


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### **Border management in Europe**

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# BORDER MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE

## Europeanization and its discontents

*Karolina S. Follis*

### **Introduction: the Europeanization of border management**

‘To the question, “What is a border?” ... it is not possible to give a simple answer’, wrote Etienne Balibar in 1993 (Balibar 2002, 75), in the opening of an essay that informed a raft of scholarship critically examining the multiple and often contradictory facets of contemporary international borders (see Walters 2006; Salter 2008; De Genova 2013, among others). Far from offering ‘simple answers’, a growing transdisciplinary body of work examines borders as key markers of sovereignty, sites of cross-border interactions, the management of mobility and, more generally, as complex assemblages of control.

Some scholars focus on borders as places where territories of two countries meet, creating unique conditions and opportunities for local people. This research became particularly salient as the European Union (EU) expanded eastwards in 2004 (and again in 2007) transforming borderlands along its Eastern edge (O’Dowd 2003; Popescu 2008; Henrikson 2011; Eskelinen *et al.* 2013; Grygar 2016). On the one hand it became important to understand the mobility of people across the external frontiers of the EU (Morokvasic 2004; Düvell 2006; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007), on the other – to grasp how EU bordering practices are exported, embraced or resisted in its neighborhood (Gawrich *et al.* 2010; Scott and Liikanen 2010; İçduygu and Yürkseker 2012; Rechitsky 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016). Another strand of scholarship emphasized bordering as control. It highlighted the delocalized, even virtual nature of contemporary borders, in the EU and beyond (Lahav and Guirardon 2001; Balibar 2009; Johnson *et al.* 2011; Zaiotti 2016). A particularly strong focus, especially in the 2010s, was placed on the southern maritime border in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, where many thousands of migrants died in recent years in the course of sea crossings into Italy and Greece (e.g. Mountz and Hiemstra 2012; Andersson 2014; Bigo 2014; Brian and Laczko 2014; Albahari 2015; Tazzioli 2016; Follis 2017).

In pursuing a research agenda examining modes of border control at sea, scholars have shown how the practices of securitization and surveillance intersect with those of humanitarian search and rescue (SAR), the administration of asylum and other forms of protection, and practices of confinement, containment and removal. All of these distinct objectives come together in the concept of border management, which for the border professional community is a term of art denoting the structures and practices that ‘encompass both security and facilitation of legitimate cross-border flows of people and goods’ (IOM n.d.). Managing the borders of Europe today

entails contradictory imperatives. The border must be at once impervious to breach and open to traffic perceived as economically beneficial. Responding to the contemporary EU and national politics of migration, policymakers and border authorities must be surveillance-minded and technologically savvy, effective in deterrence and removals, but also fluent in the idiom of human rights and sensitive to the public perception of their actions.

This chapter explores border management in Europe, at sea and on land, as a distinct field of expertise and intervention. It asks to what extent it is justified to describe this field as undergoing a process of Europeanization. It explores briefly the concept of Europeanization itself, and the analytic utility of its different iterations for thinking about European borders. It then turns to the specific strategies and arrangements that bind together national, EU and international agencies, private industry and civil society actors in the endeavour of Integrated Border Management (IBM) which underpins border control in the Schengen zone. Drawing on an understanding of Europeanization that emphasizes discourse and knowledge production, the chapter argues that within the EU, border management has developed in historically specific ways. It has become a paradigm that seeks to impose order and rationality onto the fundamentally exclusionary, and therefore antagonistic sphere of border control. The specific ways in which border management obscures and exacerbates border tensions are now reproduced along the external borders of the EU and beyond them.

One important observation we can draw from the multiple strands of the recent literature on borders is that the core function of the twenty-first century border management, that is distinguishing between persons deemed eligible to enter a given territory and those to be rejected, depends on the continuous production and supply of specialized knowledge. To manage borders effectively, practitioners must be aware of the EU's external environment, the composition of migrant populations and of how they change. These changes are conceptualized as relative levels of risk and subjected to constant analysis, which in turn informs border management practices (Paul 2017). Border management personnel must also know the border itself, which entails understanding its institutions, laws, technologies and the relationships between them. This knowledge is specifically European, in ways that this chapter will discuss.

