


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13

THE WAR ON TERRORISM IN AFRICA

Human rights issues, implications, and recommendations

Ifeoma E. Okoye and Lucy Tsado

Introduction

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (United Nations, December 9, 1994) describes terrorism as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political, ideological, racial, ethnic and religious purposes” (para. 3). Terrorism attacks the core values of the Charter of the United Nations, which emphasizes respect for fundamental human rights and compliance with the rule of law and with the fundamental objectives of maintaining peace and resolving conflicts worldwide. This perspective focuses mostly on the core implications of terrorism based on the objective of the resolution. Hence, acts of terrorism violate individuals’ fundamental human rights and grossly breach global peace and stability. These acts of terror are considered criminal and unjustifiable, notwithstanding the circumstances or any form of objectives to justify such acts of violence.

Terrorism is considered one of the most serious global security threats to most countries in Africa. The terrorist threat in Africa is evolving with terrorists groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaida expanding on the continent with plans to conduct deadly attacks in various parts of Africa. This led to formation of African terrorist groups like ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Greater Sahara, ISIS-Somalia, ISIS-Sinai, and ISIS-Mozambique (U.S. Department of State, 2019). The Global Terrorism Database (2017) reported the following terrorism incidents in Africa from 1970 to 2017: 3,907 in Nigeria; 2,016 in South Africa; 2,743 in Algeria; 4,142 in Somalia; 967 in Sudan; 2,479 in Egypt; 2,249 in Libya; and many others. Many lives and much property and national infrastructure were destroyed in the process.

The 2016 Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) reported 12 African countries with a high Global Terrorism Impact (GTI) (GTI of 6 and above) in the top 25 countries. (See Table 13.1.) This means that almost half the countries that have the highest impact of terrorism are African countries. IEP measures and correlates the impact of terrorism on the peace and economic development of a country with a GTI score ranging from 10 (highest score with extreme negative impact) to 1 (lowest score with mild negative impact).

The same report also revealed that 8 of the top 20 terrorist incidents in the world in 2015, in terms of the most fatal incidences, were in African countries (See Table 13.2.) These incidents occurred in Niger, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, and Cameroon, with Nigeria alone recording 4 of these incidents, with a total of at least 473 fatalities.

Addressing the menace of terrorism across Africa has been very challenging because the continent confronts many other tenacious problems like hunger, political

Table 13.1 Countries' Global Terrorism Impact scores

| Rank | Country | GTI Score |
|-----------|---|--------------|
| 1 | Iraq | 9.96 |
| 2 | Afghanistan | 9.444 |
| 3 | Nigeria | 9.314 |
| 4 | Pakistan | 8.613 |
| 5 | Syria | 8.587 |
| 6 | Yemen | 8.076 |
| 7 | Somalia | 7.548 |
| 8 | India | 7.484 |
| 9 | Egypt | 7.328 |
| 10 | Libya | 7.283 |
| 11 | Ukraine | 7.132 |
| 12 | Philippines | 7.098 |
| 13 | Cameroon | 7.002 |
| 14 | Turkey | 6.738 |
| 15 | Thailand | 6.706 |
| 16 | Niger | 6.682 |
| 17 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 6.633 |
| 18 | Sudan | 6.6 |
| 19 | Kenya | 6.578 |
| 20 | Central African Republic | 6.518 |
| 21 | South Sudan | 6.497 |
| 22 | Bangladesh | 6.479 |
| 23 | China | 6.108 |
| 24 | Lebanon | 6.068 |
| 25 | Mali | 6.03 |

Source: Adapted from Institute of Economics and Peace (2017) at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.pdf>

Table 13.2: African countries within the top 20 terrorist incidents in the world in 2015

| Country | Date of incident | Description | Number of fatalities |
|----------|------------------|---|----------------------|
| Niger | 4/25/2015 | Assailants attacked a military base and residential areas, killing at least 46 soldiers, 28 civilians, and 156 assailants. | 230 |
| Egypt | 10/31/2015 | An explosive device detonated on a Kogalymavia passenger flight, which caused it to crash in North Sinai, killing all 224 on board. | 224 |
| Nigeria | 8/13/2015 | Assailants opened fire on residents in Kukuwa-Gari village. At least 174 villagers were killed by gunfire or drowned in a nearby river. | 174 |
| Kenya | 4/2/2015 | Assailants armed with grenades and firearms attacked students at Garissa University College, executing at least 154 non-Muslim students. | 154 |
| Cameroon | 4/9/2015 | Assailants attacked residents, soldiers, and buildings, including mosques, in Fotokol town, killing 144. | 144 |
| Nigeria | 1/13/2015 | Assailants opened fire on a meeting of vigilantes in Zamfara state. At least 107 people were killed, and an unknown number of others were injured in the assault. | 107 |
| Nigeria | 7/1/2015 | Assailants attacked residents in mosques and in their homes in Kukawa village, killing at least 97 people. | 97 |
| Nigeria | 3/15/2015 | Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Egba village, killing at least 95 people. | 95 |

