


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STRUCTURAL CONFLICT, SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE, AND PEACE: A GUIDED READING

Michael Loadenthal

The transdisciplinary field of Peace and Conflict Studies has championed the cause of equality and peace, yet often bases its analysis in unacknowledged traditions of the critical left. Intellectual traditions from Marxism to anarchism are based in an understanding of structural inequality that are pervasive and relatively unchanged since their inception in the 1850s. From these intellectual roots, a host of liberatory, democratic, and peace-centric perspectives have emerged from feminist analysis to Occupied-inspired anti-capitalist critique. While the Marxist framework is firmly rooted in a stoic structuralism, these foundational concepts are extended through the work of neo-Marxists and poststructuralists to understand the nature of power and oppression as deterritorialized, boundless, fluid, and malleable. The following deconstructive, genealogical history traces Peace Studies' understanding of the relationship between structure and violence through a variety of core areas including basic human needs, statehood, culture, ideology, and the question of whether violent inequality is inherent in the State. The discussion of the red-to-black spectrum aims to move beyond issues of disciplinary taxonomy and instead reengage with broader, epistemological questions regarding violence, peace, domination, hierarchy, and democratic governance. This chapter seeks to trace the history of a structural analysis embedded in peace and conflict, from the early libertarianism of Marx, up until the modern anthropologists and poststructural peace theorists.

Introduction

As a theoretical framework explaining peace and conflict, the role of structure occupies a particular position best exhibited in the Marxist macro narrative of dialectical materialism. For early Marx, these presumptions—that capitalism contains within itself sufficient contradictions to foster revolution—shaped the entirety of human experiences. In establishing how structure is framed and explained in terms of peace and conflict, the pervasive Marxist presumption asserts that society is structurally ordered in a manner that maintains inequity. Marx's foundational concepts dictate that a materialist interpretation of society requires that economic activity produce material goods for human consumption, and that this system of organization of the means of production¹ results in the subsequent ordering of social phenomena.

Marx's idea that the ownership of the means of production by the bourgeoisies² will be reflective of (and a root cause of) the manner in which social, political,³ legal and cultural life exists, constructs the heart of the Marxist project.⁴ This assertion holds that the (super)structure will foster an inherently repressive, exploitative, and dominant State. For Marx and his early socio-political diagraming, such structural theories resonate in works penned nearly one hundred years later, such as those of C. Wright Mills in his book *The Power Elite*.⁵ In this book, Mills argues that the socio-political landscape has been forever changed by the structural wedding between the corporate, military, and executive/State world.

Historically, and up until the present, the revolutionary subject has deemed it appropriate to further a utopian agenda through the use of political violence. Riots, property destruction, sabotage, assassinations, arson, and bombs are all common throughout the history of struggle alongside nonviolent strategies such as civil disobedience and economic noncooperation. In order for such strategic choices to be seen as legitimate—in that the offended party feels justified in retuning structural violence thrust upon them back towards the State via revolutionary means⁶—revolutionary violence is held up against the “violence inherent in the system.”⁷ Thus the literature described in the proceeding sections will explore this precise precondition, in other words: How does a structural analysis of conflict allow one to conceptualize the violent structural ordering of the socio-political that (allegedly) lays the foundation for a resultantly violent reaction from contemporary revolutionary subjects?

Establishing a method for diagraming state violence

Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning the borders and limitations inherent in the subsequent manner of macro, structural-level analysis. If one is to discuss conflict in terms of structure, one runs the risk of saying nothing at all. As carefully historicized by sociologist Philip Abrams,⁸ in declaring structures such as “the State” (or another similarly large structure such as “the economy,” “ideology,” “human nature,” etc.) as one's object for inquiry, the scholar falls somewhere analytically between tricky and outwardly dishonest. As Abrams argues: “We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is. We are variously urged to respect the state, or smash the state or study the state; but for want of clarity about the nature of the state such projects remain beset with difficulties.”⁹

The problem exists in answering a few key questions that are precursors to any discussion of structures: “What are the boundaries of the State?”, “Where does civil society (the non-State) begin and end?”, “What other structures work *from within* the State concealed in its largess?” and so on. It is clear that a so-called “academic consensus” definition of structures of this size is absent, despite the fact that a range of scholars has adopted such a discursive task. Such scholars include legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham,¹⁰ sociologists Franz Oppenheimer,¹¹ C. Wright Mills,¹² and Max Weber,¹³ Marxists V. I. Lenin,¹⁴ Antonio Gramsci,¹⁵ Nicos Poulantzas,¹⁶ and Ralph Miliband,¹⁷ libertarian Murray Rothbard,¹⁸ critical theorist Michel Foucault,¹⁹ feminist Catharine MacKinnon,²⁰ and contemporary International Relations scholars such as I. William Zartman²¹ and Joel Migdal.²² Of course this is only a representative sampling of such thinkers drawn from specific schools of thought. Similar works on states and statecraft have also emerged from thinkers ranging from Fascist²³ to Primitivist.²⁴

