


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## BLACK POWER AND THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT

*Simon Hall*

On August 8, 1966, Robert F. Williams, the Black Power icon and former NAACP leader from Monroe, North Carolina, gave a speech in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, where he was living in exile. Standing before a 10,000-strong audience that included Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, Williams declared that Black Power was a “dissident force challenging the racist white power structure” that was “so heinously exterminating the people of Vietnam.”<sup>1</sup> Condemning the “racist white man’s war of imperialism” in Southeast Asia, he denounced America’s “vicious crusade to dehumanize, emasculate, and enslave the great Vietnamese people.”<sup>2</sup> These were strong words, but Williams was just one of many Black Power leaders who were sharply critical of America’s military involvement in Vietnam. In fact, a strong antiwar stance was virtually *de rigueur* among Black Power activists. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, all of the major Black Power groups—including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Black Panther Party, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the Republic of New Africa, and the “US” organization (as in “us” black people as opposed to “them”, the white oppressors)—denounced America’s military intervention in Southeast Asia.<sup>3</sup>

The pages of the *Black Panther* newspaper, for instance, bristled with thunderous denunciations of the “Yankee Imperialist” war of “aggression” in Vietnam.<sup>4</sup> According to the Panthers, the Vietnamese were waging “a struggle for liberation; [a] revolutionary war against the largest and most repressive monopoly system in the world—the United States.”<sup>5</sup> Eldridge Cleaver, the Black Panther’s minister of information, declared that “the black man’s interest lies in seeing a free and independent Vietnam, a strong Vietnam which is not the puppet of international white supremacy.”<sup>6</sup> The former SNCC chairman, Stokely Carmichael, meanwhile, claimed that “the Vietnam War ain’t nothing but white men sending black men to kill brown men to defend . . . a country they stole from red men,” and accused America of “raping” the people of Vietnam.<sup>7</sup> In an ‘open letter’ to “Our Militant Vietnamese Brothers,” RAM congratulated the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong on “their inspiring victories against US imperialism in South Vietnam.”<sup>8</sup> Yet, while the Black Power movement provided a major source of opposition to the war in Vietnam, its relationship with the mainstream antiwar movement was not always harmonious. Black Power’s emphasis on racial separatism, the reluctance of the mainly white antiwar movement to fully commit to fighting racism, economic inequality, and social injustice alongside opposing the war in Vietnam, and persistent doubts among Black Power activists about the seriousness of their white counterparts, ultimately prevented the two movements from forging a more productive

partnership. The result was an American Left that, by the end of the 1960s, was more divided than it might otherwise have been.

Activists, commentators, and scholars have argued about the meaning of “Black Power” since the slogan first shot to national, and international, prominence in the summer of 1966. But to generalize, Black Power advocates can be divided into two camps: Pluralists and nationalists. For pluralists, the black struggle was a version of interest-group politics—and, so long as equal opportunities and respect were offered to all groups, amicable coexistence was possible, with a cohesive black community able to enjoy a “representative share of both local and national decision-making power.” Nationalists, on the other hand, believed that one group would always come to “dominate and oppress” the others and that, to avoid “assimilation by fiat,” some form of separatism (whether in urban enclaves, a separate nation state, or the “realm of the psyche”) was necessary.<sup>9</sup> During the second half of the 1960s, numerous Black Power groups emerged, expounding such diverse goals as the promotion of black capitalism, international socialism, and cultural, religious and territorial nationalism.<sup>10</sup>

Common to most iterations of Black Power ideology, though, was the idea that the African American struggle was part of the global revolt among people of color against US racism, imperialism, and oppression. Point six of the Black Panther Party’s Platform and Program (1966), for instance, stated that “we will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America.” Similarly, in March 1969, Eldridge Cleaver described the “very intimate relationship between the way human beings are being treated in Vietnam and the treatment they are receiving here in the United States.”<sup>11</sup> Cleaver’s arguments were given added weight by the discriminatory nature of the draft and the disproportionate level of black casualties: In 1967, African Americans, who made up about 10 percent of the US population, accounted for 20 percent of all American casualties in Vietnam; that same year, 64 percent of eligible blacks were drafted, compared with just 31 percent of eligible whites.<sup>12</sup>