Source: Adapted from Institute of Economics and Peace (2017) at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.pdf>

instability, inflation, bad governance, corruption, poor health management, etc. As a result, the international calls to wage “war on terror” since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. have not made much impact in Africa. The failure of African leaders to independently and democratically tackle the threat of terrorism and its effects has led to the enforcement of draconian counterterrorism laws, abhorred criminal justice practices, and the use of repressive strategies by foreign and African governments on African soil. These strategies, designed to lessen the scourge of terrorist activities in Africa, have weakened the African character regarding respect for life. Most African countries like Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Congo, Sudan, Mali, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and many others have struggled to balance the need for security, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The war on terrorism has changed the fundamental moral fiber of the African people, and its effect is likely to be a long one if the excesses of foreign and African governments and the principles of unlimited government are not truncated.

The research focused on the issues associated with human rights violations while countering terrorism with policies that support suppression, injustice, and

antidemocratic practices. In this chapter, existing literature and theoretical frames are utilized to explain counterterrorism and human rights issues resulting from measures adopted in Africa in countering terrorism. Recommendations highlight the requirement for a balance between the protection of fundamental rights and the provision of security.

The war on terrorism in Africa

Drawing on research from a broad range of fields and disciplines that integrate various approaches, the war approach vis-a-vis the military model is a dominant counterterrorist policy in Africa (Oyewole, 2013; Amnesty International, 2015; Harbeson and Rothchild, 2018). The military or repressive model views terrorism as a threat to the security of the state. It incorporates the “war on terrorism” approach by physically attacking terrorists in military terms. In this model, states’ armed forces develop and execute counterterrorism strategies using a massive deployment of intelligence in clandestine and overt operations. Such operations include hunting down suspects, destroying terrorist bases, assassinations, drone strikes, and erratic confrontations and range from small quasi-operations to full-scale military engagement (Bhoumik, 2004; Oyewole, 2013).

The war on terror depends on the use of military and retaliatory strikes against large groups to achieve counterterrorist objectives. This approach is justified under the international laws of self-defense against state-sponsored terrorism, and states are given the legal backing to employ large-scale attacks against foreign bodies in order to preemptively disrupt terrorist threats (Bhoumik, 2004; Gellman and Linzer, 2004; Tams, 2009). This model’s strategies include military strikes, target hardening, general restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of speech, harsher penalties, restrictions on immigration, special courts or military tribunals, increased arrests, detentions without trials, torture, harsh interrogations, renditions, and killing of terrorist suspects. Military retaliation is both reactive and proactive, as evidenced by the *modus operandi* of the U.S. war on terrorism, preemptive strikes, and various African security operatives’ war approach. The military model negates the basic principles of justice and due process, lacks government accountability, violates fundamental human rights and rules of democracy, and undermines the rules of international laws on human rights. Notably, the war approach may provide instant security but may also result in the hostility of innocent, non-radicalized citizens and the waste of human lives and resources (Bhoumik, 2004).

The war on terrorism in Africa started around the 1990s due to the intensified terrorist attacks against the United States and other Western interests in certain parts of Africa, Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia in particular. In 1998, the al-Qaeda terrorist group bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The terrorist attacks led to the death of over 200 citizens of these countries and 12 Americans and injured over 500 (Lyman and Morrison, 2004). In retaliation, President Clinton ordered military strikes on Sudan’s Al-Shifa chemical factory and bombed alleged terrorist centers in Afghanistan. The U.S. also implemented counterterrorist policies that targeted the perpetrators of the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies.

