


This article was downloaded by: 10.2.97.136

On: 27 Sep 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *CRC Press*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



## **The Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750**

Christian Philip Peterson, William M. Knoblauch, Michael Loadenthal

### **The Antiwar Movement in Lebanon, 1975–1990**

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315157344-24>

Magnus Dølerud

**Published online on: 04 Sep 2018**

**How to cite :-** Magnus Dølerud. 04 Sep 2018, *The Antiwar Movement in Lebanon, 1975–1990 from: The Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750* CRC Press

Accessed on: 27 Sep 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315157344-24>

**PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT**

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

## THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT IN LEBANON, 1975–1990

*Magnus Dølerud*

### Introduction

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) began in Beirut on April 13, 1975, as a clash between elements of a Christian Lebanese right-wing militia and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). By that time, however, the Lebanese social and political fabric had been straining for at least a decade. Regional developments, such as the intensifying Arab–Israeli conflict after 1967, and increasing internal economic inequality, had exacerbated political tensions. Many factions began arming themselves, and formed semi-professional militias even before the outbreak of war. After the conflict was under way, those not yet armed scrambled to catch up; soon, Syrian and Israeli forces entered the conflict. Although only a minority of the population participated in violence, during the next fifteen years Lebanon witnessed some of the most brutal and protracted armed conflicts of the twentieth century.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter examines examples of how a portion of the population not only detested, but actively resisted the war. Activist mobilization went through a continuous development, starting with spontaneous popular reactions to violence during the war’s first two years, then evolving into humanitarian and intellectual projects to stem the social and cultural deterioration resulting from armed conflict. In the mid-1980s, popular mobilization reignited, first with simple anti-war messages, then increasingly with demands to redress the causes of the conflict. While specific slogans and demands varied, they reflected an overall shift in emphasis from negative peace—“stop the war”—to positive peace, where activists demanded social and political reforms. The initiatives treated in this chapter belong to the general field of civil society, but first some further conceptual distinctions relevant to the Lebanese context are in order.

With an area of only 10,450 square kilometers, and an estimated population of three million in 1975, Lebanon was the most densely populated country in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> Its population is distributed unevenly between eighteen officially recognized religious sects, politically grouped into three categories: Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim. These categories were given meaning within the framework of the National Pact, a power-sharing agreement made between Lebanon’s political elites on the eve of the country’s independence in 1943. The pact prescribed the presidency to a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the house speaker a Shia Muslim, while parliamentary seats and civil service appointments were allocated on a confessional basis, proportional to the assumed size of each group. This form of communal power-sharing has been theorized as

“consociational democracy,” and was for three decades remarkably effective at stabilizing the Lebanese polity and limiting violent conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Despite its stabilizing potential, the confessional power-sharing system hindered the emergence of a common national identity and inclusive political programs. Even though Lebanon appeared as a nation, the confessional system’s intention of giving all religious communities a stake in government led to often-extreme politicization of sectarian identities. The Lebanese were citizens almost exclusively by force of their communal affiliation, and could thus change their circumstances only by appealing to the political elites of their respective communities.<sup>4</sup>

Lebanon was nevertheless home to an extensive civil society. The term is here employed in a strictly empirical manner to specify a field defined as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, where people associate to advance common interests.”<sup>5</sup> Civil society in Lebanon is, however, often divided by a sectarian logic, giving rise to a Lebanon-specific conceptual dichotomy: “communal society” is the domain between the state, market, and family that is nevertheless delineated by sectarian and parochial markers. Notably, Lebanese political parties will in most cases belong to this communal society. Civil society “proper,” on the other hand, refers to the inter-communal voluntary associations with a national scope.<sup>6</sup> While the former was certainly instrumental in addressing many of the war’s socio-economic repercussions, it was associations belonging to the latter that took more explicit anti-war stances and later tried to change the social, cultural, and political circumstances that enabled protracted conflict.

### **First reactions**

“Armed men are everywhere. All roads are closed. Blood maniacs are at large. We are losing Lebanon.”<sup>7</sup> These are the words of the radio presenter Sharif Akhawi, who gained a following in 1975 for his efforts to keep listeners updated on how to avoid clashes and where sniper fire was reported. Already a few months after the first rounds of conflict, tens of thousands heeded his call to protest the war outside the National Museum of Beirut. The Museum was located next to the militia-controlled crossing point of the so-called “Green Line,” a front line that effectively divided the capital into a Christian East Beirut and a Muslim West Beirut. The Green Line remained in place throughout the war, and became the paramount symbol of the divided country and civilian population’s marginalization.<sup>8</sup> It was here the heaviest fighting in Beirut usually took place, but the museum crossing also became the favored rallying point of peace protests. It became a symbol of resilience, an icon for peace and unity.<sup>9</sup>