Similarly, a definitional problem exists between establishing a firm differentiation between the concepts of *structure* (as described by structuralists and Marxists) and *system*. Throughout this chapter these terms are used with intentionality as *structure* is meant to relay the interconnected systemic elements; the totalizing sum of the various elements such as the State, the economy, the security forces, the law, etc.²⁵ These various objects coalesce into a system of socio-political management, and thus to speak of a structure references the ordered interaction of these systems. Lévi-Strauss, in his structuralist exploration of culture,²⁶ attempts to draw such distinctions, defining “structures” especially “social structures” as that which is made up by social relations but can not be reduced “to the ensemble of the social relations to be described in a given society.”²⁷ Instead Lévi-Strauss explains, “structure” can be understood as that which “exhibits characteristics of a system . . . is made up of several elements, none of which can undergo a change without effecting changes in all the other elements.”²⁸ To provide a *post*structuralist example of the definitional problem, Foucault’s concept of governmentality speaks of the administrative power of the police, yet for Foucault, *police* are far more than simply the armed enforcers of law.²⁹ Thus in differentiating the system and structure of governmentality: “Policing is not simply a matter of providing internal security through an armed force. It involves all those measures that are directed towards state and citizen well being, from census taking to health policy to security to education.”³⁰ In this manner, the police, health establishment (i.e., “the clinic”), and education are considered *systems*, and the larger governmentality of policing is the *structure*. Though this attempt is far from precise, without concrete answers to questions such as these, adopting a structural analysis of fluid objects carries with it certain inherent limitations and abstractions.

One of the chief tasks in establishing a positional platform from which to interrogate these questions is developing an understand of the evolving ways critical scholars have come to understand power and violence as it relates to structure; to unpack the assertion of C. Wright Mills who stated, “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.”³¹

Deprivation and basic human needs

Structural inequality fosters structural violence and a resultant reactionary force from those seeking a remedy. This chapter will examine these connections but before doing so, it would seem a misstep to discuss structural theories without first referring to the “basic human needs theory” most often associated with John Burton.³² Many scholars have pointed out³³ that Burton borrowed from Paul Sites,³⁴ whose work identified eight components to human need required to produce “normal” behavior—behaviors within social norms and without violence. Another theorist contributing to this discourse is Abraham Maslow who preceded Sites, and famously created a “hierarchy of needs.”³⁵ Burton’s utilization is the most appropriate for deployment in a Conflict Analysis/Peace Studies context according to Peace Studies theorist Johan Galtung, whose work will be explored in depth later.³⁶ For Burton, humans have a need for security, recognition, identity, and personal development, arguing that the modern (for his time) infrastructure of the State fails to provide these essential components. Thus for Burton, the structural explanation for social conflict begins in the State’s inability to provide for the basic needs of the population. For example, the lack of provided security can lead to the formation of warlordism similar to the violent redrawing of neighborhood lines through criminal gang turf wars. Alternatively, a State’s inability to provide for an ethnic populations’ identity needs can lead to an identity-based armed conflict³⁷ such as those occurring in

Palestine–Israel (Arab/Muslim v. non-Arab/Jewish), India (Hindu v. Muslim), Sri Lanka (Tamil v. non-Tamil/Sinhalese), and Northern Ireland (Republican/Catholic v. Loyalist/Protestant).

Extending this deprivation theory towards that of structural conflicts, Edward Azar (along with various co-authors) argues that it is precisely this denial of human needs³⁸ that is a cause of protracted social conflict,³⁹ and that since such deprivations are experienced by large groups, these collective needs can lead to collectively experienced conflicts.⁴⁰ Azar writes, “Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for protracted social conflict.”⁴¹ He argues explicitly that “structural inequality” based in economic and political structures are inextricably linked to “protracted social conflict,”⁴² and in this manner, Azar continues within the structuralist tradition positing that a “materialist theoretical tradition . . . constitutes a significant element in class analysis.”⁴³

Thus in sum, an understanding of the human as a complete, needs-based being seeking self-actualization is essential in the development of a structural view of conflict, as without such a grounding, the structures of division and hierarchy (such as heterosexism, racism, classism) are simply laid upon incomplete, hollowed out subjects. This view of human subjects and their needs can be a starting point for the diagraming and analysis of the structures that impede such journeys towards completeness instead offering oppression, misery, and domination. If the socio-political-economic system is structured in such a way that denies humans their basic self-actualization, and such a lacking causes protracted conflict, then one can only conclude that the system is structured in such a way that deprivation and violence is guaranteed.