The Panthers also developed the analogy of the ghetto as an “internal colony,” and couched their struggle against police brutality and economic disfranchisement as another front in the struggle that the Vietnamese were waging against US imperialism. In a statement released in February 1970, the Panthers explained that they stood “for revolutionary solidarity with all people fighting against the forces of imperialism, capitalism, racism and fascism” and declared that “our struggle for our liberation [is] part of a worldwide struggle being waged by the poor and oppressed against . . . the world’s chief imperialist, the United States of America.” When it came to the question of the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation, the Panthers argued that “the most effective way that we can aid our Vietnamese brothers and sisters” was to “destroy imperialism from the inside, attack it where it breeds.”<sup>13</sup>

In a similar vein, RAM articulated a philosophy of “world revolution of oppressed people rising up against their former slave masters.” “Our movement,” they declared, “is a movement of black people who are coordinating their efforts to create a new world free from exploitation and oppression of man by man.”<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, in their 1967 statement, the US organization, which had been founded by the cultural nationalist Maulana Karenga in 1965, declared that the war in Vietnam was:

a war that denies people of color of Asia their right to choose their own form of government and to promote human life and development in the way they see is beneficial to them and to their own needs and desires. We ourselves are struggling

for self-determination on every level. We would be against ourselves if we fought to deny others of the same right.<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps the most notorious example of Black Power activists' solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle, however, came on August 29, 1970, when Huey Newton wrote to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, in "the spirit of international revolutionary solidarity," to offer:

an undetermined number of troops to assist you in your fight against American imperialism. It is appropriate for the Black Panther Party to take this action at this time in recognition of the fact that your struggle is also our struggle, for we recognize that our common enemy is the American imperialist who is the leader of international bourgeois domination. There is not one fascist or reactionary government in the world today that could stand without the support of United States imperialism. Therefore our problem is international, and we offer these troops in recognition of the necessity for international alliances to deal with this problem.<sup>16</sup>

Nguyen Thi Dinh, deputy commander of South Vietnam's People's Liberation Armed Forces, replied at the end of October, gently deflecting the offer. Expressing "sincere thanks" for this "friendly gesture," Dinh explained that "we shall call for your volunteers to assist us . . . when necessary." In the meantime, Dinh urged the Panthers to focus their efforts at home: "your persistent and ever-developing struggle" was providing, he declared, "the most active support to our resistance against U.S. aggression for national salvation."<sup>17</sup>

Given the forceful opposition to the war from within the Black Power movement, one might have expected a reasonably productive relationship with the organized antiwar movement. It was not to be. The rhetoric of some Black Power leaders did not always help. When Stokely Carmichael told whites to "move on over, or we'll move on over you," it did not make inter-racial coalition building (a challenging task in the tumultuous 1960s) any easier.<sup>18</sup> This is not to say that no cooperation took place. During late 1967 and 1968, for example, the Black Panthers worked closely with the California-based Peace and Freedom Party (PFP)—a white radical organization that was committed to ending the war in Vietnam and promoting radical social and political change at home, and that ran Eldridge Cleaver for president in the 1968 election.<sup>19</sup>

