


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Bruce Bongar, Anna Feinman, Renata Sargon

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LONE WOLF TERRORISM

Bruce Bongar, Anna Feinman, and Renata Sargon

The goal of terroristic acts is for the terroristic group to ultimately gain power and control of the region they are attacking in order to enforce laws and a lifestyle consistent with their own beliefs, which they feel are better than existing laws (Loza, 2007). The psychology behind terrorism is that these groups use violence, intimidation, shock, and destruction in order to make citizens begin to doubt and mistrust the government that is intended to protect them (Loza, 2007). If the group is successful at this, then the idea is that the citizens of that region may become attracted to joining the terrorist group, may be fearful enough to concede to the rule of this group, or at minimum place severe doubts regarding the government's ability to control or protect the area (Loza, 2007). Terroristic acts are a phenomenon that may seem like a recent development—especially to Americans whose first main exposure was the attacks on 9/11. However, terrorism has been occurring in many forms since the 1880s (Post, McGinnis, & Moody, 2014).

Terrorism has come in four main waves since the 1880s, and some scholars consider that now, with the rise of technology and communication abilities, we are in the fifth wave of terrorism known as lone wolf terrorism (Post et al., 2014). The first wave of terrorism is known as the Anarchist wave, and it occurred in the 1880s, starting in Russia and eventually moving to Europe, the Americas, and Asia (Post et al., 2014). The second wave, known as the Anti-Colonial wave, happened as a result of people's dissidence in conjunction with the dissolution of colonial powers after World War I, lasting until World War II (Post et al., 2014). Similarly, the third wave of terrorism occurred after the Vietnam war as a result of people rebelling against their parents' generation who were loyal to the government, and it is known as the New Left wave (Post et al., 2014). In 1979, the Religious wave of terrorism began that is still occurring and developing today with the suicide bombing of the United States Embassy in Tehran by Hezbollah, an Islamic-based terrorist group (Post et al., 2014). The rationalization of suicide bombings by Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Fadlallah, set a dangerous and lasting precedent for terror attacks that also set the stage for lone wolf attacks.

Suicide terrorism

Sheikh Fadlallah preached that suicide bombings are the ultimate act of martyrdom and began to lay the foundation of many terrorist tactics that are still being utilized in the present day,

including the use of communications and media to spread propaganda, martyrdom as a righteous and holy act, female terrorists, and training of specially selected individuals to carry out these suicide attacks (Bruce, 2013; Post et al., 2014). Ironically, although suicide is considered a sin in Islam, the reframing of suicide bombings as an act of martyrdom makes it acceptable for those who become radicalized (Post et al., 2014).

Islamic people from the Middle East historically have been prone to becoming radicalized because of the long-standing political, social, and economic issues, including the interference of foreign non-Islamic countries, throughout much of the region. The instability in these areas allows terrorist leaders to spread propaganda about how other religions and ways of life are threatening, unholy, and detrimental to the people of the Middle East (Loza, 2007). The people then begin to feel that they have been treated unfairly and become angry and morally outraged (Mastors & Siers, 2014).

Radicalization is posited to be a process involving three steps (Kruglanski et al., 2014). It begins with individuals who feel that they have lost meaning and significance in their lives and begin to search for ways to find meaning and feel significant (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Secondly, violence is seen as not only the most effective but also the only way to attain significance (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Lastly, the concept of being significant supersedes any other goal the individual may have, so it becomes the main focus and it is seen as only achievable through violent methods (Kruglanski et al., 2014).

An individual's worldview is also a contributing factor to whether they are prone to radicalization. Borum (2014) posited that three specific worldviews, authoritarianism, dogmatism, and fundamentalism, are linked to one's likelihood to become radicalized. Authoritarianism is linked to extremism and the denial of civil and human rights, dogmatism involves intolerance because of the inability to consider other points of view, and fundamentalism indicates black-and-white thinking as well as an apocalyptic orientation (Borum, 2014). If an individual has one or more of these worldviews, they are more prone to radicalization.