Understanding conflict via structural violence

For a variety of theorists, the State is an inherently oppressive institution and perpetrator of violence. This sentiment is reflective of critical leftist thought, as seen most clearly from the anarchist, autonomist Marxist, communizationalist, and related discourses. Despite this anti-State tendency throughout the anti-authoritarian left, admittedly for some, the State system is a site of a *reduction* in structural violence as the very nature of cooperative and integrated democratic global governance⁴⁴ or economic development⁴⁵ ensures the existence of a disincentivizing power to make war. In general, the aforementioned realist thinkers seek to maintain the so-called “liberal peace”—a state of non-war between nation states—yet this is far from a level of non-conflict sought in a revolutionary re-visioning. In order for a framework to be judged as emancipatory, it must seek justice, not simply avoid economic collapse, and attempt to create and sustain a more equitable distribution of the socio-economic peace, not simply prevent armed skirmishes between nations.

The implicit and practical intersections between theories regarding structure and violence and more canonical theories of conflict analysis and resolution abound. The Marxist analysis has been summoned in order to examine the issue of violence—in the form of inequality, inequity, oppression, and domination—that is recurrent throughout society. Regardless of trade unions, wealth-redistributing social services, banking reform and the like, gross imbalance and injustices at the system level are constant and ever present. Viewed from among the modern vernacular, we have come to know this constant state of siege through terms such as structural violence,⁴⁶ cultural violence,⁴⁷ symbolic violence, and objective violence.⁴⁸ Taken as a whole, these concepts form a manner of extending the Marxist

projects even further, providing a theoretically interrogated discourse for observing, interpreting, and interrogating the banality of a violent society. What these concepts have in common is a vantage point beyond the experience of the individual, and while some writers focus on the micro-manifestations of structural violence (e.g., homelessness, drug addiction, untreated [mental] illness), others look more structurally.⁴⁹

These concepts for explaining macro violence find their root in the modernist discourse through the work of Peace Studies/Conflict Analysis scholar Johan Galtung who called violence “where there is no such [personal or direct] actor as structural [violence].”⁵⁰ Galtung notes the distinction between violence created by a known subject, terming it “direct violence”, and that which occurs at the structural level⁵¹ when no distinct subject perpetrator can be established, terming this “structural violence.” Galtung calls for a “richer concept of violence”⁵² and further draws out this distinction regarding the subject/violence disconnect stating:

There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed.⁵³

A few years after publishing his initial works on structural/direct violence, Galtung along with Tord Höivik⁵⁴ extended their analysis and developed a formulaic representation of violence’s operationalization. In drawing out the typologies of violence, the authors differentiate between “violence that kills slowly and violence that kills quickly, violence that is anonymous and violence that has an author.”⁵⁵ These binaries are attempts to separate the slow, anonymous violence of the structural from the quick, authored violence of the direct.

Later, Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe⁵⁶ created a taxonomy of violence with an obvious Galtungian influence.⁵⁷ They caution against a myopic view of violence as emanating from deviant behavior, and attempt to distinguish between such incidents defining violence more broadly as “any action or structural arrangement that results in physical or nonphysical harm to one or more persons.”⁵⁸ The authors further distinguish between “personal violence,” that which “occurs between people acting *outside* the role of agent or representative of a social institution,” and “societal violence.”⁵⁹ Such “societal violence” is further differentiated into that which is “institutional” and “structural.” Such perpetrator-less, invisibly operating violence is a recurrent idea through the contemporary literature. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant’s⁶⁰ work concerning symbolic violence⁶¹ notes that such force can be seen as symbolic when it is “exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity.”⁶² Such manifestations include a multitude of ways in which individuals allow themselves to be disciplined and ranked hierarchically through the fields of employment, government, family, etc. While the subjected victims of such violence are conscious of its power (e.g., a subject can perceive of racist discrimination) they are unable to locate and challenge that disciplining logic and therefore comply. In this manner, symbolic violence is exemplified in gender-based domination that is “an institution that has been inscribed for millennia in the objectivity of social structures.”⁶³

Does statehood equate to violence?