Conscious of its many interpretations, for the purposes of this chapter, I will use the concept of Europeanization to denote the decentralized processes of the production, circulation and embrace of specifically European border knowledge by actors at all levels of border management. I take advantage of the versatility of the idea of Europeanization that scholars have used for different analytical purposes (Radaelli 2000). In political science, work on Europeanization encompasses analyses of normative change through the EU policy process, and studies of how EU institutions and decisions influence domestic ones in member states (Olsen 2002; Börzel and Risse 2007). Europeanization is often concerned with the 'downward flow' of activities from the EU to the national level, impinging upon 'political actors, institutions, policies and identities' (Lequesne and Bulmer 2012, 3). From this perspective authors have accounted for the 'empirically observable differential impact of Europe' in terms of relative convergence and divergence in policy outcomes (Börzel and Risse 2000).

The concept of Europeanization 'implies there is a substance or a core to Europe—a relatively coherent set of values, norms or perhaps institutions', when in fact the idea of Europe is contested, there are 'Europes, not Europe' (Walters and Haahr 2005, 139). To avoid an essentialist interpretation, anthropologists, for example, use the notion of Europeanization to capture strategies of self-representation and modes of governance 'linked to the administrative and organizational power of the European Union' (Borneman and Fowler 1997, 488). They emphasize the circularity of the process, 'the EU as both the cause and effect of itself' (*ibid.*), rather than the existence of anything like a European 'core' radiating outwards (Harmsen and

Wilson 2000; Firat 2009). Informed by these perspectives, I suggest that Europeanization can be fruitfully approached as the circulation of specifically European knowledge. It is a process whose outcome is not predetermined, but rather involves the emergence of sites and practices sharing ‘family resemblance’, but also featuring important differences.

This chapter’s account of how border management becomes Europeanized highlights the dynamic feedback loops between EU, national and non-state actors active in this field. From this perspective, we can appreciate that there is evidence of both compliance and resistance at different levels of the system, and we can understand the sources of tensions that continuously animate it. The following sections show how the Europeanization of border management in Europe, at the external perimeter of the EU and in its ‘neighborhood’, unfolds through the burgeoning field of border expertise, through the practices of its production and distribution, and through the relationships between multiple categories of de-centred actors (EU, state and non-state) who participate in this endeavour.

### **Can border control be European?**

In my ethnography of the transformation of Poland’s border with Ukraine into an external border of the EU, I documented how upon Poland’s entry into the EU, Polish border guards resisted the idea that one day the EU might have a single border enforcement authority on the EU’s external frontier. The idea of ‘common services to control external borders’ (Council of the EU 2001, cited in Neal 2009, 340) was explored in Brussels in the early 2000s. At the same time the EU channelled funds to shore up the infrastructure and operational capacity of border guards in accession states to prepare them for their new responsibility of patrolling the EU’s Eastern external frontier. Within the context of these new linkages with the administrative apparatus of the EU, one of my Polish border guard informants asserted, ‘there isn’t [a European Border Guard], and there won’t be one!’ (Follis 2012, 104). In the face of constant pressure to alter their established practices in the name of the newly imposed ‘EU standards’, Polish border guards accepted the need to modernize but insisted that only they are competent to patrol Poland’s borders, that their fundamental embeddedness in, and mastery of the nation’s borderland makes them uniquely qualified to do the job.

The fieldwork that yielded this finding was conducted in 2005 and 2006. It reflected the political controversies over the approach to governing EU external borders, which played out in the years immediately preceding the 2004 enlargement. Should borders remain the exclusive prerogative of member states? Does granting jurisdiction to EU institutions over any aspect of external borders undermine national sovereignty? What is the appropriate role for the European Commission?