The radicalization and use of suicide bombers is intended to cause a sense of shock and awe that makes a community more susceptible to mistrust the government and perhaps even side with the terror group. As stated earlier, suicide is reframed as a glorious and righteous act done in the name of martyrdom for the cause, and an individual who does this act is praised and romanticized (Bruce, 2013; Hafez, 2006; Post, 2009). Religion is even used to reward this act, with religious leaders promising that Allah sees these individuals as special and that they will be immediately accepted into and rewarded in heaven with all the pleasures of life, including sexual gratification from 72 virgins (Loza, 2007).

Terroristic groups that utilize suicide bombers have specific identifying factors they search for when recruiting people. First, they search for individuals that are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice who tend to have weak personalities and low self-esteem (Bruce, 2013). They are careful to select people who do not have severe psychiatric disorders; however, due to the denunciation of suicide in the Qur'an, they are unable to specifically pick those who have suicidal ideation, as this would be a sin (Bruce, 2013; Lankford, 2011). Individuals susceptible to becoming suicide bombers also tend to feel isolated and lack a sense of belonging (Spaaij, 2010).

The terror group leaders encourage martyrdom and take advantage of the economic unrest of the region by promising to care for the family and loved ones of the suicide bomber (Bruce, 2013; Lankford, 2011). This individual not only feels a sense of duty spurred on by the events of the region, but then also begins to feel a sense of duty to the terror group to carry out this act after all the tactics used to radicalize them and the promises for a rewarding afterlife for them and better lifestyle for their families (Bruce, 2013).

Lone wolf terrorism

As stated in the introduction, it is posited that we are now living in the fifth wave of terrorism known as Lone Wolf terrorism, which has arisen due to the advent of the internet and the accessibility of the internet and social media across the world (Post et al., 2014). Some scholars trace lone wolf terrorism back to the anarchist movement in the 19th century, but it took much longer for this term to be utilized and recognized (Pitcavage, 2015). For example, it became much more prominent in the United States in 1995 with the Oklahoma City bombing, culminating in much more attention to the topic around 2009 where there were a number of lone wolf attacks which mobilized law enforcement and academia into studying this specific phenomenon (Pitcavage, 2015).

Lone wolf terrorists are individuals that conduct terrorist attacks on their own accord, sometimes without even officially belonging to an identified terrorist group (Post et al., 2014). The propaganda of terror groups is now able to be spread through social media platforms and reach people worldwide. In fact, terror groups specifically recruit individuals that are technologically savvy in order to become more efficient and effective and disseminating information (Post et al., 2014). ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), has been especially effective at using the internet to recruit members, sometimes becoming so successful that individuals are carrying out attacks in their name without even technically belonging to the group (Post et al., 2014). Although many people associate the term “terrorism” with Islamic terror groups, it is important to recognize that many white supremacist groups are considered terroristic groups because of the one definition that specifies that the terror acts that are committed are driven by a specific ideology (Pitcavage, 2015). Pitcavage (2015) stated that lone wolf terrorists fall into seven “broad categories: (1) anarchists/left-wing extremists; (2) domestic Muslim extremists; and various categories of right-wing extremists; (3) sovereign citizens; (4) tax protestors; (5) other antigovernment extremists; (6) anti-abortion extremists; and (7) white supremacists” (p. 1666). In the sample examined in this study, 86% of lone wolf terrorists belonged to a right-wing extremist movement, with white supremacists making up the majority of this category (49%) (Pitcavage, 2015).