What is consistent throughout these approaches is a challenge to the presumption that structural inequality is “a given” needing to be accepted. If one is seeking to challenge this “given” what prevents such attempts from rising?⁶⁴ The hesitance for analyses focused on structure should be obvious, as structural problems require structural answers, and structural answers are typically disruptive and serve to displace power as Galtung notes:

Whereas the focus on *direct* violence would lead to analyses of the capabilities and motivations of international and intranational actors, with the efforts to create *institutions* that can prevent them from exercising direct violence . . . the focus of *structural* violence will lead to a critical analysis of structures and possibly to efforts to transform structures pregnant with violence into less violent ones. A basic transformation of a structure is usually referred to as a *revolution*, so this perspective is more welcome among radicals just as the institutional perspective is more welcome among liberals/conservatives.⁶⁵

Recalling previous thinkers, it is through the ideology of power perpetuated by the State that such power imbalances are normalized, hidden, and made to appear naturalized and mundane.⁶⁶ Thus while the proletariat, to return to Marx’s language, is aware of her aching back and discriminatorily calculated, gender-based compensation, she allows wage slavery and patriarchy to be enacted upon her through the aid of hegemonic ideology that legitimates, conceals, and provides explanation for the inequality through institutions such as religion, the media, the family, and the law. This is precisely the delocalized, slow, structural violence of Galtung, Bourgois, Schonberg, Höivik, Iadicola, Shupe, Wacquant, and Bourdieu. Anthropologists engaging in fieldwork such as Nancy Scheper-Hughes have drawn such condemnations of State-maintained systemic violence from direct observation of suffering in places such as Brazil, wherein she writes:

The state—represented in the personages of minor civil servants . . . contributes to the routinization and normalization of child death [as a manifestation of systemic violence] by its implacable opacity, its refusal to comprehend, and its consequent inability to act responsively to the human suffering that presents itself.⁶⁷

Once again Scheper-Hughes’ work speaks to not only the systemic violence of the State, but also the Galtungian cultural violence that obscures such structures from public viewership.⁶⁸

Returning to Galtung, the clandestine facilitation of violence is recurrent in the thinker’s later work wherein he describes cultural violence as a sort of precursor to his concept of structural violence, which he describes as an intentionally “open concept” having both precise and vague components.⁶⁹ Galtung is quick to define this concept of “cultural violence” as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”⁷⁰ Once again the focus is on ideology, or rather, how ideology functions to facilitate larger, system-level injustices. This is quite logical as earlier thinkers, such as Althusser, began from the Marxist position and thus sought to explain *how* such oppression could operate without initiating revolution.

For Althusser and Galtung, an observation of the system's violence is a necessary precondition for their theoretical inquiry, but once it has been identified, the task then becomes to uncover *how* this functions. To this end we are given two complementary answers: Althusser's ideological offerings of the State from the newspapers to the courts, and Galtung's cultural elements surrounding ideology from one's religious beliefs to the words used to describe themselves.

The foundational structure-focused work introduced by Galtung is revisited by the medical anthropologist Paul Farmer⁷¹ who often studied Haiti, and liberation theology-advocate Clodovis Boff who termed the structural violence of poverty in Brazil as “the infrastructural expression of the process of oppression.”⁷² The structural Marxist analysis, as well as the anti-State anarchist analysis, leads one to a more operational theory of structural and systemic violence within the post-millennial theoretical milieu. The productive overlaps between theories of conflict analysis and resolution and the aforementioned methods of analysis occur at the site of Galtungian negative versus positive peace and the mapping of and overcoming of so-called structural violence.⁷³ Galtung thus argues that the “basic concern of peace research is the pursuit of peace with peaceful means, if possible in a holistic and global manner.”⁷⁴ For Galtung, to create *negative* peace, one must only stop violent conflict (e.g., end a war, sign a treaty) yet to create *positive* peace, one must build beyond structural and cultural violence. This is the task of evolving, poststructural fields such as Critical Security Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies, which establish chiefly the separation of non-war (e.g., defense) from security.⁷⁵ Therefore while for many “traditional” international relations and conflict analysis scholars the presence of the State implies not only “defense from anarchy” but also security, for anti-authoritarians, critical theorists, peace scholars, and poststructuralists, such an assertion borders on ideological warfare.⁷⁶ For anarchists, the ability for States to make war precisely asserts such a structuring as preventive of peace. In other words, “insofar as ‘defense’ implies security, the state is the instrument least capable of providing this.”⁷⁷ With such a task ahead, the work of scholars examining structural and other hidden forms of violence becomes exposing these not-yet-positive aspects of the peaceful state of affairs, and to begin developing positive-trending solutions to create not only the absence of war, but the existence of a just peace.

