


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THE NUCLEAR FREEZE

Transnational pursuit of positive peace

Dario Fazzi

From the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, Cold War relations deteriorated sharply. The two superpowers became confrontational on many fronts, including a mutual boycott of the Olympics, and the nuclear arms race suddenly ramped up. The rise of international tensions not only signaled a crisis of détente, but it also revamped old fears of nuclear holocaust.¹ Public anxiety swept large portions of western societies and, in response, people turned to their local communities and relied on grassroots organizing as a way to express their uneasiness.² In the United States, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC, or simply the Freeze) epitomized this widespread discontent. In just a few years, the Freeze gathered broad popular support and stimulated a vibrant political debate. More interestingly, the Freeze was also part of a transnational wave of anti-nuclear protests that shook the Western hemisphere and challenged militarism, rearmament, nuclear deterrence, and the seemingly unstoppable institutionalization of violence.³

To a large extent, the freeze movement represented one of those phenomena that US historian Emily Rosenberg has defined as “transnational currents,” meaning a flow of ideas, mutual cultural influences, economic and social exchanges that in the twentieth century, “circulated across and beyond national states and drew the world together in new ways.”⁴ The nuclear freeze campaign, which started in America as a broad, inter-class, mix-gendered, grassroots mobilization (although politically incomplete and only partially successful), deeply impacted Western society and culture. In many ways, it represented the nemesis of the so-called Second Cold War—the period of de-escalated tensions after a period of détente.

The transnational character of the Freeze was arguably present early in the movement. The idea of freezing the arms race through a moratorium on nuclear warheads had indeed been circulating widely among American anti-nuclear groups and political elites since the late 1970s. In 1978, both the Mobilization for Survival network (*Mobe*) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) proposed to stop uranium mining as a way of halting the production of new nuclear weapons.⁵ The following year, Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oregon) introduced a nuclear freeze amendment to the SALT II treaty, asking for the immediate cessation of testing, production, and deployment of new strategic missiles.⁶ The idea of taking concrete steps towards the freezing of the nuclear arms race attracted the attention of other moderate politicians and anti-nuclear groups throughout the country. But before it could become a truly viable strategy for a massive anti-nuclear campaign the Freeze needed to be further articulated. The first one to take on that task was Richard Barnet, who in *Foreign Affairs* recommended the adoption of a “comprehensive approach” to US–USSR

relations based on a halt to the nuclear arms race. Then, an American arms control activist named Randall Forsberg elaborated on the nuclear freeze idea in an influential pamphlet that she co-authored under the title *The Price of Defense*, and later in a feature article published in *Scientific American*.⁷

In these publications, Forsberg argued that the two superpowers, and modern states in general, could no longer manage nuclear development. Calling “for a radical reorientation of US defense policy,” she stressed that technology surpassed its managers and that the nuclear arms buildup was a problem that had to be stopped—or frozen—immediately.⁸ After her first enunciation of the freeze idea, Forsberg penned a *Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race*, which was an attempt to coalesce consensus around the Freeze and organize a popular campaign in its support. In the first months of 1980, the *Mobe*, the AFSC, and many other American peace and anti-nuclear groups endorsed Forsberg’s *Call*.⁹ Then in Washington D.C. on April 26, 1980, the NWFC was officially launched with a non-violent march for a nuclear-free world.¹⁰