Due to the definitional, conceptual, and methodological issues as well as the nature of terrorism, it has been difficult to conduct research on lone wolf terrorism (Becker, 2014). There has been some debate about the definition of what a lone wolf terrorist is. Many of the existing definitions define the term differently based on some key points. For example, law enforcement believes that the term “lone wolf” may add some element of glamour and prefer the term “terrorists acting alone,” a term also used by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). The term “lone wolf” comes from the media and of the perpetrators themselves and is not a definition given by social sciences (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). This also varies by country, as in some countries a lone wolf is one who performs terroristic acts because of an affiliation with a terrorist group, whereas in other countries this term is used to mean the exact opposite – someone who acts alone without a direct affiliation to a terrorist group (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). There has also been some disagreement as to whether or not a couple or trio of individuals can be defined as lone wolf terrorists or if it must be one unaffiliated individual. Some researchers may call individuals in this situation “lone wolf packs,” which is still a point of contention because on the one hand, they are at minimally affiliated with each other, but on the other hand lack the structure of an identified terrorist group (Pitcavage, 2015; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Most researchers agree that when there are at least four individuals, it is then considered a terrorist group (Pitcavage, 2015). Borum, Fein, and Vossekul (2012) used a three-dimensional definition of lone wolf terrorism, which consisted of “loneness, or

independence of activity; direction, or autonomy of decision making; and motivation, or clarity of causation/purpose.”

There are two main perspectives on what motivates lone wolf terrorists presented by Pitcavage (2015). The first perspective is that these individuals suffer from psychological maladjustment and that this and not political ideation is what motivates them to kill others. They desire to be part of a group but are unable to fit in due to personality deficits and do have some sort of mental illness and problems with aggression and anger (Pitcavage, 2015). The second perspective combines this first perspective with the idea that because of their anger, mental instability, and desire to belong (in addition to the individual feeling unsafe and threatened), they become drawn to terrorist groups and commit acts in the name of such groups without being directed to act by the actual group (Pitcavage, 2015).

Individuals living in democratic states and the states themselves ironically tend to become most susceptible to lone wolf radicalization and attacks—due to the fact that individuals there have more of a right to privacy and because the government is not as intrusive regarding their personal lives as they are in other countries (Weissmann, Busch, & Schouten, 2014). For example, the United States has had more lone wolf terror attacks than any other country (Spaaij, 2010). Lone wolf terrorists select targets based on their ideology and locations for attacks based on their familiarity with the area, and they tend to use firearms as a main method of attack; however, in recent years explosives have been used as well (Becker, 2014). There is increasing concern that lone wolf terrorists act impulsively, which would make it more difficult to thwart the attack. However, there is also evidence that even in these cases, there is some element of planning (Meloy & Pollard, 2017). It seems to be the case that although the attack begins with a plan, a triggering event leads to an attack shortly after said event where only a few elements of the plan are used (Meloy & Pollard, 2017).

Lone wolf terrorists tend to share many similar risk factors as suicide bombers, so they are recruited in similar ways—based upon the characteristics that terror group leaders look for, and because of the internet, terror group leaders are able to cast a wider net to attract even more individuals willing to give up their lives (Bruce, 2013). Again, these leaders look for individuals that have low self-esteem, weak personalities in terms of willingness to follow a strong leader, and a lack of psychiatric issues who also are searching for meaning and significance in their lives and wish to feel a sense of belonging rather than isolation (Bruce, 2013; Hafez, 2006; Lankford, 2011; Post, 2009; Spaaij, 2010). By committing terrorist attacks, this individual not only finds meaning and a sense of belonging, but also gains notoriety and glory within their organization, which is especially appealing to them (Cottee & Hayward, 2011). Corner and Gill (2015) found that a lone wolf terrorist was 13.49 times more likely than an individual belonging to a terror group to have a mental illness and was more likely to be experiencing a major life change, be a recent victim of prejudice, and experience chronic stress. This data can be used to identify and determine methods of treating and deradicalizing lone wolf terrorists should they be caught.