### **Digging in, branching out**

Following the early, spontaneous reactions to the violence, war became gradually normalized. Front lines were cemented, the Green Line became a fortified division of the capital, and downtown Beirut became a ruined no-man’s land. Militias turned to consolidating control inside their respective territories, often in the wake of brutal massacres and forced displacement of minority communities.<sup>10</sup> Such brutality triggered protests in the war’s early phase, and anti-sectarian demonstrations erupted against the so called “identity card killings,” in which civilians were murdered at militia checkpoints based on the religion stated in their national ID cards.<sup>11</sup>

A debilitated central government, coupled with strong measures of social control by the militias, made the latter *de facto* rulers and states within the state, and the local population was dependent on them for security, basic services, and employment.<sup>12</sup> The exploitation and black market economy that thrived under militia dominance created vested interests that made continuation of the conflict highly lucrative, and hence its resolution all the more unlikely, in what has been dubbed the “war system.”<sup>13</sup> Naturally, this concept homogenizes a wide range of actors and interests, from corrupt civil servants to armed Islamist movements, but is useful in this context by representing the general state of affairs confronted by the anti-war movement.

Thus, after 1977, open protest became nearly impossible because of the dangers of venturing into the streets, but also because many hesitated to stray from the protective environments provided by sectarian regions and militia rule. This was nevertheless a period, up until 1984, in which civil society underwent a phase of organization and deliberation.<sup>14</sup> This was manifested in a proliferation of particularly two types of groups: Cultural and intellectual assemblies, and humanitarian and civil service organizations.

A small group of intellectuals established the Cultural Movement in the town of Antelias in 1978 as a response to what they saw as a deterioration of public culture and universal values in Lebanon, and to provide a venue for public debate concerning “the causes of mankind and of our homeland, away from sectarianism and partisan spirit.”<sup>15</sup> In addition to a highly popular yearly book fair, the Cultural Movement also organized a series of “National Cultural Conferences” dealing with overarching questions of culture, society, war, and peace.<sup>16</sup> The element of protest often lay in disseminating writings and ideas that countered the aggressive and exclusionary narratives of the militias, arguing for example that Lebanon’s modernism and cosmopolitanism could be regained only by abandoning sectarian politics and ideological intransigence, thus seeking to engage intellectuals in a common national cause rather than partisan agendas.<sup>17</sup>

Humanitarian and civil service organizations sprung up in regions that were either under disputed militia control, or were controlled by militias with limited resources, usually as “popular committees” that attempted to retain a minimum standard of services in the state’s virtual absence. Such committees ranged from those directly controlled by parties or militias, to those that renounced war and communal conflict. The latter was particularly common in areas that remained relatively confessionally diverse, such as the Hamra district of the capital where the Unified Front of Ras Beirut became a strong voice for coexistence and civil peace.<sup>18</sup> It also happened in more homogenous neighborhoods such as the predominantly Sunni Muslim Tariq el-Jedideh, where the volunteer-based Movement for Development provided essential services such as street cleaning, medical dispensaries, and housing for internally displaced.<sup>19</sup>

On the national level, the Lebanese Red Cross operated all over the nation and commanded a growing number of volunteers from all sects and regions.<sup>20</sup> In line with its principles, the Red Cross aimed to be impartial and independent, but also to provide volunteers with a strong sense of purpose based on humanitarianism and universalism, as well as skills and knowledge that would prove useful in later humanitarian and anti-war initiatives.<sup>21</sup> Although such groups would usually not be very vocal in their criticisms of militias or political leaders, many of their members did go on to organize or participate in anti-war actions that benefited from their organizational experience, networks and civic attitudes.<sup>22</sup>

### The 6 May march and the Peace Charter

In the mid-1980s, civil society groups began mounting concerted resistance to the militias, the war-system, and the war itself. A famous example—one often considered the first expression of a popular peace movement in Lebanon—was the so-called 6 May March in 1984. It began when a researcher at Beirut University College, Iman Khalifeh, issued a call to the “silent majority” for a march against the war under the slogan “No to war, no to the tenth year, yes to life.”<sup>23</sup> A group of seasoned activists joined her immediately; the media showed massive interest, and several politicians, parties, and institutions welcomed the initiative. The Movement for Development participated in the organizing committee, and the Red Cross, Civil Defense, and police were tasked with ensuring the medical needs and safety of the protesters. Local women’s groups and other associations all over the country organized rendezvous points and transportation to Beirut.<sup>24</sup> In the last few days leading up to the march, the mayor of Beirut took a leading role in coordinating the march, which contributed to its legitimacy.<sup>25</sup>

