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

Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy

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The Department of Defense

Publication details
https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203878637.ch14
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Published online on: 31 Aug 2011

How to cite :- Peter J. Dombrowski. 31 Aug 2011, *The Department of Defense from:* Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy Routledge
Accessed on: 03 Oct 2023
https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203878637.ch14

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14
The Department of Defense

Peter J. Dombrowski

Until the National Security Act of 1947, the United States functioned without a Department of Defense. Matters of war and peace were handled by the Departments of War and the Department of the Navy while diplomatic affairs were left to the secretary of state. With varied levels of success, the U.S. government managed to provide for national security and fight multiple wars, large and small, with a relatively small, resource-constrained bureaucracy. With World War II and the emergence of the Cold War, many of the so-called "wise men" responsible for U.S. security policies realized that never again could the United States afford to prepare for war, much less fight one, without a sophisticated organization capable both of advising the president and executing his policies using the nation's military instruments. The threat posed by the Soviet Union, the peacetime challenge of administering a global strategy of containment, and the complexity of maintaining a well-trained, technologically sophisticated, and above all "ready" force required large staff of professional support and standard procedures grounded in law and practice.

Since the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD), it has gradually emerged as the single most powerful agency in developing, and especially executing, the nation's security and foreign policies. Pentagon reforms have served to expand the roles and mission of the DoD while improving its capacity to pursue centralized policies under the guidance of the secretary of defense and his staff. The unintended result is that DoD, and the U.S. military generally, has a much larger say in American foreign policies and outcomes than anyone could have imagined in 1947.

The relationship between a country's foreign policy and its national security policy might seem straightforward, at least in theory, but it is extremely complex in practice given institutional, historical, and political realities (Hook 2011; Hook and Spanier 2010). Foreign policy at its most basic is the sum total of policies governing one state's relations with other states. More comprehensive definitions recognize that states are not unitary actors so relations within, among, and between the myriad sub-units comprising states are highly consequential. National security policy is then a subset of foreign policy encompassing only those aspects of international relations that deal with protecting the security of the country and its citizens.

More narrowly, defense policy deals largely with military matters and the use of force. Of course, policies are increasingly interconnected, so drawing firm distinctions between security and other types of policies—economic, diplomatic, and so forth—is difficult. For example, as economic globalization progressed from the 1970s onward, it became increasingly

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difficult to separate economic policies from security policies given well-recognized linkages amongst issues. One classic example of linkages is between policies governing arms sales for national security purposes and economic benefits associated with defense industries and arms production. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration used the sales of U.S. arms as a tool to support allies in the expanding "global war on terror" (Hook and Rothstein 2005). Arms sales also served as an economic policy instrument in a number of ways, including reducing the U.S. trade deficit, stimulating technology transfers, and supporting economic development in some regions of the United States.

The personalities of individuals leading foreign and security agencies also play significant roles in shaping the evolution of the institutions and policy charged with minding the national foreign and defense policies, as well as the decisions made during a specific presidential administration. Hence President Dwight Eisenhower's reforms of the National Security Act of 1947 reflected his experiences as a long-serving military officer, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, as well as his own personal decision-making style. Whether Eisenhower's professional experience was ideal for judging the needs of future presidents was less relevant than the fact that he undoubtedly influenced national decision-making processes and policies far beyond his term. Although we may be grateful that Eisenhower bequeathed the country his wisdom in the form of institutional reforms, there are clearly cases in which the idiosyncratic experiences and temperament of key national security policies has had less productive effects. For example, Henry Kissinger's secretive and highly personal approach while serving first as national security advisor and then as secretary of state under President Richard Nixon had negative ramifications for the formulation of foreign and defense policies well into the 1980s.