Counterterrorism approaches

Challenges specific to lone-wolf actors

The literature overwhelmingly supports the contention that lone-wolf actors are difficult to detect, categorize, or systematize in any meaningful way (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; McCauley, Moskalkenko, & Van Son, 2013). Moreover, despite the fact that a history of trauma, personality disorder traits, and substance abuse have been advanced as possible common links among these individuals, striking differences between actors have been observed

in background, age, and motivation (McCauley et al., 2013). Although instances of lone-wolf terrorist acts have increased in recent years, one of the biggest difficulties for both researchers and counterterrorism organizations is the relatively low number of lone-actor perpetrated acts (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011; Spaaij, 2010). Additionally, these attacks continue to be one of the more unpredictable forms of terrorism—making prevention difficult for counterterrorism practitioners, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement.

The lone wolf's preference for isolation and lack of ties to a formal organization make identification, monitoring, and detention extremely difficult. Compared to hierarchically organized terrorist groups, these individuals are better able to avoid early detection, as their plans are rarely communicated to others (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). Lone actors display a range of backgrounds with significant variation in motivations and ideologies, as well as utilizing a wide spectrum of means to send their message. These can range from lengthy rhetoric posted on social media to sending hate mail to specific targets (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). This lack of discernible recurring methodology adds to the difficulty of creating prevention strategies for these attacks.

There is literature to suggest that a number of attackers post rhetoric, plans of attack, and even intended targets on social media prior to perpetrating their attacks (Merari, 2010). However, the increasing use of social media as a means of global communication makes it difficult to sift through the information to differentiate between individuals expressing extremist ideologies (Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2015). Mainstream social media as well as more under-the-radar forums and chat rooms are increasingly being used to attract, groom, and launch potential lone actors (Weimann, 2012). In the United States and many other Western countries, attempts to limit freedom of speech have been met with substantial pushback, limiting the power of counterterrorism units to investigate unless a documented act of violence has occurred (Bakker & de Graaf, 2011).

Of particular concern is the social contagion aspect of lone-wolf terrorism: a relatively large number of lone-actor manifestos continue to circulate on the World Wide Web written by individuals such as Ted Kaczynski, Mohammed Bouyeri, and Elliot Rodger. Copycat behavior is inspired not only by perceived common ground and shared feelings of alienation, but also the near-religious reverence imparted onto these “success stories” (Pantucci et al., 2015). Methods of attack such as shootings, bombings, or anthrax letters continue to cycle through rising and falling in popularity depending on effectiveness of recent attacks (Bakker & de Graaf, 2011).

Despite often lacking means and encountering difficulties associated with the absence of organizational support of terrorist networks, lone-wolf attacks have often proven to be devastating.

Traditional counterterrorism tactics

Law enforcement, intelligence agencies, counterterrorism organizations, and military efforts have increasingly focused their efforts on fighting the lone-wolf terrorist threat. Several approaches are described within the literature produced in the last two decades, coinciding with the rise of this type of perpetrator.

Initial efforts have focused on the application of tactics that have been previously successful against traditional terrorist organizations as follows.

Confidential informants have been previously used with some success as a source of information. Their contributions have led to the disruption of plans as well as the incarceration of suspected terrorists. Confidential informants have been individuals who experienced a change of heart or members of law enforcement placed within cells undercover (Doosje et al., 2016).

Counter-radicalization has been a central strategy employed by the U.S. government, with officials attempting to engage with communities most likely to be affected by terrorism. These

programs include outreach to community leaders, education on controversial policies, and establishing trust within relevant neighborhoods. The efficacy of these programs continues to be evaluated, and addressing terrorist proclivities prior to violent escalation has become the key to decreasing the occurrence of terrorist acts. In the case of traditional terrorism, involving the community increases the cooperation between law enforcement and the general population, leading to more effective protection strategies (Barnes, 2012; Lakhani, 2012).

Agencies have employed electronic and physical surveillance as a means of monitoring, studying, and preventing a variety of terrorist activity. This tactic alone does not seem to increase the efficacy of finding potential terrorist actors, and limited success has been achieved when surveillance has been used in conjunction with other means as a strategy for detection and disruption (Barnes, 2012).

