


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Christian Philip Peterson, William M. Knoblauch, Michael Loadenthal

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Charles F. Howlett, Christian Philip Peterson

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PEACE IN AN AGE OF MODERNITY, 1865–1914

Charles F. Howlett and Christian Philip Peterson

From the conclusion of the US Civil War in 1865 to the beginning of the Great War (1914–1918), the world became a more interdependent and interconnected place. The expanding use of technologies such as steamships, railroads, electricity, and telegraph lines created a growing interconnectedness between modern nation states. These nations' militaries exploited improvements in weapons technology to build "imperial systems" across the planet in the name of "progress" or "civilization." Fueled by increasingly racist and nationalistic ideologies, European policymakers built huge standing armies and formed alliances with each other to protect the "balance of power" on the continent and secure their colonial possessions. While the growing interconnectedness of the world often fueled the militaristic competition of governments, it also became a "golden age" of internationalism that gave rise to new forms of global cooperation in areas as diverse as communications, finance, commerce, law, and weights and measures. As part of this process, an international movement for peace developed that reflected the efforts of industrialists, social reformers, writers, peace activists, lawyers, working class figures, and political leaders to create a humane and safer world.¹

This chapter examines how some private citizens, including women and government officials, gravitated toward developing a more organized, practical form of internationalism that advocated the use of arbitration—a process by which nations submit their differences to an impartial body that renders a decision to prevent military conflict—and/or the building of international law to prevent wars and break down the barriers that divided private citizens.² It will also devote considerable attention to how many elites, especially lawyers in the United States, promoted peace through the doctrine of Legalism—here meaning the belief that international laws and legal institutions represented the best way to resolve international disputes in peaceful ways.³ Instead of privileging a "Western" perspective, like many works do, this chapter considers how private citizens and governmental officials from Latin America to Asia also worked to combat the causes of war. The conclusion will gauge the legacy of the peace promotion efforts during this period.

US efforts for peace immediately after the Civil War

The US peace movement after the Civil War demonstrated a genuine interest in cosmopolitan concerns for peace—an attempt that can be characterized by a worldly outlook and hope to abolish large standing armies, develop and refine concepts of international law on land and sea, encourage restrictions on the development and manufacture of armaments,

and foster participation in peace congresses that promoted the idea of arbitration. A small but influential group of lawyers and businessmen in the 1860s began collaborating with sympathetic European peace advocates to encourage governments to establish judicial and arbitral means of settling disputes. Such a course of action, they reasoned, could bring order to the “functional infrastructure of the emerging system of interdependence” (international postal service, trade, communications, and consular services). These urban, secular activists had little use for “panaceas or preachments,” which were commonplace among still-active religious peace groups. Instead, they believed that America was part of an Atlantic community and that, as Alfred Love of the Universal Peace Union had suggested, government could act as an instrument for social and economic improvement. These new cosmopolitan peace seekers were less concerned about promoting the traditional view of nonresistance pacifism—as practiced by religious groups such as the Society of Friends in Great Britain and the United States—and focused more on the development of legal processes that would assist America in its rise to world power; at the same time, they hoped to avoid European political entanglements that could cause war.⁴

The initial scholarly expression of the cosmopolitan peace effort came from the pen of Columbia University political scientist Francis Lieber. Cognizant that the Crimean War had checked the growth of peace activism in Europe, he wrote *Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field*, General Orders No. 100 (1863), which offered a cautionary appeal for the control and containment of this conflict’s violence.⁵ Refusing to fall into the trap of working to save the world by relying on “public opinion and God,” he instead endorsed a “chastened [form] of internationalism” that emphasized building “new institutions” to promote peace. He drew upon his studies of European peace activists’ efforts, including the discussions in Geneva, Switzerland that created the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁶ He also urged arbitration in settling Anglo-American differences in the wake of the US Civil War.⁷

The Geneva Claims settlement aroused considerable interest among cosmopolitan peace advocates in the areas of international law and arbitration. David Dudley Field, a prominent American jurist who helped to codify American criminal and civil law, previously urged the British Society for the Advancement of Social Science to establish a joint committee to draft a code of international laws. Encouraged by an affirmative response, Field produced in 1872 his *Draft Outlines for an International Code* that called for the simultaneous reduction of armaments, followed by the development of international congresses to solve diplomatic conflicts via a tribunal of arbitration.⁸

Meanwhile, Elihu Burritt, the nineteenth-century US peace activist who established the trans-Atlantic peace organization, The League of Universal Brotherhood, and James Miles of the American Peace Society, called for the creation of a permanent arbitration system resting upon a code of international law that applied to governments that accepted it. Following Field’s lead, the Society succeeded in convening an international meeting in Brussels in 1873, which ultimately led to the formation of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations. With branches in America and Europe, the Association became the primary vehicle for reforming aspects of international law until 1895 when it was reorganized into the International Law Association.⁹

The European perspective

European peacemaking efforts profoundly impacted the American quest to eliminate war. European efforts to promote the importance of international law coincided with early

American Peace Society's propaganda for arbitration. At the end of 1873, two academic juridical societies were founded in Europe: The Institute de Droit International at Ghent, devoted to the study of arbitration and private international law, and the International Law Association. The Zurich meeting of the latter society in 1877 passed a resolution stating that in the future "all treaties should contain a clause making arbitration obligatory in certain classes of disputes." This society claimed as a member Sir Robert Phillimore, who later played a major role in founding the Covenant of the League of Nations.¹⁰

At the same time, Randall Cremer, a British peace advocate who furthered Anglo-American arbitration negotiations, organized the Peace Congress in Paris in 1878. With spokesmen from thirteen countries, the Congress demanded a court of arbitration and an international commission to estimate each European nation's armaments. The Congress emphasized the costly effects of wars on working men and the need for protests to prevent war. The proposal that the peace societies in various countries be federated marked a step towards international organization. These included Société Français des Amis de la Paix of France, Workmen's Peace Association of Britain (later the International Arbitration League), the Italian Peace Society, and the Netherlands Peace Society. A conference of representatives from workmen's organizations (from England, France, and Italy) to discuss peace proposals was held in Paris in 1879.

