


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Part IV

Non-State Actors

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Public Opinion

Douglas C. Foyle

Scholarly interest in the relationship between public opinion and American foreign policy has now moved into a third distinct stage. In the 1950s and 1960s, scholars mostly dismissed the public's attitudes as a shaky foundation on which to build a foreign policy given its vacillating character. Labeled the "Almond-Lippmann consensus" (Holsti 1992), the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy received little attention as it was presumed that the national interest, rather than public attitudes, drove foreign policy formulation. A second wave of research emerged in the aftermath of the Vietnam War which led to a reevaluation of both public opinion and its influence. By the late-1980s, scholars had largely turned the Almond-Lippmann consensus position on its head.

A third wave of research blossomed in the 1990s through the present which both explored the conditions of public influence and saw public opinion becoming increasingly important in research programs not directly focused on public opinion. First, scholars primarily interested in public opinion built upon the second wave's insights to construct nuanced understandings of the factors that affect public attitudes as well as the conditions that determine the public's influence. Second, as the importance of public opinion in American foreign policy processes became more apparent, especially after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the 2003 Iraq war, scholars from outside the specialty area of public opinion and foreign policy paid greater attention to it. For example, much of the research on the use of force and casualties discussed in this chapter has been pursued by scholars more broadly interested in U.S. foreign and national security policy than in public opinion in particular. As such, public opinion as a focus of study has become more greatly integrated into the broader study of foreign policy. In sum, the past fifty years have witnessed the transformation of public opinion from a subject largely ignored by U.S. foreign policy scholars to a research area central to many core concerns.

This review tracks this development beginning with a brief summary of the core tenets in the first wave in the Almond-Lippmann consensus. It then discusses the second wave research reflecting the developing response in public opinion and foreign policy research into the 1990s. Next, the chapter turns to the current third wave which deepened the exploration of conditionality and the expansion of interest in public opinion outside the specialty such as the diversionary use of force and war. It concludes with an assessment of fertile research areas related to decision making as well as the formation of public opinion.

First Wave: the Almond-Lippmann Consensus

The first wave perspective on public opinion's influence portrayed a negative view of the public opinion's rationality, structure, and policy influence (Holsti 1992, 2004). This Almond-Lippmann consensus, so named after prominent scholar Gabriel Almond and newspaper commentator Walter Lippmann, reigned in the field from the 1920s through the early 1970s. Given the time period, published works reflected a blend of philosophical argument as well as the beginnings of the social science revolution. Within this tradition, scholars held that a largely ignorant public viewed events through an emotional lens. This foundation made public opinion highly volatile in its attitudes (Lippmann 1922, 1955; Almond 1950; Kennan 1951). Further, critics argued these attitudes were unrelated to each other and lacked coherence (Converse 1964). No matter, these realists argued, as they concluded the public normally did not influence foreign policy (Cohen 1973), though some feared an overly emotional public could cause an erratic foreign policy (Kennan 1951; Lippmann 1955).

Second Wave: The Revisionists

The disastrous U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the expansion of data on public attitudes, and advances in methodological techniques spurred a rethinking of public opinion that reversed the Almond-Lippmann consensus. Beginning in the 1970s, this approach gained momentum in the 1980s. By the early 1990s, this rethinking dominated the field.

First, few scholars would dispute the realist contention that the general public lacks basic knowledge about foreign policy and international events. However, the prevailing view now portrays public opinion as possessing relatively stable attitudes that respond reasonably to changes in the international environment (Achen 1975; Shapiro and Page 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992; Knopf 1998; Drezner 2008). A revisionist view of a reasonable (though not completely informed or fully rational) public has replaced the Almond-Lippmann consensus view of a capricious and emotional public.