Last, physical denial of access to both information and firearms has been considered as a possible counter-terrorism tactic (Barnes, 2012). This has proven to be an incredibly difficult approach as specialized knowledge including but not limited to instructions on: bomb-making, weapons training, and publicly available schematics and architectural plans for potential soft targets is readily available on the internet (Barnes, 2012). Restricting access to firearms is unlikely to be successful as constitutionally protected rights are often difficult to circumvent without tangible proof (Rapoport, 2013).

Counterterrorism tactics as applied to lone-wolf actors

These aforementioned strategies have proven to be difficult to employ in the case of lone-wolf terrorism for a variety of reasons. Confidential informants are unlikely to be able to extract useful information, as these individuals tend towards isolation and have difficulty with social interactions (Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, & Zakin, 2009; Gill et al., 2014). Despite these tendencies, lone-wolf actors exist as a part of a broader community and often interact with members of this community in a way that increases awareness of possible planned attacks (Pantucci et al., 2015). Indeed, members of the community are often aware about presenting extremist ideology and/or plan to engage in violent activities expressed by the lone-wolf actor. Lone-wolf terrorists will often show signs of impending plans via identification with and activities related to a particular social movement, which is clearly visible to community members such as neighbors, doctors, or even librarians (Gill et al., 2014). It is imperative to seek the help of influential leaders in solidifying community engagement by promoting aversion to terrorist activities through both passive and active means (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). These efforts can be reasonably expected to increase the likelihood of detection and disruption of planned lone-wolf attacks by various agencies (Pantucci et al., 2015).

Scholars in the field of counterterrorism stress the need to understand how attacks happen rather than the traditional approach of examining motivations behind the attacks when attempting to locate potential lone-wolf actors (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). Shone (2010) emphasized the importance of understanding the process of radicalization as it applies to lone-wolf actors. Factors in radicalization can include feelings of insignificance, a sense of humiliation, a lack of career prospects, and personal uncertainty. These factors can contribute to the desire to identify strongly with an ideology that promotes black-and-white thinking and decreases uncertainty. The potential lone actor's social environment or lack thereof may also contribute to radicalization (Doosje et al., 2016). Successful counterterrorism organizations need to be vigilant about gaining insight into any signals that a would-be attacker may give off, by effectively utilizing intelligence projects, capturing data, and, most importantly, and working in concert with other agencies (Shone, 2010).

Researchers contend that despite the seemingly spontaneous nature of the violent lone-wolf attacks, it behooves experts in the field to look for a catalyzing event. Moreover, because lone actors perpetrate terror outside of a hierarchical structure, other extremists often inspire them. With this in mind, an effective counterterrorism strategy will include the circulation of a counter-narrative that aims to delegitimize previous attempts and attacks (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). As part of this strategy, informational and educational programs for schools and universities as well as awareness campaigns for parents and guardians are encouraged.

Bakker and De Graaf (2011) caution counterterrorism organizations to carefully toe the line between communicating potential threats to pertinent audiences and giving lone actors the public space that they inherently crave. Media coverage, which often increases with the level of human tragedy achieved, increases the payoff for these actors (Phillips, 2011). This level of public visibility is likely to encourage other such would-be perpetrators and significantly exacerbate the problem.

Scholars in the field encourage counterterrorism actors to utilize the Internet as an instrument of early detection. Citing isolationism in their offline life, researchers contend that lone actors derive social interaction from their online connections (Brynielsson et al., 2012). Agencies that are able to monitor radicalization efforts by analyzing linguistic patterns and tracking movements on social media can potentially access important information about these lone actors prior to a planned attack (Cohen, Johansson, Kaati, & Mork, 2014). Focusing on and analyzing online interactions can lead to the detection of planned lone-wolf attacks. However, Striegher (2013) warns that although online intelligence has previously been utilized, there is no research to indicate that this has been successful.

A final recommendation is one that has become the subject of much debate among policy makers, law enforcement and military, and the general public. A look at perpetrators of recent shooting sprees across the world indicates that the perpetrators were able to easily access semi-automatic firearms. Members of the counterterrorism community continue to voice reservations about the relatively easy access to these dangerous weapons. Researchers encourage agencies to pay careful attention to those applying for a permit to carry a weapon or seeking membership in shooting clubs (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011).