The National Security Complex Since World War II

As Zbigniew Brzezinski (1988: 326), a participant-observer who knows a thing or two about the relationship between the Department of Defense and American foreign policy has observed, "For many years, the main struggle over foreign policy was between the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. It was only later that public attention shifted to conflicts between the secretary of state and the national security advisor." Given this context, we will first focus on the historical struggle between the secretaries of state and defense for control over foreign policy during the post-War War II period. As the brief historical narrative proceeds, it is important to remember, as Brzezinski makes clear, that the struggle was, and is, many sided. Bert Rockman (1988) even referred to "America's Departments of State" given the many claimants to policy, including the special assistant for national security affairs (known informally as the national security advisor) and other "irregulars," for primacy in the formulation of foreign policy. From the Pentagon's perspective, this only makes its policy battles with the State Department more winnable. As we shall see, not only does the Defense Department enjoy more resources, human and budgetary, than the State Department, it also has the advantage of a clear mission and the ability to contest the roles of other public officials with international affairs portfolios.

On July 26, 1947, President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. In response to the experience of World War II and the challenges of the emerging Cold War, the act reorganized the nation's existing military organizations, foreign policy leadership, and the nation's intelligence agencies. Specifically it established four new institutions: the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). The DoD unified the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force under a single cabinet-level secretary, the secretary of defense, who reported to the president. The secretary's

primary tasks were to coordinate defense matters among the separate services and to develop general policies for the military.

While the long-term impact of National Security Act of 1947 is profound, its consequences have taken many forms. Originally, the new system was designed primarily not to integrate the foreign policy bureaucracy but to prevent the concentration of executive power. As the events of the Cold War unfolded, however, modifications to the act sought to reverse this decentralization. The creation of the DoD gave the secretary of defense the organizational muscle to play a more equal civilian role vis à vis the individual military services, including the Coast Guard in wartime (Trask and Goldberg 1997: 3–40). Still, this structure changed in response to unanticipated problems and needs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. Sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Representative William Nichols (D-Alabama), it prompted the most significant reorganization of the nation's military complex since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as opposed to the individual service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense. The act also established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders. In the aftermath of several military setbacks, the act sought to improve the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct joint and combined military operations. This change greatly increased the authority and influence of the unified combatant commands that control U.S. forces in the United States and around the world.

However, the United States military was still organized along lines of command that reported to their respective service chiefs (commandant of the Marine Corps, chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force, and chief of naval operations). The Joint Chiefs of Staff elected a chairman to communicate with the civilian government; its chairman in turn reported to the secretary of defense, the civilian head of the military. Both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense reported to the president, who holds the position of commander-in-chief of all U.S. armed forces. All this increased the ability of the chairman to direct overall strategy while providing greater command authority to field commanders.

The service chiefs no longer exercise any operational control over their forces. Rather than reporting to a service chief operationally, the service component forces supported the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) responsible for a specific function or a geographic region of the globe. The restructuring afforded a combination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement, and a reduction in inter-service rivalry. Individual services changed from relatively autonomous war-fighting entities into organizational and training units, responsible for acquisition, modernization, force development and readiness as a component of the integrated force. Thus U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), for example, would be assigned air, ground, and naval assets in order to achieve its objectives, as opposed to the inefficient method of individual services planning, supporting, and fighting the same war.

According to James Locher (2002: 450), who directed the bipartisan effort that led to the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act, it "ended a forty-five year struggle to produce a unified military establishment." Yet, Goldwater-Nichols is the story of transformational change imposed largely from the outside (see Barger 2005).

Since 1986 the geostrategic environment has shifted enormously and with it the responsibilities of the U.S. security establishment. New developments, from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the four major wars the United States has since fought to the rise of a global terrorist threat, have strained old organizational models associated with the original National Security Act of 1947 as well as the major reforms associated with the Goldwater Nichols Act.