At the time, key actors in Brussels did not anticipate movements of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East across the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas on the scale witnessed from 2011 onwards. Southern European states formed task groups on maritime borders (Western Sea Borders Centre in Madrid and Eastern Sea Borders Centre in Piraeus), but apart from the sea route between Albania and Italy, which saw the large-scale exodus of Albanians in the early 1990s (PACE 1992; Albahari 2015), boat arrivals were seen as a trickle rather than a mass phenomenon (Brian and Laczko 2014, 86). Thus, attention and investment was concentrated on the new Eastern external borders. The ‘old’ EU had little trust in the capacity of border services in postsocialist accession states to execute their new tasks fearing mass border breaches from the east. The urge to prevent such ‘invasion’ played an important part in expanding supranational involvement in the management of external borders. However, Europeanization in this sphere received momentum already in the late 1990s. The 1999 European Council Summit in Tampere

for the first time ever was exclusively dedicated to the issues of justice and home affairs within the common borderless area (Dinan 2005, 572). The idea that European space must be protected by tight borders secured in sophisticated ways to guard against a range of threats was thought of as a 'logical continuation of the integration process and the principle of free internal movement in the EU' (Neal 2009, 344). It was further reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001, which brought transnational terrorism to the top of the list of threats. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) elevated the 'area of freedom, security and justice' to one of the primary EU objectives, with 'security' as value receiving the most attention (Bunyan 1999).

As Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Slovak, Hungarian and Slovenian border guards were adapting to their new job description as protectors of the EU's Eastern frontier, Frontex, or the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, with headquarters in Warsaw, was established by the EU Regulation in 2004. Launched in 2005, the agency received a modest role of the 'trustworthy operational Community coordinator and contributor that plays a key role in the implementation of the common EU policy for Integrated Border Management' (Frontex 2006) overseen partially by the Commission, partially by the member states.

Set up initially to 'complement the national border management systems of the Member States' (*ibid.*), Frontex's mandate evolved and expanded in the course of its first decade. The expectations of the large migratory movements from the direction of the former Soviet Union did not materialize. Instead, in 2006 Spain saw a sudden increase in the numbers of Africans attempting to reach its territory via the Canary Islands, from approximately 5,000 people in 2005 to over 39,000 in 2006 (Carrera 2007; PACE 2008). In response to this perceived crisis in 2007 Frontex for the first time deployed a RABIT, or 'rapid border intervention team'. RABITs, created by secondary EU legislation, consist of international border control experts and practitioners selected and trained by Frontex to provide 'rapid technical and operation assistance' *in situ* to the EU states that request it. Host states retain command in such cases, but under the guise of 'technicalities' and 'operational cooperation', Frontex provides training, support and specialized services. In the course of Joint Operation HERA Frontex and Spanish Guardia Civil patrols searched for and intercepted migrants at sea beyond territorial waters and returned them to ports of departure, effectively preventing them from lodging asylum claims on European soil (PACE 2008: par. 48).

The interceptions of Operation HERA mobilized activists, who since then have consistently focused on Frontex as the force behind the European 'war' against migrants (see e.g. Frontexit n.d.). But Frontex is 'both more and less than this militaristic view would allow for' (Andersson 2014, 74). Ultimately, national governments retain control over borders and state loyalties continue to dominate 'the supposedly Europeanized border regime' (*ibid.*, 75). Frontex can only act upon explicit request of member states, in spite of recent (failed) proposals to give it the authority to override them (Dimitriadi 2016). Frontex's more profound, yet less visible role is in 'rethinking the border' (Andersson 2014, 76). This includes developing the concepts, vocabulary and technoscientific and bureaucratic knowledge subsequently disseminated and promoted among border guards in member states. This knowledge and the mechanisms of its distribution have come to underpin the management of the EU's external borders.

### **Integrated Border Management**

In 2016 the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation gave Frontex a new designation and expanded its mandate. Frontex is now known as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The Regulation establishes the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), which is made up

of Frontex and national authorities of member states, which are responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks (Article 3). According to the Regulation,

The objective of Union policy in the field of external border management is to develop and implement European integrated border management at national and Union level, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons within the Union and is a fundamental component of an area of freedom, security and justice.

*(Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, Recital 2)*

IBM is subsequently defined in Article 4 of the Regulation as consisting of 11 distinct but inter-related components. Among them are border control (including the appropriate referral of persons who are candidates for international protection); search and rescue ‘in situations which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea’; risk analysis; cooperation between member states, with third countries and inter-agency cooperation; return operations and the ‘use of state-of-the-art technology including large-scale information systems’. The 2016 definition of IBM is more detailed and capacious than the original concept which involved a four-tier model consisting of border control, control measures within the area of free movement, measures in third countries and return (Jones 2017, 2).