The recommendations discussed above shed some light on potential counterterrorism tactics to be used as the threat of lone-wolf terrorism continues to grow. Overall, this list of possible approaches demonstrates there is still much work to be done in understanding, analyzing, and preventing lone-wolf terrorist acts.

Goals

Deradicalization occurs when an individual moves away from extremist views towards more moderate beliefs (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research when it comes to the best and most effective methods for deradicalization. There are some known differences seen in deradicalization programs in the Middle East and South Asia versus those seen in Europe (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). In the Middle East and South Asia, deradicalization programs focus on a less extreme and more accurate interpretation of the Qur'an with the hopes that religious individuals will conclude that suicide is in fact a sin and not the ultimate sacrifice one can make (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). The programs in Europe focus on increasing the individual's vocational, social, and financial skills (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013) in order to help combat the despair an individual may feel due to the political, social, and economic unrest that is prevalent in the Middle East, while at the same time combating psychological factors of the individual (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Lankford, 2011). All of the aforementioned programs use a

variety of religious scholars, former terrorists, and experts to establish rapport and build trust, and success is measured by the individual's lack of criminal and terroristic activities—although there is no long-term data to support the efficacy of either type of program (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013).

Some believe that there is no way to deradicalize an individual and that their actions must also be met with violence and war (Loza, 2007). However, this may prove to be counterproductive, as it may validate the fact that these individuals feel under attack and that their entire way of life is threatened. Additionally, due to the advent of the Internet and social media platforms, experts must begin to look at using internet-based interventions to combat the use of propaganda disseminated by terror groups—preferably by combining facets of programming from the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe in order to ensure all angles of the complex factors influencing radicalization are addressed.

What the Israel Prison Service can teach us about lone-wolf actors

The Israel Prison Service (IPS) holds the highest number of incarcerated terrorists including the largest number of non-local inmates in the world. Additionally, the system's unique population includes lone-wolf actors and a number of inmates often referred to as “would-be suicides,” or captured individuals who, for a variety of reasons, failed to complete the planned terrorist act (Merari, 2010). Professor Ariel Merari, a scholar of suicide terrorism who has been tracking the phenomenon for nearly 30 years, has conducted a number of studies aimed at better understanding the background and motivation of suicide bombers in general and more recently lone actors incarcerated within the Service (Merari, 2010).

In a study looking at “would-be” suicide bombers, Merari and colleagues narrowed their approach by reasoning that the most accurately representative individuals for study are those that attempted to detonate their device but failed due to a malfunction (Merari, 2010). The researchers conducted a number of clinical interviews with three distinct groups which included “would-be” suicide bombers, group leaders who organized suicide attacks, and a control group of non-suicide terrorists. Findings showed that over half of the “would-be” actors were not involved in any terrorist activities prior to their attempt and none had been arrested prior to their attempt compared to a quarter of the controls (Merari et al., 2009). Despite previous literature that contends that suicide terrorists lack shared personality characteristics (Silke, 2003; Sageman, 2004), Merari and colleagues found that the majority of “would-be” actors in their sample displayed dependent and avoidant personality characteristics. The researchers noted that no psychopathic tendencies were observed among the “would-be” bombers (Merari et al., 2009). Overall, profiles compiled by these researchers described marginalized, shy individuals with a history of failed social interactions, difficulties at school, and perceived parental disappointment. A number of the “would-be” actors also presented with suicidal tendencies (Merari et al., 2009). Despite the admittedly small sample size, these findings provided a launching point for future research.

