within social psychology. Relational theories of language, such as those of Ragnar Rommetveit (see Rommetveit & Blakar, 1979) and Herbert Clark (1996) were largely overlooked in mainstream social psychology, and what might have been a central issue in social psychology was absorbed by departments of communication and sociology. Donald Campbell's (1975) disquisitions on knowledge and bias were largely taken up in social philosophy.

The resounding return of the social

In high degree, the centering of the discipline within a psychological paradigm has continued into the present. However, with the approach of the 21st century, another movement began to erupt across the social sciences and humanities—a movement that brought with it a profound recognition of the significance

of social process, most particularly in the generation of knowledge. In terms of social psychology the effects were twofold: First there emerged an alternative to empiricist philosophy of science and its conception of the individual knower, and second, there was an unleashing of a new and substantial array of scientific endeavors centered on social process. A useful way of understanding the importance of these effects is in terms of the relationship between the social psychologist's conception of knowledge, on the one hand, and the kind of research in which he or she engages, on the other (see Gergen, 1994). If one holds that knowledge making takes place within the individual mind, one's focus of research congenially centers on the individual (e.g., cognition, motivation); the psychological world is the primary locus of action. In contrast, if knowledge making is a social process, then it is the social world to which the researcher's attentions are drawn. Mental matters are secondary. In this sense there was a mutually supportive relationship between logical empiricist philosophy and the primacy of psychological explanation. As a theory of scientific knowledge, empiricist foundationalism provided a grounding rationale for a social psychology that favored both psychological explanation and the experimental method. The emerging movement and its theory of science as social process favor a social psychology in which social explanations are primary, and a pluralism in research practices is invited. A brief account of the movement toward a social account of knowledge will provide a useful introduction to more recent developments in social psychology.

The social construction of scientific knowledge

During the second half of the 20th century the attempt to establish empiricist foundations of science began to erode, and a robust view of science as a social endeavor began to take its place. One may locate the primary stimulants to this revisioning of scientific knowledge in at least four quite independent movements. The convergence of these movements provides the basis for what many today consider a social constructionist view of knowledge. (This view is sometimes referred to as *constructivist*, but in this case should not be mistaken for cognitive constructivism in psychology.) By far the most important originary writings can be traced to developments in the history of science and the sociology of knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's (1962) pivotal work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, explored the ways in which the conduct of scientific research is dependent on an array of shared understandings (a "paradigm")—understandings that did not themselves rest on scientific grounds. In effect, all scientific knowledge issues from a socially negotiated *a priori*. On this account, comparisons across paradigms are eschewed, as the assumptions shared in one tradition may well yield a different factual world from another. One cannot, for example, test the validity of behaviorist principles as opposed to cognitivist or psychoanalytic, as the lines of inquiry are based on entirely different assumptions. They construct different worlds in which the facts of one are invisible or chimerical in the other. In the sociology of

knowledge, Berger and Luckmann's (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality* expanded on the view of a socially negotiated reality to include everyday understandings of the world. As Poovey (1998) outlines, the very concept of "a fact" has sociocultural origins. The impact of these works was enormous, and has since stimulated not only the growth of these disciplines, but the emergence of the social studies of science (see, for example, Latour & Woolgar, 1979).

These developments were ultimately conjoined with three other movements, the *linguistic turn in philosophy*, *literary and rhetorical study*, and the development of *critical theory*. In the first case, Wittgenstein's latter works, and most particularly *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) essentially undermined all philosophical attempts to establish rational grounds for science, or indeed, any institution or practice. As Wittgenstein cogently argued, our language for describing the world does not function as a picture of this world, but acquires its meaning from its social usage (e.g., "language games"). The restrictions placed over language use are not required by "the way the world is," but determined by social conventions. What we term "rational grounds" for an undertaking are only rational within a given tradition of language. The literary/rhetorical movement, with its roots in French semiotics and the longstanding tradition of rhetorical studies, added further dimension to this view. As proposed in both traditions, our explanations and descriptions of the world are not so much dependent on the world in itself as on literary or rhetorical conventions. In effect, traditions of language use are essential ingredients of Kuhnian paradigms, and thus furnish the grounds from which we construct scientific realities.

The final context of ferment, the critical, can be traced at least to the writings emerging from the Frankfurt School prior to the Second World War (Jay, 1996). Of special concern to this group were the ideological implications of a positivist social science. Social science research necessarily reflected the values of the researchers, which in turn embodied unexamined values within the society. Such a science had no means of questioning its own valuational premises, and thus favored the status quo. Over time, the critical tools of the Frankfurt School were adopted by multiple groups—feminist, black, gay and lesbian, Hispanic, antipsychiatric, and so on—invested in social change. All authoritative accounts of the world, including those of empirical science, could be questioned in terms of their political and social implications. As Michel Foucault (1980) later proposed, when claims to knowledge are accepted by society, they function as implements of power. Thus, for example, to believe in the diagnostic claims of the psychiatric profession is to support practices of pathologizing both self and others, along with the skyrocketing market of psychotropic drugs. The critical movement adds a particularly important dimension to the social view of science, as it recognizes that all social traditions (including science) are value invested. Thus a continuing and critical consciousness of the ideological implications of various bodies of knowledge is essential. This ferment, spanning the social sciences and humanities, did enter early debates in social

psychology. In the 1970s, in particular, there was intense debate on the nature of psychological inquiry (see, for example, Harré & Secord, 1972; Israel & Tajfel, 1972; McGuire, 1973, Strickland, Gergen, & Aboud, 1976). Conferences and society meetings were often heated, leading to public acrimony, shouting, tears, and groups marching in protest. The context of ferment came to be known as the “crisis in social psychology.” Although there were many strands of debate—including the social relevance of psychological research, the monopoly of experimental method, the problematic emulation of the natural sciences, the political ideology masked by claims to neutrality, and the manipulative character of experimentation—much debate centered on the historicity of social psychological research (Gergen, 1973). As argued in this case, social psychological research did not so much reveal “underlying laws” of human behavior as reflect cultural conventions of the times. In this sense, scientific research is not cumulative in the traditional sense. Further, because of the values embedded in scientific terminology (e.g., conformity, obedience, aggression, altruism), the proliferation of scientific knowledge could influence the cultural conventions. In effect, social psychology contributes to just the kinds of change that work against transhistorical claims to knowledge. Although controversy was heated, the movements toward individualization were in ascendance, the power structures supported such movements, and the sides sufficiently polarized that mutual understanding was minimal. The result was simply an abandoning of debate in favor of continuing the investment in psychologically centered experimentation (Blank, 1988). As announced to applause at one meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, “the crisis in social psychology is over.”