In the United States, the Freeze gained momentum rather quickly and secured some important, though partial, political results.¹¹ Yet US anti-nuclear activists and leaders were perfectly aware that nuclear disarmament was essentially a transnational issue. Western Europe, in particular, had become an area of major concern, and opportunities, for American Freeze campaigners, especially since NATO’s 1979 *dual-track* decision—which promised on one track, to negotiate with the Soviets to remove their SS-20 nuclear missiles, and on the other, to deploy their own nuclear forces, Pershing II and Cruise missiles, within Western Europe as countermeasures—had fostered a wave of anti-nuclear dissent across the Old Continent.¹² In November 1981, an anti-nuclear rally in Amsterdam unexpectedly attracted more than 400,000 demonstrators. Vast sections of the Western European populous expressed pessimism about the future of disarmament talks, criticized their governments’ weak attempts to defend the Atlantic strategy, and accused the superpowers of using nuclear negotiations to strengthen their own positions in the nuclear arms race; indeed, in 1983, about 40 percent of the population in Britain, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands and 60 percent in Italy unconditionally rejected NATO’s dual-track decision.¹³ The popularity of this call to prevent “Euroshima” (a nuclear disaster in Europe’s heartland), was due to it being simultaneously seen as an invitation to become “good democrats” and to rise up “non-violently against the arms race.”¹⁴ The Euromissile crisis also created an opportunity for collaboration among anti-nuclear activists across the Atlantic, “especially due to links that the AFSC, FOR, WRL, and other long-standing [American] pacifist organizations had developed with European colleagues in decades prior.”¹⁵ For this reason, one of the main slogans of the April 1980 nuclear freeze march had been “Make the Connections!—Demand a Non-Nuclear World.”¹⁶ And for the same reason, during the very first NWFC national conference many delegates stressed how important it was to convince the international community to endorse a nuclear freeze.¹⁷

American Freeze activists, thus, not only understood their campaign as a quintessentially transnational one, but they also acted accordingly, eagerly looking for the establishment of forms of transnational cooperation and exchange. It was Freeze organizer Pam Solo who mainly took on the responsibility to strengthen transatlantic ties, and she “experienced these links firsthand, engaging with local, national and international campaigns simultaneously as anti-nuclear sentiment grew in popularity both in the United States and in Western Europe.”¹⁸

For his part, Randy Kehler, one of the main organizers of the US freeze campaign, emphasized that because of NATO’s dual-track decision, American and European

anti-nuclear efforts were inextricably bound together. He warned Americans to pay attention to “the rapidly escalating public reaction against the proposed placement by the US of new ‘Eurostrategic’ nuclear weapons in various West European countries.” Kehler thought that Europeans favored “a lessening of Cold War tensions between East and West, coupled with what they consider an adequate military deterrence,” and that such a stance would open a window of opportunity for the Freeze in Europe. Moreover, Kehler remarked that new developments in Europe could threaten parity, without which “a strong rationale for the freeze will be lost.” He added that it was “particularly important that the Freeze campaign in the US keep in touch with and support” the European movement, for Europe’s “success would have an enormously positive effect on our own efforts,” and “the European disarmament movements will, in turn, be able to support our work on a bilateral freeze.” In Kehler’s opinion, the relationship was a linear one: “the more opposition to the nuclear arms race from our European allies, the more difficult it will be for the US to continue” escalating the nuclear arms race overall.¹⁹

Kehler’s logic, and the need to utilize the planned 1982 UN Second Session on Disarmament as a way to reinforce their links with similar European movements, convinced many Freeze leaders and *Mobe* activists in the US to set up an International Task Force (ITF), whose main duty was specifically to enhance American anti-nuclear activists’ transnational contacts. To achieve that goal, the NWFC established an office in New York and strengthened its ties with multilateral organizations ranging from religious bodies to unions, pacifist and civil rights organizations, socialist and progressive movements, world federalists, students’ and women’s groups, gay and lesbian coalitions, and environmentalist associations.²⁰ The ITF then proposed the creation of groups of experts who would “determine whether parity in force levels between the Soviet Union and the United States” actually existed. It also suggested measures to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, increase educational and public information efforts at the international level, and bolster regional arms limitation and disarmament efforts. More importantly, the ITF gave high priority “to European arms control, including long-range theater nuclear forces, mutual force reduction, and a European disarmament conference.”²¹

According to Freeze leaders, the UN session had to be turned into a showcase for the “growing international movement demanding disarmament of all nuclear nations . . . [and] an end to the conventional arms race.”²² A petition signed by more than two million people in support of a bilateral nuclear freeze was sent to both the US and the Soviet missions to the UN, and the NWFC prepared a massive march for nuclear disarmament, drafting leaflets and brochures in English, Spanish, Greek, and many other languages.²³ On June 12, 1982, nearly a million people converged on Central Park in New York, forming what was up to that point the biggest demonstration in the whole of American history.²⁴