The Panthers were, in fact, frequently eager to work with white leftists as part of what Cleaver termed an effort to "pull a lot of people together, black and white" and "build some machinery" so that black and white radicals could work together rather than being at "cross purposes . . . isolated and alienated from one another."<sup>20</sup> Or, as an editorial in the *Black Panther* put it, the "increasing isolation of the black radical movement from the white radical movement [is] a dangerous thing, playing into the power structure's game of divide and conquer." Similarly, the PFP took the line that, as group member Mike Parker recalled, "there could be no peace unless it was a peace among free men—that you did not have a true peace just because there was no war if people were oppressed."<sup>21</sup> There was an element of pragmatism at work here too: Cleaver wanted access to money and practical support for the Panther's campaign to free Huey Newton from prison (where he was awaiting trial for the murder of Oakland police officer John Frey), and the PFP wanted help in securing the 66,000 signatures that were required to qualify for the state ballot in California.<sup>22</sup>

The Black Power movement—and the Panthers in particular—appears to have encouraged the development of draft resistance among antiwar activists. In October 1966, Stokely Carmichael complained that “the peace movement has been a failure because it hasn’t gotten off the college campuses where everyone has a 2S [Registrant deferred because of activity in study] and is not afraid of being drafted anyway.”<sup>23</sup> But as Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr. have shown, a year later the white draft resistance movement “was gathering steam.” Inspired both by Black Power and the urban rebellions of 1967, “many draft resisters saw themselves as subjects of empire who sought self-determination, much like the Vietnamese.” Rejecting the “legitimacy of the war, the draft, and the government more generally,” they now sought to resist “by any means.” This new militancy was apparent during a series of protests at the Oakland Induction Center. On October 17, more than twenty people were injured when the police attacked the demonstrators with clubs and tear-gas; three days later, when 10,000 protesters gathered in the streets around the Center in an attempt to shut it down, pitched battles with the police raged over a twenty-bloc area.<sup>24</sup>

In December 1966, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), America’s largest New Left organization, formally endorsed draft resistance, even comparing it to “the revolt of slaves against their masters.” In fact the white, campus-based New Left increasingly came to view their own struggle as one of liberation from an oppressive American empire. Or, as one draft resister put it, “We too are the Vietcong.” By the spring of 1968, SDS was offering its full support to the Black Panther Party—calling for the release of Huey Newton and other “political prisoners” and denouncing the “racist cops,” “slumlords,” and “politicians in the white power structure” as the “real criminals.”<sup>25</sup> The following April, just two months before the disastrous national convention that saw the group wrecked by arguments between supporters and opponents of the Progressive Labor faction, SDS pledged its “total commitment to the fight for liberation in the colony and revolution in the mother country” and praised the Panthers as “the vanguard force” in “our common struggles against capitalism and imperialism.”<sup>26</sup>

The Panthers, though, were unusual among Black Power groups in their willingness to enter into coalitions with white radicals. The historian Scot Brown has argued that the US organization was “leery” of the BPP–PFP alliance, and “maintained that the central role of White progressives was to ‘civilize’ racist and reactionary elements in their own communities and make financial contributions as ‘foreign aid’ to Black organizations.” Meanwhile the activist and playwright Amiri Baraka dismissed the Panthers as “extreme examples of PimpArt gone mad.”<sup>27</sup> The PFP’s Mike Parker recalled that, although his organization had been keen to find “groups in the Black community to work with . . . the only group that was even willing to talk with us . . . in a serious way . . . was the Black Panther Party.”<sup>28</sup>

The hostility of many Black Power activists towards inter-racial coalition, together with widespread fears about the possibility of the black movement being “co-opted,” could pose major problems. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this pitfall came at the 1967 convention of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP). The convention’s aim was to bring antiwar liberals, the New Left, and the antiwar and black freedom movements together around a common strategy for the 1968 presidential elections. It was the decade’s most ambitious attempt at building a broad-based, multi-issue, left coalition. On the opening night, NCNP executive director William F. Pepper (who was white) informed the delegates that “historians may well count your presence here as the most significant gathering of Americans since the founding of our nation.” He concluded by declaring that “what you begin here may ultimately result in a new social, economic and political system in the United

States.” But even as Pepper was speaking, a bongo group outside the auditorium was chanting “Kill Whitey.” It was an ominous sign of the racial tensions to come.<sup>29</sup>