This virtual closing of the doors of debate allowed the mainstream vision to continue in relative tranquility. However, one could also begin to detect the emergence of a new range of more socially oriented visions of the field, including social constructionist (Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Davis, 1985), contextualist (Geourgoudi & Rosnow, 1985), and dialectic (Altman, Vinsel, & Brown, 1981). The way was prepared for a new flourishing of social theory and inquiry, one vitally invigorated by the broader intellectual movements just described.

The new flourishing of the social

This shift in the conception of scientific knowledge—from an empiricist foundationalism to a social pragmatism—has been of signal significance in its unleashing of creative energies. For social psychologists in particular, there was first an implicit reformulation of how the term “social” might be understood. Rather than viewing relationships as the sum total of individual actions, the invitation was to focus on social process *sui generis*. The emphasis on the minds of individual actors could, for example, be replaced by a concern with coordinated action and its outcomes. The pragmatic emphasis also invited the investigator to replace the search for transhistorical or transcultural lawfulness in human behavior with more contextualized and

value-based investments in social change. The traditional demands for rigor and replicability could legitimately be sacrificed in favor of exploring new conceptions of inquiry and scholarly action. A fuller understanding of this new flourishing can be gained by a brief sketch of five major domains of exploration.

Discourse study

As described above, the contributions of linguistic philosophy and literary and rhetorical study were pivotal to the development of a social view of science. One outcome of these explorations was an acute consciousness of the significance of language in the construction of the real, the rational, and the good. It is within the collective production of language that actions become intelligible, and cultures take on their particular shape. The implications here are not insignificant. One of the 19th century promises of psychology was that an understanding of mental functioning would place psychological science in an authoritative role in all matters of human knowledge. Psychological science would essentially generate knowledge about knowledge. While that vision was largely abandoned in the 20th century, the new forms of social theory give pause: If all conceptions of reality are born within relationships, then inquiry into social process could illuminate the means by which all knowledge claims are generated. Social psychology would no longer be a tributary of general psychology, but central to understanding all scientific inquiry (see Gergen, 1989).

Inquiries into discursive construction of reality have moved in myriad directions. Many scholars have employed discourse analysis to illuminate issues of broad cultural concern. For example, the early work of Wetherell and Potter (1992) explored the subtle prejudices built into unremarkable utterances of daily life. Further inquiry (Gavey, 2005) has centered on the influence of discourse about sexual relationships on the likelihood of rape. Walkerdine and Lucey (1989) have explored the ways that mothers and daughters are domesticated by the “kitchen” talk of everyday life; Harré, Brockmeier, and Muhlhouler (1998) have explored the discursive mechanisms underlying Green Party politics. New journals sprouted to accommodate such work, including *Discourse and Society*, *Discourse Studies*, *Discourse Processes*, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, and *Language and Social Psychology*.

Increasingly social psychologists have also turned their attentions to the constructed worlds of the culture more generally, and their detrimental effects on human and environmental wellbeing. For example, Walkerdine’s work has focused on how girls are discounted in the math classroom (Walkerdine, 1989, 1990); Fine and Weis’s compilations (Fine, et al., 2003; Weis & Fine, 2005) frame the lives of marginalized youth and women in prison; Kimmel’s work (1994) suggests that the social construction of masculinity is based on homophobia; and Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, and Benton (1992) have detailed the social production of emotional responses in girls, which train them in docility. Other research has explored the

social construction of SARS (Powers & Xiao, 2008), gender (Lorber & Farrell, 1990), child sex offenders (Gavin, 2005), medical knowledge (Jordanova, 1995), and more.

One of the most significant lines of discursive inquiry has focused on the conception of mind itself. The efforts here are both deconstructive and reconstructive. In the former case, with the shift toward a social conception of science, the individual mind loses its primacy as an explanatory locus. Thus, the very concept of individual mental process stands open to constructionist analysis. Relevant inquiry has illuminated the socially constructed character of the emotions (Averill, 1982; Harré, 1986), memory (Shotter, 1990), the sense of smell (Corbin, 1986), erotic experience (Halperin, Winkler, & Zeitlin, 1990), boredom (Spacks, 1995), and intellectual disability (Rapley, 2004).

If the taken for granted assumptions of mental process are destabilized in this way, there is room for innovative reconstruction. In particular, the focus moves from mental process to “mental talk.” In one of the earliest provocations of this kind, Potter and Wetherell (1987) demonstrated the problems inherent in the traditional view that attitudes in the head cause overt public actions. As they proposed, an attitude is more fruitfully understood as a public action in itself, or essentially, as a position taken in a conversation. As Billig (1996) went on to illuminate, most of what we take to be rational thought is more adequately viewed as a social process of argumentation. We do not argue because we have private thoughts, but rather, thinking is essentially a form of social action. This line of reasoning has been a stimulus to one of the most significant lines of constructionist inquiry, namely *communal memory*. With the early volume of Middleton and Edwards (1990), the grounds were established for viewing memory not as a personal, mental process, but as a social process (see Middleton & Brown, 2005, for a review of this work to date). As proposed by Edwards and Potter (2000), a fully discursive psychology should properly replace cognitive psychology.

One problem with the analysis of discourse is that the language in question is often decontextualized. That is, one fails to appreciate the ongoing, relational process in which it is embedded. Such concerns have given rise to active inquiry into conversational analysis. The focus shifts from the content and form of discursive segments to the conversational process as it unfolds over time (see, for example, Antaki, 2004; Parker 1998). Such inquiry has been useful, for example, in demonstrating the microprocesses of establishing power in relationships (Davies, 1982; Mishler, 1986). Although not restricted to conversation analysis, the concept of *positioning* (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Van Langenhove, 1998) has opened up a fruitful line of inquiry in its own right. The concern in this case is how individuals position or define each other through their largely discursive actions. For more comprehensive accounts of development of discourse analysis in social psychology, see Burman and Parker (1993), Edwards (1997), Holtgraves (2001), Potter (1996), Weatherall, Watson, and Gallois (2007), and Willig (1999).