But on the eve of 6 May, artillery fire from both sides disrupted the relative calm that had prevailed along the Green Line.<sup>26</sup> The organizers spent the night debating whether they should go through with the march, but before they reached any agreement the decision was made for them: The Mayor went on national TV and radio and announced the march’s cancellation.<sup>27</sup> Thus, despite popular outrage and political condemnation, the march was aborted at the last minute, and the activists considered the experience a lesson in how far the militias were willing to go to stifle any criticism.<sup>28</sup>

Even though the march was cancelled, those who had joined and supported the initiative formed a lasting network of activists from which new initiatives emerged. The most immediate came a few days later; the 6 May Committee organized a petition campaign against the war to replace the aborted protest, and counted on the support of thousands who had intended on joining the march.<sup>29</sup> Although the organizers wanted “to create a current of opinion capable of exerting some pressure on those politically responsible to stop the fighting,” they were aware of how unreceptive the militias would be. Their long-term goal was to mobilize public opinion against the war and the militias as a basis for future action, as well as to persuade influential institutions (unions, banks, schools), of their cause.<sup>30</sup> The efforts of individual volunteers, women’s councils, and the Disabled Peoples’ Union, as well as broad media coverage, ensured that 70,000 people signed the “Pact of Peace between the Lebanese” that summer.

### Symbolic actions

A string of symbolic anti-war protests followed, but with no direct political impact. For example, a group called the Committee for a Lebanon of Love organized several protest actions against the war; June 3, 1985 was dubbed “White Tuesday,” the day in which the committee encouraged all Lebanese to wear white as a “condemnation of the misery and pain of the Lebanese.”<sup>31</sup> Additionally, the committee set up “love checkpoints” around the city, places where volunteers distributed flowers and pamphlets to passers-by.<sup>32</sup> Though hampered by clashes in the city, the committee repeated such actions the following summer; in 1987 a similar group, which included figures from the 6 May initiative, orchestrated a human chain between East and West Beirut in a symbolic reunification of the capital.<sup>33</sup>

A common trait for the above initiatives was that they carried no concrete political message or criticisms. The rallying cry was a clear and simple call for negative peace: “no” to the violence and the humanitarian crises that accompanied it without proposing any solutions to the conflict or addressing its root causes. This approach emanated from the fact that, even though activist groups could work together towards stopping the bloodshed, they remained far from homogenous or coherent organizations, and the members carried many different political and religious sympathies. So did the population at large. Even though the majority were war-weary, many potential protesters felt alienated by an explicitly political platform, while others would have considered it too dangerous to take a strong political stance in public.<sup>34</sup>

### **The non-violence movement in Lebanon**

This began to change in 1986, when a group of activists founded the Non-violence Movement in Lebanon. Although officially registered as an association, more precisely it was an informal network of activists, old and new. They included trade union consultants, lawyers, NGO workers, former party members, organizers of political pressure groups, and leaders of cultural associations. Many of those who took part in the initiative had been in the circle around the 6 May group, while others had previously worked with the famous Bishop turned social activist, Gregoire Haddad, who once attempted to establish a non-violent movement in cooperation with activists from abroad.<sup>35</sup>

The new Non-violence Movement sought to introduce the principles of non-violent resistance to Lebanese civil society more broadly, and to push it beyond its dual role of passive humanitarian reaction on the one hand, and symbolic expressions of anti-war sentiment on the other. In its first year, the movement limited itself to a supportive background role, organizing training workshops on non-violent resistance methods and strategies. It simultaneously introduced new discourses of anti-sectarianism, social and human rights, and political freedoms, as well as the techniques for waging non-violent struggle to achieve such ideals.<sup>36</sup>

These activists sought to inspire mobilization through existing organizations and institutions, and to reform and strengthen Lebanon’s existing civil society, not add to an already dizzying array of actors. This was the reason why the Nonviolence Movement never rigidly organized, and instead worked to connect a wide range of institutions and groups, such as teachers, disabled people’s organizations, trade unions and cultural and humanitarian associations.<sup>37</sup> The Nonviolence Movement’s approach recognized that, even though the war itself was not legitimate, many of its underlying causes were. Its task was thus to enable civil society actors to pursue non-violent activism rather than resort to armed confrontation. As such, the birth of the Nonviolence Movement marked a significant shift in the objectives of the overall anti-war movement.