Frontex’s new list of tasks, significantly expanded since the 2004 Regulation, corresponds to the new developments in IBM, which in turn reflect the European Commission’s response to the high numbers of arrivals to Europe in 2015 and early 2016. The 2015 Agenda on Migration identifies short and longer-term priorities, from preventing ‘further losses of migrants’ lives’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 22) to strengthening the common asylum policy (*ibid.*, p. 6). Some of the priorities, for example ‘developing a new legal migration policy’ (*ibid.*) are in fact ambitious political goals that require intergovernmental, as opposed to supranational action. Thus, in practice, the Commission’s main contribution to the regulation of human movement in Europe consists of Frontex’s border management mandate, which is presented as a set of neutral, self-evidently desirable measures in the interest of efficiency, security and rule compliance.

‘Who would disagree that complicated and risky things should be managed?’ ask rhetorically Rutvica Andrijasevic and William Walters (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 981), before offering a Foucauldian critique of the concept of ‘border management’, which, as they argue, reconfigures borders into ‘objects of technical expertise and intervention’ obscuring the fact that they are inherently ‘sites of politics and social struggle’ (*ibid.*, 977). In spite of the seemingly order-imposing rationality of managerialism, international government of borders is ‘a crowded, heterogeneous and sometimes disputed field of expertise and intervention’ (*ibid.*, 979). Frontex, according to the authors, is just one of many actors working side by side with national border services and international organizations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Civil Aviation Organisation and a number of specialized humanitarian organizations involved in assisting migrants in general, or caring for particular groups (asylum applicants, unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking, etc.). Private corporations are also involved supplying technological products and expertise, with their influence and financial stake in border management continuously increasing (Carmel 2016), particularly given that ‘use of state-of-the-art technology’ is now enshrined in the legal definition of IBM.

Yet, regardless of national loyalties and corporate power dominating this crowded field, Frontex successfully imposes its conceptual matrix at the external borders of Europe, even if it remains ‘an agency that lacks independence’ (Andersson 2014, 76). Frontex is the commissioning

agent of much of the new technology now deployed at sea, on land and in the air (Hayes *et al.* 2014). It is the coordinator of Eurosur, that is the European Surveillance System defined as ‘the information-exchange framework designed to improve the management of Europe’s external borders’ (Frontex, Eurosur n.d., see also Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015). Eurosur depends on a network of National Coordination Centres (NCCs), which gather and supply information from their own borders into the system. The infrastructure however has been developed at the European level, combining the decisive preoccupations with security and controlling irregular migration with the EU Treaties-derived duty to observe fundamental rights.

### **The paradox of border management, humanitarianism and fundamental rights**

Throughout Frontex’s first decade, human rights watchdogs have scrutinized its human rights record and accountability (HRW 2011; PACE 2013). A range of diverse voices in international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media expressed the view that Frontex’s actions are contrary to ‘European values’ or, in other words, to the EU’s overall commitment, declared in the Treaties, to fundamental human rights. This criticism prompted a set of moves on the part of Frontex to incorporate ‘fundamental rights’ language into its documents, and to build internal monitoring of its rights conduct into the institutional structure. Since 2011, Frontex has had a Fundamental Rights Strategy (Frontex 2011; Frontex, n.d.a) and a Fundamental Rights Officer. Expert partners, such as the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), European Asylum Support Office (EASO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator provide assistance to Frontex in developing an accurate understanding of ‘the particular situation of persons seeking international protection, ... including women, victims of trafficking and children’ (Frontex 2011, 14). Since 2013 a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights independently advises Frontex on ‘on the respect, protection and promotion of fundamental rights through Frontex activities’ (Frontex 2016, 13). Such legal and institutional assurances have not entirely satisfied the critics who have noted the apparent contradictions and disjunctions between security, humanitarianism and rights.

