


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MUSLIM YOUTH AND LIVED EXPERIENCES OF ISLAM

Louis Audet Gosselin

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is the youngest region in the world, with 43 percent of its population under 15 years old (2015). In some Muslim-majority countries that proportion is even higher: about 50 percent in Niger, 48 percent in Mali, 47 percent in Chad, 46 percent in the Gambia, and 46 percent in Burkina Faso (United Nations 2017, 226–237). Thus, Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa is largely shaped and lived by youth. While most African Islamic institutions (mosques, schools, Sufi brotherhoods) are led by elders and in many African societies social stratification heavily favors older people over youth voices, the debates and initiatives led by Muslim youth are central to the evolution of Islam on the continent.

Debates and studies on both African youth and on Islam in Africa have been shaped by the fears of governments, international institutions, scholars, and large parts of public opinions on the continent and around the world. The conjunction of economic crisis and demographic shift towards a younger continent led to a moral panic in the 1980s and 1990s concerning the growth of a young unemployed urban population. Riots, armed movements, criminality, and social woes were blamed on youth (Cruise O'Brien 1996, 55–74). This coincided with the rise of Islamist movements across the world, often attracting youth, and led to a binary view of Islam as either “radical” or “moderate”. Thus, Muslim youth were seen in a double negative lens as both part of a dangerous generation and of a suspicious faith. Since the twenty-first century, however, many scholars have adopted a more nuanced approach to the study of youth that considers youth agency and focus, following Karl Mannheim (1972, 276–320), on how new generations coming of age appropriate parts of their cultural heritage to make sense of current situations and to navigate hardship (Cole and Durham 2007, 1–28).

Moving away from alarmist discourses on Muslim youth as either dominated and indoctrinated, or as a potential danger, this chapter presents the multiple facets of youth expressions of Islam across the continent and aims at explaining the conditions that orient these expressions. First, I will explore the transformations of Islamic education, which is central to shaping Muslim youth's lives. Second, I will explain how Islamic reform movements have attracted and still attract significant portions of African youth. Third, I will present several Islamic trends that have been largely shaped by youth throughout the continent, such as Sufi and neo-Sufi movements, and Shi'i Islam. Fourth, I will tackle the controversial question of youth involvement in Jihadi

movements. The fifth part will present how young Muslims redefine marriage, family, sexuality, and the private sphere. And, finally, I will analyze how Muslim youth adapt to the specific conditions of the twenty-first century in connecting Islamic activism with notions of entrepreneurship and volunteerism, as well as with new media and popular culture.

Islam and education

Youth expressions of Islam are intimately tied to education systems, which shape the early lives of Muslims across the continent. An important part of the efforts by Islamic activists and *dawa* organizations have, since the mid-twentieth century, been oriented towards the creation of modern Islamic schools. These schools (*madrasa*, Franco-Arabic or Anglo-Arabic) were competing both against traditional Quranic education and colonial public or missionary schools. In several regions, Muslim parents were reluctant to send their children to European-style schools, which were viewed as immoral places where children were at risk of losing their faith and adopting either Christian or secular ideas. In many colonies, this led to the monopolizing of administration positions by Christians and the marginalization of Muslims. Islamic reformers thus sought to create a modern Islamic system where strict Islamic principles would be associated with the technical skills needed for Muslim youth to find their place in the modern world without losing their faith and identity (Brenner 2001).

The development of an Islamic education system has created a parallel world for several young Muslims who, despite the early promises of reformers, found themselves marginalized in postcolonial societies. With European languages retaining official status in most countries after independence, education in Arabic and an advanced training in Islamic theology did not lead to much employment opportunities outside the Islamic education system. It did, however, give the graduates, especially those who were able to pursue university studies in the Arab world, solid religious credentials and the ability to open new schools (Launay 2016; Loimeier 2009). The Islamic education sector has thus grown significantly, and Islam plays a major role in the education and socialization of a significant part of African youth through education.

However, secular and Christian schools did not only produce secular elites. Many Muslim students and graduates of public schools also sought ways to live their religion actively in a milieu that was partly hostile to it. These youths tried to live Islam in ways that were more coherent with their education than traditional Quranic schools. This was the case in the 1970s and 1980s in both Ghana and Upper Volta, where Salafi ideas provided young intellectuals trained in Western-style schools a way to bridge the gap between modernity and Islam and live along religious and moral principles that are coherent with rational modernity (Kobo 2012).