### **The march of the handicapped**

The first major public event co-organized by the Nonviolence Movement was with the Friends of the Handicapped association. In October 1987, a group of seventy-five war-wounded—thirty-two of them in wheelchairs—set out from Halba in the north of Lebanon. The march “for the sake of peace and human rights in Lebanon” lasted for four days, ending in Tyre in the south. While participants traveled mostly by bus, they stopped in

several towns and neighborhoods to move by foot and wheelchair and were joined by hundreds along the way.<sup>38</sup>

The organizers explained that the march's primary objective was to "oppose violence in all its forms," while introducing a broader definition of violence that the movement had adopted from non-violence theory. Aside from the regular forms of physical violence that were "exercised upon the physical integrity and dignity of the human being," the Nonviolence Movement had set out to combat

the economic violence that deprives the Lebanese of their most fundamental rights, such as housing, medical care, food, education . . . not to mention the violence exercised against liberties: freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, and all related liberties, notably the freedom to travel from one Lebanese region to another.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, this march became the first tangible realization of the movement's objective to collaborate with and mobilize pre-existing civil society actors—in this case a primarily special interest-driven disabled persons' organization—around a struggle for political reforms toward a positive peace.

### **The National Trade Union Congress**

In Spring 1987, the anti-war movement dramatically broadened its popular base beyond the intellectual middle class. This expansion happened in the form of the National Trade Union Congress; a broad front of unions and civil society groups against the war and its social and economic ramifications.<sup>40</sup> The major actor was the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCLW), which included most of the country's syndicates and federations with 200,000 members.<sup>41</sup> The GCLW had been active throughout the war, but since its membership spanned the political spectrum, previous strikes and protests had been limited to purely consensual socio-economic demands. In 1987, however, the fighting and exploitation had led to a whopping 487 percent increase in consumer prices and the situation became so dire that the unions accused politicians of implementing a "starvation policy."<sup>42</sup> At the first Congress in May, the delegates adopted a comprehensive political platform for the new front. Although socio-economic demands were still prominent, the congress also called for an end to the war, national unity, civil rights, and for ridding state institutions of sectarianism.<sup>43</sup>

The new-found common ground for civil society spawned the largest anti-war action during the war. In November 1987, the National Congress declared an open-ended general strike, calling on union members and the public to take part in protests.<sup>44</sup> As usual, protesters from east and west were to meet at the Museum in yet another symbolic reunification of the country. While mainly leftist parties and allied unions organized mobilization in the west, institutional support in the east was weaker since leftist parties were not allowed by the militia. Thus, the task fell on some of the more active unions in the region, and the informal network around the Nonviolence Movement.<sup>45</sup>

On the strike's fifth day, more than 100,000 people converged on the Green Line in a partly spontaneous, partly organized mass mobilization that expressed the myriad frustrations of the population.<sup>46</sup> Despite the unions' attempts to limit the slogans and demands to socio-economic issues, many felt that there were more pressing issues at hand, and the "demonstrators nevertheless shouted slogans related to the militias' control over state and

society, against the war, and calling for restoring the national fabric and resuming communications between the regions of the country.<sup>47</sup> Some even began dismantling the physical barriers erected to separate east and west Beirut, and authorities worried that the demonstration would degenerate into a riot.<sup>48</sup>

The labor leadership proved unable to capitalize on the strike's popular momentum, and suspended it just as huge crowds were in the streets waiting for the next move.<sup>49</sup> The GCLW took the official position that no party had exerted pressure on it, and expressed overall satisfaction with the government's promises of economic reforms, which had been the main demand of the strike.<sup>50</sup> Popular opinion and activists from other civil society sectors were not convinced by this announcement.<sup>51</sup> With momentum building in the streets, the movement's leaders had realized the necessity of posing more concrete political demands, but this would have meant allocating responsibility within the executive, which in Lebanon was unavoidably a sectarian matter. Generally, Sunni Muslim union leaders rallied around the Sunni prime minister, while Christian leaders were unwilling to undermine the Maronite Presidency. Recognizing this threat of the confederation splitting, the leadership was reluctant to politicize the strike further, and by the fifth day felt compelled to suspend it.<sup>52</sup> Despite publicly declaring success, the President of the GCLW commented privately that "Those who benefit from the continuation of war throughout the country stood against our program . . . the struggle that we led . . . remains incomplete without an explicit political content."<sup>53</sup>

### **The 1988 presidential election**

The massive disappointment of the general strike led to a hiatus period, as those working for positive peace pondered their next move. Thus, there was no major popular mobilization, and only limited trade union action, for the next eight months. Summer 1988 provided a new opportunity, as the constitutional deadline for electing a new president was approaching. The Nonviolence Movement seized the event and gathered a few hundred individuals, representing forty-nine unions and civil associations, in an overnight sit-in outside the temporary parliament building on the Green Line in late July.<sup>54</sup> The protesters spent the night singing protest songs, making speeches invoking the continuity of the popular movement from the 6 May March, and displaying the 70,000 signatures from the "peace pact."<sup>55</sup> The speeches covered all the issues raised during previous mobilizations: Socio-economic challenges, political rights, national unity, and renunciation of violence, achieved through a comprehensive mobilization inspired by non-violent principles.<sup>56</sup> Yet the most pressing demand was the free, fair, and timely election of a new president to initiate a peace process and put the country back on track.<sup>57</sup>

