


This article was downloaded by: 10.2.97.136

On: 22 Sep 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *CRC Press*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750

Christian Philip Peterson, William M. Knoblauch, Michael Loadenthal

Philosophies of Peace, 1750–1865

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315157344-2>

Casey Rentmeester

Published online on: 04 Sep 2018

How to cite :- Casey Rentmeester. 04 Sep 2018, *Philosophies of Peace, 1750–1865 from: The Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750* CRC Press

Accessed on: 22 Sep 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315157344-2>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

PHILOSOPHIES OF PEACE, 1750–1865

Casey Rentmeester

World peace was not even a pipe dream for much of human history, much less an ascribable ideal. In Western civilization, the ancient Greeks understood peace roughly as agreement between peoples. The Romans, who borrowed much of their culture from the Greeks, had a more general understanding of peace as juridical order. With the rise of Christendom, peace took on a subjective conception, meaning roughly inner peace of the soul. It was not until the Enlightenment that peace came to be understood on a wider scale in which global peace became even conceivable. While French philosophers Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were the first to propose a project of peace on a wide scale (i.e., beyond one's immediate bordering countries), Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant provide the most comprehensive theories of world peace in the eighteenth century. Bentham, a utilitarian, argued that we should strive for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons, and since war causes the most suffering, we ought to strive toward universal and perpetual peace. Kant, an ethicist who emphasizes the duties humans have to each other, argues that it is our duty to work towards world peace and proposed a League of Nations in order to do so. This chapter chronicles the conceptions of world peace throughout the history of Western civilization from the ancient Greeks to the Enlightenment and show how Kant's philosophy in particular influenced peace plans of the twentieth century.

Pre-Enlightenment conceptions of peace

The twentieth-century German philosopher Martin Heidegger argued that Western civilization began in ancient Greece since its philosophical doctrines and everyday routines began there.¹ If Heidegger is right, then the most appropriate place to begin our chronicling of peace in the Western world is ancient Greece. The ancient Greek understanding of εἰρήνη (*eirēne*) best captures their version of peace, the personification of which is found in the goddess Eirene. On a conceptual level, *eirēne* was understood mainly as a harmony of one's ethical and social relationships, and sometimes used as a synonym for ὁμόνοια (*homonoia*), meaning "of one mind" or unanimity.²

The two greatest philosophers of ancient Greece, Plato (428–348 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE), understood *eirēne* in this sense. Plato makes it clear in Book V of his masterpiece, *The Republic*, that barbarians (i.e., non-Greeks) are "by nature enemies," while fellow Greeks are "by nature friends."³ Because Plato "drew very sharp lines between Greeks and barbarians, [*Eirene*] should apply to the household, to the village, to the city-state—and the maximum extension, a very audacious one, would be to all Greeks."⁴ Plato's most

famous student, Aristotle, proposed that some people are born naturally as slaves, and even mentions that some Greeks considered all non-Greeks to be naturally regarded as slaves.⁵ Plato and Aristotle are representative of the ancient Greeks in that they display Greco-centric tendencies. Due to such tendencies, the ancient Greeks considered *eirene* as possible among Greeks but would have never considered it as a viable option on a wider scale. Thus, any concept of world peace would have been completely foreign to ancient Greek sensibilities.

The Roman equivalent of *eirene* is *pax*, from which the Romans named their goddess Pax. While the Romans clearly imitated the Greeks in various cultural aspects, including philosophy, religion, and art, *pax* is not identical to *eirene*. Johan Galtung, commonly regarded as the founding father of Peace Studies, states that the Roman *pax* was

a direct concept of order (including absence of violence) and unity—but no doubt an order and unity with a center—the center of the Roman Empire. *Homonioia* became *concordia* (“harmony”), extended, like citizenship, ultimately to everybody living in the Roman Empire and accepting the ruling from the center.⁶

For the Romans, then, *pax* was a more general concept than the Greek *eirene* since it was more closely linked with order in the empire; however both are similar in that they exclude barbarians.

The famous period of *Pax Romana* (i.e., Roman Peace, which lasted from 27 BCE to 180 CE) was certainly not “peaceful” for bordering “barbarian” peoples of Rome. Indeed, Ali Parchami has argued persuasively that “*pax* came to be closely associated and in some instances intertwined, with such terms as ‘pacification’, ‘victory’, ‘conquest’, and ‘empire.’” He continues, “Far from connoting peace in the modern sense *pax* had an unmistakable militaristic and hegemonic overtone.”⁷ This attitude of peace as pacification can be seen in the national epic, the *Aeneid*, written between 29 and 19 BCE. In it, Virgil, ancient Rome’s famous poet, perhaps put it best when he said, “Remember, Roman, these will be your arts: to teach the ways of peace to those you conquer.”⁸ Here Virgil implies that peace is something that must be enforced, rather than some sort of mutual treaty agreed upon. Thus, while the typical depiction of the goddess Pax displays reciprocity by representing Pax with babies at her breast, the actual version of *pax* was that of pacification by submission.