Narrative psychology

As the emphasis on discursive construction took center stage, it carried with it a specific interest in narrative. Narrative is a pivotal discursive form used to link events intelligibly across time. Within the constructionist framework, early inquiry by Mancuso and Sarbin (1983) and Gergen and Gergen (1983) more fully linked narrative concerns with psychological inquiry. Later volumes by Sarbin (1986), Polkinghorne (1988), and Bruner (1990) gave the study of narrative a prominent place in psychological study. Open for inquiry were such topics as the relationship of narrative to personal identity, moral behavior, social acceptability, personal memory, self-acceptance, social efficacy, intimacy, and even the intelligibility of psychological theorizing itself.

With a rich palette of possibilities open, narrative inquiry became a fertile domain of study. In the field of personality, for example, the longstanding concern with life history was highly congenial to narrative study (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1990). The work of Dan McAdams (1985, 1993, 2006a) has been enormously important in its contribution to the understanding of narrative in personal life. His inquiry into “resurrection narratives,” for example, has also fired interest in the relationship of people’s self-understanding to their spiritual traditions (McAdams, 2006b). Holstein and Gubrium (2007) have illuminated the continuous process of creating and performing the storied self in everyday life. The study of gender differences in psychology has also been treated through narrative study (Gergen, 2001). Tappan and Packer (1991) have explored the use of narrative in developing morality. The use of narrative in constructing intelligible history, of both self and culture, has frequently been explored. A series of 11 volumes edited by Josselson and Lieblich, later joined by McAdams, has been critical in providing a venue for narrative researchers to present their work (e.g., Josselson & Lieblich, 1995; Lieblich & Josselson, 1994; Josselson, Lieblich, & McAdams, 2003). Among the vast array of topics treated by such research have been the stories of Israeli holocaust survivor families (Bar-on & Gilad, 1994), the gendered body (Gergen, 1993), professional practice within a mental hospital (Abma, 1999), and loneliness among Asian refugee women (Bennett & Detzner, 1997). The rich productivity in narrative research has also stimulated much critical reflection on narrative methods and their potentials (Gergen & Davis, 2003).

Critical social psychology

As treated above, ideological critique played an instrumental role in the development of the social account of scientific knowledge. The stage was thus set for the development of a critical movement in social psychology. The logic of this movement has not simply been that of developing reflection in the field of the potentially oppressive or destructive repercussions of various forms of theory and research. The further hope is to liberate researchers from the mesmerizing effects of taken-for-granted

assumptions and practices, thereby stimulating inquiry into more promising alternatives. One of the earliest of such offerings was that of Edward Sampson (1979), who has continued to question the ways in which psychological theory constructs a world of fundamental separation among people. Critical inquiry has since moved in many disparate directions. Particularly active have been participants in various politically sensitive wings of the discipline. Feminist psychologists have been among the vanguard of the critical movement, pointing to the gender biases pervading many of the concepts and research practices of the field at large (Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Gergen, 1988). Similarly active have been constituents of the gay and lesbian movement, much concerned with the constructed character of sexual categories, their implicit values, and their impact on cultural life (Bohan, 1996; Bohan & Russell, 1999; Kitzinger, 1987). Other researchers have studied gender formation, sexual identity, and sexual activity (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Tiefer, 1995). At the same time, class-based critique remains active (Fine et al., 2003; Henriques et al., 1984; Holzman & Morss, 2000; Parker & Shotter, 1990). Critical inquiry has also illuminated conceptual and ideological problems inherent in the cognitive movement (Coulter, 1979; Potter, 1996), evolutionary psychology (Dupre, 2003), positive psychology (Held, 1996), and experimental methodology (Gergen, 1994). Broad compilations and discussions of critical social psychology may be found in Fox, Prilletensky, and Austin (2009), Gough (2001), Hepburn (2003), and Ibanez and Iniguez (1997).

Theoretical social psychology

In viewing scientific activity as the outcome of social process, attention is drawn to the array of shared understandings from which scientific activity proceeds. Such understandings inform the conception of research, along with “the phenomenon under study.” The presumptions shared by cognitive social psychologists differ from those of a symbolic interactionist, for example, or a social phenomenologist, and thus their practices of research and the “phenomena” under study. Within scientific communities this socially negotiated array of understandings is more formally viewed as theory. Thus, as the theoretical discourse of social psychology is expanded or contracted, so are the possibilities for meaningful inquiry. In this sense, both the behaviorist and cognitive movements in psychology generated certain research possibilities, but in both cases the focus and methods of inquiry were circumscribed. Further, with the overarching demand for “empirical research” on “basic psychological processes,” dialogues on the nature and potential of theory were virtually abandoned. However, as sensitivity to the social basis of science increased, so did interest return to the development of theory in itself. From the social standpoint, to expand and enrich the forms of theory is to vitalize the potentials of the discipline.

Of particular relevance to social psychology, a number of theorists began to explore means of reconceptualizing mental

functioning. Much of this work vindicated the sociocultural perspective (see, for example, Kirschner & Martin, 2010). The writings of Mead and Vygotsky provided an important touchstone, both proposing a social genesis of psychological process. Significant work by Harré (1993), Wertsch (1991) and Bruner (1990) all amplified and extended this line of thought. For other theorists, such as Shotter (in press), and Sampson (2008), the Russian literary theorist Michael Bakhtin (1981) has served as a muse. Bakhtin’s emphasis on dialogical process shifted the theoretical focus from what takes place within the person to collaborative processes. Perhaps the most obvious example of collaborative activity is that of conversation. And with this vision in place, the grounds were established for the development of *discursive psychology* (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992), and it was in this context that the abovementioned attempts to reconceptualize attitudes and reason as social actions took place. Such lines of deliberation are radically extended in Gergen’s (2009) explorations of relational being. As proposed in this case, virtually all intelligible behavior emerges from and is sustained (or not) within collaborative process. Thus, to engage in behavior commonly termed “rational,” “intentional,” “emotional,” and so on is essentially to sustain a cultural tradition of relational performance. For more extended discussion of theoretical potentials, see *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* and *Theory and Psychology*.

Qualitative research methods

Given that many researchers with a social orientation to knowledge understand the possibility and promise of multiple viewpoints, there has been a strong interest in expanding the range of research methods and practices. The question is not so much which method captures “more of the truth,” or is more rigorous, but what kind of methodology or practice enables one to achieve one’s ends as a social psychologist. In this sense, prediction is simply one among many possible goals for the field. One might also engage in research for purposes of opening a new way of seeing the social world, furnishing information to policy planners, illustrating a theory, providing insight into a particular culture or subculture, generating empathy or understanding of marginalized peoples, creating social resistance, contributing to discussions of broad cultural concern, or helping a minority group achieve its ends. In entertaining a pluralism of standpoints, values, and goals, the invitation has been to expand the range of research practices.