While the Nonviolence Movement, trade unions, and other associations only called for holding elections within a constitutional framework to elect *any* president with solutions, another group had one particular candidate in mind: Raymond Edde.<sup>58</sup> He had been in exile in Paris since 1976 due to repeated attempts on his life, ostensibly by extremists opposed to his conciliatory stances and criticism of violent political forces.<sup>59</sup> However, because Edde had set certain implausible conditions for his return to Lebanon, related to Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the entire campaign—"Friends of Raymond Edde"—was mostly an exercise in hypotheticals.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, since the president is elected by parliament rather than popular vote, it was as much a campaign for "resurrecting" the political awareness of citizens, and using Edde's reputation for incorruptibility, patriotism, and honesty to highlight the shortcomings of other candidates.<sup>61</sup> Thus, the group reformulated Edde's conditions and



positions as a charter of political demands named “the unified popular will,” which included calls for national unity, sovereignty, restoration of legitimate authorities, and an end to the war.<sup>62</sup> Through a media campaign, the group gathered some 60,000 signatures for the charter.<sup>63</sup> With this support, combined with street demonstrations, sit-ins, and meetings with politicians around the country, the Friends of Edde sought to influence politicians to support his candidacy.<sup>64</sup>

By early fall 1988 it was clear that political maneuvering and external pressure would once again carry the day, with outside interests—especially the United States, Israel, and Syria—taking precedence over Lebanon’s recovery. In a last-minute attempt to maintain stability, the outgoing president appointed General Michel Aoun as head of a military government, and hence acting president. The Friends of Edde had to end their campaign, while many among the population rallied around Aoun, who harnessed popular discontent with the militias and politicians to present himself as a symbol of national sovereignty and security.<sup>65</sup>

For the existing anti-war movement, this shifting of support to Aoun represented no less than a cooptation of its momentum and an exploitation of the strategies it had introduced. In addition, the Taif agreement was negotiated by Lebanese parliamentarians in October 1989 as an official end to the conflict, but entailed only a slight rebalancing of power between political elites. It thus excluded any civil society voices calling for genuine social and political change.<sup>66</sup> In other words, it was a “continuation of war by other means.”<sup>67</sup> Despite the agreement, the most destructive phase of the conflict immediately followed, when Aoun initiated a “liberation war” against the Syrian military presence, rendering the streets unsafe for protests.<sup>68</sup> Hence, there would be no more public anti-war actions, and most civil society actors turned to internal organizing, sensitization and training geared towards making Lebanese society less prone to violent conflict in the future.<sup>69</sup>

## Conclusions

The initiatives presented in this chapter hardly constitute a clear-cut and unitary peace movement. They originated from various groups and organizations with different demands and objectives, beginning with calls for negative peace and ending the war, and then expanding to social justice, economic reform, respect for human rights, national unity, and the ever-sensitive issue of political secularization.<sup>70</sup> In all their variety, their demands nevertheless shared the central feature of addressing some of the core issues underlying Lebanon’s susceptibility to violent conflict, and were ultimately concerned with the components of a long-term, positive peace, rather than merely a securitization of the country and an absence of physical violence. But when the fighting finally subsided in 1991, the only major political result was the Taef agreement’s recalibration of the country’s power sharing formula, while most of the fundamental structural problems remained.

Why were these movements unable to have a stronger impact? Although a non-violent struggle for positive civil peace was complicated by the threat of brutality from militias, such “ruthlessness” is in itself not enough to explain its failure on a strategic level.<sup>71</sup> Elsewhere, it has been shown that the approval of people’s social environments is a determining factor for their participation in collective action.<sup>72</sup> This can explain why, with the exception of the 1987 general strike, there was a lack of mass participation in anti-war protests, as much of the population retreated into psychological and geographical isolation in their respective communities.<sup>73</sup> Such isolation was partly a result of the above-mentioned war

system, which had the additional significant effect of creating actors at all levels that had both economic and political interests in continued war.<sup>74</sup> This proliferation of exploitative actors who had myriad agendas, rarely needed to “rule” more than a limited portion of society—a dynamic that complicated the basic assumption of non-violence theory that political power ultimately stems from consent to be ruled.<sup>75</sup>

The very complexity of the Lebanese civil war, the “war system,” hampered the movement’s goals. Positive peace usually requires fundamental political and social reform, and its champions thus need to engage in contentious politics to pressure power-holders to enact change.<sup>76</sup> The number and variety of armed and non-armed actors in the war allowed all parties to deflect responsibility for violence and social ills, leaving the state—incapacitated by war, external intervention, and the excesses of the war system—as the object of the movement’s demands. For all its progress in developing non-violent methods and tactics, the anti-war movement lacked a clearly defined and reform-capable opponent against which to wage non-violent struggle. The greatest achievement of the Lebanese anti-war movement was thus to maintain, throughout fifteen years of war, a numerically small but highly active segment of society that kept alive the idea of a pluralist, democratic, and united Lebanon.