University students have also adhered to reformist trends of Islam, and Western-trained intellectuals have been increasingly involved in Islamic activism since the 1990s. This category was historically associated with secular, mostly left-wing ideologies. However, from the 1990s onwards, Islamic reformist activism has grown in popularity on many university campuses on the continent. For example, in Niger, Salafi Islam has become the dominant ideological force at Université Abdoul Moumouni in response to harsh living conditions and culture shock experienced by young students who came from small towns or villages into the capital for their studies. Salafism offers them both a moral compass to navigate the dangers of the city and a project to moralize the whole Nigerien society as they graduate and take on leadership positions (Sounaye 2018). In Ethiopia, the “Intellectualist” movement has, after 1991, mobilized a group of university students and young urban intellectuals around a Muslim Brotherhood-inspired set of ideas, including individual piety and moral self-reformation, involvement in economic

and political initiatives, and the promotion of Islam as a basis to reform society as a whole (Østebø and Shemsedin 2015). The involvement of university students in Islamic activism has further been studied in many countries such as Senegal (Gomez-Perez 2008) and Nigeria (Obadare 2007).

In many countries, boys and young men are heavily favored in education and girls and young women have less access to schooling. This is also the case in Islamic education, where most teachers and school owners are men, and where opportunities for higher education are mostly offered to male students. However, several attempts have led to the development and the strengthening of female Islamic education (Alidou 2016; Schulz 2013). In addition, young women actively seek to compensate the gap in formal Islamic education by organizing informal educational initiatives and strongly investing in training sessions organized by Islamic associations in order to access knowledge and reclaim Islamic authority (Sounaye 2016; LeBlanc 2014).

Muslim youth and Islamic reform

The popularity of various trends of Islamic reform among Muslim youth across Africa caused alarm among Western analysts and African governments, at a time when the “radicalization” of Islam, especially around the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the development of jihadist armed group on the continent, has become a major security issue. However, close attention to the conditions of youth activism in Islamic reformist movements show a more nuanced reality.

Historically, doctrinal changes in African Islamic societies have in large part been associated with generational change. Indeed, within rapidly changing societies, new generations come of age in a world that is significantly different from the one their elders encountered earlier. In consequence, the religious landscape is constantly reshaped with new generations coming of age. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, this reshaping has led to the strengthening of various Islamic reform movements (see Loimeier *intra*), especially the Salafi trend that attracts a significant portion of African Muslim youth.

The popularity of Salafism among African youth is explained by several factors. Salafi Islam is promoted by well-funded *dawa* institutions, which distribute literature, fund mosques and schools throughout the continent, and offer grants for graduates of *madrasas* to pursue university degrees in Medina. Although these opportunities have considerably diminished in recent decades, the prestige and theological credentials associated with international Salafi networks attract young followers. In addition, local Muslim scholars across the continent have adopted Salafi ideas and developed teachings that have attracted many young Muslims (Østebø 2013). These efforts make Salafi ideas omnipresent throughout Africa. Many Muslim children are socialized in Salafi schools and Muslim youth learn Islamic practice in local Salafi mosques or with one of the many popular Salafi preachers who have gained significant exposure and popularity across the continent. These preachers are often part of the latest cohorts of graduates from the Islamic University of Medina, which reformed its teachings in the 1990s to better train those who are destined to preach in their country of origin. With their intimate knowledge of the texts and their training in public speech, these preachers often dominate public discourse on Islam (Thurston 2016). Thus, many young African Muslims come to adhere to Salafi Islam through socialization and the influence of authority figures.

African youth have also embraced Salafi and other trends of reformist Islam in response to the moral and practical challenges that they face. Corruption is often seen as a major burden for the development of African countries. Youth bear more directly the weight of this burden

as they come of age in a society with limited access to jobs and, more generally, where older leaders hold most power positions. Thus, they have few options but to enter clientele networks to navigate the transition to adulthood. Islamic reform appears as a way to contest pervasive corruption through moralization of society from below and a process of self-fashioning as a moral individual living by a strict code of conduct derived from the Qur'an and the Sunna. Islamic reform can thus be a foundation for youth to build an alternative cultural citizenship based on faith and on an identity that transcends national boundaries (LeBlanc and Gomez-Perez 2007).