The neo-Marxist poststructuralists and boundless power

Neo-Marxist (sometimes called post-Marxist) continental philosophers such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari have further nuanced conceptions of operationalized State power and its inherent violence. These analytical positionings developed by Hardt and Negri concerning the biopolitical reproduction of a deterritorialized⁷⁸ yet totalizing manner of statecraft are built upon earlier works within continental philosophy's poststructuralist and critical fields, most notably *A Thousand Plateaus*.⁷⁹ To their own admission, Hardt and Negri borrow from Deleuze and Guattari in their “demystification of structuralism” theory of a deterritorialized power,⁸⁰ and in diagramming the social production (and reproduction) of biopower among the “social machines in their various apparatuses and assemblages.”⁸¹

Deleuze and Guattari's concept of “assemblage” is seen by many as a critical alternative to understanding structure as it has been traditionally understood.⁸² For Deleuze and Guattari, it can be deployed as a systems analysis approach based in concepts of a multiplicity of deterritorialized functionalities and not the stoic uniformity of Marxist structuralism.

This shift towards the fluid, structurelessness of “assemblage” has been explained by post-structural Queer theorist Jasbir Puar in her numerous works.⁸³ Puar also argues that contemporary scholarship focused on intersectionality—such as that seen in feminist, gender studies and Queer theory literatures—has the tendency to imply a structuralist position and thus, poststructural work dealing with assemblage might function as a more useful framework for diagramming oppression.

Deleuze and Guattari’s work is more explicitly instructive in their diagramming of the State’s development into a collectivity enacting “relations of domination.” The authors explain this shift:

The State was first this abstract unity that integrated sub-aggregates functioning separately; it is now subordinated to a field of forces whose flows it coordinates and whose autonomous relations of domination and subordination it expresses . . . It is no longer the transcendent law that governs fragments; it must fashion as best it can a whole to which it will render its law immanent.⁸⁴

In this description, the State as a physicality is a false construction, as the State “has never *actually* existed, [but instead] . . . its function is purely theoretical: It mediated between the primitive territorial machine and the modern capitalist machine.”⁸⁵ In this understanding of State-led systemic violence, the apparatus functions as an intermediary between sovereignty and capital accumulation. For these thinkers, the State is thus an ordering mechanism, an arranger of apparatuses that functions to inscribe a hierarchical logic upon more horizontalist communities, or as Deleuze and Guattari state:

[The State] operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical, hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations . . . Thus the central power of the State is hierarchical.⁸⁶

Thus for Deleuze and Guattari, the State is less a physicality than a patterned behavior and function of organization. The State gives new hierarchical order to previously (more) horizontal methods; the State transforms the agrarian pre-State community into the industrial private property State through divisions of labor, centralization of capital, and maintenance of a logic of unequal exchange.

For Hardt and Negri⁸⁷—as following after Deleuze and Guattari—they develop a framework for discussing statecraft as superior to traditionalist sovereignty working to combine a Marxist interpretation of superstructure with a Foucauldian inclusion of biopolitics. This is used to argue⁸⁸ that not only is the operational logic of neoliberalism and statecraft transnational, but that its operationalized form via biopower is a far more invasive manner of social ordering than any manifestation of domestic or international law. Such a contention is not to be confused with the structural Marxist emphasis and critique of empire/imperialism. Poststructuralist scholar Todd May makes such distinctions clear in explaining the writings of Hardt and Negri:

Empire is distinct from imperialism precisely in that the latter is structured by discrete nation-states pursuing their interests through subjugation and exploitation,

whereas empire is structured by fluid and intersecting political and economic networks with no particular centre and only relatively demarcated geographic boundaries.⁸⁹

In this sense, while *Empire* serves as an analysis of statecraft and structure, Foucault allows for an analysis of power and bodies; a Foucaultian power analysis of the State and the ideology of Statehood. What Hardt and Negri develop within the genealogy under examination is the commonality behind *all States*, and in this sense they continue the anarchist project of critiquing the structural *nature* of the State and not simply its oppressive policies, laws, or actions.

Conclusions

The poststructural analysis advances traditionalist Marxism by not focusing on the singular subjectivity of class, and instead looking at the totalizing effects of power and its inscription atop all relations (i.e., social, political, economic), enacted through biopolitics.⁹⁰ Through Foucault's understandings of disciplinary power one can then interpret the micro politics of control, and subsequently adopt a biopolitical approach to examine power's more macro control sites.⁹¹ Thus Hardt and Negri complement the Marxist position, arguing that the target is a deterritorialized, super-national capitalist apparatus, *not* European-era imperialism. Reaching back towards structuralism, Hardt and Negri argue that the currently relevant object is a structureless, fluid, non-State and thus the perfect subject of poststructural analysis.⁹² These understandings of biopower's relations to Empire and totalized control have not escaped the insurrectionary anarchist theorists, who borrowing from both Foucault and the Marxists, speak to a similar social ordering. The anonymous authors of the French anarchist, high theory journal *Tiqqun*, in their paper "Preliminary Materials for a Theory of the Young Girl," write:

Under the hypnotic grimaces of official pacification, a war is being waged. A war that can no longer be called simply economic, social or humanitarian because it is *total* . . . Paradoxically, it's because of the total character of this war—total in its means no less than in its ends—that it could be invisible in the first place . . . What's at stake in the ongoing war are "forms of life," which for the Empire, means the selection, management, and attenuation of those forms of life.⁹³

The authors later call these Empire-controlled forms of life the "bio-political monopoly" speaking to Foucault's power/knowledge dominance. What we see in the work of insurrectionists such as *Tiqqun* is the constant and intentional shift between micro and macro forms of power—from the (micro) biopower of individual psychologies, to the macro ordering of the totality of the socio-political, economic spheres of activity.