In the summer of 1880, the well-traveled and wealthy British peace advocate Hodgson Pratt helped to organize the International Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain and Ireland (IAPA), whose first meeting was held on August 16, 1880 in London. Rivaling the British Peace Society and Cremer's own International Arbitration League, Pratt's society established three objectives: (1) form "a public opinion in Europe favourable to the substitution of arbitration for war"; (2) establish and "promote friendly feelings between the citizens of different countries"; and (3) "correct erroneous statements in the Press or in European Parliaments on international questions." Pratt insisted that there needed to be a "purely secular organization" unencumbered by spiritual and Christian concerns. He planned to make his organization relevant by undertaking Continental tours and to publicize his message through a monthly journal entitled *Concord*.¹¹ His calls for "secular-led" arbitration efforts made his organization the model for every other arbitration society that emerged during fin de siècle Europe.¹²

Arbitration, international law, and world peace, 1865–1900

The cosmopolitan peace movement in the US gained momentum with the formation of the National Arbitration League (NAL) in 1882.¹³ Working to popularize "arbitral ideals," participants in a two-day conference (May 1882) praised US Secretary of State James G. Blaine's call for the holding of a Pan-American Conference to improve relations throughout the Western hemisphere by summoning a congress of nations to limit armaments, negotiate permanent treaties of arbitration, and establish an international court.¹⁴

Paradoxically, the drive for global harmony was led by figures who envisaged the "triumph of peace through the domestic and global extension of Anglo-American racial supremacy."¹⁵ Combining the rhetoric of evangelical Christianity with the pseudo-scientific idiom of racial Anglo-Saxonism, leading British and American peace seekers promoted the ideal of international arbitration. In 1887, Cremer and other British legislators traveled across the Atlantic, visiting many American cities, with a proposal for an Anglo-American treaty agreement to submit to arbitration all future disputes between the powers.¹⁶ Cremer's vision was finally

given wide publicity in 1895 when two Quakers, Albert and Alfred Smiley, welcomed to their scenic Lake Mohonk, New York, resort notable national leaders supporting the cause of international arbitration. It was the first of twenty-two annual conferences that grew over time from fifty to 300 selected guests. The purpose of these discussions was “to help concentrate the public opinion of our own land, which is very largely in favor of peace, and to bring it to bear upon the war system.” These conferences popularized the idea of a permanent international court and lent a glow of respectability to the peace movement itself.¹⁷

The idea of international arbitration also gained momentum when the long-simmering border dispute between Venezuela and the British Crown Colony of Guiana erupted in the mid-1890s. Using the pretext of the Monroe Doctrine to assert its imperial preeminence in the Western hemisphere, the US interceded on Venezuela’s side. After weeks of mounting tension, the two powers agreed to submit their differences to an ad hoc tribunal that in effect ruled in favor of the British.¹⁸ In the wake of this decision, Secretary of State Richard Olney accepted British ambassador Sir Julian Paunceforte’s overture for a treaty arrangement, one that required the two countries “to submit all financial and territorial differences over a five-year trial period to a complicated system of arbitrated settlement.” US peace leaders vigorously pressed for Senate ratification of the treaty. Their efforts were in vain, however, as Senators remained skeptical “of British intentions [and] doubtful over the mechanical peace agreements involved in the joint proposal.”¹⁹

Although the United States refused to ratify this treaty, the cause of arbitration progressed during The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The first of these meetings, which Tsar Nicholas II had called to abate an expensive arms race and build a global peace, put peace activists in a position to lobby government officials on behalf of issues as diverse as the rules of war, treatment of prisoners, protection of noncombatants during times of war, and arbitration. Even if government representatives refused to create a system to prevent future wars, they passed a resolution that called on governments to arbitrate their disputes with third parties.²⁰ They also created the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an informal tribunal of appointed arbiters that could settle disputes between nations if they were voluntarily called upon to do so.²¹

Outside the United States and Western Europe, Latin Americans played their own role in building support for using arbitration and international law to promote peace.²² Hoping to strengthen their credentials as “civilized” nations, a congress of Latin American nations issued a pact called the “Preservation of Peace” in 1864. Although most of the signatories’ governments never ratified this treaty, the document pledged “the parties . . . to use pacific measures exclusively to put an end to all of their differences” through arbitration when other measures failed.²³ In September 1880, Chile and Colombia agreed to settle their disputes through arbitration. Further hoping to advance the cause of arbitration, Colombia next invited every other Latin American government (save Brazil) to attend a conference the following year in Panama designed to achieve similar results. Latin American representatives also held conferences in 1877 and 1883 to strengthen “Private international law.”²⁴

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Latin Americans made a concerted effort to link the practices of arbitration and the building of international law to the idea of Pan-Americanism. This process began to gather steam when seventeen Latin American nations accepted James G. Blaine’s invitation to attend the First International Conference of American States (1889–1890).²⁵ After considerable debate, all the delegations save Chile agreed to a resolution that called on the governments of the Americas to use

compulsory arbitration to settle their disputes except when one of them believed that the matter would “compromise the independence of their nation.”²⁶ After passing this resolution, several Latin American nations and the United States signed a compulsory arbitration treaty, although none of them ended up ratifying it.²⁷

The efforts of Latin Americans to make arbitration and international law important components of Pan Americanism did not end with the signing of the arbitration treaty in 1890. During the Second Pan-American conference in Mexico City (1901–1902), all of the assembled nations endorsed their intention to abide by the resolutions of the 1899 Hague Convention, including the one on “voluntary arbitration” and make them a part of “American International Public Law.” Hoping to build on this precedent, nine Latin American countries went even further and signed a treaty of “obligatory [compulsory] arbitration,” a method of settlement that the signatories pledged to employ so long as the dispute did not involve the “independence nor honor of the nation.”²⁸

Along with working to further the cause of arbitration, Latin Americans also played a role in developing international law and legal institutions. After attending the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, several Latin American nations accepted the invitations of the United States and Mexico to participate in a Central American Peace Conference in Washington, D.C. Convinced that institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration would always favor European and US interests over those of their own nations, Costa Rica and four other Central American countries drew on the advice of US representatives and chose to create a Central American Court of Justice. Modeled on the plan for an international court that the United States had presented at Hague Peace Conference (see below), this court became the first “permanent, obligatory international court of justice,” as it could rule on “any international dispute among the Central American republics or between them and a foreign nation.” It could even rule on disputes against governments raised by private citizens.²⁹