Islamic youth activism is also characterized by ambivalence. While classical conversion theory presented conversion as a straightforward transition from “traditional” practices to textual and normative religions, recent attention on individual life-stories has shown that conversion is often an ongoing process and that many young Africans shift from one religious affiliation to another (Langewiesche 2003). Marloes Janson has shed light on some of the dynamics and contradictions behind the adoption of reformist branches of Islam by young Gambian Muslims, such as the Tablighi Jama'at and Salafism. While many Gambian youth, like their peers across the continent, are attracted to Islamic reform movements and ideas, their daily lives, the economic and social constraints that they face, and the attractiveness of various elements of worldly youth culture (music, sports, consumerism, entertainment) lead them to accommodations, compromises, and relapses in their convictions (Janson 2016). Such process has also been observed in Ethiopia (Østebø 2013) and Egypt (Schielke 2009). Far from a disconnection from modernity and the surrounding world, these conversions can be seen as a way to engage critically with modernity and its shortcomings, and to develop an alternative way of life that reconciles faith, morality, and socioeconomic development.

Both young men and women have adopted Islamic reformist ideas, but the reasons sometimes differ and Islamic reform serves various gendered aspirations. In the late twentieth century, young men in West Africa have adopted Islamic reform as a way to counter the dominance of the elders and negotiate their sociopolitical role at a time when perspectives seemed blocked for young men (Savadogo, LeBlanc, and Gomez-Perez 2009). Reformist Islam has also been a trend used by young women to participate in the public sphere. In some cases, it has led to the adoption of an “Islamic feminism”, where strict adherence to Islam is used to counter patriarchal customs (Saint-Lary 2012). In other cases, it has led young women to gain agency over their personal lives (employment, marriage) without openly confronting social norms (Schulz 2010; Masquelier 2009). In several urban contexts, young women have transformed practices in mosques and Muslim communities through their use of reformist ideas and Islamic knowledge. In Dakar, women gained access to mosques by referring to the sacred texts and convincing male leaders of their correct interpretation, whereas previously only older women could access Friday prayer from outside the mosques (Augis 2012).

The popularity of the various brands of Islamic reform movements among African youth has attracted the most attention from scholars. However, young African Muslims also actively participate in and revive other forms of Islamic piety, such as Sufism, popular charismatic religious movements, or previously nonexistent groups such as Shi'i Islam.

Youth activism in Sufi, charismatic, and Shi'i movements

While the popularity of Islamic reform among youth seems to point towards a “radicalization” of Islam, it must be noted that young Muslim are also highly invested in a plurality of movements with various orientations. In Senegal, new leaders emerge within well-established Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya and the Muridiyya that cater specifically to young

members. For example, at the turn of the twenty-first century, younger leaders of the Senegalese Tijaniyya started their own preaching directed towards urban youth. These leaders, such as Moustapha Sy of the “Moustarchidine” movement, adopted elements of Islamic reform discourses and focused on helping young urban Muslims navigate the challenges of modern cities while remaining faithful to Islam and the brotherhood. They also dared to speak of social and political issues that affected youth, such as corruption, and mobilized young followers in social works (cleaning of public spaces, blood donations, charity) (Samson 2016). The Muridiyya, for its part, has been successful in mobilizing marginalized youth for the defense and promotion of the brotherhood through the *Baye Fall* movement. These activists devote their life to the defense of the leaders and are exempted from religious obligations due to their involvement in the higher interests of the brotherhood. This particularity, which is controversial among Senegalese Muslims, attracts otherwise stigmatized sections of urban youth such as drug and alcohol addicts, who can regain a sense of belonging and purpose through religious activism. Such form of activism, though marginalized, is part of a wider trend of individualized piety (Audrain 2004). While Sufi authority has long been portrayed as male, women too have increasingly accessed leadership positions within brotherhoods. This is particularly visible in Senegal, where young women are drawn to female leaders for guidance and where a new generation of women leaders emerged in the early twenty-first century (Hill 2018).