Beginning with Galtung's structural violence, and arriving at *Tiqqun*'s total violence, the reader is treated to a host of framings of the same object. In all cases, from Marxist to anarchist and from insurrectionary to critical theory, the focus has remained on the State, and how its structuring vis-à-vis the populace contributes to the creation, perpetuation, and regimentation of a host of inequalities. Chronologically these ideas appear recurrent in the literature—from Marx's superstructure/base, to the identification of structural violence as "the violence of poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation," and on into the modern

discourse as seen through popular philosophers with movie star followings such as Slavoj Žižek.⁹⁴ As the most famed of these writers, post-Marxist philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek provides a concise retelling of the previous discourse through his inventive taxonomy/typology for classifying forms of violence. In *Violence*, Žižek writes that “subjective violence” exemplified in “acts of crime, terror, civil unrest, international conflict” is, “just the most visible” type of violence and that “objective violence” is “the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things.”⁹⁵

In this sense, the State must be complicit in both forms of violence as the State is the entity fighting through the venue of the “subjective” and the maintainer of the conditions of the “objective.” It is for this reason that Žižek perfectly rounds out this discussion, as his identification of the “objective violence” leaves its linkages to the State as a presumption. Žižek takes little care to explicitly identify *who* maintains this “normal state of things” but as one can deduce, the inequity of poverty, asymmetry of administered justice, and divergent experiences of individuals in regards to race, class . . . is the product of an endemically maintained system in which the State must be seen as central.

Thus Žižek represents the grand conclusion of the Marxist–anarchist–insurrectionary–critical/continental philosophy narrative concerning the State and violence precisely because he fails to explicitly identify its obviousness as an integral component of the analysis. If for Žižek the “subjective violence” is best seen in crime and war, one must acknowledge that the State is centrally located as the arbitrator of crime and the crafter/defender of war. It is for this reason that what was stated by Marx in 1848, rings true for Žižek in 2008, and can be restated concisely as: The structuring of society along the lines of capital ownership and resulting socio-political realities cyclically fosters and maintains classes of inequality wherein a capital-rich class dominates and a capital-poor class remains subordinated, oppressed and victimized by violence.

Notes

- 1 Gramsci's *Selections from Political Writings, 1910–1920* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) dissects some of these thematic concepts in an approachable manner in essays such as “The Instruments of Labor”; in *ibid.*, 162–166, he interprets the meaning of productive capital and ownership.
- 2 Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (republished by Marxist Internet Archives, 1848), accessed December 1, 2012, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm.
- 3 This line of core Marxist argumentation is also adopted by Foucault when, for example, he speaks of the court and its role in “proletarianisation.” Here he states, “[The penal system’s] role is to force people to accept their status as proletarians and the conditions for the exploitation of the proletariat,” *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1977* by Michel Foucault, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gor et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 14; Foucault explains through the interview that not only does the court inscribe disciplinary powers of political suppression to the governed, it also functions in a classed manner in which those without access to capital (e.g., the “established” proletariat, and the lumpenproletariat) are further sanctioned with State violence is they violate (e.g., non-payment, bankruptcy, theft, revolt, violence . . .) the codified structural inequalities (e.g., deeds, loans, mortgages, contracts, etc.) the court maintains.
- 4 See Engels and Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”; Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (*Die Revolution* (republished by Marxist Internet Archives), 1852), accessed October 18, 2012, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/; Marx, *The Civil War in France*, trans. Friedrich Engels, 1871; V. I. Lenin, “The State and Revolution,” in *Collected Works*, ed. Stepan Apresyan and Jim Riordan, vol. 25 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1932), 381–492.