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Most of the reforms undergone by the Department of Defense were carried out with the objective of either providing the president with more independent advice on defense matters, getting better control over military spending, or rationalizing parts of the complex interagency process which the Pentagon routinely dominates. Few if any reforms were directly targeted at the foreign policy process or even DoD's role within that process. That said, the net effect of the creation of the Department of Defense and its consolidation and centralization over time was to create a domestic power center to rival, if not overwhelm, the other civilian and security agencies with more than a passing interest in American foreign policy.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the last major reform of the Department of Defense undertaken by Congress. Individual presidents and their secretaries of defense have subsequently tinkered at the margins with internal DoD structures and informal "folkways" have developed to suit the needs of the policy teams running the nation's defense programs at any given time. Especially since 9/11, the national security structure has become more complex with the rearrangement of responsibilities in some cases and, more important, the creation of new bureaucracies with differing competencies. Thus for example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which President Bush signed into law on December 17, created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). This office was intended, in theory, to ride herd over the nation's intelligence bureaucracies after the obvious breakdown in 2001. As we shall see, despite congressional intent, it appears that ODNI has further complicated the already byzantine intelligence community. More important in this context, ODNI serves as another friction point in the already difficult relations between civilian and military intelligence agencies.

Inside the Pentagon

On October 24, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered that the functional and regional commanders be referred to not as "CINCs" but as "combatant commanders" when applied to "unified" regional organizations (e.g., USCENTCOM), or "commander" when talking about "specified" units such as the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Rumsfeld said the term "CINC" was inappropriate notwithstanding its employment for many decades, because under the U.S. Constitution, the President is the military's only commander-in-chief. His decision was described as intended to clarify the military's subordination to civilian government (Garamone 2002). Rumsfeld's decree did not, however, reduce the growing influence of the combatant commanders not just on military operations but on all facets of international affairs in their regions. Further, Secretary Rumsfeld's political and bureaucratic maneuverings within the Bush White House reopened old questions about the Pentagon's foreign policy powers.

Combatant commanders play a real and highly visible role in promoting U.S. defense and national security interests but also American foreign policies in what defense analysts call regional "theaters." While the assistant secretary of state sits in Washington and forays occasionally into her or his "area of responsibility," a combatant commander has an enormous staff, aircraft, and extensive contacts with the militaries of other nations. By contrast, the resources and influence of an ambassador, no matter how seasoned or politically connected. must appear quite modest to our allies, coalition partners, and adversaries. Gregory Treverton (2009: 229) observes that the rise of covert operations, often carried out by operators associated with the U.S. Special Operations Command has led the military to be increasingly independent. In 2006 it was revealed that Military Liaison Elements (MLEs) were deployed and conducted operations in many countries including allies without the knowledge of local ambassadors. The military is often the most visible presence of the U.S. government overseas.

Moreover, in the case of maritime nations few doubt that the U.S. navy lurks or could lurk just over the horizon with little notice.

As with various Cold War crises, the 9/11 attacks exposed weaknesses in the structure and organization of U.S. national security but, more importantly, also revealed the political dimensions underlying the national tragedy. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), a compelling narrative written by an excellent staff who examined nearly three million pages of documents and interviewed more than a thousand individuals, emphasized familiar bureaucratic and organizational failures. Procedural flaws did not allow key pieces of information to flow where they were needed. Organizational cultures did not mesh so cooperation was limited. By default its recommendations are capable of being followed with traditional reforms. Yet as the organizational theorist Charles Perrow (2005) points out, the government's bureaucratic organizations worked as well as could be expected. The problems that led to 9/11 were largely executive failures on the part of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Perrow expressed little faith in the reorganization proposed by the report or the changes likely to be enacted in the aftermath of failure.

Bush's so-called "global war on terror" (GWOT) demonstrated the dangers associated with relying too heavily on the Department of Defense. Perhaps the most notorious examples concern the Iraq War, first in terms of prewar planning and second in terms of the implementation of post-combat stabilization and reconstruction operations. In the former case, the State Department organized an extensive planning process that was roundly ignored by the Pentagon. In the second example, the Pentagon asserted total control over the occupation but quickly lost control of Baghdad. Prosecuting the war brought out more nuanced issues. Diplomacy, international policing, intelligence collection and analysis rather than military force were in the forefront of the U.S. and international responses. In particular, counter-terrorism required multilateral legal adjustments and political cooperation that required careful diplomacy. Moreover, in attempting to get to the roots of terror—whether poverty or the ideological dimensions—the Pentagon proved woefully unprepared.