Although it was weakened by a number of factors, Black Power had a starring role in the NCNP’s implosion. Early on, 350 black militants walked out to attend their own conference. The 400 who remained formed a caucus, and issued a series of non-negotiable demands to the 2,000 white delegates. The black radicals were uncompromising, often meeting in secret, closed-door sessions. Their rhetoric was also unbending: “We, as black people, believe that the United States . . . is committed to the practice of genocide, social degradation, to the denial of political and social self-determination of black people, and cannot reform itself. There must be revolutionary change.” The Caucus demanded 50 percent representation on all convention committees and insisted that the NCNP support a series of measures—including the setting up of white “civilizing committees” to eliminate white racism. When the whites capitulated, only after a lengthy and emotional debate, the black Caucus demanded half of the convention votes, thereby granting itself an effective veto power. Once again, after a prolonged debate, the whites acquiesced, precipitating a wave of hostile press coverage. A *New York Times* editorial referred to the “flagrant example of organizational surrender to the blackmail of Negro extremists” while the *Berkeley Barb* accused white delegates of masochism. The reality was, in fact, more complex—and the Black Caucus’ original complaint that the NCNP had not “involved Blacks meaningfully in the initiation, planning or operation” of the convention was certainly well founded. Nevertheless, the attitude of Black Power activists contributed to the convention’s failure, and the NCNP itself collapsed shortly thereafter amid a toxic atmosphere of acrimony and financial insolvency.<sup>30</sup>

Just a few weeks later, the chasm between black and white opponents of the war was once again on show. On the morning of October 21 more than 100,000 Americans gathered at the Lincoln Memorial for a mass rally protesting the war in Vietnam. That afternoon, 35,000 marched to the Pentagon to engage in acts of civil disobedience.<sup>31</sup> The demonstration, organized by the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (the Mobe), was one of the most iconic antiwar protests of the decade—but it was boycotted by African Americans. The decision had been announced at a Mobe meeting on September 30, in New York City, where SNCC’s John Wilson stated that there was a feeling within the black community that “everything black people do must be relevant to the black struggle.” A meeting of African American activists had been held in the city the previous day, where it had been decided that blacks would participate at the rally at the Lincoln Memorial but would not engage in civil disobedience at the Pentagon. Instead, they would go to the black community in Washington, D.C., and wage a door-to-door campaign concerning the war in Vietnam and the “neo-colonial state” of the nation’s capital. Wilson and Omar Ahmed (of the Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE) explained their stance more fully on October 7, when they stated that while African Americans were “prepared to defend themselves in their own community” they feared being abandoned by their white comrades in the event that trouble broke out at the Pentagon, or on the bridges en route to the protest.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to concerns that the protest was “irrelevant” to the needs of African Americans, and worries that black participants risked bearing the brunt of any police or military response, the countercultural elements of the planned protest also irked black radicals. In the run-up to October 21, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, the leaders of the Yippies (a group of radical countercultural activists), claimed that the Pentagon would levitate 300 feet in the air, glow orange, and vibrate as the demon of war was exorcised. But as SNCC’s Gwendolyn

Patton put it, “Black People are not going to go anywhere to *levitate* the Pentagon, okay. We don’t find that cute.”<sup>33</sup> In fact, the “countercultural turn” fueled a growing suspicion among Black Power activists that white radicals were not really serious. Speaking at a rally in Berkeley in February 1968, for instance, SNCC’s James Forman challenged white radicals:

You who support the NLF, will you support us? You who call yourselves leftists and revolutionaries, what will you do when they seal-off Oakland and Harlem? Will you fight and die for your black brothers? Will you kill a white cop?”