Youth involvement in Sufi movements also led to the creation of new organizations distinct from the historical brotherhoods. In Mali, part of urban youth has invented, since the late 1990s, a new form of Sufi religiosity that adopted elements of Rasta culture. These so-called “Rasta Sufis”, led by Sheikh Sufi Bilal, are mostly composed of marginalized urban young men in Ségou and Bamako (Soares 2010, 254–255). These new Sufis, who did not claim any affiliation with existing brotherhoods, distinguished themselves by a shortened initiation process and an involvement in local development initiatives, while they avoided direct political involvement.

In the same period, the Malian Sheikh Chérif Ousmane Haidara gathered a large following among urban youth in Mali and neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire). His movement, Ansar Dine, is not strictly speaking Sufi, but Haidara borrows elements of Sufi traditions, especially a charismatic relationship between the leader and his disciples. His mostly young followers are from modest educational and economic backgrounds, and who are attracted by the movement’s ethos of self-redefinition along Islamic moral lines and its involvement in local development and collective solidarity in peripheral neighborhoods (Holder 2012).

Young Muslims have also been attracted to several nonconformist Islamic movements, such as Shiism. While Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa is overwhelmingly Sunni, Shi’i organizations have been set up in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and around the Lebanese trading communities in many African cities. Shiism remains marginal, but has in some contexts been successful in attracting young Africans in search of new religious identities. This is the case of the Islamic Association of Nigeria (IAN) led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, who adopted a radical anti-state position inspired by Shi’i Islamism. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Nigerian state was severely criticized by Muslim youth for its corruption. This led to the popularity of several radical Islamic movements, such as IAN which advocated a complete break with the state and the construction of a parallel society based on El-Zakzaky’s interpretation of Islamic law and following the model of the Iranian Revolution (Kane 2016, 152). In Senegal, Shi’i preachers were first sent from Lebanon to strengthen faith among the Lebanese diaspora. However, a significant number of young Senegalese converted to Shiism under the influence of this reform movement among the Lebanese community, which appears to some young Senegalese as a refreshing new voice in the country’s religious landscape (Leichtman 2009).

Jihadism: a youth revolt?

Most of the activism led by young Muslims is nonviolent and does not directly confront existing states and powers. However, in some regions, thousands of young Muslims have joined jihadist armed groups that aim at overthrowing state authority and establishing their interpretation of strict Islamic law on populations. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, armed Islamist groups have emerged in several regions of Africa, especially the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Many of these groups are to various degrees connected to global networks such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, but all have their own local objectives. In addition, local tensions are central to their emergence. In particular, jihadist groups have exploited generational divides and youth discontent to recruit.

This is expressed explicitly in the name of the Somali insurgent group al-Shabab, literally “the youth”, which succeeded in recruiting young men in Somalia and, as the group gained power and controlled large parts of the country, from the Somali diaspora around the world. The project of building, through violence, an ideal Islamic society was indeed very attractive, especially to Somali youth who grew up in a stateless and chaotic country. Al-Shabab especially succeeded in mobilizing diaspora youth during the Ethiopian intervention (2006–2009), thus using nationalist sentiment (Hansen 2013). In Nigeria, the radical preacher Muhammad Yusuf attracted a significant following among young rural migrants to Maiduguri, in the state of Borno, with his uncompromising criticism of the state and of corrupted secular institutions. The brutal repression of the movement and the killing of Yusuf by Nigerian military in 2009 led to further radicalization of its young members and the launching of an armed insurrection, which has since been known as Boko Haram, and which is still very active and has spread to neighboring Cameroon, Niger, and Chad (Thurston 2017). The group has instrumentalized local gendered tensions by targeting young women while also drawing support from some young women in a context where women are marginalized in Nigeria (Matfess 2017).

Generational dynamics are also central to the spread of jihadist militancy in Mali and Burkina Faso, especially among Fulani communities. The monopolization of land by older herders and the reduction of grazing lands through the extension of farming, in part supported by decades of development initiatives that neglected herding, have left young pastoralists without any economic prospects. In addition, the corruption of the state, in particular of the judicial system, leaves little alternative than for marginalized rural youth to seek alternative means of protecting their interests. The strict implementation of *sharia* law in replacement of an unreliable legal system is viewed positively by many young herders (Benjaminsen and Ba 2018).