This assertion of Pentagon control predictably created friction in its relationship with the State Department. Even as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged nations and non-state actors alike to respect the rule of law, the Pentagon oversaw extraordinary renditions and shadowy prison systems that often led to the physical abuse of detainees. It did not help that many U.S. covert operations, once revealed, undermined U.S. credibility and legitimacy while complicating the political relations of the United States with adversaries and allies alike.

Perennial Issues Facing National Security Policy

Even as waves of reform change organizational charts and authorities across the foreign and defense policy nexus, much remains to be done. Four issues of particular importance for the management of international affairs and for the overall health of the American democratic system remain central to national security policy: (1) civilian control over the military, (2) funding imbalances, (3) the interagency process, and (4) the efficiency of the intelligence community.

Civil Military Relations

As discussed above, many of the DoD reforms undertaken in the past decades sought to centralize power in the hands of the defense secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff embodied in the chairman as the principal military advisor to the president. Prior to 1947, the War

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Department and the Navy Department were just two relatively modest government bureaucracies working alongside the State Department. With relatively few bases and small numbers of U.S. troops deployed overseas, the State Department enjoyed the advantages of embassies and foreign delegations in setting and executing foreign policies. Moreover, prior to the creation of the CIA and the myriad of the intelligence agencies that grew and proliferated during the Cold War, the pre-World War II State Department had an advantage in intelligence collection and analysis. The post-World War II reforms that established Pentagon dominance in U.S. foreign policy continue to create tensions between military and civilian authorities.

Managing Resources

In terms of resources—financial and human—the scope and scale available to the Pentagon far exceed those of any other agencies with international functions (Adams and Williams 2010: 213). Regardless of whether this distribution makes sense from the perspective of grand strategy or even budgeting to fulfill the demands of a rational planning process, this fact is the product of politics—electoral, bureaucratic, and even on occasion personal. As such it is difficult to change the distribution beyond incremental shifts and even modest reallocations will take time.

The imbalance between international affairs and defense spending has a complex history, but one factor appears central. The constituencies for the Department of State and the semi-autonomous U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are largely limited to the employees for those agencies and the recipients of services. Of course, recipients of U.S. foreign aid do not vote. By contrast, the Department of Defense and its programs have multiple constituents, all of whom vote either as legislators or, citizens.

Interagency Process

In the American political context, the interagency process serves as both a top-down and a bottom-up means of communication and information sharing. The various departments, committees, and agencies comprising the U.S. national security community gather information (including both facts and analyses) and develop policies options or alternatives. Through interagency committees and other mechanisms, materials are passed up the line through levels of decision makers. On the other hand, decisions made from the president on down through his White House staff and department heads are passed down through to operational levels (ranging from diplomats at the United Nations to ambassadors and their country teams to military commanders on the ground). Players in the interagency process "voice opinions, offer recommendations, and for better or worse, advance bureaucratic interests" (Raach and Kass 1995: 10–11). The two-way flow of information varies across issue-areas and from crisis to crisis. How well or poorly the process works often depends on who is in charge, whether in the White House or in the various foreign policy bureaucracies.

Gen. Jim Jones, President Obama's first national security advisor, focused special attention on managing the interagency process and ensuring that his National Security Council functioned to meet the president's needs. According to an unclassified memo, Jones asserted that the "interagency process must advance the interests of the administration as a whole and all participants should engage in the process from that perspective. The NSC's role is to manage an interagency process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable—all in order to advance the national security interests of the United States" (Rozen 2009). However, unlike other administrations dominated by national security advisors (for example, Henry Kissinger

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in the Nixon years), the NSC under President Obama appeared to manage the interagency system efficiently while allowing Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and especially Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to run the nation's international affairs at the president's behest.

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Use

The intelligence process has been described as a combination of three separate activities: (1) gathering, interpreting, and distributing information; (2) manipulating events abroad using covert means; and (3) guarding against foreign intelligence agencies and other hostile organizations. No perfect intelligence system can be devised as failures are an often inevitable consequence of trying to anticipate world events (see Johnson 2003). Intelligence analysts have often suggested remedies for American intelligence failures in either organizational changes or through the creation of new agencies or structures (such as, for example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence created in 2006).

