

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MIGRATION AND THE WELFARE STATE

Igor Jakubiak and Paweł Kaczmarczyk

Introduction

The share of international migrants worldwide has remained relatively stable over the last decades. However, their absolute number has soared, and the global picture of immigration has changed since the 1960s (UNDP, 2009). The majority of international migrants today target well-developed economies with long immigration traditions, such as Australia, Canada or the United States, as well as selected European countries. With the increasing number of migrants present in these societies, immigration has become one of the pivotal subjects discussed in both academic and public debate. One topic, which has often surfaced in recent years, is the relationship between welfare and migration. Immigrants in developed economies are regularly presented and perceived as a threat not only to the stability of the labour market or cultural unity, but also to the sustainability of the welfare state. Immigration is said to burden the state and local budgets of host countries and to negatively affect the public services enjoyed by natives. The fiscal effects of migration were one of the main reasons that some of the governments (e.g. United Kingdom, Australia) decided to curb the inflow of immigrants into their countries or limit newcomers' access to social benefits. There are three main reasons for the increased interest in this subject: large and growing immigrant populations in modern immigrant states; the increased strain on government spending induced by population aging; and the strain on public finances, caused by the global financial crisis of 2008 (OECD, 2013).

The stereotype of the adverse impacts of immigration on the welfare state can be broken down into two components (Kaczmarczyk and Rapaport, 2014). The first one is purely economic and relates to the alleged negative fiscal position of immigrants. The second has a socio-political character, and relates to social trust and solidarity, which is allegedly undermined by the presence of 'aliens' in a redistributive or insurance system. This in turn translates into negative attitudes among citizens and weakens the political foundations of the welfare state. However, recent research shows that both concepts should be dismissed in the European context. In nearly all European states, immigrants make a positive net contribution to welfare systems, and the 'group loyalty' effect, described on the basis of racial diversity in the United States, does not occur in the case of Europe (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016).

This chapter begins by providing a theoretical background of welfare migration research. Next, empirical research in the European context is presented, followed by final conclusions and challenges for future studies.

Theoretical considerations

Nannestad (2007) proposed a typology of approaches to migration and welfare systems, in which he distinguished four main areas of interest: (1) the welfare system as a pull factor (i.e. *welfare magnet hypothesis*); (2) the impact of the welfare system on immigrant behaviour at the destination (i.e. the set of incentives and disincentives for integration); (3) the impact of the immigration on the current welfare system at destination (i.e. fiscal effects); and (4) the impact of the immigration on future welfare arrangements (i.e. *political economics of migration*).

In the case of the first issue, there is a general consensus that the presence of redistributive policies will explicitly or implicitly induce adverse selection mechanisms in migration patterns. It is expected that potential net beneficiaries will be attracted to the more generous systems and that potential net contributors will be discouraged by the high taxes necessary to support them (Musgrave, 1969; Chiswick, 1988; Wildasin, 1994; Borjas, 1999; Brücker *et al.*, 2002; Hassler *et al.*, 2002; Cohen, Razin and Sadka, 2009; Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri, 2011). The second issue deals with moral hazard – which is present in any redistributive system – but from the immigrant perspective. For a variety of reasons, it is preferable for migrants to integrate into the host country society. The main incentive for such integration, which is not without cost on the immigrant side, is labour market absorption. However, the presence of welfare benefits can undermine this incentive and lead to segregation (Okun, 1975; Putnam, 2000). A large portion of literature, devoted to welfare and migration, concentrates on the welfare and fiscal effects of migration. Unfortunately, it offers no unequivocal answer to the question of the impact of migration on welfare, which is understood as either the well-being of non-migrants in the host society or the public expenses of the destination country. In the first case, the set of assumptions, which can often be described as conservative, strongly affects the results, suggesting that they should be treated with caution (Djajic, 1998, 2009; Fuest and Thum, 1999; Michael and Hatzipanayotou, 2001; Michael, 2003, 2011; Djajic and Michael, 2009). In the second case, the main differences appear between static analyses, which concentrate on calculating current budgetary contributions and expenses related to immigration, and dynamic approaches, which aim to assess the long-term impact of inflows on the host economy (Wildasin, 1994; Wellisch and Wildasin, 1996, 1998; Storesletten, 2000; Chand and Paldam, 2004; Coleman and Rowthorn, 2004; Boeri, 2010; OECD, 2013). The last area of research concentrates on the effect of immigration on the formation of migration and redistributive policies. Theoretical frameworks suggest a strong impact of migration on the support of the welfare state. However, the empirical research in the European context does not confirm those conclusions (Benhabib, 1996; Dolmas and Huffman, 2004; Ortega, 2004; Sand and Razin, 2007; Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri, 2011).