Overall, while jihadi leaders are often not young and Jihadism cannot be reduced to “youth and violence”, it appears that jihadist organizations have been successful in exploiting youth grievances and aspirations in areas where states and existing institutions have failed to gain their confidence. In addition, the ideal of a utopian Islamic society where corruption, racism, and injustice would disappear is attractive to many young African Muslims who do not trust state institutions and live in a society that they consider immoral. However, young Muslims do not only contest the sociopolitical order through religious activism. They are also implicated in redefining the personal and private spheres of marriage, family, and sexuality.

Marriage, family, and sexualities

Access to marriage is a major concern for African youth, since marriage is one of the main markers of transition to adulthood. Demographers have noted that urban youth face increasing difficulty making that transition and tend to marry later, in large part due to the financial

burden attached to weddings and scarce employment opportunities available (Calvès 2016). In religious organizations, marriage is also of central importance since sex outside marriage is prohibited. In that context, Islamic youth organizations have created initiatives to facilitate marriage for their members. For instance, Lagos-based Nasrul-lahi-Fatih Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) has specialized in organizing Islamic dating activities between young Muslims eager to meet a spouse who shares their religious commitment and who wants to raise a family in accordance with Islamic values (Janson 2019). In addition, the Islamic reformist vision of marriage is often attractive for urban youth as it advocates moderate spending, in contrast with many traditions where families organize large wedding ceremonies and pay significant amounts as dowry. Reformist doctrines also offer opportunities for young Muslims to avoid fixed marriage by stressing the prevalence of strict religious rules over customs and family decisions, thus allowing for freely consented marriage. In turn, young married couples redefine gender relations, religious life within families, and social norms that are passed on to younger generations.

While marriage is publicly debated and often implicates wider social networks, sexuality is rarely discussed in public and relegated to a very private and secret space. In particular, homosexuality is considered a major sin in most Islamic trends and is marginalized and periodically targeted with violence. However, young Muslims constantly reinvent ways of practicing sexuality by balancing religious norms, family pressure, desire, popular culture, and competing notions of love (Decker 2015).

The most obvious marker of public display of pudicity is the practice of veiling among Muslim women, which takes many forms. Most young women wear variants of either hijabs or niqabs, the latter being mostly used by adherents of Salafi Islam. Reasons for young women wearing the veil in public are numerous. Adherents of reformist Islam, especially Salafis, often view veiling of their daughters as a religious duty, and thus young women raised in these families have little choice but to wear a veil, and often this practice becomes a habitus that they keep later in their lives (Brégand 2012). However, many veiled women freely choose to wear it to follow their reading of Islamic texts, like young men chose to wear the beard and the *kamis* (robe), with their trousers shortened to above the ankles to follow the example of the Prophet. In contexts where sexual harassment is very common such as in schools, universities, and workplaces, appearing as a pious Muslim can also serve as a protection for young women. The diffusion of hijab among young educated urban women is one of the visible markers of Islamic reform in Africa and has contributed to normalizing Islamic practice among urban women (van Santen 2010).

In sum, young Muslims are at the center of debates and transformations around marriage, family, and sexuality, which deeply affect gender roles and models. They are also active in other dimensions that are taken up by young Muslims across the continent in the social and economic realms.

Muslim youth social and economic initiatives

While concerns among many analysts of African Islam revolve around its potential radicalization or political impact, significant parts of Muslim youth's religious activities mostly relate to social and economic initiatives. Since the 1980s, most African countries have struggled economically and employment opportunities have become scarcer for youth as governments reduced their budgets. In that context, both governments and international donors strongly encouraged youth to launch private economic initiatives. Young people coming of age at the time of economic liberalism thus tend to adopt the entrepreneurial discourse to carve out a

place for themselves in a difficult economy. This is visible among young Muslims across the continent.