In the battles for foreign policy primacy, one of the key objectives is control over the intelligence community, which has maintained nominal independence under the National Security Act of 1947. The act created a director of central intelligence (DCI) who, through the CIA, was responsible for coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating, and disseminating information. Since the creation of the DCI and the CIA, this independence has sometimes been subverted by political, bureaucratic, and budgetary realities. More to the point for this chapter, the secretary of defense has recently exerted significant influence over intelligence matters.

Among national security practitioners, "actionable intelligence" is the gold standard. This is true for diplomats as well as for military officers. Intelligence that can give the United States an upper hand in everything from bilateral relations to multilateral negotiations is highly sought after if rarely found. For military officers, especially those with operational responsibilities such as executing war plans or leading preemptive strikes against suspected terrorists, useable knowledge matters. In the vast intelligence community nurtured by the U.S. government, the question is which organizations and what processes have the best chance of providing actionable intelligence to all potential consumers.

One way in which the Department of Defense overwhelms the State Department in terms of its influence on U.S. foreign policy is through access to intelligence independent of the CIA or the more recently created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Military leaders enjoy direct control over many intelligence assets. Indeed, the bulk of the intelligence budget does not go to civilian agencies but rather to military organization and programs. As a RAND report noted in 2005, "[w]hile the DCI is the titular head of the Intelligence Community, the secretary of defense has operational direction and control over nearly half of the Intelligence Community agencies and influences most of the Intelligence Community's resources" (Barger 2005: 40). As some long-time observers report, many intelligence agencies are largely "combat support agencies" that see the Pentagon as their primary customer (Richelson 2008: 122).

Recent histories of the Department of Defense decision-making process, particularly since Goldwater-Nichols, suggest that the imbalance is partly a result of the elevation of the stature of the combatant commanders and their need for strategic intelligence, and partly the diminished voice of the Department of State in articulating its needs for national intelligence (Barger 2005: 109). Under particularly powerful defense secretaries, the superiority of the Department of Defense has been fostered by aggressive bureaucratic maneuvering. For example, under Secretary Rumsfeld, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 created a new position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a position that has further institutionalized the Pentagon's central role in gathering intelligence.

Future Issues Facing the Pentagon

Few national security experts believe that the global challenges facing the United States will diminish or become less complex any time soon. From a state-centric perspective, the rise of China, peaceful or otherwise, will call into question American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, some believe that the "unipolar moment" will give way not to a new bipolar arrangement but to a multipolar world in which the United States is the first amongst equals rather than the dominant state in the system. From a transnational perspective, climate change, energy production and flows, the global commons, and transnational terrorism all present threats great and small to U.S. national interests. More traditional military challenges also remain at least for the short to medium term as Iraq remains a failed state, the insurgency in Afghanistan shows no signs of abating, and troubles with either Iran or North Korea or both loom just over the horizon. No one has a ready solution for the very real possibility of chaos in Pakistan—a nuclear state confronting another nuclear state and providing safe havens for terrorists and insurgents across a lightly defended international border. Given these certainties, experts and policy makers will continue to tinker with the organizational structures attempting to protect U.S. national security interests.

Defense Reforms

As noted earlier, the Pentagon's faltering performance before and since 9/11 has led many to call for moving "beyond Goldwater-Nichols." For example, the resource disparities built into the national security complex and exacerbated by 9/11 are susceptible to reform, although it would be unwise to expect even the most committed president or administration to succeed in major reallocation from Defense to State or other possibilities. That said, from the perspective of adjusting the relative weight of the policy instruments available to the president, perhaps the most valuable adjustment would be to achieve "[g]reater integration among international affairs institutions" (Adams and Williams 2010: 247–248). Integration of strategy, policies, and priorities would allow senior officials to clarify trade-offs and weigh alternative approaches to meeting national security challenges. As it stands, the oversized "hammer" of the well-funded Department of Defense means that most foreign and security problems look like "nails" to be pounded with military forces or intelligence assets controlled by the national defense leadership. Hence the Defense Department engages in national-building, counter-piracy operations, and other untraditional roles while waiting eagerly for a true "whole of government" approach to emerge with civilian agencies capable of serving as full partners capable of meshing with the far-flung roles of the Pentagon.