Again, these developments have taken many forms. Two of these are especially relevant to the new consciousness of relationship. In the first case, many researchers became concerned with the relationship between themselves as researchers and those under study. Many researchers experience a certain discomfort in making claims to knowledge about others, in dominating the process of description and explanation without offering their subjects any right to voice. Certain of these sentiments pervade the forms of narrative research mentioned above. Increasingly, then, researchers have attempted to open spaces

for various groups to represent themselves to the profession and public. For example, in her work in Guatemala, Brinton Lykes (1989) invited her “colleagues” from war-torn villages to express their perspectives with photographs made from cameras she provided. Others, who are most closely associated with Action Research methods, close the gap between researcher and researched by collaborating with groups working for social justice and economic security (for a full review see Reason & Bradbury, 2008).

A second concern with relationship centers on the process of representing or describing one’s research findings. From a constructionist view of knowledge, there are no foundations for any particular form of representation (e.g., writing, photography, art, music). Thus, a space is opened to consider the full range of representational devices available for communication. Further, careful consideration is invited to the forms of relationship fostered by one’s means of representation. For example, all writing invites a relationship between author and reader (Gergen, 2009). In this vein, much traditional writing in psychology both formalizes relationships in the discipline and is opaque to those outside. Such writing tends to be divisive and elitist. With such concerns in mind, social psychologists have begun to experiment with various forms of writing. For example, in her feminist work, Gergen (2001) has employed both dramatic monologue and fictitious dialogue. More radically, researchers have begun to explore the potentials for performance to carry both theoretical and empirical content (see, for example, Gergen, 2005; Newman & Holzman, 1996). To illustrate, Russell (2000) has used interview data to create a musical piece, entitled *Fire*, performed by choral groups. The work is based on research into the attempt in Colorado to eliminate certain civil rights provisions for gays and lesbians. For a more extended review of the range and innovation in qualitative inquiry in psychology and related disciplines, see Camic, Rhodes, and Yardley (2003) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005), along with the contents of the journals *Qualitative Inquiry* and *Action Research*, and the electronic journals *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* and *The Qualitative Report*.

Segregation, unification, or pluralism in social psychology?

As ventured at the outset of this chapter, an inquiry into history is important primarily as it enables us to reflect on our contemporary pursuits and to deliberate on future developments. I thus wish to complete this account with a brief discussion of the discipline’s potentials at this historical juncture. Given this history of the social dimension in social psychology, how might we optimally proceed? Social psychology has a rich and varied history, but also one in which conflict in orientations is rife. At the present juncture, the conflict largely impedes communication and its creative potentials and reduces the capacity of the field for significant contribution to the society. How can and should the discipline now proceed? In this discussion it is important to note that the primary questions are not soluble on either rational or empirical grounds. There is no end to the

rational justification that may be generated in support of any of the explanatory positions described in this chapter. And research findings used in support an orientation cannot rule out the competitors, as such research indeed constructs a world of fact in its terms. Thus, we are primarily treating questions of the pragmatics and politics of the knowledge-making process. In order to stimulate dialogue on future trajectories, I now draw attention to three major options.

Segregated disciplines

Arguably the most likely option is simply that of sustaining the status quo. As Good (2000) proposes, we confront an *endemic disunity*. The various forms of social psychology can continue to function as relatively autonomous groups. One might even justify such continuation on the grounds that the various paradigms—particularly at the psychological and social extremes—are simply incompatible. As outlined earlier, both the psychological and the social discourses can be expanded indefinitely. One can describe the social world without regard to psychology, and one can continue to explore mental process without regard to social activity. And, one must imagine that there is a certain satisfaction in the status quo on both sides of the continuum. Among the psychological purists there is the satisfaction of possessing sufficient institutional power that publications, grants, curricula, and professional advancement are largely under control. Simultaneously, social purists enjoy the inspiring and affirming collegiality both with scholars across the social sciences and humanities and with a wide range of societal practitioners.

Yet these very strengths also represent important weaknesses. Psychological purists run a variety of risks, including the risk of irrelevance, wedded to an outmoded philosophy of science, and a methodology that renders such research relatively mute in terms of major issues in society. Also, with the expansion of cognitive-neuro reductionism, they risk being subsumed by experimental psychology more generally. At the same time, the social purists risk the failure of establishing a professional guild. So diffuse are their efforts and so resistant to “disciplining” that there is no “department of knowledge” to rationalize and defend their efforts. Further, with their lack of evaluative standards for theory and research, their pursuits fail to capture the respect of more empirically oriented colleagues in the social sciences. By sustaining the present conflict in explanatory preferences, the tendencies toward mutual criticism within social psychology is also likely to intensify. Invited, then, is some form of unification that may yield a mutually supportive, affirming, and richly strengthened discipline.

A unified social psychology

Empiricist foundationalism invited scientists to envision an ultimate unification of all sciences. If there is only one empirical world, it was reasoned, then all objective assays of this world must ultimately be compatible. On these grounds,

foundationalists imagined the achievement of an empirically grounded and unified body of knowledge. Although this was a vision of a now moribund vision of science, its remnants remain robust. Edmund O. Wilson's (1998) view of a converging "consilience" in behavioral knowledge is but one example. And, while muted on matters of unification, most empirical research favored by those committed to psychological foundationalism continues to view research as *progressing* toward an increasingly accurate, and objective account of the world. Following a Popperian logic, this investment in progress presumes that empirically unsupported or false accounts of the world will ultimately be discarded. For many social psychologists, this methodologically driven orientation to inquiry would be sufficient grounds for unification.

Yet, as we have seen, the demand for methodological rigor tends to favor the experimental method, which in turn tends to eliminate concern with social process. Further, fueled by the now ascendant social account of scientific knowledge, there is a growing resistance to accepting the empiricist view of scientific progress. Rigorous research does not, on this account, lead toward an increasingly accurate or objective description of human behavior; all research constructs human behavior from a particular perspective. If there is progress, it is always from within a tradition, and not generalizable across traditions. Further, because all research paradigms are saturated with cultural values, unification around any particular view carries with it a dangerous totalitarianism. If unity were possible, it would not fall within traditional positivism. Nor is it either likely or desirable that those committed to a positivist program give over to a social constructionist vision of science in general, and social psychology in particular.