Second, an extensive literature developed establishing that the public's attitudes had a meaningful organized structure. Although scholars disagree over the number of dimensions that characterize public attitudes, most agree that public attitudes meet the criteria set by Converse (1964) of both stability and "some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (e.g., individuals favoring multilateralism will tend to express positive attitudes toward working through the United Nations and other multilateral organizations). The most prominent analysis by Wittkopf (1990) describes two dimensions for public opinion (yielding four beliefs system types) with a cooperative internationalism dimension defining whether an individual favors or opposes working with other countries to solve global and national challenges and a militant internationalism dimension indicating whether the person favors forceful action, possibly unilateral in nature, to pursue U.S. interests. Other scholars (Hinckley 1992; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995) point to a third unilateralism/multilateralism dimension. Alternatively, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) suggest a hierarchical model that portrays public's attitudes emanating from general core values and then eventually to more specific foreign policy attitudes. Still others have compared the dimensions and content within the mass public with elite attitudes (Holsti 2004). Despite nuances among these scholars, the consensus view portrays a public with stable and structured beliefs in contradiction of the Almond-Lippmann consensus.

The third component of the Almond-Lippmann consensus regarding the public's influence has experienced the most research attention in recent years. Unlike the Almond-Lippmann consensus era when scholars either viewed the public's influence in a negative light or, more

often, suggested the public had little influence, second wave research made no assumptions about the positive or negative effect of public opinion and focused on determining whether the public influenced policy or not. Although it appeared, at first, that research into this area would reverse the Almond-Lippmann consensus position as well, that has not occurred. Instead, as research on the questions raised in the second wave continue, it gave rise to a third wave examining conditional influence on public opinion and greater integration of public opinion into current debates over issues such as the use of military force.

First, some scholars contend that public opinion plays a limited role in foreign policy formulation. For example, Jacobs and Page (2005) found that public opinion's influence paled in comparison to other policy actors (such as interest groups and policy experts) and had little or no statistical influence. This finding complements research suggesting that presidents use sophisticated polling operations to limit public influence by building support for their chosen policies (Heith 2004), constructing policies which only appear to reflect the popular will while being substantively otherwise, or enabling leaders to ensure general popular support despite pursuing unpopular policies (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Jacobs and Burns 2004). Further, some contend that public opinion tracks elite opinion rather than driving policy development (Witko 2003).

Some researchers have focused closely on whether presidents can effectively shape public opinion to their benefit (Goethals 2005; Rockman and Waterman 2008). As the president can claim unique access to information compared to the Congress and public to justify foreign policies, presidents appear relatively more effective at affecting public attitudes on foreign policy than other subjects (Cohen 1997; Cohen and Hamman 2003; Canes-Wrone, Howell, Lewis, 2007; Kernell 2007). Scholars have pointed to several conditions affecting the president's ability to lead public opinion including rallies (discussed later), effort (Kernell 2007), the type of activity pursued (Cohen 1997; Kernell 2007), political context (Entman 2004, Canes-Wrone 2006; Kernell 2007), and the definition of the dependent variable (such as approval rating (Ostrom and Simon 1989) or support for a particular policy (Cohen 1997). Others are skeptical of the president's ability to change public attitudes (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards 1999).

Second, a common finding in the literature suggests that public opinion constrains the policy options available to government leaders by limiting the range of choices they have available to them (Russett 1990; Powlick 1991; Hinckley 1992; Powlick and Katz 1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 1999; Sobel 2001; Foyle 2004). While not causing leaders to select particular policies, this research suggests that public opinion has an important and strong influence on policy.

Third, some research employing statistical analyses finds that public opinion consistently influences policy. These scholars established that policy outputs were consistent with public attitudes (Monroe 1979) and that shifts in opinion more often than not preceded changes in policy (Page and Shapiro 1992). Other scholars have followed up on this broad pattern of responsiveness with quantitative analyses suggesting a strong public role in defense spending (Hartley and Russett 1992), congressional voting (Fordham 1998; Meernik and Oldmixon 2008), presidential decisions on the use of force (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991), and presidential rhetoric (Rottinghaus 2007).

Third Wave: Conditionality and Expansion

As interest in public opinion grew, public opinion research moved forward on two fronts. First, scholars began to consider how a range of conditional factors affected public opinion's influence. Second, researchers interested in questions not directly related to public opinion

grew interested in public opinion's influence resulting in a much wider range of scholars becoming interested in public opinion. This discussion briefly summarizes the first area before turning to the issue of how the broader field became more interested in public opinion.