The discourse of border management projects the idea that the exclusionary effects of European border policies can somehow be achieved without sacrificing the humanitarian objective of ‘saving lives’ and without violating the fundamental rights of migrants who attempt to enter Europe. The official EU discourse increasingly emphasizes the life-saving powers of technology and fundamental rights safeguards in border protection (see Lemberg-Pedersen, this volume). This paradox has been conceptualized as the rise of the ‘humanitarian border’, which encompasses ‘an uneasy alliance of a politics of alienation with a politics of care, and a tactic of abjection and one of reception’ (Walters 2011, 145). Others stress how humane treatment of migrants becomes an important part of the professional identity of European border officials, ‘which also distinguishes them from other, less humane, police cultures’ (Aas and Gundhus 2015, 14). Frontex is far from the only actor declaring its humanitarian credentials at the border (see, for example, Cuttitta 2014 on the Italian Navy operation Mare Nostrum and Cuttitta 2017 on non-state humanitarian actors). However, the EU agency specifically ‘seems to have appropriated the language of fundamental rights as a standard item of its self-presentation’ (Aas and Gundhus 2015, 14).

Meanwhile, while Frontex’s everyday policing practices undertaken alongside national border guards to some extent enact compassion, they are also, or rather primarily, repressive (Fassin 2005; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). They are repressive in the sense that they encompass practices such as deterrence, use of force, detention, deportation (benignly called ‘return’) and a

general thwarting of the will and agency of the migrants attempting to cross borders. Repression is generally justified by the claim that irregular migrants are people who have knowingly broken rules, even if some practitioners acknowledge the complexity and desperate situations that drive such migration (Feldman 2013). For the individuals subjected to these forms of enforcement, the effects are brutal, even if (which is not always the case) personnel adhere to the principles of humane treatment (De Genova and Peutz 2009; Gerard and Pickering 2013; Plambech 2014; Schindel 2016).

Along the entire perimeter of the EU, ideas derived from the distinct but interrelated traditions of humanitarianism (Fassin 2012) and human rights (Dembour and Kelly 2011) are in a tense relationship with the politics of border control. The latter is driven by anti-immigrant sentiments, nationalist retrenchment in many EU member states, as well as securitizing imperatives and the interests of the ‘illegality industry’, that is the varied group of national and international agencies and private bodies engaged in the profitable business aspect of border management (Andersson 2014). This intertwining of the principles of fundamental rights and human dignity with the logic and practice of exclusion is characteristically European, distinguished from a more military-strategic approach of countries like the United States and Australia (Bigo 2014, 214). It can be found in national border and immigration policies of member states (see Fassin 2005 on France, Albahari 2015 on Italy, Follis 2012 on Poland). Above all, however, it underpins the EU’s common activities at external borders, enshrined in directives, regulations, green and white papers, briefings, training manuals, codes of conduct and countless other documents which circulate among the border managers of Europe (Horii 2012). The EU has devised an exclusionary border regime grounded in ostensibly neutral legal principles, but the enduring tension between compassion and repression has material consequences.

The EU embraces a concept of rights that is highly bureaucratized, and therefore largely stripped of its emancipatory potential. No matter how many fundamental rights clauses are incorporated in Frontex rules, border management cannot escape its primary task of selective exclusion of those who are deemed ‘undesirable’ according to relatively stable criteria: poor, non-white, needy, but with no claim to international protection that would be considered justified according to current restrictive definitions of asylum (Bohmer and Schuman 2007). As such, border management reinforces racialized and gendered hierarchies of citizenship and non-citizenship.

As Bigo shows, IBM ‘exists to avoid the danger of [migratory] overflows and that of the complete liquidity entailed by a world without borders. The logic of control is not so much a defensive/offensive military move against enemies as it is a logic of policing, of filtering, of risk management’ (Bigo 2014, 214). Others have cautioned that underestimating militarization is a mistake, and that in fact police-military divides are eroding (Jones and Johnson 2016). Developments in border technology, particularly the deployment of drones, show that the military logic of tracking and targeting now also applies to managing migration, even if the purpose is not killing but ‘only’ deterrence and return (Chamayou 2012; Suchman *et al.* 2017). Either way, the border management optic which treats migrants not as people but as ‘flows’ to be halted or diverted by a range of different means has led to the humanitarian catastrophes at sea (Spijkerboer 2007) and to the emergence of ‘zones of social abandonment’ (Biehl 2005). In and beyond Europe we see a growing number of camps, ghettos, detention facilities and other “‘local traps” where people are forced to live in places where they do not want to live and where they can be forgotten. In the process, some populations end up being less human than others’ (Bigo 2014, 221).