Toward a pluralist pragmatism

While unification seems counterindicated, there is a more promising alternative. As the constructionist critique of recent decades has made clear, there are no culturally and historically transcendent grounds for claiming objective, impartial, empirical truth. However, it is also clear that the constructionist orientation to science is similarly without such grounds. On its own account, the constructionist orientation must itself be viewed as culturally and historically situated. Thus, we are not dealing here with an opposition between perspectives that can in any way be settled by logic or observation. More promising is to look at the various activities in which social psychologists are engaged and to consider their potentials for mutual enrichment. In this case, we do have within the scattered communities of social psychology an enormous spectrum of aims and interests, theoretical orientations, methods of study, and visions of possibilities. Rather than seeking standards of comparison, whereby certain activities are favored over others, we may view all such activities in terms of their pragmatic potentials. We need not ask, for example, whether experiments are more or less superior to case studies or action research, but celebrate what each may contribute to the broader society of which the

field is a part. In this case we replace the criterion of truth with that of societal utility. It is not whether our research on cognitive priming, the neurology of empathy, cultural variations in self, or the discursive construction of emotion is ultimately true or false. Rather, we may ask about the contribution such lines of inquiry make to the future of society. We may recognize that prediction and control may be useful to the society for certain purposes, but we may also appreciate the power of the case study, the development of social practices, stimulating theory, political action, the offering of cultural insights, the liberating effect of critique, and so on. In effect, we might build an enormously rich field of study—one linked outward to both the intellectual and the cultural surrounds—by celebrating the pluralist pursuits of the field and their multiple offerings. Here we extend the implications of William James's (1907) pragmatic view of knowledge, and his appreciation of multiple worlds (see for example, Fishman, 1998; Stuhr, 2010).

The possibilities for a mutually enriching *détente* have been advanced by Joost and Kruglanski (2002). And it is appropriate to close with examples of such benefits: Within the empirical tradition, social psychologists have made many important contributions to the psychology of health (see, for example, Stroebe, 2000). These contributions have largely employed traditional methods, statistical analyses, and so on. And few would doubt the potentials of such research in making a contribution to society. At the same time, within the socially oriented domain there is a substantial line of inquiry into the social construction of health and illness (see, for example, Flick, 1998; Lorber, 2002). As the groundbreaking work of Arthur Frank (1995) proposed, for example, our experience of pain is lodged in narrative understanding. The same physical condition may be more or less burdensome depending on whether it is constructed in a narrative of helplessness as opposed to one that places it in the service of a valued goal. Pain thus becomes a social phenomenon as opposed to merely a physical sensation (Morris, 1991). There are great gains to be made by allying these otherwise disparate approaches to a social psychology of health. Much the same kind of synergy is represented in explorations of "distributed cognition," essentially the results of distributing knowledge, memory, skills, and so on across a relational network. Such work combines the insights of cognitive psychologists, relational theorists, and ecologists. Further, it has broad applicability in education and work settings (see, for example, Dror & Harnad, 2008; Salomon, 1996).

Such a pragmatic orientation to inquiry would not eschew critical reflection. A major problem with the schisms of the past was that the competing enclaves of the field developed defensive postures that shielded themselves from examining shortcomings. In a pragmatic pluralism, one could celebrate the potentials inherent in all forms of inquiry. In all cases we should ask, what does this work contribute to the broader society and indeed the global condition of which it is a part? Simultaneously, however, we should remain open to critique from alternative perspectives. Of particular importance, we must ask not only

what we contribute, but in what ways we do injury to the society. Whose traditions, ideologies or practices do we honor—directly or indirectly—and whose are suppressed or destroyed? By welcoming such internal reflection, we not only enrich the discipline's potentials but create a science in which human values are somewhere toward its heart.

Notes

1. Pavlov's conditioning research earned him the Nobel Prize in 1904. The full text of his research became available in 1927.
2. Continental philosophy is often identified with philosophers such as Descartes and Kant, both of whom celebrated the profundity of mental life. This is in contrast to English empiricism, in which philosophers such as Locke, Bentham, and Mill emphasized the publicly observable world.

References

- Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Marien, H. (2009). Priming and authorship ascription: When nonconscious goals turn into experiences of self-agency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *96*, 967–979.
- Abma, T. A. (1999). Storytelling as inquiry. *Qualitative Health Research*, *8*, 821–838.
- Allport, F. H. (1924). *Social psychology*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). The historical background of modern social psychology. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 1, pp. 3–56). Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Altman, I., Vinsel, A., & Brown, B. B. (1981). Dialectic conceptions in social psychology: An application to social penetration and privacy regulation. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 14, pp. 107–160). New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Antaki, C. (2004). Conversation analysis. In S. Becker & A. Bryman (Eds.) *Understanding research methods for social policy and practice*. London, UK: Policy Press.
- Aristotle (2008) *De Anima* (trans. R. D. Hicks). New York, NY: Cosimo Classics.
- Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs*, *70*, 1–70.
- Averill, J. (1982). *Anger and aggression*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The dialogic imagination: Four essays*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Bales, R. F. (1950). *Interaction process analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Bartlett, F. C. (1932). *Remembering: An experimental and social study*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bar-on, D., & Gilad, N. (1994). To rebuild life: A narrative analysis of three generations of an Israeli holocaust survivor's family. In A. Lieblich & R. Josselson (Eds.), *Exploring identity and gender* (pp. 83–112). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Baumgartner, S. R. (1977). Critical studies in the history of social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *3*, 681–687.
- Bavelas, A. (1948). A mathematical model for group structure. *Human Organization*, *7*, 16–30.
- Bennett, J. A., & Detzner, D. F. (1997). Loneliness in cultural context: A look at the life history narratives of older Southeast Asian refugee women. In A. Lieblich & R. Josselson (Eds.), *The narrative study of lives* (Vol. 5, 113–146). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality*. New York, NY: Anchor.
- Billig, M. (1996). *Arguing and thinking* (2nd ed). London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Blank, T. O. (1988). Reflections on Gergen's "Social psychology as history" in perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *14*, 651–663.
- Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bohan, J. S. (1996). *Psychology and sexual orientation: Coming to terms*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Bohan, J. S., & Russell, G. M. (1999). *Conversations about psychology and sexual orientation*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Brandes, U., & Erlebach, T. (Eds.). (2005). *Network analysis: Methodological foundations*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Britt, S. H. (1937). Social psychologists or sociological psychologists – which? *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *32*, 314–318.
- Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burman, E. & Parker, I. (Eds.) (1993). *Discourse analytic research: Repertoires and readings of texts in action*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Buss, D. M. (Ed.) (2005). *The handbook of evolutionary psychology*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Cacioppo, J. T., & Bernston, G. G. (Eds.) (2004). *Social neuroscience: Key readings*. London, UK: Psychology Press.
- Camic, P., Rhodes, J. E., & Yardley, L. (Eds.). (2003). *Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and design*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Campbell, D. (1975). On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition. *American Psychologist*, *30*, 1103–1126.
- Cartwright, D. (1971). Risk taking by individuals and groups. An assessment of research employing choice dilemmas. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *20*, 361–378.
- Chomsky, N. (1968). *Language and mind*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, & World.
- Churchland, P. S. (1986). *Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind/brain*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Clark, H. H. (1996). *Using language*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Comte, A. (1856). *A general view of positivism*. London, UK: Methuen (originally published in 1844).
- Corbin, A. (1986). *The foul and the fragrant: Odor and the French social imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Coulter, J. (1979). *The social construction of the mind*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Crawford, J., Kippax, S., Onyx, J., Gault, U., & Benton, P. (1992). *Emotion and gender: Constructing meaning from memory*. London, UK: Sage.
- Crawford, M., & Marecek, J. (1989). Psychology reconstructs the female, 1968–1988. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *13*, 147–165.
- Danziger, K. (1992). The project of an experimental social psychology: Historical perspectives. *Journal for the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *36*, 329–347.
- Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *8*, 377–383.