Conditionality

As the interest in public opinion grew, scholars examined a range of conditional variables that affected public opinion's influence on foreign policy including level of public support for the policy (Graham 1994), domestic structure (Risse-Kappen 1994), elections (Nincic 1990; Gaubatz 1999), presidential attitudes toward public opinion (Foyle 1999), stage of decision making (Foyle 1999; Knecht 2011), issue salience and decision context (Foyle 1999; Knecht 2011), and presidential popularity (Canes-Wrone 2006).

The current challenge for scholars is to develop models that evaluate how these various conditions interact. Although notable attempts have been made to synthesize a comprehensive public opinion model or model of governance that integrates public opinion into foreign policy making (Rosenau 1961; Powlick and Katz 1998; Western 2005; Baum and Potter 2008; Berinsky 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010; Knecht 2011), no one approach has emerged to dominate the field. As this field progresses, greater integration with other political science subfields will likely prove valuable (Foyle and Van Belle 2010; Foyle 2011).

Elections

A subset of research running concurrently with the broader work on public opinion and foreign policy focuses on the role of foreign policy in elections. One strand examines whether foreign policy affects vote choices during elections. The development of this literature tracks the broader trend in the public opinion and foreign policy literature with earlier accounts suggesting that public opinion had only a limited influence, if any, on voting. Early analyses based on opinions and voting in the 1950s and 1960s suggested that foreign policy remained only a secondary factor (Stokes 1966). As the bipartisan consensus over foreign policy broke up over Vietnam, foreign policy rose in prominence as a voting issue as partisan differences at the elite level emerged (Aldrich et al. 2006). Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) found that attitudes about foreign policy conditionally influenced vote choice. The strongest influence they found occurred when large differences between the candidates existed and the candidates emphasized the foreign policy issues during the campaign. The influence of foreign policy issues dropped to the extent that few differences existed between the candidates or the campaign did not feature foreign policy issues. Recent work considering the Iraq War's influence on voting supports foreign policy's importance in vote choice (Gartner and Segura 2008; Berinsky 2009; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).

A second set of research considers how elections affect foreign policy choices by leaders. Some scholars have found that approaching elections systematically push leaders to make more peaceful choices (Gaubatz 1999), to give concessions in arms control negotiations when an approaching election occurs during poor economic conditions (Morrow 1991), and to avoid interventions (Stoll 1984; Auerswald 2000). Others have argued that elections cause increased uses of force. Motivationally, leaders might see foreign policy as a chance to distract the public from unpopular domestic circumstances or boost public support. This approach is considered in the next section on the diversionary use of force. Some researches portray presidents as wishing to avoid foreign policy choices of any kind during election years given the inherent risks involved in these decisions (Quandt 1986; Huth and Allee 2002). Others have argued that

leaders who are facing difficult elections seek “successful” conflicts or dramatic successes in an ongoing conflict in hopes that they will appear to be effective leaders (e.g., Morrow 1991; Richards et al. 1993; Downs and Rocke 1995). Still other scholars suggest that leaders become highly responsive during election years and pursue whatever policy the public prefers (peaceful, aggressive, etc.) (Nincic and Hinckley 1991; Cane-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Finally, consistent with the Almond-Lippmann consensus, a good amount of research suggests elections have no influence on foreign policy decisions (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Hristoulas 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Gowa 1999; DeRouen 2001).

The Diversionary Theory of the Use of Force and Public Opinion Rallies

The rally effect concept suggests that during times of international crisis or tension an upsurge in popular approval of a nation’s leadership emerges. Substantive findings on the size of the rally effect vary considerably as do causal explanations. The literature on this question originates from Mueller’s (1973: 209) definition of the rally as an event that is international, directly involves the president, and is “specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.” Four broad explanations exist for rallies. First, Mueller (1973) pointed to an upwelling of patriotism in times of national danger as the motivating factor. Second, in a view seeing the public as reactive to elite messages, some (Brody and Shapiro 1989) argue that the silence of opposition elites removes negative news messages and causes a positive message bias leading to increased public support. Third, crises might create a more generalized positive assessment of all social institutions, including the president (Parker 1995). Finally, as rallies must come from opponents shifting to supporters of the president, some scholars have emphasized the interaction between information and partisanship (Edwards and Swenson 1997; Baum 2002). Although no consensus exists on the cause of rallies or even that they are real (Russett 1990; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Baker and Oneal 2001), the subject continues to draw attention.