## Beyond Europe, beyond territory

Since the 1990s, the abiding logic underpinning the reinforcement of the EU's external borders has been the idea that the borderless internal 'area of freedom, security and justice' needs to compensate for its internal openness by establishing tight protection around its perimeter. Hence EU-level rather than member state only investment in border management. Theorists of globalization interpreted this development as part of a larger pattern when 'the liberalization of trade and finance at regional and global levels is being accompanied by a new set of political anxieties about borders, crime, illegal migration, and terrorism, along with political demands and initiatives to reassert the power of the border' (Walters 2002, 561; see also Andreas and Snyder 2000). Many constituencies in Europe over the last two decades have indeed embraced and promoted the drive to strengthen and secure borders as a form of a counter-globalizing move, even when they acknowledged, or even extolled, the economic benefits of some types of freedom of movement for selected groups, both within and across the EU's external borders (Favell 2008). The hardening EU border regime has been in tension especially with local and regional economies in Europe's borderlands, where petty trade, smuggling, seasonal labour migration and other forms of licit and illicit traffic provide a source of livelihood to vast populations (Jansen 2009). Securitization has complicated everyday lives of borderlands' inhabitants whose 'concerns over security stand in contrast to the wish to keep borders open and fluid to maintain social, cultural and emotional ties across the border' (Pfoser 2015, 1698).

However, beyond the dynamic tension between openness and closure, there are other ways to understand the Schengen area. The shorthand 'Schengen' refers to the EU territory without internal border checks established on the basis of the 1985 Schengen Agreement and today mostly corresponding to the 'area of freedom, security and justice' encircled by the external EU border. When examined from a longer historical perspective, Schengen can be understood as a new 'culture of border control' which has evolved, following a logic of selection and retention of specific features, from the older, Westphalian model where borders were the exclusive prerogative of nation-states (Zaiotti 2011). Zaiotti argues that this development has 'not been smooth or straightforward' (ibid., 218). Since the original agreement between five members of the European Economic Community it has grown to encompass almost all member states. Its development has been encountering the resistance and criticism from various quarters and political angles. Nevertheless, 'external borders are now de facto European and ... [Schengen's] impact does not stop at Europe's confines' (ibid., 219).

Indeed, this brings us back to Balibar, who shows that some borders are not located at borders at all, that they are ubiquitous and can take the form of selective checks inside and beyond the bordered territory (Balibar 2002). Scholars have empirically documented these developments, variously conceptualizing them as the externalization, deterritorialization and disaggregation of borders (Sassen 2007; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Zaiotti 2016). Walters argues that

Schengen is an event which allows us to denaturalize the connection between borders and nation-states. Schengen highlights the historicity of borders, revealing the contingency of the configuration of sovereignty, territory, and population associated with the modern state.

(2002, 576)

If that is the case, Europeanized border management instantiates most fully the historical development whereby the idea and the apparatus of the border becomes separated from the actual

geopolitical borderline. This does not entail that sovereignty wanes or weakens, but rather that it is being rearticulated and that it expands into new arenas (Jones and Johnson 2016). From this perspective, Europeanized border management can be seen as a toolkit of ‘pooled’ sovereignty, where the actors are not just sovereign states but also ‘their agents and their intermediaries’ like Frontex and other EU institutions (ibid., 195). What emerges is a set of complex bureaucratic and sociotechnological arrangements, like the massive interoperable EU databases or the Eurosur system discussed above. These arrangements allow states to surveil and police access to their territories at a distance and by proxy, or rather through a complicated and not always acknowledged hierarchy of proxies. In spite of their ostensibly equal status within the EU, Southern coastal EU states bear the burden of bordering on behalf of Northern Europe, and the EU as a whole relies on so-called partnerships with third countries to ‘stem the flow’ and contain undesirables (HRW 2006).