Interested in limiting foreign interventions in Latin American affairs, the Chilean lawyer Alejandro Alvarez worked to build a “new system of hemispheric governance” based on the principles of “American international law.”³⁰ Convinced that the influence of ideas such as liberalism and constitutionalism made the Americas exceptional, he argued that the Monroe Doctrine represented a form of “American international law” that legitimated the principles of non-intervention, non-interference, mutual cooperation, and the peaceful settlement of disputes among the American nations.³¹ Hoping to institutionalize these ideas, Alvarez worked with US legal expert James Brown Scott to create the American Institute of International Law (AIIL) in 1911, which established franchises in “each of America’s twenty-one republics.”³² At its first institutionalized meeting in 1916, this organization adopted the “Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations,” which insisted that all countries in the Western Hemisphere had a “right to independence . . . self-protection . . . [and] the duty of respecting their own territories and jurisdictions.” From there, the AIIL worked in concert with numerous parties, including the Pan American Union and International Commission of (Inter-American) jurists to codify “American international law” during the 1920s and 1930s.³³

The ideas that Westerners articulated about arbitration and international law soon spread to private citizens in East Asia, especially in Japan. For example, a small number of Japanese worked with the British Peace Society to create the *Nihon heiwa-kai* in 1889, which became Japan’s first peace society. Like peace societies in the West, *Nihon heiwa-kai* established its own newsletter (est. 1892) to fight militarism with passive Christian nonresistance—defined here as rejecting the use of any form of violence as a measure of opposition based on religious

principles. Influenced by his contacts with members of the British Peace Society, member Kitamura Tokoku made every effort to explain why “militant nationalism” and the “military buildup” of the Great Powers would destroy civilization through a calamitous war. To create a more peaceful planet, he urged people to emancipate themselves from the “external world” and cultivate their “inner freedom” so as to see their common humanity.³⁴ The organization’s most influential writer was Uchimura Kanzo, who was considered Japan’s leading pre-World War II Christian pacifist. Despite his support for the 1894–1895 war against China, he quickly changed his mind when appraised of the brutalities associated with that conflict. Embracing absolute pacifism, Kanzo wrote and spoke out against war and militarism until he died in 1930.³⁵

Some Japanese citizens focused on building contacts with Westerners. For example, a small number of activists created the Japanese Society of International Law in 1897 so they could shape Western debates concerning the creation of international institutions.³⁶ Also committed to engaging the wider world on the issue of peace, many Japanese representatives, including some from the government, attended the Lake Mohonk conferences; by 1904, Baron Kentaro Kaneko showcased Japan’s commitment to the development of international law. He did so by outlining how it agreed to handle a dispute concerning the status of 500 Chinese slaves on a Chilean ship, one that the Japanese government freed after the vessel appeared in Yokohama harbor. Not only did this action uphold international laws against the slave trade, Kaneko commented, but the Japanese government also agreed to let Russian Tsar Alexander II arbitrate the dispute after Chile challenged its behavior. The fact that the Russian Tsar ruled in Japan’s favor, he continued, “should not overshadow the important ways that his nation had defended the principle of peaceful arbitration.”³⁷

Some Chinese and Persians also grappled with the issue of peace during the turn of the century. Chinese thinkers such as Kan Yuowei, Ou Jujia, and Sun Yatsen wrestled with “adapting Confucian values to contemporary conditions.” To cite one example, Ou Jujia argued that the spread of “Confucian teaching” would not only promote harmony, but also serve as a “foundation for all governments to embrace a common international law.” As devoted “followers of Confucius,” Chinese representatives had signed various agreements at the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences, as well as an arbitration treaty with the United States in 1908.³⁸ In Persia, a small number of people turned to religion to achieve peace—especially, Baha’i, an offshoot of Shia Islam espoused by Sayyid Ali Muhammad. Based on the teaching of Ali Muhammad (also known as Baha’ o ‘llah), followers took parts of various religions to promote religious tolerance, the unity of humanity, economic equality, and gender equality. Hoping to create a global religion, they also advocated universal disarmament as way to abolish war and unify humanity. Somewhat cautious of the Baha’i movement’s influence within his country, Mizra Ali Kuli Khan, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Persian Legation in the United States, voiced Persia’s determination to help create a more peaceful world by promoting the signing of arbitration treaties. Such an approach made sense, he asserted, because peace activists had already done enough to “justify our hope in the final triumph of universal peace.”³⁹

The Swedish-born inventor and philanthropist Alfred Nobel, furthermore, wanted to play his own role in cultivating a universal peace and uniting humanity. As many authors have pointed out, Nobel invented dynamite and made a number of fundamental innovations in weapons technology working as a scientist. Because he believed that human beings could use his discoveries for either good or evil, he grappled with the issues of peace throughout his life. From one angle, he pondered whether or not dynamite could produce a war machine

so terrible that would deter countries from engaging in war with each other. At the same time, he paid close attention to the activities of the peace groups described above and “procedures of conflict resolution,” including the creation of an “international court.” Nobel’s interest in the subject of peace and making war obsolete manifested itself in a correspondence with the Czech–Austrian peace activist and author Bertha von Suttner that lasted for almost two decades. Evidence suggests that Suttner shaped Nobel’s thinking on the subject of peace through her activism and her anti-war novel *Lay Down Your Arms* (1889). Inspired by her efforts to end war, Nobel decided to create an award for promoting peace that now goes by the name Nobel Peace Prize, which was first awarded in 1901.⁴⁰

Women’s efforts for world peace, 1865–1915

One of the more important developments in the quest for peace during the Age of Modernity was the increasing involvement of female activists, who emphasized three basic conceptions that would form the building blocks for a women’s peace movement: That women best understood the supreme value of preserving life; that women as teachers were committed to enhancing the quality of life; and that women as organizers had much to offer the established peace movement in terms of energy and devotion.⁴¹

One of the more forceful figures was Lucia Ames Mead, president of the Massachusetts Woman’s Suffrage Association.⁴² She reflected other leading female peace workers’ cardinal assumption that like individuals, nations could be selfless in their dealings with their neighbors. As an educator, she hoped that schoolteachers would instill a sense of internationalism in the minds of American youth. She was not afraid to let children read about war, “provided they are taught that it is the most savage and most foolish method ever discovered for settling disputes.”⁴³ She also stressed the fundamental role of women as preservers of life:

Beginning with the nursery, to which we will bring no tin swords or leaden soldiers, and teaching in schools and clubs and “patriotic” societies a true instead of a false or narrow patriotism, we will set ourselves to conquering ignorance and prejudices around us.⁴⁴

The Women’s Christian Temperance Union leader Hannah J. Bailey’s own Department of Peace and Arbitration demonstrated the increasingly important role organized women could play in opposing war and militarism.⁴⁵ Her state and local departments aggressively lobbied legislatures and school boards to reject military training in public schools. They also levied criticisms against Sunday schools’ sponsorship of Boys’ Brigades, an organization composed of young males who wore uniforms and carried rifles supplied by the churches. Bailey, herself, demanded that organizations were needed to convince mothers not to “allow their children to have military toys, to practice warlike games, or anything that makes them familiar with taking life as a pastime.”⁴⁶ The late nineteenth century also witnessed American females promoting international women’s organizations devoted to peace, disarmament, and arbitration. In 1869, Marie Goegg established the International Association of Women to further the goals of peace and liberty. In 1870, the noted American suffragist Julia Ward Howe “called for a Women’s Peace Congress for the World to take place in England,” although by 1873 she had more success coordinating “‘women’s peace festivals’ . . . in the United States, western Europe and Constantinople.”⁴⁷

The proliferation of international women's peace organizations was equally evident in Europe.⁴⁸ In his 2014 work *NGOs*, Thomas Davies explains that as the twentieth century approached, non-governmental organizations led by women began challenging more established male-dominated peace organizations. In 1895, in Paris, the International Union of Women for Peace was established. A year later, also in Paris, the Universal Alliance of Women for Peace by Education (known also as the International League of Women for General Disarmament) was created. In 1898, the Association for Peace and Disarmament through Women, took center stage in calling for an end to military conflict through armament reduction. As Davies states: "These organizations not only pioneered the promotion of general disarmament, but also wider reforms of the international system, such as the 'International Senate' for the pacific resolution of disputes promoted by the International League of Women for General Disarmament."⁴⁹

One of the more important contributions women made to the cause of world peace was persuading governments to take action at the 1899 Hague Conference. More than one million signatures were attached to a petition obtained from peace supporters in Europe, the United States, and Japan, which women presented at the conference. Most notably, "the 'first worldwide Women's Peace Demonstration' aiming to pass identical resolutions in 500 centres in eighteen countries was planned for three days before the opening of the conference." A notable contribution of women peace advocates at The Hague Conference was "the pioneering of activist techniques for the lobbying of intergovernmental conferences. Among the techniques pioneered at this conference were the unofficial newspapers covering conference proceedings and the salon where peace activists and government delegates could mingle."⁵⁰

Dawn of a new century: Legalists at work for international peace in the United States

In many ways, the international movement became a more pragmatic enterprise during the early twentieth century. In the United States peace became a prestigious calling, one devoted primarily to the legal settlement of disputes. This sort of international peacemaking, based on a narrower vision of peace and justice, gained considerable recognition among experts in international law. In fact, by 1902,

supporters of arbitration and international law in general were hailing a half century of progress in which "the awakened conscience of the world" had redefined the very notion of a concert of nations and transformed 'the rules and regulation of international relations.'⁵¹

The only problem was that arbitration, in and of itself, offered no sure-fire guarantee of peace, and skepticism abounded: As the historian Mark Mazower has written: "The left charged that there would be war so long as capitalism existed. The right wanted to protect the nation's prerogatives and accused the peace movement, even in this most respectable of incarnations, of being led astray by high-mindedness."⁵²

Perhaps more importantly, after 1900, even though anti-imperialism and antimilitarism remained objectives of the peace movement there was a decided shift from "non-institutional pacifism to institutional internationalism." This shift occurred as

International lawyers and other moderate internationalists . . . championed periodic congresses as the indispensable prerequisite for discussion leading to the creation of a world court. These Legalists believed in the legal equality of sovereignty states, though as extremely cautious reformers they tolerated the inequality of power among them until regular international conferences could formulate a code of laws that all nations would accept.

Equally important, Legalists couched their arguments for world peace in terms of a pro-law movement, one seeking to promote the “non-idealistic” mechanisms of arbitration, courtroom justice, and, if possible, world federation backed by the rules of international law.⁵³

Almost no UA Legalist proved more influential before World War I than the Republican politician and US Secretary of State (1905–1909) Elihu Root. Unconvinced that arbitration could establish permanent world peace, furthermore, Secretary of State Root “believed that impartial lawyers were better placed than necessarily partial diplomats for settling international disputes.”⁵⁴ His magnetism attracted Republican internationalists who would shape American foreign policy for almost half a century, such as Henry Stimson and James Brown Scott. They agreed with Root’s argument that

disputes between nations shall be settled by judges acting under the judicial sense of honorable obligation with a judicial idea of impartiality rather than by diplomats acting under ideas of honorable obligation and feeling bound to negotiate a settlement rather than to pass without fear or favor upon questions of fact and law.⁵⁵

The importance that lawyers such as Root and Scott placed on developing international law and judicial institutions should not obscure an important point: They believed that undertaking such an enterprise complemented—even increased—the global power and influence of the United States. As Benjamin Allen Coates argues in his book *Legalist Empire* (2016), “Legalists . . . [viewed] international law as an extension of American principles abroad.” Because the United States was an “inherently lawful nation,” the strengthening of international law would allow it “to engage with an ever-closer world without sacrificing any of its national traditions.” Instead of allowing international institutions to override American sovereignty on issues such as immigration and race relations, it would discipline state behavior in ways that “protected the rights of capital” in “backward” nations and help prevent the United States from becoming ensnared in European wars.⁵⁶ Consistent with this position, Legalists such as Scott used the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 to push for the creation of a permanent international court modeled on the US Supreme Court. According to Coates, US delegates fought for such a court because they believed that if it could render binding decisions, it “could prod states to change their behavior . . . by clarifying the law . . . and modeling the possibility of an impartial settlement.” No matter where judges on the court hailed from, so the argument went, Americans did not have to worry about their decisions because the United States was a “civilized” nation that already followed international law.⁵⁷