With the rise of Christendom in the Roman Empire, *pax* began to take on a different connotation. Instead of explicitly referring to a relationship with others, *pax* became associated with inner peace of the soul. Perhaps the best example of this shift occurs in Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 CE–430 CE), who was born of a Christian mother and a pagan father. In his *Confessions*, Augustine chronicles his conversion to Christianity. While he lived his first thirty-three years as a non-believer, he eventually converted to Christianity in 386 CE. In the very first paragraph of his *Confessions*, he states, “our heart is restless until it rests in [God].”⁹ And while he does speak of *pax* as a domestic peace between persons in Book IX, he states that true *pax* is oneness with God in Book XIII: “Love lifts us there, and your good Spirit exalts our humble estate from the gates of death. In a good will is our peace [*pax*].”¹⁰ It is fitting that this quote deals with death because the common epitaph used today, “Rest in peace,” is a translation of the Latin phrase “*Requiescat in pace*,” a hope that the soul of the deceased will find peace in the afterlife (*pace* in this context is a derivation of *pax*). In the Christian sense, this peace can only be found through unity with God. Thus peace of mind with an eye toward unity with God becomes the primary understanding of peace for people living in Europe’s Middle Ages.

Enter the Enlightenment: Peace for all of Europe

Rene Descartes (1596–1650) is commonly considered the father of the Enlightenment (which is typically considered to run from the late 1600s to the early 1800s) in that he shifted the locus of the criterion of truth from God or the priest to oneself. With his famous “*cogito, ergo sum*” (i.e., “I think, therefore I am,”) Descartes posed the possibility that an individual can determine what is true not through God, but by oneself.¹¹ During the Enlightenment period, we find an emphasis on the individual over authority figures (such as God), an emphasis on reason over faith or passion, and an emphasis on progress over stagnation. All three of these emphases help explain why the leading philosophical figures of this period attempted to work out plans for world peace using rational argumentation in the quest for spiritual progress as a species.

Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743) offered the first robust philosophy of peace in the Western world during the early 1700s with what he called his “project for perpetual peace.” As a French public official, Saint-Pierre worked as a secretary to one of the members of the Congress of Utrecht, which ended the wars of Louis XIV. Having seen the peace that was struck between France and its enemies, he set his sights on a loftier goal: Peace for all of Europe. He stated, “Mankind may live in peace so long as they have nothing of any sort to be disputed or divided between them.”¹² He saw commerce as the uniting factor between countries, and disputes regarding commerce as causes of division. To restore concord, he proposed a “perpetual Congress” or Senate with representatives of each European country to arbitrate such disputes.

Saint-Pierre’s project would likely not be given any contemporary attention if the young Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) were not selected to edit his collected works. Rousseau tells us in his *Confessions* that he was acquainted with the elder Saint-Pierre in his youth, and in taking on the project of editing his works he found that Saint-Pierre was mistaken in one respect: He naively believed that humans could be guided by reason alone in their actions, rather than being led by the passions. Rousseau states, “The high opinion [Saint-Pierre] had of modern knowledge made him adopt that false principle of perfected reason, the basis of all the demonstrations he proposed, and the source of all his political sophisms.”¹³ Fancying himself a realist (perhaps ironically, since most philosophers consider Rousseau to be an idealist), Rousseau held Saint-Pierre’s view to be too optimistic, though he was taken by the possibility of creating his own project for perpetual peace.

Rousseau’s “A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe” offers a detailed account of his plan for perpetual peace for Europe. Here, he proposes a government to “unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individual members, and place the one no less than the other under the authority of the Law.”¹⁴ Upon chronicling the various ways in which Europeans are already united (religion, civil institutions, etc.), he makes the case for what he calls a “general League” among European countries by showing the mutually beneficial nature of such a body. He lists four essential aspects this League must contain in order to be successful:

The Federation must embrace all the important Powers in its membership; it must have a Legislative Body, with powers to pass laws and ordinances binding upon all its members; it must have a coercive force capable of compelling every State to obey its common resolves whether in the way of command or of prohibition; finally, it must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to

withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of the whole body.¹⁵

To satisfy the last aspect, he proposed armed sanctions against those who break the treaty. Noting that Europe already had delegates that meet regularly and accomplished virtually nothing, he argued for a “permanent Diet or Congress” to arbitrate any disputes and to uphold this “perpetual and irrevocable alliance.”¹⁶