The *Mobe* network took the lion’s share in enhancing the Freeze’s transnational connections, and it favored the strongest and most effective transatlantic exchanges. Throughout 1983, the main organization promoting the Freeze in the US helped groups “design and organize local education and action campaigns against first-strike weapons (particularly the Euromissiles) in communities throughout the nation.” The *Mobe* held Euromissiles Organizers Conferences in ten different cities “to help educate and train local organizers to work in their communities against the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles.” In cooperation with the Livermore Action Group, a Berkeley-based anti-nuclear organization that had studied the European movement and, in particular, the ways in which Dutch anti-nuclear organizations had popularized their anti-nuclear messages well-beyond their national borders,

the *Mobe* organized the National Days of Nuclear Disarmament with a particular focus on Euromissiles.²⁵ Ultimately, the *Mobe* launched a series of “joint European/US actions against deployment of the Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles, with emphasis on production and testing sites.” The centerpiece of this mobilization was made of local and regional actions held throughout Western Europe, the US, and Canada, including a “walkathon” held in Washington D.C. in October of that year.²⁶

European reactions to these efforts were varied. In 1981, representatives of peace movements from fifteen European countries established in Copenhagen the International Peace Communication and Coordination Center (IPCC), a body that aimed to coordinate the European peace and anti-nuclear campaigns, assist communication and cooperation among them, and strengthen their transnational ties. American Freeze organizers such as Pam Solo and Melinda Fine, the latter being the head of the ITF, regularly attended the IPCC meetings and “maintained formal and regular contacts through this forum with their counterparts in Europe.”²⁷ Within the IPCC, the British END paid relatively less attention to the freeze strategy, thinking that its approach was too soft and not fully consistent with a radical reorientation of the whole nuclear arms race.²⁸ Conversely, the Dutch IKV actively promoted and supported the freeze campaign within the IPCC at almost every meeting it held. According to the Dutch campaigners, it was “of great importance to stress right from the beginning that a freeze concept [was] not to be seen as a ‘less radical’ approach than the concept of unilateral steps” toward nuclear disarmament, and it could represent a viable strategy for the future of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe as well.²⁹

Hence, a bilateral nuclear freeze was progressively gaining “widespread support as a way to reduce the risk of nuclear war” in Western Europe, and only a very few Europeans “endorse[d] the view that a freeze would leave the Soviet Union superior to the U.S.,” thus assuaging one of the strongest criticisms that the Reagan administration was leveling against the Freeze at home.³⁰ This did not substantially alter the American administration’s dismissive attitude, but it did induce US policymakers to look at these developments in a transatlantic way, and with rising apprehension. As US Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard R. Burt argued, the nuclear freeze proposal was being “supported [in Europe] by many who [were] deeply committed to rapid and significant progress in arms control,” that is, by that portion of European society that the Euromissile crisis had awakened to action.³¹ While realizing that the European anti-nuclear demonstrations were composed of “a very miscellaneous set of groups,” coming together “with widely differing objectives and goals and ideas,” Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger warned against the risk that this movement might grow into “a movement something like the anti-Vietnam movement,” a fact that would have represented “a matter of considerable concern” for American policymakers.³²

Moreover, as many polls in Europe indicated, after the massive June 12 march, “the appeal of a nuclear freeze” soared and “opposition to the development of intermediate range nuclear weapons such as Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, and the Enhanced Radiation Weapon” peaked. While many Europeans continued to support NATO, “equally sizable majorities” shared the sentiment of the American Freeze movement. The reason for this support was primarily economic, at least in the eyes of one US national security analyst:

The several anti-nuclear movements coalescing this Spring are fueled by mounting criticism of US economic policies. Europeans unduly criticize our monetary and

trade policies as the leading cause of Europe's economic difficulties. In the US, pro-freeze sentiment's somewhat more evident among the lower middle class . . . In Europe and Japan, support for nuclear opposition comes from a range of groups that are feeling the economic pinch.