Heller and Pezzani (2016) draw attention to ‘the recourse to strategies of “externalization,” through which non-EU states have been turned into migration gatekeepers on behalf of the EU’ (see also Zaiotti 2016). Frontex coordinates this cooperation to try to reduce the number of people arriving at the EU’s borders ‘by extending the use of EU “border management” policies, techniques and technologies to those countries’ (Jones 2017). As of early 2017, Frontex had 19 such agreements with states and entities including Turkey, Nigeria, Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Eight other such agreements are to be signed by the end of 2019 with, among others, states that are seen as vital to containing Mediterranean migration, that is Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia (ibid.).

These agreements and proposals for further cooperation have long attracted the scrutiny of human rights advocates, on the grounds that such outsourcing circumvents European states’ legal obligations to refugees (HRW 2003, 2006). In recent years, particularly controversial have been the initiatives to cooperate with Libya, due to the situation following the military intervention in 2011, by joint United States and European forces, which left the country in a protracted state of political instability. In these conditions irregular migrants face particular hardships and violence, especially abuse by armed groups and exploitation by human smugglers and dire conditions in violent and overcrowded detention facilities (HRW 2014; Sunderland 2016). European states and Frontex are accused of being complicit in maintaining this intolerable situation, due to their emphasis on deterrence and containment, which contributes to the persistent displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. With this track record, it would be very difficult to convince migrant advocates that ‘capacity building’ and border guard training in Libya is a legitimate venture by EU actors who are ostensibly committed to fundamental rights. Thus far Frontex has no formal agreement with Libya, mostly because as of 2017 the UN-recognized government of Libya competes with two other authorities for control over the country. Nonetheless, independently of Frontex, under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU operates the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Libya. The Libyan EUBAM (EEAS n.d.), with its €17 million budget from August 2016 to August 2017, aims to accomplish in a new region that which in previous decades was accomplished in Ukraine and Moldova, namely, the setting up of a reliable migration buffer zone. In that sense, the Europeanization of border management extends beyond the EU frontier, as personnel from the border guard, customs and police services of the EU member states converge on strategically selected locations to intervene into and shape, with varying results, the practices of their non-EU counterparts (Jeandesboz 2015).

## Conclusion

This chapter has argued that border management in the EU has developed in historically specific ways. I have shown that by framing cross-border movements as a problem of management, the EU has depoliticized the fundamentally exclusionary, and therefore antagonistic sphere of border control. EU institutions have sought to project an image of order and rationality in a contentious field where life and death are at stake. The member states have insisted on their autonomy in matters of border control, but at the same time they have benefited from and contributed to entrenching the EU strategy of IBM. The discourses and practices of IBM obscure and exacerbate border tensions. This effect is now reproduced along the EU's external borders and beyond them, even as civil society and social movement actors question and resist current practice.

It is the stance of this chapter that border management is Europeanized in the sense that it is underpinned by the circulation of specifically European border knowledge. European institutions underwrite its production and dissemination. European laws, policy papers, training materials, codes of conduct and a myriad of other documents are distributed among border professionals in Europe and beyond, inculcating a particular shared vocabulary alongside a set of concepts, practices and dispositions. The transformation has profound material consequences in the form of infrastructures and technologies that coordinate border policing across and beyond member states' territories. This does not mean that what emerges is a unified service or a uniform type of a Europeanized border personnel. Europeanization is received differently in various national contexts and across different universes of border control, from those working at sea, to those guarding land borders or operating the databases of Eurosur. For this reason, to understand the Europeanization of border management we must pay attention to the 'actual work routines and the specific professional "dispositions"' rather than Europeanizing discourse alone (Bigo 2014, 209). If we agree with Jones and Johnson that 'although not a sovereign state ... in the area of border security the EU increasingly acts like one' (Jones and Johnson 2016, 191), it is important to have an accurate grasp of the tensions and dynamics of these actions. This chapter emphasized the attempts to reconcile repressive security measures with narrowly framed and ultimately largely vacuous fundamental rights protection measures. In spite of the existence of such measures, the exclusionary logic of border management overdetermines the outcomes. Those people who are unwanted in Europe must be pushed away, sometimes at the cost of life. Europeanized border management continues to proffer technical solutions to political problems.

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