Perpetual peace

By the late eighteenth century, projects for “perpetual peace” became more commonplace among Enlightenment philosophers. In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) coined the term “international law,” thus opening up the possibility of thinking of laws that bind all nations.¹⁷ In Essay IV of this work, Bentham works out what he calls “A Plan For An Universal and Perpetual Peace.” As a utilitarian philosopher, Bentham’s plan revolves around what he considers to be the highest good, happiness, which he understands as pleasure. He begins with the simple claim that war causes suffering and must therefore be avoided. In order to avoid war and thus embark upon a “perpetual peace,” he offers two fundamental propositions: First, “the reduction and fixation of the force of the several nations that compose the European system,” and second, “the emancipation of the distant dependencies of each state.”¹⁸ In practice, this means a reduction of the military forces of European countries and a project to emancipate European colonies. Thus, while Bentham’s project is similar to Saint-Pierre’s and Rousseau’s in that the focus begins in Europe, he argues that the ultimate goal is the “common welfare of all civilized nations,” making his aim world peace as opposed to simply peace in Europe.¹⁹

Bentham’s ultimate argument for embarking upon his plan for world peace is grounded in his fundamental axiom that “the greatest happiness for the greatest number . . . is the measure of right and wrong.”²⁰ If we are to pursue what is right, we are to pursue plans that alleviate suffering and maximize happiness for not only our own citizens, but every person in the world. Regarding the first proposition of his plan, (i.e., the reduction of military forces), Bentham claims that military expenditures are extremely costly and thus cause suffering. To alleviate this suffering and facilitate peace, he argues for “the establishment of a common court of judicature for the decision of differences between the several nations.”²¹ Regarding the second proposition (i.e., elimination of colonies), Bentham notes that European colonies are “a source of expense, not of revenue” for the colonizing country and that “the real interests of the colony must be sacrificed to the imaginary interests of the mother-country,” thus it is mutually beneficial to do away with colonization.²²

Appealing again to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, Bentham argues that peace will initiate trade between countries, and because “all trade is in its essence advantageous,” this will bring about a maximum amount of happiness for all nations.²³ Bentham acknowledged that setting up a common tribunal to adjudicate disputes between countries would be painful, but the pain of diplomacy is much less than the pain of war. He also notes that while in general citizens commonly prefer war to peace, this was only because “the great body of the nation” consists of “uninformed and unreflecting” citizens who should not determine a country’s stance on war or peace.²⁴ If civilization were to embrace truly the Enlightenment idea of progress, which for Bentham means maximizing happiness for citizens of the world, then it must strive for a universal and perpetual peace.

Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay, "Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch," is perhaps the crowning document of peace projects during the Enlightenment. Although he was relatively unknown throughout Europe for much of his academic career, Kant (1724–1804) achieved celebrity status as an intellectual with his publication of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) at the ripe age of fifty-six. Philosopher Arnulf Zweig notes that, as early as 1783, "Kant was hailed as the benefactor of mankind, liberator of the human spirit and defender of freedom."²⁵ In regard to his peace project, Kant was influenced by his reading of Rousseau. In fact, in his notes to one of his early works, he states, "The education of Rousseau is the only way to make society flourish again Thanks to it governments will be better ordered and wars will become rarer."²⁶ Kant's goal in "Perpetual Peace" was to provide a means to not only making war a rarity but to establish a universal and lasting peace for the world.

Kant's project for perpetual peace is grounded in his deontological ethics. A hallmark of Kant's ethics is his belief that "the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as end in itself, not merely as a means to the discretionary use of this or that will."²⁷ This descriptive claim about the world leads to Kant's prescriptive thesis that "rational beings all stand under the law that every one of them ought to treat itself and all others never merely as a means, but always at the same time as end in itself."²⁸ In other words, one should not treat other rational beings as mere resources; to do so is to dishonor their nature. In this regard, Kant is clearly at odds with Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. For Bentham, moral consideration is based on the ability to feel pleasure and pain; Kant, conversely, considers rationality to be the fundamental basis for moral consideration since it gives a person dignity. Put simply, instead of seeking world peace in order to maximize happiness, Kant's project for peace is based on the deontological claim that persons have a duty to respect other persons as autonomous agents.