Although Americans failed to create a permanent international court before World War I, they took other steps to further the Legalist agenda. Reflecting same impulses that resulted in the emergence of the AAIL in 1911, Scott and others created the American Society of International Law (ASIL) in 1906 and started publishing *The American Journal of International*

Law (AJIL) one year later. On the whole, these individuals saw their endeavors as important steps in creating a “scientific” clearinghouse that would help make the American public more aware of how to use international law and judicial institutions to promote peace.⁵⁸ Consistent with this goal, Scott helped create the Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in 1910. In practice, political scientists, legalists, and jurists warmly greeted the ASIL, one formed to promote the Second Hague Peace Conference’s nonbinding motion that an international court endowed with judicial authority ought to supplement the existing arbitration tribunal. The ASIL not only popularized the idea of an international court comparable to the US Supreme Court, but reviewed technical matters such as the potential impact of sanctions and advanced the emerging field of international jurisprudence. These sorts of efforts played an important role in the decision of the League of Nations to create a World Court after World War I ended.⁵⁹

Practical peace machinery for internationalism at work

Hoping to coordinate more efficiently the peace movement’s numerous activities, especially in the United States, moreover, Edwin Ginn, a noted textbook publisher and president of Ginn & Company, took the first step. A believer in international compacts, a world court, and enforcement of global harmony backed by an international police force, Ginn established his own major peace organization to educate people to the importance of peace through more businesslike procedures. His World Peace Foundation (WPF), led by Edwin D. Mead and Denys P. Myers, made available both peace classics and important new works such as Jean de Bloch’s *The Future of War*, and the writings of British pacifist Norman Angell.⁶⁰ The foundation also distributed a series of brief, accurate, and informative pamphlets and leaflets. Acting on the belief that educational work for peace would be most effective among youth, the WPF generously subsidized the American Peace League—founded in 1908 by Fannie Fern Andrews, a Boston school teacher. It also aided financially the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs, which originated in 1903 for the promotion of international friendship and understanding among university students.⁶¹

Not to be outdone by Ginn’s magnanimity, Carnegie contributed \$10 million in United States Steel Corporation bonds in December 1910 toward the formation in New York of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). He chose to direct the officers of the Endowment to “hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization.”⁶² Their efforts were ably led by former Secretary of State Elihu Root as president. As president of the foundation, Root’s worldview matched other “practical” peacemakers of his generation: Namely, the commitment to democracy cemented with an elitist vision. CEIP leaders, who dominated peace discourse until the outbreak of world war, “talked a lot about public opinion but regarded it as something to be educated, and believed power should be put in the hands of a small group of scientifically trained legal experts.” As Mazower so compellingly points out: “It was a conservative vision in that it sought to defuse political, social, and economic conflicts by reducing clashes of interest and equity to matters of legal principle.”⁶³

Typifying the era’s elitism, the CEIP was reluctant to subsidize “peace” societies per se; instead, the endowment spent its money on only the safest peace proposals as dictated by twenty-seven very conservative trustees. The CEIP remained detached, even businesslike. Seeking to establish “a veritable Faculty of Peace,” the popular endowment not only sponsored interchanges of US and foreign professors, but amassed an admirable research

library filled with learned documents on the development of international law, the causes of war, and the past records of peace efforts. It also spent large amounts of money on foreign publications such as the *Japanese Review of International Law* and *Il Diritto Internazionale Codificato* (Italy) to put the “scientific development of international law at the center of their vision.”⁶⁴ Clearly, at the Progressive Era’s outset, elites put their faith in other elites, but remained blind to the reality that a global conflict awaited them.

Conclusion

What happened to derail such lofty promises for world peace in the early years of the twentieth century? As many authors have argued, the steps that private citizens and government officials took to promote peace from 1865 to 1914 failed to prevent the British from waging war against the South African Boers, Germany’s attempts to exterminate the Herero and Nama people in its colony of South West Africa from 1904 to 1908, and foreign troops’ violent suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China. They also failed to prevent World War I, a conflict that may have killed as many as twenty million people. Even if Latin America proved “surprisingly free from significant warfare during the twentieth century,” as one scholar writes, this region nevertheless has experienced conflicts that have killed hundreds of thousands of people up to the present day. The United States also carried out a wide variety of interventions in Latin America—and elsewhere—during the twentieth century that have often boiled down to participating in wars.⁶⁵

Numerous scholars have addressed these failures.⁶⁶ Most suggest that peace activism proved too weak to stop nation states, especially those in Europe, from building the military power necessary to preserve the “balance of power” and protect their colonial empires. They also failed to discredit nationalist and Social Darwinian ideas that glorified the waging of war. It did not help that many who gravitated toward peace activism after 1900, especially in the United States, were “politically conservative or middle-of-the-road” individuals who saw some utility in retaining the ability to wage war and viewed an international court as a great way to promote peace without subjecting their domestic order to more international oversight. As the historian David Patterson put it, even if some of these conservatives criticized the “military and armament makers” of the era, they nevertheless “failed to probe deeply into the national and imperial rivalries that fostered the arms race. They were in fact too much a part of the established order to advance any well-developed theoretical criticisms of it.”⁶⁷

In Europe, which had a large pacifist presence, results were similar. When World War I broke out, historian Sandi Cooper writes, “most pacifists . . . along with most socialists . . . accepted their government’s assertion that they had been attacked. Patriotic pacifism demanded that defensive war be waged. The War of August 1914 was a ‘just war.’”⁶⁸ Whatever legacy was left of nineteenth-century European pacifism found its way into the current lexicon of liberal internationalism.⁶⁹ The bottom line was that the peace movement was “far too weak politically and ideologically to counter the vast historical forces . . . [of] nationalism, economic self-interest, and political rivalry . . . that were propelling Europe toward disaster.”⁷⁰