The related massive diversionary theory of war (or force) literature evaluates whether leaders use military force to solve domestic political problems (Levy 1989; James and Oneal 1991; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Hendrickson 2002; Huth and Allee 2002; Meernik 2004; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Foster and Palmer 2006; Tarar 2006). This theory suggests that leaders use international force in order to distract the public from domestic problems by “changing the subject” (and indirectly building public support Levy 1989; DeRouen and Peake 2002) or creating rally (Mueller 1973; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Kernell 2007). Scholars have suggested that a bad economy (Russett 1990; Richards et al. 1993), tightly contested elections (Huth 1998), or elections in the midst of an ongoing war enhance these incentives (Stoll 1984). On the other hand, some scholars suggest leaders do not conceive of international threats or respond to them in the manner suggested by the theory (Foyle 1999; Hendrickson 2002). Other research strands have suggested that domestically vulnerable democracies have *less* opportunities to divert because potential challengers anticipate the leader’s politically inspired temptation to use force and will avoid challenging these weakened leaders (Fordham 2005). Research on this question continues apace with little in the way of consensus points developing. What is clear from a public opinion perspective within this literature is that the public and its reaction to foreign policies has been centrally integrated into the research.

War and Public Opinion

Aside from potential presidential attempts to use force to affect public opinion, scholars have devoted considerable effort toward evaluating the factors that influence the public’s approval

of the use of force and support for wars more generally (Klarevas 2002; Eichenberg 2005). A number of factors have been identified as important. First, some scholars contend actions linked to vital national interests receive greater support (Ladd 1980). Second, multilateral military operations have been identified as receiving more support than unilateral ones (Kull 2002). Third, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) argued that the military's mission drives public support with humanitarian interventions and instances of "foreign policy restraint" (military action against an actor who acted aggressively against American interests) receiving greater public support than interventions in the internal affairs of other countries. Fourth, still others have emphasized the existence (or lack) of consensus in elite political discourse as cuing public support (or opposition). Elite consensus yields public support while elite division causes the public to divide behind the positions taken by leaders of the political party with which they identify (Brody 1992; Larson 1995; Powlick and Katz 1998; Berinsky 2009).

Fifth, an extensive literature has considered the effect that causalities have on the use of force with the bulk of the literature suggesting that as causalities go up, support for wars decrease (Mueller 1973; Larson 1995; Gartner 2008) and votes for the leaders in power drop (Karol and Miguel 2007). Finally, engaging the casualties literature, still others have suggested that perceptions of whether the use of force is likely to succeed overwhelms the casualties effect (Gelpi et al. 2005) although not without spurring controversy (Klarevas, Gelpi, and Reifler 2006; Berinsky and Druckman 2007; Gelpi 2008). Although most scholars in this debate acknowledge that multiple factors determine public support, the most active point of controversy lies between scholars supporting the casualty aversion hypothesis and proponents supporting the success hypothesis.

The Media and Integrated Models

A central factor that is receiving more attention within this literature is the media's role in linking opinion and policy. A short review such as this one cannot fully capture the complicated relationships among public opinion, elites, the media, and events that shape public attitudes about uses of force and wars (see also chapters in this volume by Van Belle on the news media and Haney on interest groups). The developing consensus in the literature is that public support for wars emerges and continues or wanes based upon these interactions. For public opinion, pre-existing attitudes about politics (ideology, partisanship) affect the information the public seeks out, receives, attends to, and its influence. Elites attempt to shape this information in a way conducive to their political objectives. The media provides the essential linchpin by deciding which information to present and how to present it. The challenge for scholars in this area is to develop, test, and refine theories that fully integrate these complex interrelationships.