### Notes

- 1 On the outbreak and course of the conflict, see Farid El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); on militias, see Salim Nasr, “The Militia Phenomenon,” *Middle East Report*, no. 162 (1990): 7.
- 2 Gabriel M. Bustros, *Who’s Who in Lebanon 1977–1978* (Beirut: Publitec, 1977), 24.
- 3 Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 147–150.
- 4 Ussama Makdisi, “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon,” *Middle East Report*, no. 200 (1996): 23–26; 30.
- 5 The definition used by the Civicus Civil Society Index, see Volkhart F Heinrich, “Studying Civil Society Across the World,” *Journal of Civil Society* 1, no. 3 (2006): 217.
- 6 Fadia Kiwan, “La société civile au Liban: ses forces et ses faiblesses,” *Oriente Moderno* 94, no. 2 (2014): 285–301.
- 7 Quoted in “Bloody Round 4 in Beirut,” *Time Magazine*, October 20, 1975, accessed April 2, 2018, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946564,00.html>
- 8 Marie-Thérèse Oliver Saïdi, “La ligne verte de Beyrouth, 1975–1991,” *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 190 (1998): 43–60; Gaby Nasr, “Musée-Berbir: la ‘Promenade des engrais,’” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, May 5, 1984, 2.
- 9 Aïda Kanafani-Zahar, “Le Musée National de Beyrouth: mémoire des contraires, frontière et passage, échafaud et liberté,” in *Mémoires de guerres au Liban (1975–1990)*, ed. Franck Mermier and Christophe Varin (Paris: Sindbad, 2010).
- 10 Nasser Yassin, “Beirut,” *Cities* 29, no. 1 (2012): 64–73.
- 11 Paul Achcar, “Perspective d’émergence d’un espace public et mouvements de paix,” in *Reconstruire Beyrouth: les paris sur le possible*, ed. Nabil Beyhum (Lyon: Maison de l’Orient, 1991), 323.
- 12 Paul W.T. Kingston and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, “Rebuilding *A House of Many Mansions*: The Rise and Fall of Militia Cantons in Lebanon,” in *States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Ian Spears (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
- 13 Salim Nasr, “Anatomie d’un système de guerre interne: le cas du Liban,” *Cultures et Conflits*, no. 1 (1990): 85–99.
- 14 Ghassan Slaiby, “Les actions collectives de résistance civil à la guerre,” in *Le Liban aujourd’hui*, ed. Fadia Kiwan (Paris: CNRS, 1994), 127.
- 15 MCA, *Objectifs et activités* (Antelias: Mouvement Culturel, 2000), 14.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 16–17; “Communiqué du Mouvement culturel d’Antelias,” *Le Réveil*, February 17, 1984, 3.