- 5 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- 6 For a sampling of thinkers who make such an argument see Alfredo M. Bonanno, *Armed Joy* [*La gioia armata*], trans. Jean Weir (London: Elephant Editions, 1977), accessed January 17, 2012, <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/alfredo-m-bonanno-armed-joy.pdf>; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963); Noam Chomsky et al., “The Legitimacy of Violence as a Political Act? Noam Chomsky Debates with Hannah Arendt, Susan Sontag, et al.” (Chomsky.info, December 15, 1967), accessed August 11, 2013, www.chomsky.info/debates/19671215.htm; Ward Churchill, “On the Necessity of Armed Struggle: Reflections on the RAF and the Question of Moving Forward,” in *The Red Army Faction A Documentary History, Volume 2: Dancing With Imperialism*, by André Moncourt and J. Smith, vol. 2 (Montréal, QC; Oakland, CA: Kersplebedeb; PM Press, 2009), 1–13; Ward Churchill and Mike Ryan, *Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America* (Edinburgh, UK: AK Press, 2007); Peter Gelderloos, *How Nonviolence Protects the State* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2007); TIC, *The Coming Insurrection*, intervention series 1 (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007); Derrick Jensen, Aric McBay, and Lierre Keith, *Deep Green Resistance: Strategy to Save the Planet* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011); Theodore J. Kaczynski, *Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski, a.k.a. “The Unabomber”* (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2010); Craig Rosebraugh, *The Logic of Political Violence: Lessons in Reform and Revolution* (Portland, OR: Arissa Media Group, 2004), accessed August 11, 2013, <http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptID=655683>; Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1908); A. K. Thompson, “Representation’s Limit: The Epistemology of Spectacular Violence,” in *Violent Interventions* (15th Annual Conference of the York Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 2008).
- 7 Hannah Arendt offers a beautifully penned encapsulation challenging this Marxist position stating: “The consensus of very strange; for to equate political power with ‘the organization of violence’ makes sense only if one follows Marx’s estimate of the state as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling class. Let us therefore turn to authors who do not believe that the body politic and its laws and institutions are mealy coercive superstructures, secondary manifestations of some underlying forces.” Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), 1.
- 8 Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977),” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1977): 58–89.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 59.
- 10 Jeremy Bentham, *The Handbook of Political Fallacies* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962).
- 11 Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York: Free Life Editions, 1908), www.franz-oppenheimer.de/state0.htm.
- 12 Mills, *The Power Elite*.
- 13 *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 4th ed. (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1978).
- 14 “The State,” in *Selected Works, Vol. II* (republished by Marxist Internet Archives, 1917), accessed May 2, 2013, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/sw/volume02.htm; “The State and Revolution.”
- 15 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
- 16 *Political Power and Social Classes* (New York: Verso, 1975); *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, trans. David Fernbach, New edition (New York: Verso, 1978); *Fascism and Dictatorship* (New York: Verso, 1974).
- 17 *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Merlin Press, 2009).
- 18 *Anatomy of the State* (lulu.com, 1974); *The Ethics of Liberty* (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
- 19 “Governmentality,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104.
- 20 *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*, edition unstated (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
- 21 *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

- 22 *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 23 Benito Mussolini, *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions* (Ardita, 1935); Carl Schmitt, "The Legal Basis of the Total State," in *Fascism*, ed. Roger Griffin, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 24 Kaczynski, *Technological Slavery*, 38–120; John Zerzan, *Future Primitive: And Other Essays* (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1994).
- 25 Adam Schaff, *Structuralism and Marxism* (Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press, 1978), 4.
- 26 *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
- 27 *Ibid.*, 279.
- 28 *Ibid.*
- 29 Thomas Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society* 14, no. 3 (2002): 49–64.
- 30 Todd May, *The Philosophy of Foucault* (Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 154.
- 31 As quoted in Arendt, *On Violence*.
- 32 *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997); *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
- 33 Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005), 68–77; Richard Rubenstein, "Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2001), accessed August 3, 2013, www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Rubenstein.htm.
- 34 *Control: The Basis of Social Order* (New York: Dunellen Pub. Co., 1973).
- 35 "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–396.
- 36 "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses," *Journal of Peace Research* 22, no. 2 (June 1, 1985): 146.
- 37 A great deconstruction of identity, identity-based conflicts and their role in conflict mobilization can be found in Ho-Won Jeong's *Conflict Management and Resolution: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 59–79.
- 38 Azar differs slightly from Burton and Maslow, naming his basic human needs as "security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation." "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Social Conflict," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Volume 2*, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1991), 93. Some of these conditions were also proposed in an earlier study by Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). Shue identifies security, subsistence, and freedom all as "basic rights."
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- 47 Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291–305.
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- 49 Philippe Bourgois and Jeffrey Schonberg, *Righteous Dopefiend* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2009); Philippe Bourgois, *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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- 54 "Structural and Direct Violence."
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- 56 Peter Iadicola and Anson D. Shupe, *Violence, Inequality, and Human Freedom* (Dix Hills, NY: General Hall, 1998).
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- 58 Iadicola and Shupe, *Violence, Inequality, and Human Freedom*, 23.
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- 60 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, "Symbolic Violence," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 272–274.
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- 62 "Symbolic Violence," 272.
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 Jeong, *Conflict Management and Resolution*, 104.
- 65 Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research," 146.
- 66 See for example Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*.
- 67 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Two Feet Under and a Cardboard Coffin: The Social Production of Indifference to Child Death," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 280.
- 68 This analysis stands in a methodological contrast to the discussion of "apparatuses" by poststructuralists such as Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), or the concept of the "totality" offered by insurrectionists such as The Invisible Committee in *The Coming Insurrection*, or in *Tiqqun Revue no2/2001* (La Fabrique, 2001); *Introduction to Civil War* (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2010); *This Is Not a Program*, trans. Joshua David Jordan (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e),