There were also concerns about whether, as one black activist put it, “white radical students are more white and middle-class than they are radical.”<sup>34</sup> As William Leach of the Black Panther Party explained, “what black folks want to see is militant whites who . . . are ready to do more than talk about fighting racial injustice and social inequality.”<sup>35</sup>

Doubts about white radicals’ commitment and seriousness were compounded by the antiwar movement’s reluctance to embrace a so-called multi-issue agenda—in other words, to organize around economic and social inequality, and campaign against racism, *in addition to* calling for an end to the war in Vietnam. This question, which divided antiwar activists throughout the duration of the war, was of particular importance to Black Power activists who saw clear connections between domestic racism and overseas oppression. In February 1968 James Forman argued that “all activities against the United States’ genocidal war in Vietnam must be seen as efforts to help oppressed people around the world to obtain self-determination—including black people in the United States.” The SNCC leader also stated that the antiwar movement had to be based on the principles of “anti-racism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism.”<sup>36</sup> In February 1970 New York’s radical *Guardian* newspaper editorialized that “an antiwar movement which speaks eloquently in one massive voice against the oppression directed toward the Vietnamese . . . but only gives token support to 23 million blacks . . . cannot expect black Americans to enlist in the actions of the antiwar coalitions.”<sup>37</sup>

Of course, many peace activists’ primary motivation was a desire to end the war in Vietnam as quickly as possible, but even those who supported racial equality and social justice too often worried that multi-issuism risked diluting, or weakening, the antiwar cause. When white antiwar activists argued that they should focus solely on the war, though, they offended black radicals who accused the movement of ignoring the relationship between the war and racism. In November 1969, for instance, the Black Panther Party refused a request to participate in an antiwar demonstration in Washington because the mainly white organizers had “either failed to see” or did not “want to see the importance of black people’s just struggle or its direct relationship with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.”<sup>38</sup> At a Vietnam Moratorium rally at Buffalo College in New York that same month, one black speaker told the white students present that “You don’t empathize with the black man . . . This Moratorium was called because the white man is dying in Vietnam, not the black man.”<sup>39</sup>

When Black Power activists did participate in antiwar protests alongside whites, it sometimes served to exacerbate the differences between two distinct antiwar constituencies. On November 15, 1969, David Hilliard, the Black Panther Party’s Chief of Staff, addressed a crowd of 175,000 in San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park, where he exclaimed that “you goddamned sure can’t get [peace in Vietnam] with no guitars.” Things went downhill from there.<sup>40</sup> A report in the *Guardian* explained how:

As Hilliard's anti-fascist, pro-Marxist-Leninist speech became more militant and as he cursed President Nixon, the young, white hippy throng started booing. Hilliard responded angrily: 'We will kill Richard Nixon—we will kill any motherfucker that stands in the way of our freedom. We ain't here for no goddam peace because we know that we can't have no peace, because this country was built on war. But if you want peace you've got to fight for it, fight for it, fight for it!' Angry hippies shouted 'peace, peace' at him. Hilliard responded angrily: 'Peace, peace, peace . . . at the risk of more suffering for the people of Vietnam, at the risk of more lives being taken in the black community?'<sup>41</sup>

In the end, Black Power's emphasis on racial pride and separatism, together with the (mainly) white antiwar movement's reluctance to organize around racism, encouraged independent black antiwar organizing. During the Spring Mobilization demonstrations of April 15, 1967, several hundred black activists had attended a rally in Harlem, arranged by the Black United Action Front, where they heard Stokely Carmichael declare that "black people have been trying to prove to white people in every war what good Americans we've been, only to come back and find racism, but we're not going to Vietnam. We're working for Black Power" in America.<sup>42</sup> The following year, the National Black Antiwar Antidraft Union (NBAWADU) was formed in order to "secure a black base for anti-war activity" and to "eliminate the possibilities of being absorbed by the white anti-war movement whose goals in many instances were not congruent with ours."<sup>43</sup>

Black Power was, at best, a double-edged sword for the antiwar movement. Although black militants were some of the most vociferous opponents of the war, Black Power's emphasis on racial pride, cultural distinctiveness, and political autonomy made inter-racial cooperation particularly challenging. The 1967 convention of the National Conference for New Politics, which imploded in the wake of a draining and lengthy debate about the respective roles of whites and blacks in the struggle, was symptomatic of the way in which Black Power made attempts at constructing broad-based multiracial alliances treacherous. Fears among some African Americans that the peace movement was intent on co-opting the black movement, together with Black Power's separatist bent, resulted in the formation of black antiwar groups.