- 17 Hani Feghali, (Cultural Movement), Skype interview with author, Paris/Beitostolen, September 19, 2016; “Clôture du colloque national à Antélias,” *Le Réveil*, May 29, 1984, 5.
- 18 André Bourgey, “La guerre et ses conséquences géographiques au Liban,” *Annales de Géographie* 94, no. 521 (1985): 15; “The Opinion of the Ras Beirut,” *IKE*, January 3, 1980, 2; “Le ‘Front unifié de Ras-Beyrouth’ veille aux intérêts de population,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, July 2, 1976, 2.
- 19 Abdel Rouof Sinno, *Harb Lubnān 1975–1990: tafakkuk ad-dawla wa taṣaddū al-mujtammāʿ* (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2008), 1611–1612; Désirée Akiki, “Le ‘Mouvement pour le Développement’ s’est illustré par les secours aux sinistrés,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, April 10, 1978, 4.
- 20 Sinno, *Harb Lubnān*, 1564–1567.
- 21 Marie-Jeanne Asmar, “34.190 personnes ont reçu en 1984, l’aide des 797 secouristes de la Croix-Rouge libanaise,” *La Revue du Liban*, no. 1319, March 2, 1985, 18; “Croix-Rouge et croissant-rouge: par l’humanité vers la paix,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, May 6, 1984, 5.
- 22 Michel Mégard (Nonviolence trainer), interview with author, Geneva, September 29, 2016; Hani Feghali, interview; Nader Sraj (Movement for Development), interview with author, Beirut, July 17, 2014.
- 23 Nader Sraj, “‘Imān khalīfa: sīrat al-lāʿunf fī ḥayāt shāba lubnāniyya,” *Bāḥithāt* 11 (2006): 227–243.
- 24 “Daʿwāt ilā ‘masīrat 6 ayār,” *An-Nahar*, May 1, 1984, 6; “Mazīd min at-tarḥīb bi-masīrat 6 ayār,” *An-Nahar*, May 4, 1984, 4; “Communiqué du comité organisateur,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, May 5, 1984, 2; “Plusieurs députés participeront à la ‘Marche de la paix,’” *Le Réveil*, May 5, 1984, 2.
- 25 “Barqiyāt taʿyīd li-masīrat 6 ayār,” *Al-Ahwar*, May 5, 1984, 4.
- 26 Sraj, “‘Imān khalīfa,” 237; Frode Holst, “Kuler mot fredsmarsj,” *Verdens Gang*, May 7, 1984, 1.
- 27 “La marche de la paix ajournée sine die,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, May 6, 1984, 1.
- 28 Paul-Jean Franceschini, “L’impossible foi de Beyrouth,” *Le Monde*, May 14, 1984, 6; “Les bombardements ayant empêché la ‘Marche du 6 mai,’” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, May 8, 1984, 1.
- 29 “Un référendum pour remplacer la marche du 6 mai,” *Le Réveil*, May 12, 1984, 3.
- 30 “Nicole Machnouk: ‘dire non à la guerre et le faire entendre,’” *Le Réveil*, June 26, 1984, 5.
- 31 “‘Lijnat lubnān al-muḥabba’ tadaʿū ilā ‘ṭhulathā’ abyad,” *An-Nahar*, May 29, 1985, 4.
- 32 “‘Ḥawājiz muḥabba’ fī bayrūt as-sharqiyya,” *As-Safir*, August 5, 1985, 7.
- 33 “‘Irtidā’ al-abyad li-azḥār al-waḥda wa arādat as-salām,” *An-Nahar*, June 2, 1986, 4; “Daʿwa li-mushārika fī ‘as-silsila al-bashariyya’ al-khamīs al-muqbil,” *As-Safir*, August 18, 1987, 5.
- 34 Nicole Maillard (6 May Committee), interview with author, Beirut, June 19, 2013; Sana Ayass Khatcherian (6 May Committee), interview with author, Antelias, July 23, 2013.
- 35 Michel Touma, *Grégoire Haddad: évêque laïc, évêque rebelle* (Beirut: Les éditions *L’Orient-Le Jour*, 2012); Jean Goss, “Jean Goss au Liban en février dernier,” *Cahiers de la Réconciliation* 48, no. 6–7 (1981): 43–48.
- 36 *Ad-dawra at-tathqīfiyya al-ʿulā hawl al-lāʿunf 14–15–16/11/1986: al-bimāmij* (unpublished workshop program).
- 37 “Dawra tathqīfiyya li-ḥarakat ‘al-lāʿunf,’” *As-Safir*, November 18, 1986, 7; “Majmūʿat lubnaniyīn li-ḥarakat lāʿunf nawā lahā fī dawra ulā,” *An-Nahar*, November 16, 1986, 11.
- 38 “Lebanon’s Handicapped Protest Against Violence,” *Monday Morning* 16, no. 794 (1987): 10; Marie-Jeanne Asmar, “De Halba a Tyr, les handicapes ont réclamé la paix,” *La Revue du Liban*, no. 1456, October 17, 1987, 8.
- 39 Irène Mosalli, “Laure Moughayzel: ‘Du nord au sud et toutes confessions confondues, halte à la guerre . . .,’” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, October 13, 1987, 4.
- 40 “Al-itihād al-ʿummālī yawjah ad-daʿwāt ilā ‘al-muʿtammār an-naqābī al-waṭanī al-ʿamm,’” *An-Nahar*, April 8, 1987, 7.
- 41 John Coggins, *Trade Unions of the World 1989–1990* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1989), 245.
- 42 Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou Rjeily, *Bilan des guerres du Liban 1975–1990* (Paris: Éditions l’Harmattan, 1992), 202; Al-itihād al-ʿummālī al-ʿamm, *Al-muʿtammār an-naqābī al-ʿamm at-thānī* (Beirut: Manshūrāt al-itihād al-ʿummālī al-ʿamm, 1987), 55.
- 43 “Mawāqif min al-azma al-ʿamma wa tawajuhāt lil-muʿtammār an-naqābī al-waṭanī al-ʿamm,” *As-Safir*, May 8, 1987, 6.
- 44 “At-taḥḍīr li-iqrāb 5 tishrīn at-thānī,” *An-Nahar*, October 21, 1987, 7.
- 45 Hani Feghali, interview.
- 46 “A Strike Collapses,” *Monday Morning* 16, no. 797 (1987): 6–7.
- 47 Sinno, *Harb Lubnān*, 1458.