- Davies, B. (1982). *Life in the classroom and playground: The accounts of primary school children*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 20, 43–63.
- Deaux, K. & Philogene, G. (Eds.). (2001). *Representations of the social: Bridging theoretical traditions*. New York, NY: Wiley Blackwell.
- Deutsch, M., & Krauss, R. (1960). The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 61, 181–189.
- Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Dror, I., & Harnad, S. (Eds.). (2008). *Cognition distributed: How cognitive technology extends our minds*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Benjamins.
- Dupre, J. (2003). *Human nature and the limits of science*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Eagly, A. (1987). *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Edwards, D. (1997). *Discourse and cognition*. London, UK: Sage.
- Edwards, D., and Potter, J. (1992). *Discursive psychology*. London, UK: Sage.
- Farr, R. M. (1996). *The roots of modern social psychology 1872–1954*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
- Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. *Psychological Review*, 57, 271–282.
- Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 7, 117–140.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fine, M., Torre, M., Boudin, K., Bowen, I., Clark, J., Hylton, J., et al. (2003). Participatory action research: Within and beyond bars. In P. Camic, J. E. Rhodes, & L. Yardley (Eds.), *Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and design* (pp. 173–198). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Fishman, D. (1998). *The case for pragmatic psychology*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Flick, U. (1998). The social construction of individual and public health: Contributions of social representations theory to a social science of health. *Social Science Information*, 37, 639–662.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Fox, D., Prillettensky, I. & Austin, S. (Eds.). (2009). *Critical psychology, an introduction* (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage.
- Frank, A. W. (1995). *The wounded storyteller; body, illness and ethics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.) *Studies in social power* (150–173). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gantt, E. E., & Williams, R. N. (2002). Seeking social grounds for social psychology. *Theory and Science*. Retrieved from <http://theoryandscience.icaap.org>
- Gavey, N. (2005). *Just sex? The cultural scaffolding of rape*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Gavin, H. (2005). The social construction of the child sex offender explored by narrative. *Qualitative Report*, 10, 395–415.
- Georgoudi, M., & Rosnow, R. L. (1985). Notes toward a contextualist understanding of social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1, 5–22.
- Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 26, 309–320.
- Gergen, K. J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist*, 40, 266–275.
- Gergen, K. J. (1989). Social psychology and the wrong revolution. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 19, 463–484.
- Gergen, K. J. (1994). *Realities and relationships*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gergen, K. J. (2009). *Relational being: Beyond the individual and community*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gergen, K. J. (2010). The acculturated brain. *Theory & Psychology*, 20, 795–816.
- Gergen, K. J., & Davis, K. E. (Eds.) (1985). *The social construction of the person*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Gergen, K. J., & Gergen, M. (1983). Narratives of the self. In K. Scheibe & T. Sarbin (Eds.), *Studies in social identity* (pp. 254–273). New York, NY: Praeger.
- Gergen, M. (1988). *Feminist thought and the structure of knowledge*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Gergen, M. (1993). Life stories: Pieces of a dream. In G. Rosenwald & R. Ochsberg (Eds.), *Storied lives* (pp. 127–144). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gergen, M. (2001). *Feminist reconstructions in psychology: Narrative, gender and performance*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gergen, M. (2005). Toward a performative psychology [in German]. In H. P. Mattes & T. Musfeld (Eds.), *Psychologische Konstruktionen. Der Diskurs des Performativen* (pp. 200–210). Gottingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Gergen, M., & Davis, S. N. (2003). Dialogic pedagogy: Developing narrative research perspectives through conversation. In R. Josselson, A. Lieblich, & D. McAdams (Eds.), *Up close and personal: The teaching and learning of narrative research* (pp. 239–258). Washington, DC: APA Publications.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goffman, E. (1982). *Interaction rituals: Essays on fact-to-face behavior*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Good, J. M. M. (2000). Disciplining social psychology: A case study of boundary relations in the history of the human sciences. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36, 383–403.
- Gough, B. (2001). *Critical social psychology*. London, UK: Palgrave.
- Graumann, C. F. (1986). The individualization of the social and the desocialization of the individual: Floyd H. Allport's contribution to social psychology. In C. F. Graumann & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Changing conceptions of crowd mind and behavior* (pp. 97–116). New York, NY: Springer.
- Greenwood, J. D. (2004). *The disappearance of the social in American social psychology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Halperin, F. I., Winkler, J. J., & Zeitlin, D. M. (1990). *The construction of erotic experience in the ancient Greek world*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Harré, R. (1993). *Social being*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harré, R. (Ed.) (1986). *The social construction of emotion*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harré, R., Brockmeier, J., & Muhlhausler, P. (1998). *Greenspeak: Study of environmental discourse*. London, UK: Sage.
- Harré, R., & Secord, P. (1972). *The explanation of social behaviour*. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Harré, R., & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.) (1998). *Positioning theory: Moral contexts of intentional action*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

- Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Held, B. (1996). *Back to reality, a critique of postmodern psychotherapy*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C., & Walkerdine, V. (1984). *Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity*. London, UK: Methuen.
- Hepburn, A. (2003). *An introduction to critical social psychology*. London, UK: Sage.
- Higgins, T. E., Cesario, J., Hagiwara, N., Spiegel, S., & Pittman, T. (2010). Increasing or decreasing interest in activities: The role of regulatory fit. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98, 559–572.
- Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, J. F. (2007). *Handbook of constructionist research*. New York, NY: Guilford.
- Holtgraves, T. M. (2001). *Language as social action: Social psychology and language use*. London, UK: Psychology Press.
- Holzman, L., & Morss, J. (Eds.). (2000). *Postmodern psychologies, societal practice and political life*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). *Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies in opinion change*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hull, C. (1943). *Principles of behavior*. New York, NY: Appleton-Century.
- Iacoboni, M. (2009). Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60, 653–670.
- Ibanez, T., & Iniguez, L. (Eds) (1997). *Critical social psychology*. London, UK: Sage.
- Israel, J. & Tajfel, H. (Eds.) (1972). *The context of social psychology: A critical assessment*. London, UK: Academic Press.
- Jahoda, G. (2007). *A history of social psychology: From the eighteenth-century enlightenment to the Second World War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- James, W. (1907). *Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking*. New York, NY: Longman Green.
- Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Jay, M. (1996). *The dialectical imagination: A history of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jodole, D. (1991). *Madness and social representations*. London, UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf.
- Jones, E. E. (1990). The rocky road from acts to dispositions. *American Psychologist*, 34, 107–117.
- Jones, E. E. (1998). Major developments in five decades of social psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 3–57). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. II, pp. 219–266). New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Joost, J. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). The estrangement of social constructionism and experimental social psychology: History of the rift and prospects for reconciliation. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6, 168–187.
- Jordanova, L. (1995). The social construction of medical knowledge. *Social History of Medicine*, 8, 361–381.
- Josselson, R., & Lieblich, A. (Eds.). (1995). *Interpreting experience: The narrative study of lives*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Josselson, R., Lieblich, A., & McAdams, D. (Eds.). (2003). *Up close and personal: The teaching and learning of narrative research*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, 15, 192–238.
- Kelman, H. (1968). *A time to speak: On human values and social research*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
- Kelman, H. (1997). Group process in the resolution of international conflicts: Experiences from the Israeli–Palestinian case. *American Psychologist*, 52, 212–220.
- Kerckhoff, A. C., & Back, K. W. (1968). *The June bug: A study of hysterical contagion*. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York.
- Kessler, S. J. & McKenna, W. (1978). *Gender: An ethnomethodological approach*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kim, U., Yang, K., & Hwang, K. (Eds.). (2006). *Indigenous and cultural psychology: People in context*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Kimmel, M. S. (1994). Masculinity as homophobia. In H. Broad & M. Kaufman (Eds.), *Theorizing masculinities* (pp. 200–219). London, UK: Sage.
- Kirschner, S. R., & Martin, J. (Eds.). (2010). *The sociocultural turn in psychology: The contextual emergence of mind and self*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Kitzinger, C. (1987). *The social construction of lesbianism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Koehler, W. (1930). *Gestalt psychology*. London, UK: G. Bell and Sons.
- Koffka, K. (1935). *Principles of Gestalt psychology*. New York, NY: Harcourt.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). *Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Le Bon, G. (1895). *The crowd: A study of the popular mind*. London, UK: T. Fisher Unwin. (Originally published in 1895.)
- Levine, J. M., & Thompson, L. (1996). Conflict in groups. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 745–776). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Levinger, G. (1959). The development of perceptions and behavior in newly formed social power relations. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power* (pp. 178–193). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lewin, K. (1936). *Principles of topological psychology*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Lewin, K. (1946). Action research and minority problems. *Journal of Social Issues*, 2, 34–46.
- Lieblich, A., & Josselson, R. (Eds.). (1994). *Exploring identity and gender*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lorber, J. (2002). *Gender and the social construction of illness*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Lorber, J., & Farrell, S. A. (Eds.). (1990). *The social construction of gender*. London, UK: Sage.
- Lutz, C. A. (1988). *Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lykes, M. B. (1989). Dialogue with Guatemalan Indian women: Critical perspectives on constructing collaborative research. In R. Unger (Ed.), *Representations: Social constructions of gender* (pp. 167–185). Amityville, NY: Baywood.
- Mancuso, J. C., & Sarbin, T. R. (1983). The self-narrative in the enactment of roles. In T. R. Sarbin (Ed.), *Studies in social identity*. New York, NY: Praeger.

- Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, *98*, 224–253.
- McAdams, D. (1985). *Power, intimacy and the life story: Personalological inquiries into identity*. New York, NY: Guilford.
- McAdams, D. (1993). *The stories we live by*. New York, NY: William Morrow.
- McAdams, D. P. (2006a). *Identity and story: Creating self in narrative*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- McAdams, D. P. (2006b). *The redemptive self: Stories Americans live by*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- McCarthy, J. C. (Ed.). (1998). *Modern enlightenment and the rule of reason*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
- McDougall, W. (1908). *An introduction to social psychology*. London, UK: Methuen.
- McGuire, W. (1969). The nature of attitudes and attitude change. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (2nd ed., Vol. 3). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- McGuire, W. J. (1973). The yin and yang of progress in social psychology: Seven koans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *26*, 446–456.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Middleton, D., & Brown, S. D. (2005). *The social psychology of experience: Studies in remembering and forgetting*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Middleton, D., & Edwards, D. (Eds.). (1990). *Collective remembering*. London, UK: Sage.
- Mikulincer, M., Shaver, P. R., Bar-On, N., & Ein-Dor, T. (2010). The pushes and pulls of close relationship: Attachment insecurities and relational ambivalence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*, 450–468.
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *67*, 371–378.
- Mishler, E. G. (1984). *The discourse of medicine*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Mishler, E. G. (1986). *Research interviewing: Context and narrative*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morawski, J. G. (1994). *Practicing feminisms, reconstructing psychology: Notes on a liminal science*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Moreno, J. (1951). *Sociometry: Experimental method and the science of society*. Beacon, NY: Beacon House.
- Morris, D. B. (1991). *The culture of pain*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Moscovici, S. (1961). *La psychoanalyse, son image et son public*. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Moscovici, S. (2001). *Social representations: Explorations in social psychology*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Moscovici, S. and Markova, I. (2006). *The making of modern social psychology: The hidden story of how an international social science was created*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M. (1969). The group as polarizer of attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *12*, 125–135.
- Newman, F., & Holzman, L. (1996). *Unscientific psychology: A cultural-performatory approach to understanding human life*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Parker, I. (Ed.). (1998). *Social constructionism, discourse and realism*. London, UK: Sage.
- Parker, I., & Shotter, J. (Eds.). (1990). *Deconstructing social psychology*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Parot, F. (2000). Psychology in the human sciences in France, 1920–1940. Ignace Meyerson's historical psychology. *History of Psychology*, *3*, 104–121.
- Pavlov, I. P. (1927). *Conditioned reflexes: An investigation of the physiological activity of the cerebral cortex* (trans. G. V. Anrep). London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Pettigrew, T. (1979). Racial change and social policy. *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, *441*, 114–131.
- Plato (2007). *The republic*. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.
- Polkinghorne, D. E. (1988). *Narrative knowing and the human sciences*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Poovey, M. (1998). *The history of the modern fact: Problems of knowledge in the sciences of wealth and society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Potter, J. (1996). *Representing reality*. London, UK: Sage.
- Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behavior*. London, UK: Sage.
- Powers, J. H., & Xiao, X. (Eds.). (2008). *The social construction of SARS: Studies of a health communication crisis*. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
- Rapley, M. (2004). *The social construction of intellectual disability*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. (Eds.). (2008). *Handbook of action research* (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage.
- Rodrigues, A., & Levine, R. V. (1999). *One hundred years of experimental social psychology*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Rommetveit, R., & Blakar, R. M. (1979). *Studies of language, thought and verbal communication*. London, UK: Academic Press.
- Rosenwald, G., & Ochberg, R. (1990). *Lived stories*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Ross, E. A. (1908). *Social psychology*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Russell, G. (2000). *Voted out: The psychological consequences of anti-gay politics*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Salomon, G. (Ed.). (1996). *Distributed cognitions: Psychological and educational considerations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sampson, E. E. (1979). Scientific paradigms and social values: Wanted—a scientific revolution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*, 1332–1343.
- Sampson, E. E. (2008). *Celebrating the other: A dialogic account of human nature* (2nd ed.). Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications.
- Sarbin, T. (Ed.). (1986). *Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Schachter, S. (1951). Deviance, rejection, and communication. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *46*, 190–207.
- Schachter, S. (1959). *The psychology of affiliation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Schachter, S., & Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review*, *69*, 379–399.
- Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. (1961). *Intergroup harmony and cooperation: The Robber's Cave Experiment*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange.
- Shotter, J. (1990). The social construction of remembering and forgetting. In D. Middleton & J. Edwards (Eds.), *Collective remembering*. London, UK: Sage.
- Shotter, J. (in press). Life inside the dialogically structured mind. In J. Rowan and M. Cooper (Eds.), *The plural self: Polypsychic perspectives*. London, UK: Sage.

- Skinner, B. F. (1938). *The behavior of organisms: an experimental analysis*. Oxford, UK: Appleton-Century.
- Spacks, P. M. (1995). *Boredom: The literary history of a state of mind*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Staub, E. (1992). *The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Steiner, I. D. (1974). Whatever happened to the group in social psychology? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 10, 93–108.
- Stokols, D., & Altman, I. (Eds.). (1987). *Handbook of environmental psychology* (2 Vols.). New York, NY: Wiley.
- Stroebe, W. (2000). *Social psychology and health* (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Strickland, L., Gergen, K. J., & Aboud, F. (1976). *Social psychology in transition*. New York, NY: Plenum.
- Stryker, S. (1977). Developments in two social psychologies: Toward an appreciation of mutual relevance. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 40, 145–160.
- Stuhr, J. J. (Ed.). (2010). *100 years of pragmatism: William James's revolutionary philosophy*. Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press.
- Sugiman, T., Gergen, K. J., Wagner, W., & Yamada, Y. (Eds.). (2008). *Meaning in action: Constructions, narratives and representations*. Tokyo, Japan: Springer.
- Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, 223, 96–102.
- Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1984). *The social dimension: Vol. 1. European developments in social psychology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tappan, M., & Packer, M. (Eds.). (1991). *Narrative and storytelling: Implications for understanding moral development*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Tarde, G. (1898). *L'opinion et la foule*. Paris, France: Alcan.
- Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). *The social psychology of groups*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Tiefer, L. (1995). *Sex is not a natural act, and other essays*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Triandis, H. (2005). *Culture and social behavior*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Vangelisti, A. L., & Perlman, D. (2006). *The Cambridge handbook of personal relationships*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Langenhove, L., & Harré, R. (Eds.). (1999). *Positioning theory: Moral contexts of intentional action*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Voelklein, C., & Howarth, C. (2005). A review of controversies about social representations theory: A British debate. *Culture and Psychology*, 11, 431–454.
- Vygotsky, L. (1934). *Thinking and speaking*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Vico, G. (1968). *The new science of Giambattista Vico* (trans. T. G. Bergin & A. W. Shippee). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Walkerdine, V., & the Girls and Mathematics Unit (1989). *Counting girls out*. London, UK: Virago.
- Walkerdine, V. (1990). *Schoolgirl fictions*. London, UK: Verso.
- Walkerdine, V., & Lucey, H. (1989). *Democracy in the kitchen: Regulating mothers and socializing daughters*. London, UK: Virago.
- Weatherall, M., Watson, B. M., & Gallois, C. (Eds.). (2007). *Language, discourse, and social psychology*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weis, L., & Fine, M. (2005). *Beyond silenced voices: Class, race, and gender in United States schools*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Weick, K. (1969). *The social psychology of organizing*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Weick, K. (2001). *Making sense of the organization*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Wertsch, J. (1991). *Voices of the mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). *Mapping the language of racism: Discourse and the legitimation of exploitation*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Whyte, W. F. (1955). *Street corner society: The social structure of an Italian slum*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Willig, C. (Ed.). (1999). *Applied discourse analysis, social and psychological interventions*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- Willis, P. (1977). *Learning to labour: How working class kids get working class jobs*. Farnborough, UK: Saxon House.
- Wilson, E. O. (1998). *Consilience: The unity of knowledge*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations* (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Wundt, W. (1921). *Volkerpsychologie* (10 Vols.). Leipzig, Germany: Alfred Kroner Verlag.