A more recent study conducted by Ganor and Merari (2018) presented at the International Homeland Security Forum was the first of its kind and included data collected from 700 attackers and interviews with 45 imprisoned lone-wolf actors with the aim of defining motivations, creating profiles, and formulating prevention techniques (Ganor & Merari, 2018). Motivations for planned attacks ranged from pre-existing psychological conditions and ideological (nationalistic and religious) factors to trigger events including geopolitical changes, traumatic experiences, and social contagion. Over half of the lone-wolf actors interviewed presented with mental disorders, specifically psychosis and/or suicidal ideation, and a similar number of interviewees expressed regret at surviving the attack. Although the number of female attackers was low, this subgroup displayed a notably high incidence of reported familial problems. Of particular concern is the

finding that over 10% of these actors utilized social media prior to their attacks, with over half of those individuals expressing intent (Ganor & Merari, 2018).

The data collected by Merari and colleagues has allowed experts in the field to develop a better understanding of the motivations of lone-wolf actors. Moreover, it has established a possible pattern by which multidisciplinary counterterrorism teams could potentially locate and immobilize would-be threats. A similar approach to studying lone actors in the United States could potentially yield further information on how to deal with this growing threat.

A multidisciplinary approach to lone-wolf terrorism

The study of lone-wolf terrorism is deeply rooted in the multidisciplinary approach, yet there are differing views and limited research on the subject. Scholars in the field of counterterrorism often emphasize the need for a multidisciplinary approach, but rarely operationalize what this step would look like in practice (De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2016). The following section will address multidisciplinary approach to the global fight against traditional terrorism on the macro level, and then explore the potential for a multi-pronged community-based approach on the micro level.

Schmid (2005) looked at a possible multi-pronged approach to battle traditional terrorism. Much of what he found can be relevant to fighting lone-wolf actors as well. On a macro scale, several actors are instrumental in counterterrorism efforts, with one such actor being the government whose policies are often the target of the lone actor's anger. Schmid (2005) recommends four "pillars" of government in order to prevent terrorist actions: good governance, democracy, rule of law, and social justice. This authority contends that corruption, political violence, and desperate actions (such as those of a lone-wolf actor) are to be expected in a society with long-standing injustices and inequalities (Schmid, 2005). Schmid further emphasizes the importance of economic and social measures, stating that suppressing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations is key to their demise. On the other side, the researcher contends that although the correlation between poverty and the existence of terrorism is low, the correlation between respect for human rights and absence of terrorism is significant. Another economic motivation for terrorism can be unemployment and the resulting feelings of hopelessness in younger individuals. All of these factors contribute to the importance of social and economic measures in terrorism prevention (Schmid, 2005).

Schmid, along with a number of his colleagues, encourages the use of psychological-communication-educational measures to decrease the susceptibility of easily influenced groups. These groups include individuals already identifying as part of a terrorist organization, unaffiliated members of the community, and other vulnerable populations. Researchers propose a series of offensive and defensive psychological operations, including promotion of desired perceptions among both members of the community and potential members of terrorist organizations (Crelinsten & Schmid, 1992). These efforts are meant to dissuade potential future actors from embracing terrorism, deny means for carrying out an attack, and increase international cooperation in the battle against the global terrorist threat (Schmid, 2005).

On the legal front, a number of agencies have acted to aid countries with few resources of their own in counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, agencies such as the Terrorism Prevention Branch provide legal assistance to the global community by training judges and lawyers, aiding in the drafting of legislation, and expediting extradition. Over 70% of countries belonging to the UN have requested such aid, and policy makers and researchers are optimistic that this organization will continue to be a resource (Schmid, 2005).

Lastly, Schmid (2005) encourages counterterrorism organizations to continue to utilize good intelligence as a means for disrupting terrorist activity. The researcher contends that although

intelligence often contains accurate, up-to-date information on terrorist activities, the information fails to be utilized in a timely manner due to information-sharing constraints. Bureaucratic issues and fear of revealing sources continue to be problems that prevent full cooperation across all actors (Schmid, 2005). Each of the major actors described above is involved in the global fight against terrorism and is crucial to counterterrorism efforts across the board; however, the lone-wolf terrorist is far more likely to be thwarted at the community level.