Spurred in part by the controversies in this regard around the Iraq 2003 war, scholars have successfully moved to integrate these complicated relationships into coherent models although their emphasis and arguments about how these three factors interrelate differ considerably. Western (2005) emphasizes the role that elite actors, most notably the president but including others as well, play in competing to shape how the foreign policy issues are framed. The outcome is determined by the complex interaction among the actors, information, media and events. Baum and Groeling (2010) emphasize the media's role in determining the information and message provided to the public about the positions that elites take on the foreign policy issues of the day. The media's incentives to cover conflict and convey "unique" perspectives among elites provides a potentially distorted reality in the media. Their "strategic-bias theory of elite-press-public interaction" points to an "elasticity of reality" where media and elite communication effects have a stronger influence on public perceptions (and support) than

substantive reality earlier in events. Over time, “reality” pushes aside rhetorical effects and comes to dominate public opinion. Finally, Berinsky focuses more on public opinion than the previous two views. He argues that public opinion on war emerges from “the attachments and enmities forged on the domestic political stage. In particular, partisan politics and group attachments drive the public’s decision to support or oppose military conflicts” (Berinsky, 2009: 210). As with domestic politics, elite cues provide direction for the public, for good or for ill, to form positions on the events of the day.

While each of these researchers disagree on the role and significance the media, elites, and public opinion have in shaping overall support for wars, they largely agree that public support is driven by the interactions among them. They also agree that events in the real world do not translate directly into public support or opposition and instead are mediated, to one degree or another, by elites and the news media. And, each of these scholars embrace neither the Almond-Lippmann consensus position of an ill-informed public nor the revisionist position of an event and information driven public opinion. Instead, they have staked out positions with varying degrees of emphasis that point to a more middling and conditional position on these important questions.

Directions for Future Research

Previous work in this field has established a strong foundation for a vigorous research agenda with several areas requiring innovative projects to extend our knowledge. On the decision making side, several areas require greater attention: the public’s influence on congressional foreign policy making, variation across the upper levels of executive branch agencies, the reaction of officials within executive branch agencies to public opinion in the new opinion and media environment, shifting presidential behavior regarding public opinion, and the extent to which opinion in foreign countries affects U.S. foreign policy processes. On the mass opinion side, as the U.S. population becomes more diverse and the polity becomes more inclusive, greater attention should be devoted to assessing how demographic variation influences the public’s opinions. Further, two interrelated issues require sustained attention engaging how the media influences policy. Many studies of public opinion’s influence point to the importance of understanding how and when public opinion becomes activated. Related to this question lies the issue of how the public becomes informed about foreign policy issues. As the media lies at the intersection of both activation and information, greater attention to how the media environment influences public opinion formation will enhance our understanding of these issues. The foregoing discussion considers each of these issues in turn.

Decision Making and Decision Makers

As evidenced by this review, most scholars in this area have chosen to focus on how the president evaluates and reacts to public opinion either directly or indirectly. At the same time, while many of the results reported here imply congressional reaction to public opinion, very little work has focused on the intersection among public opinion, Congress, and foreign policy. What there is has engaged the issue at a broad level (Howell and Pevehouse 2005), at a particular point in time (Fordham 1998), or focused on only two of the three factors such as Congress and foreign policy (Henehan 2000), or public opinion and Congress (Jacobs et al. 1998). Additional research engaging the congressional politics literature from the American government subfield is necessary to consider the scope and nuance of the public influence on congressional foreign policy making. With a focus on Congress, a whole range of questions

really need to be extensively engaged such as whether or not public opinion influences congressional foreign policy making and the conditions of potential variation. Potential factors to consider are systematic variation across regions, issue variation (e.g., foreign aid policy, treaty ratification, defense policy, etc.), electoral cycle, and party. Simply put, while an extensive amount of research has evaluated congressional policy making, the field is really at the very beginning stages of considering how public opinion, Congress, and foreign policy interact, making this area potentially very fertile ground.

The executive branch beyond the president is in need of greater attention as well. Few studies have systematically examined variation among top foreign policy makers such as secretaries of state, defense, and national security advisor (although see Sobel 2001). While the bureaucratic politics literature suggests that institutional positions influence how individuals perceive foreign policy issues (see the Jones chapter, this volume), these insights have not been applied to foreign policy making as it relates to public opinion. For example, is there variation among how these high level political appointees see and react to public opinion? Do these perspectives differ markedly from that of the president who has to run for election? If variation exists, does it emerge because of institutional factors such as bureaucratic interests and from information flows? How much does historical learning influence change over time (e.g., the Defense Department's greater interest in public opinion after the Vietnam War)? Do differences emerge because of individual level variation (e.g., beliefs)? A project engaging these questions would need to engage a combination of individuals with different institutional positions considering the same issue (comparing the secretary of state with the secretary of defense on the same issue) as well as considerations in how people holding the same executive position evaluated public opinion over time (e.g., comparing secretaries of state).