- 2011); on the politics of *witnessing*, Scheper-Hughes is more akin to the work of socio-anthropologists such as Paul Farmer “On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below”; “An Anthropology of Structural Violence”; Paul Farmer and Jim Yong Kim, “Anthropology, Accountability, and the Prevention of AIDS,” *The Journal of Sex Research* 28, no. 2 (May 1, 1991): 203–221; Paul Farmer and Arthur Kleinman, “AIDS as Human Suffering,” *Daedalus* 118, no. 2 (April 1, 1989): 135–160; and Bourgois and Schonberg, *Righteous Dopefiend*; Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, “Making Sense of Violence,” ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 1–31.
- 69 “[Theory or Taxonomy?]: A Rejoinder,” *Journal of Peace Research* 9, no. 1 (January 1, 1972): 89.
- 70 “Cultural Violence,” 291.
- 71 “On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below.”
- 72 “Methodology of the Theology of Liberation,” in *Liberation Theology*, ed. Jon Sobrino and Ignacio Ellacuría (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 11–12.
- 73 Galtung, “Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research,” 145.
- 74 “What If the Devil Were Interested in Peace Research?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 1 (March 1, 1988): 1–4.
- 75 For further inquiry in this manner, one can examine works by a variety of authors that seek to redefine counter-State violence while simultaneously examining the presumed legitimacy of State-initiated violence. These new critical fields have sought to redefine what constitutes “security,” see for example Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, eds., *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Hayward Alker, “Emancipation in the Critical Security Studies Project,” in *Critical Security Studies And World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 189–213; Nick Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010); Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Paul Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, eds., “Critical Security Studies,” in *International Society and Its Critics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), accessed January 2, 2013, www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199265208.001.0001/acprof-9780199265206; Laura J. Shepherd, ed., *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods* (New York: Routledge, 2013); on what can be considered legal/ethical/moral/strategic violence in a time post-nation-State when the rise of non-State actors in armed conflicts continues see for example Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit, *Critical Terrorism Studies: An Introduction to Research Methods* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting, eds., *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2010).
- 76 Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*; Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society and the Construction of Peace*; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre, “Evolution in Democracy–War Dynamics”; Hegre, “Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?”
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- 78 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
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- 80 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*.
- 81 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 28.
- 82 *A Thousand Plateaus*.
- 83 Jasbir Puar, *Terrormist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2007); “‘I Would Rather Be a Cyborg than a Goddess’ Intersectionality, Assemblage, and Affective Politics” (European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, January 2011), accessed August 7, 2013, <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0811/puar/en>.
- 84 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 221.
- 85 Ian Buchanan, “Power, Theory and Praxis,” in *Deleuze and Politics*, ed. Nicholas Thoburn and Ian Buchanan (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 27.
- 86 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 433.
- 87 Hardt and Negri’s work is further interpreted and adapted in the post-millennial, insurrectionary-influenced texts that surround student occupations, and the rise in global anti-austerity protests. One such publication that borrows heavily from Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* is the anonymously penned “Twenty Theses on the Subversion of the Metropolis,” trans. Institute for Experimental

- Freedom (Institute for Experimental Freedom, 2009), accessed October 19, 2014, www.zinelibrary.info/files/twentietheses.pdf. Other examples include the similarly anonymously authored “Communiqué From an Absent Future: On the Terminus of Student Life” (Self-published, 2009), accessed October 19, 2014, <https://archive.org/details/CommuniqueFromAnAbsentFuture>.
- 88 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*.
- 89 May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*, 137.
- 90 Michele Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- 91 Michele Foucault, *Discipline & Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
- 92 May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*, 136–137.
- 93 Tiqqun, *Preliminary Materials for a Theory of the Young-Girl*, trans. Ariana Reines (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2012), sec. A, Z.
- 94 Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois, “Making Sense of Violence,” 1.
- 95 Žižek, *Violence*, 1–2.