The events of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also intensified the focus of the international community in fighting the war on terror in Africa. With the emerging transnational terrorist activities in Africa, Western countries like Britain, France, and Norway joined American forces to fight the war against terrorism in Africa. Obviously, African countries conveyed their support of the U.S.-led efforts to launch war against terrorism in Africa by sharing intelligence and collaborative efforts with the United States. In 2002, President Bush's counterterrorist policies in Africa included establishing the Combined Joint Task Force with the Horn of Africa in Djibouti and its environs, comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Harbeson, 2007). In furtherance of the war effort, President Bush announced a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East and Northeast Africa. Similarly, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) fronted a series of military trainings and support operations in the Sahel region. The initiative resulted to the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Enterprise that now consists of North African and Sahelian states (Harbeson and Rothchild, 2018).

In furtherance of its counterterrorism objectives in Africa, the Pentagon established a unified Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM), responsible for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organizations. Among other things, the U.S. AFRICOM's command strategy prioritizes objectives such as unifying the diverse U.S. programs on the African continent, proliferating U.S. focus on security in Africa, and reducing threats from violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to a level manageable by internal security forces (Harbeson, 2007; Ploch, 2010; United States Africa Command, 2019). The U.S. AFRICOM has made tremendous progress in providing security against VEOs in Somalia. In partnership with other international players like the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the troop-contributing countries, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and others are committed to improving the security conditions of Somalia by giving adequate training to its national security forces, which will sustain security within the country and further disrupt the activities of Somalian terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia (United States Africa Command, 2019).

According to the United States Africa Command (2019), in Libya, the U.S. AFRICOM assists in destabilizing terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS. Recently, U.S. Command conducted military strikes against the leadership and operational commanders of both ISIS and AQIM, thereby providing the Libyan government the opportunity to improve security. The U.S. AFRICOM Command, in conjunction with France, joined forces to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in providing security and operational assistance for these African countries. In the efforts to destabilize terrorist organizations like Boko Haram and ISIS in West Africa, African countries in the Lake Chad Region established a multinational joint task force, consisting of forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in collaboration with the multinational joint task force, are rendering humanitarian support and security assistance to affected countries (United States Africa Command, 2019).

In addition to U.S. efforts in waging war against terrorism in Africa, African states and their leaders have responded to this threat in similar ways. In West Africa, Sahelian states like Nigeria have also used joint task forces in handling major terrorist crises in the past. For example, former President Shagari and Major-General Muhammadu Buhari (in his previous administration) followed a substantially similar approach by invoking repressive ferocity against the Maitatsine uprisings in 1983 and 1984. The Obasanjo administration (1999–2007), President Yar’adua’s administration, and present President Buhari’s administration continued the punitive military attacks by dispatching a large number of troops (Operation Restore Law and Order and other joint security forces) to the Niger Delta crises and Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks.

Other African countries like South Africa, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups, have established legislations in response to the phenomenon of terrorism. The South African anti-terrorism legislation may, to a great extent, be considered an infringement on fundamental rights because of its severity when compared to international standards (Powell, 2002). The South African Police Service (SAPS) is in productive counterterrorism cooperation with United States law enforcement to help improve security, enhance risk management efforts, and develop better strategies for protecting its borders (United States Department of State, 2018).

The war approach is very much prevalent in Kenya, as the Kenyan security apparatus not only engages in military tactics but also takes direct orders from the U.S. government for the targeted assassinations of terror suspects. Kenyan’s past and present administrators have exploited the international preoccupation of Kenya with a war approach in the name of improving security in Kenya. The 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies led to profiling and targeting of Muslim residents, massive arrests and cases of extraordinary renditions, covert detention facilities, torture, invasive interrogations, and the sudden disappearance of terrorist suspects (Al-Bulushi, 2018). Somalia’s rise of a ruthless and independent network with al-Qaeda around 2003 and 2004 attracted the Western war on terrorism in Somalia. The U.S. and other Western governments responded to the threat of terrorism in Somalia by building up Somali counterterrorist networks headed by faction leaders and past military and police officers and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland. Repressive strategies involved in the process include unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of terrorist suspects suspected to have links with al-Qaeda, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders (International Crisis Group, 2005). Some African countries’ governments, like Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Mauritania, have used the terrorist threat as an excuse to coagulate policies that support suppression, disregard rule of law, and violate rights and antidemocratic practices while solidifying U.S. support for their anti-terrorist policies (Harbeson, 2007).