Despite its obvious shortcomings, the international movement for peace deserves credit for a number of accomplishments. It helped stimulate government activity on behalf of peace and began the process of building a more cooperative world order.⁷¹ For example, even under a President such as Theodore Roosevelt, who saw waging war as an integral and

necessary part of international affairs, the United States eventually ratified twenty-two bilateral arbitration treaties that it had signed with countries as diverse as Great Britain, China, Sweden, Japan, Brazil, and Uruguay, although these agreements exempted “matters affecting vital national interests or honor.” A firm believer in building international law and using the process of arbitration to prevent conflicts, President William Howard Taft signed bilateral arbitration treaties with France and Great Britain in 1911 that did exempt matters of “national interests or honor.” These treaties even called for the creation of Joint High Commissions of Inquiry that would offer opinions on what courses of action to take if a disagreement arose over whether a dispute was subject to arbitration.⁷² Well aware of the steps that private citizens had taken to promote peace during his lifetime, Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan signed “cooling off” treaties with thirty countries (twenty were eventually ratified) that “pledged signatories to submit disputes to an investigatory committee and postpone hostilities until the committee issues.”⁷³ Despite the US government’s own reservations and refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles, American Legalists and arbitrationists generally supported European efforts that led to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague in 1922. It was former President Taft, among other American Legalists, who, prior to the war, assumed a leading role in establishing the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), which called for the creation of an international judicial body and members’ use of military force and economic sanctions to punish aggressors.⁷⁴

Individuals outside the United States and Europe made important contributions to the global movement for peace described in this chapter. The efforts of Latin Americans in Pan American conferences and forums such as the AIII played an important role in convincing the Franklin Roosevelt administration to renounce the right of intervention as part of its Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. The historian Greg Grandin also makes a compelling argument that Latin Americans played an important role in shaping the “liberal” international order that the United States set out to build after World War II, an approach that included the ideals of respect for national sovereignty, the building of international institutions and arrangements, regional alliance systems, and individual and “social rights.”⁷⁵ Perhaps US President Calvin Coolidge foreshadowed some of this behavior when he thanked Latin American nations for compiling a “most impressive record” of using cooperative arrangements, including the processes of “mediation and arbitration to settle their disputes” and promote “disarmament.”⁷⁶

Despite these accomplishments, World War I changed the way that many peace activists approached the task of creating a more humane world.⁷⁷ In the United States, a more radicalized peace movement emerged—one that extended the antiwar analysis by applying it to issues such as economic justice, gender equity, non-violent acts of resistance in labor and civil rights disputes, support for conscientious objection to military conscription, and the deleterious effects of imperialism. One of the main arguments of the postwar movement was that organized violence as waged by governments was rooted in social injustice. Along with both US and European pacifists, new peace internationals were established as well: The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the War Resisters’ International. Consistent with its postwar focus, these organizations championed all types of social reforms in order to abolish the causes of war. Joining these organizations were women, social reformers, and radicals with “a more secular impulse and progressive agenda.”⁷⁸

But perhaps the most significant transformation resulting from World War I was the emergence of “a powerful secular impulse.” The shift from “sacred to secular resistance” and toward a “new conscientious objection” based on nonreligious principles took hold within the larger peace movement after 1914. The war, itself, accelerated the trend toward a less religiously dominated peace movement as socialists, anarchists, and other political radicals now based their dissent on secular principles: Political, philosophical, and humanitarian. In many cases, “more antiwar than pacifist, these radicals were motivated by internationalism, worker solidarity, and a refusal to fight in capitalist wars.”⁷⁹

Others searched for new forms of internationalism to create a more peaceful world, given the ways that the pursuit of arbitration and the building of international law had failed to prevent World War I. After this conflict ended, some Americans argued over whether to create an international court consistent with a Legalist vision, construct something similar to LEP, or to embrace Wilsonian internationalism.⁸⁰ This final approach, which played a key role in shaping the League of Nations, posited that a general organization of states would guarantee the territorial integrity of all other members (i.e., collective security) through either public opinion, economic sanctions, or collective military intervention to punish aggressors and regulate imperialism of the “Great Powers.” It also hoped to facilitate the replacement of “balance of power” politics by promoting free trade, disarmament, self-determination, and transparent international diplomacy. Some thinkers, especially in Europe, took up the task of building an international body of law that gave multilateral institutions the power to override the sovereignty of states in the name of protecting the “global community.”⁸¹ Still others embraced the “proletarian internationalism” of the Soviet Union or linked the issue of peace to the anticolonial struggle against imperialism.⁸²

The scope of the problems that the world still faces in areas as diverse as state sanctioned violence and nuclear weapons (both examined in forthcoming chapters) necessitates that people continue draw on the lessons of the past and pursue different forms of internationalism to promote peace. Should private citizens and international actors ever deem such an enterprise too hopeless to pursue, they will empower governments to use the ideal of sovereignty and international law in ways that further the causes of isolationism, nationalism, and xenophobia.⁸³ Perhaps the sad truth is, as the historian Merle Curti noted, “people learn very little, consciously, from the past. Old mistakes are repeated; . . . the lessons of experience, if they are learned at all, are easily forgotten.” Yet, he also reminds us that

no merchant would ever try to keep shop without a ledger, to be consulted and studied on occasion; and no mariner would dare sail a vessel without carefully scrutinizing his day-by-day log. So it may well be that those who today hope and pray and work for a warless world may orient themselves somewhat better by relating their ideas and programs to the historical struggle against war.⁸⁴

Those peace merchants and mariners in the Age of Modernity took the first steps to start their ledgers and chart their logs. Now it is up to us to complete them.

Notes

- 1 Emily S. Rosenberg, “Currents of Internationalism,” in *A World Connecting, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 3–5, 6–15, and 815–825. For debates about the meaning of the term “modern,” see *ibid.*, 820–801; and *American Historical Review*