Given the breadth of the protests, Reagan's advisers thought that "only a broad, deeply desired concept of world peace [could] subsume issues such as the nuclear freeze," and they recommended Reagan give a "major speech . . . in May at a college commencement (e.g., Eureka College May 9) presenting a 'Strategy for the Attainment of Enduring World Peace'" that would suggest a parallel in the minds of a concerned European public to "the World Peace speech of John F. Kennedy in 1963."³³

It was especially the Freeze's immediacy and simplicity that captured Europe's attention.³⁴ Such immediacy and simplicity brought "large minorities in West Germany (40%), Italy (37%), and the Netherlands (31%)" to favor an agreement between Washington and Moscow that would stop the production of nuclear weapons and freeze the numbers of nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles.³⁵ Compared to those who preferred other options, the European supporters of a nuclear freeze represented large majorities in their respective countries. Among those who opposed missile deployment, more than 54 percent in the UK favored a freeze instead of Reagan's zero option (i.e., that the Soviets remove their warheads *before* America deploy its own—essentially bargaining something for nothing), along with 59 percent in West Germany, 42 percent in Italy, and 73 percent in the Netherlands.³⁶

The idea of a freeze was particularly popular in Scandinavia. The Danish Friends of Peace Fund endorsed a Social Democratic resolution passed by Parliament calling for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, as well as for "a freeze on all stocks of nuclear weapons." In Norway, groups such as the No to Nuclear Weapons, which CIA analysts defined as "allergic" to nuclear weapons, lent active support to a "nuclear freeze" and "no first use" options and proposed a freeze resolution that was later deferred by the governing Center-Christian coalition.³⁷ However, as CIA officials highlighted, "the publicity given to the peace movement's claims over the past few years [had] contributed to the lack of confidence among West European publics in Washington's ability to deal responsibly with world problems."³⁸

In sum, despite the different political contexts in which European anti-nuclear activists worked, their public positions had numerous points in common, including a shared and open dissatisfaction with arms control initiatives proposed by the US and an "advocacy of some form of nuclear freeze."³⁹ This focus solely on the tactical distinction between multilateralism and bilateralism, as a way to distinguish the European systemic interests from the American supposedly national ones, was reductive; in fact, without necessarily descending into the kind of "methodological transnationalism" that Jan-Henrik Meyer rightly considers misleading and exaggerating, American and European anti-nuclear campaigners remained convinced that the nuclear issue was a genuinely transnational one, operated in transnational ways, and adopted transnational strategies and tactics.⁴⁰

The ways in which Freeze activists framed their points of contention, organized their protests, and differently affected their own national political, cultural, and social environment allows contemporary readers to consider the Freeze as a transnational phenomenon. The Freeze, indeed, helped to educate and inform widely diverse sections of the public on both sides of the Atlantic about the risks of the nuclear arms race. It fostered public interest in nuclear issues and in persuading members of the political elite to place nuclear policy under rigorous public scrutiny.⁴¹ It was instrumental in coalescing consensus around complex issues

that had often been confined to political, military, or scientific circles, thus radically democratizing the debate over nuclear weapons and strategy.⁴² It represented a cross-generational attack on modern states' inability to manage nuclear weapons—regarded as the instruments and archetypes of institutionalized violence.⁴³ All in all, with its attempt to redefine national interests and place them in a broader transnational context, the Freeze offered a rational and valid alternative to the dangerous revival of the Cold War.⁴⁴

Notes

- 1 On the Second Cold War, see David S. Painter, *The Cold War: An International History* (London: Routledge, 1999). On the transformative impact of the 1970s, see, Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
- 2 Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen, "Introduction: The Last Insurrection? Youth, Revolts and Social Movements in the 1980s," in *A European Youth Revolt: European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s*, ed. Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2; Michael S. Foley, *Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013), 3–4. Stephen Milder, "Thinking Globally, Acting (Trans-)Locally: Petra Kelly and the Transnational Roots of West German Green Politics," MA Theses, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008, 29–35.
- 3 Holger Nehring, "Peace Movements and the Demilitarization of German Political Culture, 1970s–1980s," in *Demilitarization in the Contemporary World*, ed. Peter N. Stearns (Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 60–88. In spite of its varied transnational contacts, many authors have mostly focused on the national character of the nuclear freeze campaign, rendering it as a quintessentially American product. See, among the others, David Cortright and Ron Pagnucco, "Limits to Transnationalism: The 1980s Freeze Campaign," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, ed. Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 159 and Angela Santese, "Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s," *The International History Review* 39, no. 3 (August 2016): 496–520.
- 4 Emily S. Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World," in *A World Connecting 1870–1945*, ed. Emily S. Rosenberg, Akira Iriye, and Jürgen Osterhammel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 815–899.
- 5 On the *Mobe*, an umbrella organization encompassing more than one hundred peace, religious, environmental, feminist, and public interest groups, see Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer, "Introduction: The Nuclear Freeze in Theory and Action," in *Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze*, ed. Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 4; see also New York University Libraries—Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Mobilization for Survival Records (hereinafter TAM 127), Box 1, Miscellaneous and Box 2, December 2–11, 1977 Conference evaluation.
- 6 Douglas C. Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 34.
- 7 Richard Barnet, "US–Soviet Relations: The Need for a Comprehensive Approach," *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 4 (Spring 1979): 779–795. Randall Forsberg, "A Bilateral Nuclear-Weapon Freeze," *Scientific American* 247, no. 5 (November 1982): 52–61. Both sources are quoted by David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 141. The Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense* (New York: Times Books, 1979).
- 8 Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Nuclear Freeze and Its Impact," in *Arms Control Today*, 2010, accessed June 2, 2017, www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/LookingBack. Freezing the nuclear weapons systems was not an entirely new idea. It had circulated within arms control circles since the early 1960s, but when NATO proposed the deployment of missiles in Europe and the *Mobe* adopted it as its official strategy, the freeze acquired public prominence. David S. Meyer, "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement," *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2 (1993): 159.