- 48 Nelly Helou, “Du 5 au 9 novembre cinq jours de grève generale,” *La Revue du Liban*, no. 1459, November 14, 1987, 20–22; Per A. Christiansen, “Barrikadene må ned,” *Aftenposten*, November 10, 1987, 9.
- 49 “Al-ittihād al-‘ummālī ‘alaqa al-idrāb,” *Al-Amal*, November 10, 1987, 7–8.
- 50 Rima Shaheen, “A. Beshara: No Pressures on Us to Suspend Strike,” *Monday Morning* 16, no. 797 (1987): 19–21; Nelly Helou, “Cri d’alarme du president de la CGTL,” *La Revue du Liban*, no. 1456, October 17, 1987, 14–16.
- 51 Rima Shaheen, “A Strike or a Holiday?!” *Monday Morning* 16, no. 797 (1987): 71.
- 52 Kiwan, “La société civile,” 287; Slaiby, “Les actions collectives,” 132.
- 53 Ghassan Slaiby, *Fī al-ittihād kuwwa* (Beirut: Dār al-mukhtārāt, 1999), 162.
- 54 “I’tišām ḥatā as-ṣabāh amām ‘qaṣr maṣṣūr,” *An-Nahar*, July 28, 1988, 4.
- 55 Amal Dibo (Nonviolence Movement), interview with author, Beirut, July 4, 2013.
- 56 “‘Intakhabū al-waḥda was-salām wa ḥuqūq al-insān,” *Ad-Diyar*, July 28, 1988, 5.
- 57 “Laure Moghayzel: ‘Un president pour l’unité, la paix et les droits de l’homme,’” *La Revue du Liban*, no. 1497, August 8, 1988, 24.
- 58 “Al-liqā’ an-naqābī al-‘ummālī da’ā ilā intikhāb ra’īs yuwaḥḥid lubnān,” *National News Agency*, August 10, 1988, 3; “Ta’aqad al-yawm mu’tammaran ṣaḥafian bil-kārltūn,” *Al-Bayrak*, August 1, 1988.
- 59 Marc Yared, “Raymond Eddé: ‘Si je suis élu président . . .,’” *Arabies*, no. 18 (1988): 30–33.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 ‘Les Comités des Amis de Raymond Eddé’: Quand la société civile fait de la politique (unpublished manuscript).
- 62 Ibid.; “Lijnat aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd Iddih,” *As-Sharq*, August 1, 1988.
- 63 Paul Achcar (Friends of Eddé), interview with author, Beirut, February 25, 2016.
- 64 “Aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd fī ṣūr,” *An-Nahar*, September 15, 1988, 4; “‘Aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd’ fī ṣaidā,” *Ad-Diyar*, September 9, 1988; “Bayān min ‘aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd’ ilā an-nawāb,” *Ad-Diyar*, September 9, 1988; “‘Ḥājjiz’ li-aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd amām bkirkī,” *An-Nahar*, September 1, 1988, 3; “‘Lijān aṣḍiqā’ al-‘amīd’ zārat qabalān,” *An-Nahar*, July 28, 1988, 5.
- 65 Mansour Raad and Joe Stork, “Everyone Misunderstood the Depth of the Movement Identifying with Aoun,” *Middle East Report*, no. 162 (1990): 11–14.
- 66 Fadia Kiwan, “The Formation of Lebanese Civil Society,” *The Beirut Review*, no. 6 (1993): 69–74.
- 67 Slaiby, “Les actions collectives,” 133.
- 68 Fawwaz Traboulsi, “Confessional Lines,” *Middle East Report*, no. 162 (1990): 9–10.
- 69 Alain Refalo, “Liban: de l’action symbolique à la conscientisation de la société civile,” *Alternatives non-violentes*, no. 119 (2001): 141–143; Philippe Clerc, “Formation à la non-violence au Liban,” *K comme King*, no. 30 (1991): 9–10.
- 70 Theodor Hanf, “The ‘Political Secularization’ Issue in Lebanon,” in *Proceedings of the Fourth EASRG Conference*, ed. Murād Wahbah (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1983).
- 71 Ralph Summy, “Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent,” *Pacifica Review* 6, no. 1 (1994): 1–29.
- 72 Bert Klandermans and Jacquélien Van Stekelenburg, “Why People Don’t Participate in Collective Action,” *Journal of Civil Society* 10, no. 4 (2014): 341–352.
- 73 Samir Khalaf, *Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bowj* (London: Saqi, 2006), 122.
- 74 Elizabeth Picard, “The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon,” in *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, ed. Steven Heydemann (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
- 75 Hardy Merriman, “Theory and Dynamics of Nonviolent Action,” in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
- 76 Daniel Lieberfeld, “What Makes an Effective Antiwar Movement?,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–14.