On a micro community level, a possible approach includes forming teams consisting of members from mental and public health, educators, religious leaders, law enforcement personnel, and other representatives of the legal system (Weine, Cohen, & Brannegan, 2015). Required training for the teams would focus on threat and risk assessment and best practices, and the team would play a role in building awareness of the current threat to the community through its leaders and advocates. Researchers encourage potential teams to hold multidisciplinary conferences with the hope of disseminating accurate and crucial information to relevant stakeholders (Weine et al., 2015).

An important consideration in multidisciplinary work is the balance between increasing cooperation and the exchange of information among agencies without compromising the privacy and right to confidentiality of individuals being assessed. Based on research that looks at personal characteristics of lone-wolf actors, De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker (2016) encourage researchers and counterterrorism agencies alike to focus their attention on individuals with a known history of mental health issues who are attempting to obtain a permit to carry a gun. This type of information can only be gleaned if mental health organizations and law enforcement or other agencies involved in issuing gun permits are able to work together. Notably, this approach works best with individuals who are already predetermined to be a potential threat (De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2016).

Another approach to multidisciplinary cooperation provides a framework for the role of government officials, law enforcement, and mental health organizations in formulating preventative activities for vulnerable populations, specifically younger individuals. A plan like this was implemented in the United States in 2011; however, some concerns were raised that this program was geared more towards gathering intelligence than actual preventative care (Weine et al., 2017). With this in mind, researchers encourage actors looking to implement similar programs to seek a buy-in from the community, prioritize collaboration, and emphasize the protection of civil liberties (Weine et al., 2017).

Increasingly, mental health professionals are being called to the forefront of the struggle with lone-wolf terrorism. Mental health practitioners are encouraged to provide aid within their traditional scope of practice, including providing a safe space for clients to express a variety of views, build trust within the community, and seek consultations in cultural competency related to the context of their clients' experiences. Additionally, mental health workers are invited to become actively involved in the multidisciplinary approach to counterterrorism by attending threat assessment training, building relationships with law enforcement and community leaders, and consulting with a professional peer group to discuss violence and extremism (Weine et al., 2017).

As the study of lone-wolf terrorism and counterterrorism tactics continues to grow, it becomes clear that an interdisciplinary approach and cooperation will be the key to fighting the lone-wolf terrorist threat.

Conclusion

Due to the rise and accessibility of the Internet and use of social media around the globe, the current geo-political stage is set to facilitate the rise of lone-wolf terrorism. Unfortunately, due to nature of lone-wolf terrorism as well as a number of methodological issues, research on the matter has been difficult to conduct. For this reason, relatively little is known about

motivations, risk factors, and commonalities of this population. The current perspective is that the motivation for the actions of these individuals is likely the psychological maladjustment that they suffer from, rather than political motivation. Secondary motivating factors are feelings of intense anger, the desire for recognition and belonging, and mental instability (Pitcavage, 2015). The work of Merari and colleagues in this field has been promising as well as informative, and it would behoove practitioners of counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and other relevant actors to continue to pay attention to future literature coming out of Israel.

Prevention of lone-wolf attacks is incredibly difficult for counterterrorism practitioners around the world, as this continues to be one of the most unpredictable forms of terrorism. Monitoring is difficult due to the lone actor's tendency towards isolation. Several common tactics for prevention have been attempted, including the use of confidential informants, counter-radicalization, electronic and physical surveillance, and physical denial of access to information and firearms, all with limited to varying success. The literature suggests utilizing the Internet as an instrument of early detection as well as paying careful attention to individuals applying to carry a weapon.

Due to the complex nature of lone-wolf terrorism, a multidisciplinary approach is key. Cooperation across law enforcement agencies; counterterrorism practitioners; scholars in the fields of politics, psychology and economics; and other relevant actors is crucial to the containment of this threat. Further and more extensive research is needed in order to better understand and eventually eliminate lone-wolf terrorism across the globe.

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