A new assessment of the opinion and policy relationship is necessary deeper within the bureaucracy as well. Baum and Groeling (2010) clearly establish that the media environment of the 2000s differs significantly from previous periods and describe how these factors influence public opinion in the Balkanized media environment of the Internet age. Previous scholars have provided systematic accountings of how public opinion influenced foreign policy in two previous media ages. Cohen (1973) provided a close look at the 1950s when major newspaper and network television news dominated. Powlick (1995) provided a comparative study of the 1980s in an environment when both polling had expanded and 24-hour cable news existed. The current era provides a radically different media information and opinion environment. A useful contribution to the literature would be to provide a comparative evaluation among the three eras to ascertain the effect that media and opinion environments have on knowledge and influence of public opinion on officials within the foreign policy bureaucracies.

With the advent of extensive polling of non-U.S. publics over the last decade, scholars might be well served to consider the influence of non-U.S. opinion on American foreign policy. To be sure, recent studies have considered the influence of American foreign policy on non-U.S. opinion (Foyle 2007; Holsti 2008). The reverse question remains to be studied. To what extent does non-American opinion influence American foreign policy decision making? To be sure, U.S. decision makers consistently have considered how foreign governments were going to react to American policies. Do decision makers systematically evaluate opinion in other countries and how does it influence policy? Given the extensive recent attention to opinion in other countries regarding foreign policy, this research seems to provide the next best step.

Mass Public Opinion

While we have developed a better understanding of how public opinion toward foreign policy forms, we have less of a sense for how subsets of the public view and react to foreign policy.

Most research on demographic characteristics and their relationship to foreign policy attitudes has emphasized ideological and partisan factors as the most important components. Other factors such as race, ethnicity, occupation, economic background, religious beliefs, and gender have received relatively less attention (Holsti 2004; Snyder, Shapiro, Bloch-Elkon 2009). More generally, the influence of demographic factors on opinion formation and political attitudes on foreign policy remains understudied (Berinsky 2009).

Despite the need for greater overall attention to this area, some scholars have probed these questions in increasing detail (Holsti 2004; Berinsky 2009). For example, several recent studies have considered particular demographic characteristics and their relationship to foreign policy such as the influence of race (Gartner and Segura 2000), gender (Eichenberg 2003), and religion (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008). Further work considering these areas can build on these efforts with a focus on discerning the conditions under which these characteristics affect foreign policy attitudes similar to the work on public opinion's influence.

As argued by Baum and Groeling (2010) the current public opinion environment is remarkably different than the one that existed in recent memory. This new environment points to the need to reconsider how changing information sources might influence the content of public opinion about foreign policy. Unlike previous eras when media coverage represented a "one-size fits all" presentation, the Balkanization of the media allows individuals to seek out information that conforms to their preexisting political views. At the same time, traditional media sources on television and in print have scaled down their foreign news coverage. At once, individuals are now confronted with less information about foreign policy in their traditional sources, but, through the Internet, now have access to much more detailed information about foreign policy issues. Previous work has suggested that a relationship between the media source an individual uses and the factual knowledge an individual possesses (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003). In addition, media reporting of foreign policy issues has played a prominent role in theories of how public attitudes about foreign policy issues become activated (Powlick and Katz 1998). As the public can now choose among news sources in a manner unimagined previously, more attention needs to be paid to how this new information environment affects whether and how public attitudes become activated.

The field of public opinion and American foreign policy is characterized by decades of vibrant scholarship. With the changing policy making environment in recent years, new opportunities present themselves in exploring new areas of research as well as reconsidering commonly accepted insight. The diversity of scholarly interest represented by the researchers cited in this review is testament to the ongoing value and vibrancy of work in this area.

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