The embrace of countercultural forms of protest among many white opponents of the war, which did little to dispel Black Power activists' skepticism about white radicals, also helped derail efforts at coalition-building, with Black Panther William Leach accusing hippies of treating revolution as a "joke."<sup>44</sup> Additionally, in January 1971, black delegates who attended a conference of the National Coalition Against War, Racism and Repression warned against staging "another series of middle class—white-nude-be in or psychedelic 'cultural experiences'." These sorts of actions were, they explained, not taken seriously by those who were "suffering from hunger, poverty, racism, exploitation and police terror."<sup>45</sup>

Multi-issuism also divided radical black opponents of the war from the wider antiwar movement. Black Power adherents not only opposed the Vietnam War because they thought it was wrong or immoral, but also because they understood that the conflict was linked to domestic racism and repression. At the best of times, it would have been difficult for the antiwar movement to persuade African Americans to devote time and energy to a cause that neither gave adequate recognition to the importance of race nor spoke specifically to black concerns. The emergence of Black Power in the second half of the 1960s meant that antiwar groups that failed to emphasize the role of racism in the Vietnamese conflict, and declined



to link the movement to end the war with the struggle for black justice in the United States, were at best going to be ignored by black militants; at worst, they would stand accused of racism.

When white opponents of the war did—with the encouragement of Black Power militants—embrace a radical critique of the war and the tactics of resistance and confrontation, it is far from clear that this served the wider interests of the antiwar movement. After all, anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic rhetoric, the valorizing of Huey Newton (who, in September 1968, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter over the killing of police officer John Frey, a verdict later over-turned on appeal), the open defiance of the draft, violent confrontations with the police, and the talk of American “fascism” played poorly—not just with Middle America (where opinion polls consistently showed high levels of intolerance for antiwar protesters), but among more moderate opponents of the Vietnam War as well (particularly those associated with groups such as the War Resisters League and the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy).<sup>46</sup> This was a danger that SDS had recognized back in August 1966 when it asked whether “the violence that voices itself in the anti-war rhetoric of SNCC” might also “undermine much of the moral basis of middle-class anti-war ferment?” SDS also fretted that “tactics which blacks may identify with” might “leave most white people (including our constituencies) feeling uncomfortable.” Moreover, when Huey Newton urged white radicals to reject the establishment and to choose Ho Chi Minh as a “friend” over Robert Kennedy, he was encouraging white activists down a path that would leave them cut off from the real sources of political power and influence in the United States. SDS leader Greg Calvert, who had been an enthusiastic promoter of revolutionary consciousness within the New Left, later described this development as “one of the most disastrous things that happened in the movement.”<sup>47</sup>

According to some influential commentators, the rise of identity politics over the past four decades has served to fracture and divide the American Left.<sup>48</sup> On the surface, the failure of the Black Power and antiwar movements to work together more productively would seem to support this interpretation. The historian David Burner, for instance, has even gone so far as to accuse black militants of thumbing their noses at Leftist camaraderie and “repelling . . . as much of the antiwar movement as possible.”<sup>49</sup> But as we have seen, the reality was far more complex. Although the style, tone, and stance of Black Power activists could make inter-racial coalition building challenging, the countercultural turn within the student movement, together with the reluctance of many white antiwar activists to embrace a multi-issue agenda, encouraged African Americans to protest the war either on their own terms, or not at all. The absence of a meaningful or productive alliance between the Black Power and antiwar movements was, then, as much a product of the shortcomings of white antiwar activists as it was the fault of black militants. It is a lesson that might well prove instructive to those who are engaged in the difficult work of challenging militarism, oppression, and inequality, in our own, troubled times.