For Kant, moral personhood is not limited to the individual; rather, a collective body such as a state or country should be regarded as a moral person as well. Kant states:

A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property. It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose except the state itself. It is a trunk with its own roots. But to incorporate it into another state, like a graft, is to destroy its existence as a moral person, reducing it to a thing.²⁹

Colonization is thus never justified because it reduces an autonomous agent to the status of a thing, which for Kant means a mere resource. This emphasis on autonomy also serves as the basis of Kant's critique of war. He states, "Undoubtedly war is the greatest source of the evils which oppress civilized nations In many places freedom is curtailed because of war."³⁰ Not only does forcing one's citizens to go to war thwart their autonomy, the incessant threat of a future war limits the freedom that individual citizens have since they are taxed to maintain a standing army. Thus, Kant argues for the abolition of all standing armies.³¹

Because Kant's ultimate argument for peace is based upon an appeal to autonomy that is primarily understood as freedom, perhaps an illumination of Kant's conception of "freedom" is warranted. Kant distinguishes "senseless freedom" from "rational freedom," the former referring to the lawlessness found among so-called "savages," and the latter referring to laws in civilized countries that allow for citizens to be autonomous.³² In contemporary philosophical terms, senseless freedom can be understood roughly as "negative liberty" in that it means absence of constraint, while rational freedom means "positive

liberty” since it has to do with the ability to pursue one’s own interests.³³ Anyone who prefers the former to the latter is regarded “with deep contempt as barbarity, rudeness, and a brutish degradation of humanity.”³⁴ For Kant, if civilization is to progress, individuals must place positive liberty higher than mere negative liberty.

Kant defines peace as the end of all hostilities, which can be embarked upon if humans only use reason to progress from the natural state of war.³⁵ He asserts, “Reason, from its throne of supreme moral legislating authority, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, even though peace cannot be established or secured except by a compact among nations.”³⁶ As rational agents, states have a duty to strive to attain perpetual peace through diplomacy. On a global scale, this consists of three steps:

1. give up senseless freedom;
2. adjust themselves to the constraints of public law;
3. establish a continuously growing state consisting of various nations, which will ultimately include every nation.³⁷

This final step leads to Kant’s famous concept of a League of Nations, in which he envisioned the inclusion of all nations in order to ensure security and justice among them all, thereby establishing perpetual peace. Kant states explicitly that such a plan was considered “fantastical” by Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, though he considers it to be a “necessary outcome” once nations understand that it is in their best individual interests.³⁸ Indeed, Kant ends “Perpetual Peace” with the claim that:

the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.³⁹

One could say that Kant takes Bentham’s concept of international law to its logical conclusion with his understanding of world citizenship, though his deontological emphasis on duties to others based on respect for dignity is surely different than Bentham’s utilitarian emphasis on maximizing happiness for all.

Kant’s legacy

After the Enlightenment, many philosophers of the Western tradition lost faith in the possibility of world peace. The greatest philosophers of the nineteenth century—Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche—perhaps in an attempt to refute Kant, argue not only against world peace, but even advocate for war in some instances. G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) in his *Philosophy of Right* famously stated that war can strengthen a people, is not absolutely evil, and is even necessary in some contexts.⁴⁰ Karl Marx (1818–1883), who was heavily influenced by Hegel, provides no specific plan for world peace. W. B. Gallie argues persuasively that this is likely because Marx believed that problems of peace and war could only be approached when “more basic social problems, transcending state-boundaries and conflicts, had been more or less satisfactorily settled.”⁴¹ For Marx, citizens needed to end the exploitation of workers in a capitalistic system before even considering world peace. Finally, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) explicitly argued for the virtue of war due to its ability to restore the honor of courage.⁴² Thus, to read the main philosophers of the nineteenth century in search

of plans for world peace proves futile. Due to this reality, eventual plans for world peace that ultimately shaped the twentieth century often hearkened back to Kant's philosophy.⁴³

Speaking of Kant's "Perpetual Peace," Michael Desch rightly notes that "Although his essay was penned at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant's influence really took hold at the end of the nineteenth century, eventually becoming the philosophical rationale for efforts to promote peace."⁴⁴ While the first Peace Society was founded in 1816 and the first International Peace Congress was held in 1843, formal plans to embark upon a path of world peace did not begin until the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.⁴⁵ Historian Randall Lesaffer sums up the five-point platform of the Hague Peace Conferences as follows:

- 1) the establishment of an international league of States which would impose collective security, 2) the codification of international law and 3) in particular the laws of war with the purpose of humanizing warfare, 4) disarmament through binding international agreements and 5) the peaceful settlement of disputes, mainly through arbitration, as an alternative for war.⁴⁶