Human rights violations and challenges in the context of counterterrorism in Africa

Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (United Nations, n.d.a), identified various inalienable fundamental rights of individuals. This includes the right to life, liberty, and security of person (article 3); the right not to be tortured

(article 5), the right of equality (article 7); the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (article 9); the right to a fair hearing and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (articles 10 and 11), and the right to an adequate standard of living (article 25) (United Nations, n.d.a). These rights emphasize the right not to be tortured, no matter the circumstances. Observing human rights is based on the assertion of the importance of the corresponding freedoms. There is a need to reasonably observe and respect the rights of others and to secure the freedom of any person from torture. The moral doctrine of human rights aims at ascertaining the fundamental requirements for each human being for leading and enjoying a minimally good life. Notwithstanding these legal provisions on human rights, counterterrorism strategies by both foreign and African leaders involve practices of interrogation and torture that violate fundamental human rights. According to part 1 (article 1) of the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), torture is defined as

Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed.

Fariss (2019) identified the top 1 percent of the worst cases of human rights violations using the latent variable estimates from each of his models to categorize the worst 1 percent of cases each year. The study revealed that African countries like Sudan and Uganda were among the countries with the top 1 percent of the worst cases of human rights abuses several decades ago. However, Cingranelli and Filippov (2018) suggests that the worst cases of human rights abuse are still prevalent in the most recent years based on available data. Roser (2019) assessed governments' protection of human rights in Africa from 1946 through 2017. The study revealed that many countries in Africa have had the worst human rights protection index over the years, as indicated in Table 13.3 and Figure 13.1.

The five countries with indices below -2.05 are in Africa. Table 13.3 and Figure 13.1 show that the African countries with the highest negative human rights protection indices were South Sudan with -2.59 and Sudan with -2.47 . The Democratic Republic of Congo came third with -2.43 while Nigeria and Central African Republic were tied with -2.06 . The only other countries in the world with such high indices were Syria (-2.56), Myanmar (-2.47), North Korea (-2.44), Iraq (-2.39), Afghanistan (-2.31), Philippines (-2.13), and Yemen (-2.11). The other African countries with indices below 0 were Libya (-1.98), Ethiopia (-1.95), Somalia (-1.74), Egypt (-1.54), the Congo (-1.29), Mali (-1.2), Kenya (-1.2), and South Africa (-1.06).

Similarly, the human rights violation index measured human rights violations in Africa on a range of 1 to 10 (indicating worst index). The measurement combined a metric of variables like freedom of the press, civil liberties, political freedoms, political prisoners, incarcerations, human trafficking, torture and executions, and religious persecution. The African countries with an index of 8.5 and above are found in

Table 13.3 Countries with the worst human rights index (-2 and below)

| Country | Protection of human rights index: range -3.8 to +5.4 |
|---|--|
| South Sudan | -2.59 |
| Syria | -2.56 |
| Sudan | -2.47 |
| Myanmar | -2.47 |
| North Korea | -2.44 |
| The Democratic Republic of Congo | -2.43 |
| Iraq | -2.39 |
| Afghanistan | -2.31 |
| Philippines | -2.13 |
| Yemen | -2.11 |
| Nigeria | -2.06 |
| Central African Republic | -2.06 |

Source: Adapted from Max Roser (2019). Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/human-rights>

Human Rights Scores, 2017

These Human Rights Scores indicate the degree to which governments protect and respect human rights. The values range from around -3.8 to around 5.4 (the higher the better).




Figure 13.1 Human rights scores, 2017. Available at: OurWorldIndata.org/human-rights/

Source: Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014), Fariss (2004)

Note: These scores are produced from an econometric model that combines measures from nine other sources. For details, see Fariss (2019).

Table 13.4. South Sudan and Sudan had 9.9 and 9.3, respectively. The Democratic Republic of Congo had an index of 10 while Nigeria had 8.7, and the Central African Republic had 9.5. Other African countries with high indices (more than 8.5) in this category include Egypt (9.7), Somalia (9.8), Chad (9.5), Equatorial Guinea (9.5), Libya (8.7), Zimbabwe (8.6), Cote de Ivoire (8.7), and Guinea (8.5).