- Roundtable: “Historians and the Question of ‘Modernity,’” *American Historical Review* 116 (June 2011): 631–757.
- 2 Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 59–65; James P. Piscatori, “Law, Peace and War in American International Legal Thought,” in *American Thinking About Peace and War*, ed. Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1978), 135–137; and Charles F. Howlett and Robbie Lieberman, *A History of the American Peace Movement from Colonial times to the Present* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 114–116. For a thorough account of how the world became more interconnected during this time period, see Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870–1945*, 835–836.
 - 3 For a definition of Legalism, see Benjamin Allen Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Centuries* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3.
 - 4 Pacifism, a term introduced by the French peace activist Emil Arnaud in the last decade of the nineteenth century, means either the absolute renunciation of war or the refusal to participate in or the opposition in principle to a specific war on religious, philosophical, humanitarian, or social justice grounds. The values associated with peace are more desirable than armed conflict and more important than motives, and the behavior should be predictably consistent. During WWI it took on the principle of absolute renunciation of all wars. See Charles F. Howlett and Glen Zeitzer, *The American Peace Movement: History and Historiography* (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1985), 53. For an overview of the cosmopolitan approach to peace consult, Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 59–78.
 - 5 Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 37–38.
 - 6 DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History*, 64–65; James P. Piscatori, “Law, Peace and War in American International Legal Thought,” 135–137; Mazower, *Governing the World*, 38.
 - 7 On this arbitration, especially The Alabama Claims issue, see Merle Curti, *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1936), 91–98. For a comprehensive discussion of arbitration and disarmament efforts in Europe consult, A. F. C. Beales, *The History of Peace* (New York: Dial Press, 1931), 130–161.
 - 8 H. M. Field, *Life of David Dudley Field* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), 220–242; *Herald of Peace* XVIII (April 1882): 41–42.
 - 9 *Advocate of Peace* VI (December 1875), 76 and ff.; *Herald of Peace* (January 1876): 2; Burrirt-Miles Mss. (American Peace Society, Washington, D.C.); Louis Sohn, “The Growth of the Science of International Organizations,” in *The Relevance of International Law*, ed. Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffman (New York: Doubleday Anchor edition, 1971), 328–330.
 - 10 Norman Angell, “Peace Movements,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 12 (1934) 41–47.
 - 11 Beales, *A History of Peace*, 163.
 - 12 Sandi Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 54–55.
 - 13 DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform*, 65.
 - 14 *Ibid.*, 65–66.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, 66.
 - 16 David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press, 1976), 18–24.
 - 17 *Report of the First Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1895* (Lake Mohonk, NY: Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895), 9 (subsequent citations to these conference reports will use the format: *Annual Report*, year).
 - 18 David S. Patterson, *Towards a Warless World*, 108.
 - 19 *Annual Report, 1895*, 36–44.
 - 20 Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 87.
 - 21 David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 40–43; and see also Rosenberg, “Currents of Internationalism,” in *A World Connecting*, 835–837. Mazower, *Governing the World*, 75–81.
 - 22 Like their counterparts in Europe and the United States, some Latin Americans focused on promoting peace through developing arbitration arrangements, whereas others preferred

- accomplishing the same task through the building of international law and judicial bodies (Legalists). This chapter will devote further attention to this divide in its “Dawn of the Century” section. Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 66–67.
- 23 Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” *The American Journal of International Law* 3 (April 1909): 286–287. For a thorough history of Latin American governments’ relationship with arbitration during the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, see Gonzalo de Quesada, *Arbitration in Latin America* (Rotterdam: M. Wyt & Zonen, 1907).
 - 24 Chile and Colombia even agreed to have the United States arbitrate their dispute should they “ever be unable to agree upon an arbiter.” See A. Curtis Wilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement,” *The Hispanic American Historical Society Review* 5 (November 1922): 666–667; and Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” 301–302. The term “private international law” refers to the disputes between the private citizens of different nations. Benjamin Allen Coates offers a compelling explanation of how “some Latin American elites highlighted their nations’ participation in legal international relations in order to prove their membership in the ‘civilized world.’” See Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 120–121.
 - 25 While James C. Blaine wanted to call a Pan American conference to expand American trade in Latin America and check potential European influence, he also appears to have seen value in expanding the practice of arbitration to avoid warfare. For example, see Samuel Guy Inman, *Inter-American Conferences: 1826–1954* (Washington, D.C.: Washington University Press, 1965), 38–89; Wilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement,” 670–601 and 681–682. Andrew Carnegie donated almost one million dollars to create the Pan American Building in Washington, D.C., which became the headquarters of the Pan American Union in 1910. See also Lockey, *Essays in Pan-Americanism* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1967), 73–4.
 - 26 For accounts of these developments, see Inman, *Inter-American Conferences*, 33–47; John Edwin Fagg, *Pan Americanism* (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Kreiger, 1982), 24–25; Joseph Byrne Lockey, *Essays in Pan-Americanism*, 80–82. Chile resisted compulsory arbitration because it hoped to retain the territory it had taken from Bolivia and Peru during the Pacific War (1879 to 1883). More to the point, it only wanted the practice of “compulsory arbitration” confined to “newly arising issues.” See Inman, *Inter-American Conferences*, 43.
 - 27 Inman, *Inter-American Conferences*, 44; and Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” 329.
 - 28 Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” 331.
 - 29 The Central American attendees were Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. See Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 119–120; Fagg, *Pan Americanism*, 31; and Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine,” 1054. In theory, this court could rule on cases that involved imperialism, but it could not guarantee that governments would heed its rulings. For a fuller treatment of this subject and the expiration of the court’s charter in 1918, see Jorge L. Esquirol, “Latin America,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Law*, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 573–577.
 - 30 As Greg Grandin argues, Alvarez often equivocated on the relationship between “international law” and “American international law.” See “Your Americanism and Mine: Americans and Anti-Americanism in the Americas,” *The American Historical Review* 111 (October 2006): 1054–1055.
 - 31 Juan Pablo Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933,” *Diplomatic History* 40 (April 2016): 206.
 - 32 Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine,” 1054. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace donated a significant amount of money to make the functioning of the AAIL possible. See James Brown Scott, “The Gradual Progressive Codification of International Law,” *The American Journal of International Law* 21 (July 1927): 431.
 - 33 For a more in depth treatment of this subject, see Scott, “The Gradual Progressive Codification of International Law,” 121–143; and Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas,” 210–212.
 - 34 Harold Josephson et al., *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 513–514.
 - 35 Cortright, *Peace*, 29.
 - 36 Thomas Davies, *NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 61.
 - 37 *Annual Report*, 1904, 66–67.