Notice that each and every point here can be found in Kant's plan for perpetual peace. The international league of States is Kant's League of Nations, the codification of international law was discussed by both Bentham and Kant, the appeal to humanization is aligned with Kant's emphasis on human dignity, disarmament is an explicit aspect of Kant's plan, and the plea for diplomacy is supported by Kant's understanding of progress in civilization. Geoffrey Best is right to state that the Hague Peace Conferences are a model of all League of Nations and United Nations gatherings that followed.⁴⁷ Therefore, Kant's legacy looms large not only in the basic arguments of the Hague Peace Conferences but also in the eventual League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.⁴⁸

Conclusion

Neither Bentham nor Kant—representatives of the most robust plans for world peace in the Western world—should be regarded as idealists in regard to their understandings of human nature. Bentham thought that human beings were primarily concerned with their own well-being and he did not consider altruism to be in our nature.⁴⁹ Kant at one time called human beings "a race of devils," by which he meant that most people base their actions on self-interest as opposed to selflessness or compassion for others.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, both considered world peace as not only an ideal for which to strive, but as *practical* if humanity is to take seriously what is best for the world as such. The existence of the United Nations provides a means for which to embark upon this path, though the question remains as to whether this "race of devils" will indeed progress.

Notes

- 1 Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 2nd ed., trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 64–65.
- 2 H.G. Liddell and Robert Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 557.
- 3 Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Charles M. Bakewell (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), 470c.
- 4 Johan Galtung, "Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 2 (1981): 186.

- 5 Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. J. E. C. Welldon (London and New York: MacMillan, 1901), Book I, Chapter 6.
- 6 Galtung, “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace,” 187.
- 7 Ali Parchami, *Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 15–16 (emphasis added).
- 8 Virgil, *Aeneid*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Bantam, 2004), 158.
- 9 Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3.
- 10 *Pax domestica* is translated as “domestic harmony” in the Chadwick version; *ibid.*, 169, 278.
- 11 René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, in *René Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence*, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), 232.
- 12 Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe* (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2010), 2.
- 13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions*, in *Collected Works of Rousseau*, Volume V, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH and London: University Press of New England, 1995), 354.
- 14 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe and The State of War*, trans. C. E. Vaughan. (London: Constable, 1917), 38–39.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 59–60.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 61.
- 17 On the history of Bentham’s coining of this term, cf. M.W. Janis, “Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of ‘International Law,’” *The American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 2 (1984): 405–418.
- 18 Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, Volume 2, ed. John Bowring (Boston, MA: Elibron Classics, 2005), 546.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 Jeremy Bentham, *A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government*, in *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London: Continuum, 1977), 393.
- 21 Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 547.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 548.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 552.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 559 and 556.
- 25 *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence*, ed. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22.
- 26 Quoted in George Armstrong Kelly, “Rousseau, Kant, and History,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29, no. 3 (1968): 361.
- 27 Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 45.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 51.
- 29 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in *On History*, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (New York and London: Macmillan, 1963), 86.
- 30 Immanuel Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” in *On History*, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (New York and London: Macmillan, 1963), 66.
- 31 Cf. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 87.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 98.
- 33 On positive and negative liberty, cf. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1969). Oftentimes, negative liberty is understood in a political context as the ability to do what one wishes without legal consequences, and examples include freedom of speech or freedom to drive a vehicle as fast as one wishes. Positive liberty in a political context includes the freedom to participate in public decisions.
- 34 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 98.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 85, 92.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 100.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 101.
- 38 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” in *On History*, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (New York and London: Macmillan, 1963), 19.
- 39 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 105.

- 40 G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde 194–198.
- 41 W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 68.
- 42 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With A Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 283.
- 43 While some nineteenth century philosophers lost faith in this possibility of world peace, the same cannot be said of nineteenth century poets. Alfred Lord Tennyson, for instance, looked forward to a Federation of the world in his “Locksley Hall,” as noted by Frank Ninkovich in his *The Global Republic: America’s Inadvertent Rise to World Power* (Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 99.
- 44 Michael C. Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007): 11–12.
- 45 Cf. M. Campbell Smith, “Translator’s Introduction” to Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: MacMillan, 1917), 78.
- 46 Randall Lesaffer, “The Temple of Peace: The Hague Peace Conferences, Andrew Carnegie and the Building of the Peace Palace (1898–1913),” *Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series* 140, no. 24 (2013): 16. For the full transcript of the Hague Conventions, cf. *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907*, 2nd ed., ed. James Brown Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915).
- 47 Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After,” *International Affairs* 75, no. 3, (1999): 619–634.
- 48 Indeed, William Galston argues that “Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points [for world peace] were a faithful transcription of both the letter and spirit of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*” in *Kant and the Problem of History* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 26–27.
- 49 Cf. Jeremy Bentham, *The Book of Fallacies* (London: Hunt, 1824), 392–393.
- 50 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 112.