Table 13.4 Countries with the worst human rights violation index (8 and above)

| Country | Human rights violation index 1–10; 10 being the worst Countries with index 8 and greater in Africa |
|----------------------------------|---|
| The Democratic Republic of Congo | 10 |
| South Sudan | 9.9 |
| Somalia | 9.8 |
| Egypt | 9.7 |
| Central African Republic | 9.5 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 9.5 |
| Chad | 9.5 |
| Sudan | 9.3 |
| Eritrea | 9.2 |
| Nigeria | 8.7 |
| Zimbabwe | 8.6 |
| Cameroon | 8.3 |
| Tunisia | 8.1 |
| Ethiopia | 8.0 |

Source: Adapted from Max Roser (2019). Presenting data from Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index Human Rights Dimension. Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/human-rights>

Many African countries had very high indices. Other countries in the world with such high indices were Syria (9.9), North Korea (9.6), Iran (9.3), Uzbekistan (9.3), China (9.1), Saudi Arabia (8.8), Russia (8.7), Iraq (8.7), Pakistan (8.6), Turkmenistan (8.5), Afghanistan (8.3), and Belarus (8.1).

Considering that African countries are among those with the highest indices in human rights violations, as well as record high indices for terrorism, there is no doubt that there is an intersection of both indices that indicates positive relationship. There is a likelihood that many African countries respond to terrorism by counterterrorism measures that are not appropriate, given their high human rights violation scores.

Governments' use of torture and renditions as interrogation policies has created much controversy as it violates human rights and produces disastrous results in most cases. Following the 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies, the United States mounted a theater of operations in East Africa by setting up military bases; secret prisons like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's underground prisons in Somalia, where prisoners suspected of being members of Al-Shabaab are interrogated and tortured under very harsh conditions; targeted strikes by U.S. Special Operations forces; drone attacks; and expanded surveillance operations in various parts of that region (Scahill, 2014). The U.S. counterterror tactics included the targeting of Muslims in cities like Nairobi and Mombasa. Muslims are monitored and terrorized by police systematically gathering suspects, death threats, vanishings, and extrajudicial killings (Al-Bulushi, 2018).

Human Rights Violations, 2014

Human rights violations measured on a scoring system from 0 to 10 (where 10 is worst). This is an aggregated metric on that basis of multiple variables, including: press freedom, civil liberties, political freedoms, human trafficking, political prisoners, incarceration, religious persecution, torture and executions.

Our World
in Data




Figure 13.2 Human rights violations, 2014. Available at: OurWorldInData.org/human-rights/
Source: Fund for Peace (Fragile States Index)

Following Al-Shabaab’s expansion of violence into Kenyan territory, as evidenced in the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Kenya and several killings by the terrorist group, the Kenyan military buckled up strategies to sustain the war on terrorism. In 2014, the Kenyan government deployed about 5,000 security operatives who raided homes and businesses, extorted huge sums of money, and harassed and detained over 4,000 people, including journalists, registered refugees, Kenyan citizens, and international aid workers without charge and in horrendous conditions for more than the 24-hour legal limit (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The Human Rights Watch (2015) also reported extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture, and ill treatments of detained suspects by the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). These acts of injustice to human rights have continued without proper investigation or prosecution of the perpetrators. In furtherance of the Kenyan war on terror, security actors conducted communications surveillance without oversight and intercepted communications content and data used to spy on and profile, leading to the arrest, torture, killing, and disappearance of terrorist suspects (Privacy International, 2017).

Subsequent to Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria since 2009, military retaliatory tactics in the northeastern region of Nigeria include extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrest of suspects, military detention, suffocation, starvation, torture, murder, forced disappearances, etc. According to Amnesty International (2015), Nigerian military forces extrajudicially executed over 1,200 people; indiscriminately arrested over 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and committed numerous acts of torture. The report further noted that “Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in

military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of medical assistance” (Amnesty International, 2015: 58). Many innocent people were shot dead inside detention facilities; some had their throats slashed after being captured during cordon-and-search operations. About 8,000 people died as a result of murder, suffocation, and torture by the security forces and their allied militia, the civilian joint task force. Amnesty International gathered from a military official that soldiers “go to the nearest place and kill all the youths. . . . [P]eople killed may be innocent and not armed.” Most of these deaths were unrecorded and never investigated.

Notwithstanding that these acts of torture violate international treaty obligations under the Convention against Torture and are condemned by the international community and the world at large, a democratic state confronted with the choice of allowing its citizens to be killed by terrorists or employing some forms of torture to prevent such harm to its citizens may select the use of torture. Considering the stake involved in human rights violation, one may ask, “Can torture ever be justified in the war against terrorism?” The choice is between maintaining security and preserving human rights. The first choice may necessitate the use of torture, whereas the second choice may require rejection of torture.