- 9 Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Strategy Papers, in TAM 127, Box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign.
- 10 “March for a Nuclear-Free World,” campaign poster, in TAM 127, Box 9, April 25–30, 1980, Antinuclear Demonstrations.
- 11 Michael J. Hogan, *The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 1–2; Gordon Faison and Randy Kehler to Active Participants in the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, July 22, 1981, in TAM 127, Box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign; *The Freeze Newsletter*, July, 1981 “Freeze Wins in Mass., Oregon Legislature; NY State Assembly” in TAM 127, Box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign. Edward M. Kennedy and Mark O. Hatfield, *Freeze! How You Can Help Prevent Nuclear War* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 169–194; Douglas C. Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze*; David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics*. (New York: Praeger, 1990), 225; David Cortright and Ron Pagnucco, “Transnational Activism in Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign,” in *Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze*, ed. Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 83; Robert Kleidman, *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993). In their paper “Social Movements and the Policy Process” Rochon and Mazmanian state that despite being able to generate broad support at the polls, “the freeze movement failed to translate its goals into public policy.” According to this view, the freeze movement became too bogged down in congressional politics to maximize its effectiveness and the resolution that was passed in 1983 was so watered down that it “had no practical significance” and “did not affect the actual conduct of superpower diplomacy.” Thomas R. Rochon and Daniel A. Mazmanian, “Social Movements and the Policy Process,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (1993), 75.
- 12 On the Euromissile crisis in the context of the Cold War, see Leopoldo Nuti, Frederic Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother, eds., *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). NATO’s dual-track decision is available online: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The “Double-Track’ Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces) “NATO Basic Documents,” February 27, 2009, accessed June 22, 2017, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090227173641/www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b791212a.htm>.
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- 16 “Stopping the Draft is Not Enough,” campaign poster, in TAM 127, Box 9, April 25–28, 1980, March for a non-nuclear world.
- 17 First National Conference Report, March 20–22, 1981, in TAM 127, Box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign.
- 18 Kyle Harvey, “The Promise of Internationalism: US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European Challenge,” 231.
- 19 Randy Kehler, “Is the Freeze Achievable?” in Nuclear Weapon Freeze Campaign – Strategy Paper, February 9, 1981, in TAM 127, Box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign.
- 20 David Cortright and Ron Pagnucco, “Transnational Activism in Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign,” 83. TAM 127, Box 2, Endorsement letters.
- 21 Mobilization for Survival Letter, October 31, 1981, in TAM 127, Box 2, SSD Meeting Riverside, October 31, 1981. A coordinating committee (CC) composed of “one representative from each local, national, and international organization working steadily to plan and mobilize for the [UN SSDII] Campaign should have met at least monthly and worked in close cooperation with the ITF in order to promote nuclear disarmament nationally and internationally, see “UN SSDII Campaign—Structure Proposal 10/31/81,” *Protest and Survive*, May/June 1982, in TAM 127, Box 2, SSD Meeting Riverside, October 31, 1981.