While the 1990s were characterized by a blossoming of Islamic youth activism through civic associations aimed at spreading Islamic education and defend the interests of Muslims, younger generations have shifted their interest towards the economic sphere. This is in part a continuity, since most trading communities in West Africa and the Indian Ocean coast have a long association with Islam. However, many young Muslims rebrand their activities as modern “business” and adopt elements of the contemporary neoliberal development discourse. For example, economic activities are presented as a moral and civic duty in order to favor economic development. Private entrepreneurship is further seen by these youth as a form of religious activism, as they adopt an Islamic way of doing business. Trading opportunities with the Arab world, especially through the pilgrimage, are important in shaping this Islamic entrepreneurship. In addition, trading in Islamic fashion and religious items (amulets, veils, prayer mats, literature) give a moral outlook to the activities of these youth (LeBlanc 2012). By Islamizing mundane activities and daily life, these youths create an Islamic way of life adapted to current dominant economic and political discourses. Islamic activities are also reframed in an entrepreneurial mode, and young Islamic scholars “sell” their discourses using entrepreneurial methods, such as marketing, social media, and organizational models inspired by modern business (Sounaye 2015).

Islamic youth activism has in recent years also become heavily oriented towards humanitarian assistance and NGO work. For many young Muslims, association activism and *dawa* alone are “not enough” to properly live Islam. This work should be complemented with concrete social work that makes an immediate difference in the community (LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin 2016, 1). The NGO-ization of many sectors of African societies since the late twentieth century has left little space for social action outside the development industry (Hearn 1998). This led young Muslims to engage in humanitarian work and get involved in Islamic NGOs to reconcile their ideal of an Islamic society with the constraints of the twenty-first century, where experiences as a volunteer are often the only path towards employment (Becker 2015). Earlier youth organizations also opened their activities to development projects and have partially rebranded themselves as Islamic NGOs. Islamic solidarity is presented as a duty, and members collect and donate money, blood, and goods to hospitals and people in need (Binaté 2016). Young women have been particularly active in Islamic NGOs.

Young Muslims have also been at the forefront of the use of new media in Islam. The rapid development of the internet at the end of the twentieth century is central to young Muslims’ religious practice. They are connected with discourses and ideas produced around the world and follow the speeches of star preachers from Arab and Western countries. Ideas developed by Saudi clerics, by the Muslim Brotherhood figure Yusuf al-Qaradawi, or by Western-based intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan are heard and debated among African youth. African preachers can also reach global audiences, such as Congolese theologian Abdul Madjid Kasogbia, whose “comparative theology” and debates with evangelical pastors made him very popular among young Francophone Muslims in Africa and in Europe. Young Muslims have also used cellphones as a central tool of Islamic practice, sharing information rapidly to mobilize for activities through SMS and messaging applications such as WhatsApp, receiving the call for prayer on their devices, and participating in debates with like-minded youth across the world. Muslim organizations of all colors diffuse sermons on Facebook Live, WhatsApp, and Telegram to reach youth audiences in all regions (Binaté 2017; Madore et Audet Gosselin 2019). New media have been used by Muslim women to rise to prominence and circumvent their relative marginalization in Islamic higher education. Digital media also offer new models to young women seeking Islamic knowledge (Madore 2020).

Finally, young Muslims creatively articulate Islam through popular culture. Sports are very popular among African youth, and Islamic organizations have established football clubs to better mobilize young adherents (Loimeier 2016, 6–7). In addition, young Muslims have used popular music, such as hip-hop, to convey their messages in a form that makes sense for their age and reach a large public. Hip-hop offers the possibility of making music without instruments, thus circumventing the ban on musical instruments expressed by many Islamic scholars (Masquelier 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter offered a short overview of the multiple facets through which young African Muslims express their faith and their commitment to Islam. The experience of young Muslims is extremely varied and changes from one country to another. These expressions of Islam are strongly influenced by the types of education that youth receive. The development of Islamic education as a response to the inefficiencies of traditional Quranic education and to the perceived destructive nature of secular education created a large sphere where youth are socialized in an Islamic context and can access high-level theological education in the Arabo-Islamic world. However, youth trained in Western-style schools have also developed ways to reconcile secular knowledge and active faith. Youth are at the forefront of the development and popularity of Islamic reformist trends, such as Salafism, whose ethical, social, and intellectual content attract the youth. But Muslim youth are also central to the development of neo-Sufi movements and to new, previously fringe trends of Islam on the continent. They are at the center of jihadi movements, which use social and economic discontent of young Muslims to recruit fighters. Young Muslims are at the center of transformations in regard to marriage, family, and sexuality. Finally, Muslim youth have created new ways to live their religion in the twenty-first century by appropriating entrepreneurship, volunteerism, and digital media.

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