Recommendations: Balancing protection of fundamental human rights and provision of security in Africa

The defense of human rights and the upholding of the rule of law while countering terrorism is indeed at the heart of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Member states acknowledged that effective counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights should be balanced in all circumstances, and failure to ensure this would be counterproductive (United Nations, n.d.b). Adjusting the appropriate balance between security and the requirements of liberty in a democratic free society is a cumbersome responsibility that emphasizes democratic vigilance and accountability.

There is a need for a healthy balance between rights and security so that citizens can trust the fundamental human rights to life, privacy, justice, equality, and freedom as much as is necessary for keeping African nations safe. African states and their foreign partners must respect the provisions of international laws on protection of human rights and the rule of law and observe the ethics of democracy while devising strategies to provide security. The burden should be on states to show that the objective of limiting any aspect of human rights is sufficiently important to justify overriding a constitutionally protected right. Various African states must have provisions against state torture, unlawful detentions, executions without trials, and inhuman and humiliating punishments and ensure the democratic accountability of intelligence and law enforcement officers. Such provisions must contain specific requirements for investigation and prosecution of officers involved in violations of human rights. States must suppress the purported immunity granted to intelligence officers who perpetrate torture on suspects under detention. Civilians must have the right to sue interrogation or government officials who default in the observance of human rights. The provisions must contain regular checks and executive reviews on the use of criminal justice powers.

Importantly, African nations need to develop and sustain preventive measures rather than embarking on reactive military emergent strategies. To win the war against terrorism in Africa, African governments must confront the fundamental causes of terrorism such as hunger, poverty, lack of opportunities, lack of proper management of economic globalization and lack of proper protection of human rights such as civil, political, socio-economic, religious, and cultural rights. They must develop and implement a strong, broad, and vigorous counterterrorism strategy that addresses the grievances and feelings of marginalization that extremist recruiters use to lure youths into committing violent attacks. The government needs to examine the factors that motivate many youths in Africa to resort to violent extremism. Other noncoercive measures to counter terrorism include rehabilitation of terrorists through programs such as training, counseling, and treatment to enable them to desist from engaging in terrorist activities. Essentially, African states should incorporate the tenets of restorative justice and peace-making ideologies in designing strategies to fight terrorism. Restorative justice falls under the category of the conciliatory counterterrorist model and entails parties gathering to share and resolve issues through the values of cooperation, healing, participation, truth-telling, mutual care, reconciliation, and peace-making.

The balance between liberty and security can be achieved through further research on how to improve discipline and training for public safety. Obviously, it is difficult to have a predetermined command structure in response to any rapidly evolving, high-stress, violent event, but apt tactical training and practice can help ensure effectiveness in a crisis situation. Future research needs to develop better strategies on how to train security agencies to practically observe and respect human rights and uphold democratic processes and the rule of law. African states must be mandated by the African Union to commit to and adopt a stance to fight terrorism in their regions with respect to the rule of law, and failure to adhere to the guidelines or any infringement must draw sanctions. Indeed, states should respect the provisions of the constitution, the rule of law, and the ethics of democracy while devising strategies to provide security.

Conclusion

Terrorism has a direct impact on government stability and on the security of its citizens. The complexity of it is that citizens have a fundamental right to security provided for by their government. Therefore, governments need to fundamentally protect their citizens from terrorism rather than being the terrorizer. When governments use power to terrorize citizens through extrajudicial killings, politically motivated oppression, torture, and executions, it undermines the very right to security that its citizens are supposed to enjoy as a fundamental human right. Thus, it behooves African governments to ensure that they crack down on both government-sponsored terrorism and terrorism from terrorist groups.

There are certain factors that indicate a country's willingness to respect the fundamental human rights of citizens, such as freedom of press, protection of civil liberties, and political freedom. When governments ensure that these rights are observed, they indicate a commitment to keeping citizens safe from oppression of any form.

A country that has lower indications of terrorism and high indication of respect of basic rights is more likely to attract investors for economic development. There is a strong positive correlation between security and economic development. Therefore, a nation with questionable human rights practices, especially the security of its citizens, undermines its commitment to protection of basic rights, and that leads to economic degeneration.

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