Revitalizing the State Department

Much of this chapter focuses on the Department of Defense, the various reforms that have been suggested or enacted since its creation in 1947, and how these developments have affected other U.S. foreign policy units, particularly the State Department. Yet, in analyzing the imbalance between the powers and resources of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, it is insufficient to simply place blame on the overly muscular military wing of U.S. international affairs. If secretaries of state have always struggled to maintain a dominant position, the struggle has been made worse by the structural and resource inadequacies of the State Department itself. As with the Department of Defense, the post-Cold War era and its unique challenges have led to both internal and external calls for changes in the way the department is organized

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and funded. Secretary of State Colin Powell was the first secretary during this period with the personal prestige, political stature, and drive to push reforms forward. This stature allowed Powell to push through reforms in the State Department's organizational culture and to gain an infusion of resources for personnel, information technology, security, and facilities. Powell also helped win increased funding for development assistance and resources to fight the global AIDS epidemic. Unfortunately, as a bureaucratic loser in many internal fights over policy and programs within the Bush administration, Powell's potential to change the Department of State in more substantive ways fell by the wayside.

Secretary of State Clinton, a former U.S. senator from New York, appears to have taken a major step forward in reforming the Department of State. Specifically, she adopted a strategy long held within the Department of Defense and the military services. In 2009, Clinton announced that the State Department planned to conduct a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Clinton 2009). The review called for the assertive use of "smart power," a term clearly designed to differentiate the State Department from the Pentagon. To Clinton,

> Smart power translates into specific policy approaches in five areas: First, we intend to update and create vehicles for cooperation with our partners; second, we will pursue principled engagement with those who disagree with us; third, we will elevate development as a core pillar of American power; fourth, we will integrate civilian and military action in conflict areas; and fifth, we will leverage key sources of American power, including our economic strength and the power of our example (Ackerman 2009).

Point four most closely addresses the main issues of this chapter. No doubt with an eye to the interagency fiascos associated with Afghanistan and Iraq, Clinton acknowledged that civilian and military power must be aligned more closely if the United States was to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. It will be many years before it becomes clear whether Secretary Clinton succeeded in her reforms. More broadly, the jury is out on whether her reforms alter the relative balance between defense and diplomacy in the organization and conduct of America's international affairs. Critics remain pessimistic about these prospects, perhaps with good reason. The long-standing traditions and procedures providing the foundations for Pentagon planning—dating back at least to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System implemented by Defense Secretary James McNamara in the early 1960s—are largely nonexistent in the State Department. As Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams (2010: 31) observe, "[t]he dominant culture of the organization is not a strategic planning culture, which has made long-term planning difficult." Further, much depends on congressional funding for the Department of State, which even with the upticks of the Powell-Rice years remains unpopular, especially with the public. Surveys routinely reveal that American voters vastly overestimate the amount of money the country spends on foreign aid and diplomatic infrastructure such as embassies.

In a time of large government deficits, foreign operations budgets are vulnerable even though, by any reasonable measure, they contribute modestly to the nation's economic woes. By many estimates, foreign operations spending is a relatively cost effective way to engage the rest of the world. But in contrast to the Defense Department and the military services, the diplomatic corps lacks the protection afforded by the "iron triangle" of the military services, Congress, and the defense industries. Even with the customary "Buy American" provision routinely placed on foreign aid programs, assistance does not generate sufficient jobs at home or campaign contributions to attract the protection of powerful legislators. For the foreseeable future, the Department of State will remain the poor relative of the Department of Defense, which will maintain its dominant role in the national security establishment. President Obama, who supported Clinton's assertion of influence, was unlikely to restrain the Pentagon's power after the November 2010 midterm elections strengthened the political

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strength of the Republican Party in Congress. As traditional "hawks" in national security policy, the Republicans gained both public and political authority to resist White House efforts to level the playing field of national security policy.

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