- 22 Mobilization for Survival Letter, September 3, 1981 and *Protest and Survive*, May/June 1982, October 9, 1981, in TAM 127, Box 2, SSD Meeting Riverside, October 31, 1981.
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- 26 Mobilization for Survival, “Ongoing Campaigns and Priorities 1983,” in TAM 127, Box 55, 1983 Program and Walkathon, 1983.
- 27 Kyle Harvey, “The Promise of Internationalism. US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European Challenge,” 232.
- 28 Patrick Burke, “European Nuclear Disarmament: Transnational Peace Campaigning in the 1980s,” in *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s*, ed. Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (New York: Cambridge University Press), 227–250.
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- 32 Transcript of an interview with the Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), October 27, 1981, in Roosevelt Institute for American Studies (RIAS), American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1981 Supplement, Department of State, Washington D.C., 1985; Transcript of an interview with the Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), November 24, 1981, in RIAS, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1981 Supplement, Department of State, Washington D.C., 1985.
- 33 Memorandum for William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Charles Z. Wick, A Public Affairs Campaign to Support and Follow /up President Reagan’s Trip to Europe June 5–11. On April 23, 1982, CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, Approved for Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110001-0. See also Strategy paper outlines a public affairs campaign in preparation for President Ronald Reagan’s 6/2–6/11 [1982] trip to Europe; White House, US Declassified Documents, accessed June 13, 2017, [tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4w49F8](https://tinyurl.com/tinyurl/4w49F8).
- 34 Freeze leaders realized soon on this viability. In Kehler’s words, “a combination of pressures . . . can result in widespread recognition of the freeze as the most attractive and viable first step out of the nuclear trap.” The Freeze, Kehler thought, could easily generate “growing support and pressure for an end to nuclear testing, domestically and internationally.” Randy Kehler, “Draft—Is the Freeze Achievable, Strategy Paper,” undated, in TAM 127, box 9, Nuclear Freeze Campaign.
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- 36 West European Public Opinion in 1982 on INF Deployment and Related Security Issues,” February 14, 1983, in NARA, RG 306-USIA, S 2-14-83. “Memorandum for Richard E. Bissel from P/RWE—Douglass A. Wertman—Italian Public Opinion on INF and Related Issues,” July 19, 1983, in NARA, RG 306-USIA, S-7-19-83 A.

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- 38 “Western Europe: The Peace Movement After Initial INF Deployment – An Intelligence Assessment,” July 1984, CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, CIA-RDP85S00316R000200070003-0, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/27. “Western Europe: Evolving Public Attitudes toward NATO and the Superpowers,” May 1985, CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, CIA- CIA-RDP86S00588R000200170003-7, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/27.
- 39 “Western Europe: Leftist Opposition Parties and INF,” June 1983, CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010035-2, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12.
- 40 Jan-Henrik Meyer, “Transnationale Geschichte. Eine Perspektive. Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft,” *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft* 26 (2013/14), 145–161. Astrid Mignon Kirchhof and Jan-Henrik Meyer argue that “analytically, we can distinguish between two aspects of such transnationalism, namely, the perception of nuclear power as a transnational or global problem—which is in line with modern environmentalist thinking about the environment as a global phenomenon (Engels 2010)—and the self-perception of the actors as part of a transnational community. From a critical point of view we may also ask to what extent the rhetorical invocation of international solidarity mainly served to bolster the legitimacy of the supposedly common cause,” see Astrid Mignon Kirchhof and Jan-Henrik Meyer, “Global Protest against Nuclear Power. Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s,” *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 1 (2014): 169 and 175.
- 41 David S. Meyer, “Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement,” *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2 (June 1993): 159; Jeffrey P. Knopf, “The Nuclear Freeze Movement’s Effects on Policy,” in *Coalitions and Political Movements*, ed. Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer, 127. For a critical review of the Reagan administration’s nuclear strategy, Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982); Doug Rossinow, *The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
- 42 David Cortright, *Peace*, 141.
- 43 Protesters’ slogans mostly posed the same dramatic question: “Are We the Last Generation?” See TAM 127, Box 2, 6–9 August Actions 1979.
- 44 See Robert Wuthnow, *Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Response to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation, and Other Threats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51.