- 38 Peter Stearns, *Peace in World History* (London: Routledge, 2014), 108; and *Annual Report*, 44–45.
- 39 *Annual Report*, 1911, 79–85.
- 40 For a cogent summary of Nobel's views, see "Alfred Nobel's Thoughts about War and Peace," accessed May 10, 2017, www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/tagil/. On Suttner's role in the creation of Nobel's peace prize, see Heffermehl, *The Nobel Peace Prize: What Nobel Really Wanted* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 25–28. On von Suttner's efforts to promote peace, see "Bertha von Suttner- Biographical," accessed May 10, 2017, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1905/suttner-bio.html. See also Rosenberg, "Currents of Internationalism," in *A World Connecting*, 835–836.
- 41 Linda Schott, "The Women's Peace Party and the Moral Basis for Women's Pacifism." *Frontiers* 8, no. 2, (1985), 18–24.
- 42 *Annual Report*, 1897, 99.
- 43 *Annual Report*, 1897, 97.
- 44 *Annual Report*, 1902, 64.
- 45 *Annual Report*, 1895, 67–68 and 88.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 68. America's most famous female pacifist, Jane Addams, picked up on this theme, remarking shortly after the peace treaty ending the Spanish–American War of 1898 was signed that "Children were 'playing war' in the streets. In no instance . . . were they 'freeing Cubans,' but with the violence characteristic of their age, they were 'slaying Spaniards' . . . [T]he spectacle of war has been a great setback to the development and growth of the higher impulse of civilization." Quoted in Allen F. Davis, *American Heroine: The Life and Legend of Jane Addams* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 140.
- 47 Davies, *NGOs*, 60.
- 48 Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 62–63.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 60–61.
- 50 Davies, *NGOs*, 63.
- 51 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 90.
- 52 *Ibid.*
- 53 Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 257.
- 54 "The Federal Tendency," *The Independent* LXX (March 23, 1911): 601–604; John Bassett Moore, "International Arbitration," *Harper's CX* (March 1905): 610.
- 55 Root won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913. Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1954). See also C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 39–73; David S. Patterson, "The United States and the Origins of the World Court," *Political Science Quarterly* 91, no. 2 (Summer 1976): 279–295; *Annual Report*, 1906, 150; Charles Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), 18–26; and Mazower, *Governing the World*, 91–92.
- 56 Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 11.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 94–95. The US proposal to create a permanent international court at the Second Hague Peace Conference largely failed because of disagreements over the issue of sovereignty and how to balance the interests of "Great Powers" and "smaller countries" when selecting judges. US delegates could only manage to secure "a motion that approved the court plan in principle and urged its adoption in the future." See *ibid.*, 91–95.
- 58 Patterson, "The United States and the Origins of the World Court," 293–295; *Proceedings of the Second National Conference for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (November 7–8, 1911, 90–95); *Proceedings of the Third Conference for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (December 21–22, 1912), 195 ff.; Mazower, *Governing the World*, 92; and Mark Weston Janis, *America and the Law of Nations, 1776–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 8.
- 59 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 92–93; Patterson, "The United States and the Origins of the World Court," 279–280, 294–295; and Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969).
- 60 For an informative article on de Bloch see, Peter van den Dungen, "Jean de Bloch: 19th Century Peace Researcher," in Howlett, ed., "Apostles of Peace," *Peace Research*, Vols. 15–18 (May 1983–January 1986): 21–27.
- 61 Peter Filene, "The World Peace Foundation and Progressivism, 1910–1918," *New England Quarterly* 35 (December 1963): 484–501; and Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 134–137.

- 62 *Yearbook for 1912 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (New York, 1913), 1–3.
- 63 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 92–93.
- 64 Nicholas Murray Butler, *The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1913), 75–83; Butler, “The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” 396–400. Quoted in Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform*, 85; Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), 19–21; Joseph W. Winn, “Nicholas Murray Butler, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Search for Reconciliation in Europe, 1919–1933,” *Peace & Change* 31 (October 2006) 555–584. The “scientific development quote” comes from Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 98.
- 65 Numerous works address the subjects of US interventions in Latin America. For example, see Alan L. McPherson, *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2016); and Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). For the quote, see Stearns, *Peace in World History*, 78.
- 66 For example, Mazower, *Governing the World*, 87; Davies, *NGOs*, 76; C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 382; and John Gittings, *The Glorious Art of Peace: From Iliad to Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 146–149; and Mazower, *Governing the World*, 90–93.
- 67 Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 259–260.
- 68 Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 212.
- 69 For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Waqar Zaidi’s article in this volume.
- 70 Cortright, *Peace*, 43–44.
- 71 A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace*, 27, But when the war did happen it ultimately “provided a great shakeout of the movement.” See Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 201.
- 72 John E. Noyes, “William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties,” *Villanova Law Review* 535 (2011): 536–537. For a thorough analysis of the US relationship with arbitration, see Coates, *Legalist Empire*, especially 99–106. For accounts of why the Senate refused to ratify these treaties, see Noyes, “William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties,” 546–550 and Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 102–104.
- 73 Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 127–128. For a more thorough examination of Bryan’s relationship with peace promotion, see Paolo E. Coletta, “William Jennings Bryan’s Plans for World Peace,” *Nebraska History* 58 (1977): 193–217.
- 74 Beales, *The History of Peace*, 309–316; and Patterson, *Towards a Warless World*, 251–255.
- 75 See Grandin, *Your Americanism and Mine*, 1055–1059; and Grandin, “The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism,” *American Historical Review* 117 (February 2012): 88–90.
- 76 Fagg, *Pan Americanism*, 156–157.
- 77 Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History*, 106.
- 78 Scott Bennett and Charles F. Howlett, eds., *Antiwar Dissent and Peace Activism in World War I America: A Reader* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 27–28.
- 79 Bennett and Howlett, *Antiwar Dissent and Peace Activism*, 31–32; and Peter Brock, *Twentieth-Century Pacifism* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), 34f and 104–153.
- 80 Coates, *Legalist Empire*, 152–162.
- 81 *Ibid.*, 168–170. See also Frank Ninkovich, *The Global Republic: America’s Inadvertent Rise to World Power* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014), Chapter 4; and Mazower, *Governing the World*, Chapter 5.
- 82 For an account of anti-colonialism and peace, see Angell, “Peace Movements,” 46–47. John Gittings makes a strong argument that socialists failed to promote peace with vigor during the late 1800s and early 1900s. See Gittings, *The Glorious Art of Peace*, 148–149. On socialist influence in postwar America see, Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1971); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933–1983* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1984), 8–20; and Scott Bennett, *Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003).
- 83 For an overview of this development, see “The Power of Populism Roundtable,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 6 (2016): 2–55.
- 84 Mele Curti, *Peace or War*, 14.