### Notes

- 1 “Support American Negroes’ Use of Revolutionary Violence Against Counter-Revolutionary Violence,” p. 19, and “Speech by U.S. Negro Leader Robert F. Williams,” p. 24, both articles in *Peking Review* 9, no. 33 (12 August 1966).
- 2 “Speech by U.S. Negro Leader Robert F. Williams,” *ibid.*, 26.
- 3 See, for instance, Michael Bibby, *Hearts and Minds: Bodies, Poetry, and Resistance in the Vietnam Era* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 54–56. On the naming of US, see Scot

- Brown, *Fighting for US: Maulana Karenga, the US Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 2.
- 4 “NLF Vietnam,” *The Black Panther*, 16 August 1969, quoted in G. Louis Heath, ed., *The Black Panther Leaders Speak* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1976), 112.
  - 5 Larry Jones, “Power to the People of Viet Nam,” *The Black Panther*, July 26, 1969, 16, quoted in *Ibid.*, 111.
  - 6 Eldridge Cleaver, “The Black Man’s Stake in Vietnam,” (extract from *Soul on Ice*) quoted in *Two, Three . . . Many Vietnams: A Radical Reader on the Wars in Southeast Asia and the Conflicts at Home* (New York, Evanston, London: Canfield Press, San Francisco, 1971), ed. the Editors of Ramparts with Banning Garrett and Katherine Barkley, 220.
  - 7 Stokely Carmichael, “A Declaration of War,” February 22, 1968, in Massimo Teodori, *The New Left: A Documentary History* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 276.
  - 8 “Greetings to Our Militant Vietnamese Brothers,” *Viewpoint Magazine*, July 4, 2015, accessed December 9, 2016, <https://viewpointmag.com/2015/07/04/greetings-to-our-militant-vietnamese-brothers/>; Bibby, *Hearts and Minds*, 54. On RNA see also <http://christiandavenportphd.weebly.com/uploads/1/8/3/5/18359923/rna-lit-1.pdf>, accessed December 11, 2016.
  - 9 William L. Van Deburg, *New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965–1975* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 25–26; Simon Hall, “The NAACP, Black Power, and the African American Freedom Struggle, 1966–1969,” *The Historian* 69, no. 1 (March 2007): 53–57.
  - 10 For Black Capitalism see Christopher Strain, “Soul City, North Carolina: Black Power, Utopia, and the African American Dream,” *Journal of African American History* 89, no. 1 (2004), 57–74. For religious nationalism see Claude Clegg, *An Original Man: The Life and Times of Elijah Muhammad* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Ula Taylor, “Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam: Separatism, Regendering, and a Secular Approach to Black Power after Malcolm X (1965–1975)” and Angela D. Dillard, “Religion and Radicalism: The Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr., and the Rise of Black Christian Nationalism in Detroit,” in *Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940–1980*, ed. Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). See also Johanna Fernandez, “Between Social Service Reform and Revolutionary Politics: The Young Lords, Late Sixties Radicalism, and Community Organizing in New York City,” in *Freedom North*, ed. Theoharis and Woodard. For an excellent overview of the Black Power movement see Peniel Joseph, *Waiting ’Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2011) and Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” *Journal of American History*, 96, no. 3 (December 2009): 751–776.
  - 11 BPP Platform in Teodori, *The New Left*, 283; Eldridge Cleaver, “The Black Man’s Stake in Vietnam,” in *The Black Panthers Speak*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: De Capo Press, 2002), 100.
  - 12 Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 10.
  - 13 “The Black Panther Party Stands for Revolutionary Solidarity” (February 1970) in *The Black Panthers Speak*, ed. Foner, 220; see also Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr., *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013), 12.
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