Empirical evidence

Before moving to the empirical evidence behind each of the hypotheses described in the previous section, it must be noted that research of the relationship between welfare and migration is characterised by a number of challenges. First, there is no simple definition of welfare or the welfare state, which historically has been operationalised as anything from the entire public expenditure to the unemployment benefits level. Second, welfare arrangements differ between countries, which makes any comparisons and quantifications difficult. This has caused many authors to propose a typology of welfare states, rather than a measure of their generosity, starting with the seminal work by Esping-Andersen (1990). Third, the size of the welfare state is strongly connected with the level of wealth or development of the country. This means that any measures of welfare generosity are usually correlated with the average wage, per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or any other index used to describe the relative attractiveness of the destination labour market for potential migrants. This makes it difficult to disentangle the individual effect of welfare generosity on location decision. Moreover, the assessment of the effect that immigration has on the destination country's economy requires a number of very strong assumptions regarding the immigrant labour market performance and demographics such as the level of welfare dependency, unemployment, fertility and average age. Last, it is difficult to obtain a representative sample of immigrants, and their presence in large surveys, such as Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) or Labour Force Surveys (LFS), has for many years been insufficient for general conclusions (leaving aside the issue of unsatisfactory sets of variables that are available from those sources).

In the empirical research on the impact of welfare arrangements on immigrant behaviour, two distinct approaches can be distinguished. The first is based on measuring the impact of welfare arrangements on location decisions. Methodologies range from ordinary least squares (OLS) through experimental approaches to conditional logistic regression, and use either aggregated or disaggregated data on migration flows. This approach is more prevalent in the US. The second approach concentrates on differences between welfare dependencies of natives and immigrants in the host countries and is more often used in the European context. A comprehensive work by Brücker *et al.* (2002) provides estimations of the 'immigrant effect' on welfare use (unemployment benefits) in various European countries. Authors obtain significant results in the case of Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Austria and Finland and no such effects for Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece or Spain. Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) present a comparison of welfare use among immigrants and natives in Sweden and conclude that participation among the former is relatively higher, even after controlling for observable characteristics. They also find that this difference decreases with time spent in-country, which suggests an assimilation *out of* and not *into* welfare, although at a rate insufficient for long-term convergence. For Germany, a number of studies (Castronova *et al.*, 2001; Riphahn, 2004; Riphahn, Sander and Wunder, 2010) show that the higher welfare take-up rate among immigrants (Frick, Smeeding and Wagner, 1999; Riphahn, 1999) is mostly due to their higher eligibility rate, or in other words – observable characteristics, mainly: lower education, lower household head age, and higher number of children. Moreover, immigrants in Germany were found not to be more likely to claim benefits they are eligible for (Bird *et al.*, 1999) and to assimilate out of welfare over time (Fertig and Schmidt, 2001). In the case of Denmark, Nannestad (2004) shows that immigrants from non-Western countries remain net beneficiaries of the welfare state even after ten years of residence. Blume and Verner (2007) analyse the process of immigrant assimilation and observe a decline in usage of welfare over time, although the convergence is not complete in the case of women and men from less-developed countries. An empirical assessment of migrant fiscal position and welfare dependency, presented in Boeri (2010), suggests that migrants are overrepresented among recipients of non-contributory transfers. A Europe-wide assessment by Barrett and Maître (2013) suggests that there is little evidence that immigrants are more likely to receive welfare payments. Similar conclusions were presented by the OECD (2013) study of the fiscal effects of immigration. It also suggests that three basic characteristics: age, education and labour market status, can explain a large proportion of net fiscal position differences between immigrants and natives. Moreover, it should be noted that immigrants' excess use of welfare arrangements does not constitute a proof of welfare magnetism, i.e. that immigrants' choice to migrate and their residential decisions are affected by welfare generosity (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012). Barrett and Maître (2013) provide several alternative explanations of residual dependency, based on Brücker *et al.* (2002), such as self-selection, discrimination and network effects.

An example of research on the impact of welfare arrangements on the geographical distribution of immigrants is Péridy (2006), who estimates a linear regression model of immigration into the Euoropean Union (EU) from 67 source countries and concludes that higher public spending in destination countries correlates with higher migration flows. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) use conditional logistic regression to estimate the effect of welfare generosity on immigration decisions. Estimations based on the data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) show that welfare arrangements can act as a magnet across the countries of the EU. It is important to note that in both Brücker *et al.* (2002) and De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) immigrants are defined as non-EU citizens. A more recent work by Giulietti *et al.* (2013), in which authors control for potential endogeneity between welfare generosity and migration flows, finds no evidence of the welfare magnet in the case of migration within the EU and little evidence in the case of non-EU immigrants.

The research of the fiscal effects of migration concentrates on the computation of the net fiscal position of migrants, as suggested by Wellisch and Wildasin (1996). There are two distinct strands of literature. In the *static*, or *cash flow*, approach, analysis refers to a given year (tax year) and compares the contribution of immigrants to the public treasure – in the form of direct and indirect taxes, although in practice, most studies are limited to the first case – with the value of benefits and services received. Its main advantages are simplicity and a lack of strong assumptions. Calculations are generally based on historical data. However, it lacks the forward-looking perspective and is not useful for predicting long-term consequences of migration, especially in terms of population aging. Such studies are usually limited to one country. In the case of the UK (Gott and Johnston, 2002; Sriskandarajah, Cooley and Reed, 2005; Rowthorn, 2008), the results suggest that the effect of immigration is small, around 0.2 per cent of GDP, and positive. They also show a strong impact of the business cycle on the immigrant net fiscal position, which can be tied to the large volatility of immigrant employment in changing economic conditions. Studies conducted in Denmark (Wadensjö, 2000, 2007; Nannestad, 2004) show that the fiscal impact of migration differs with the origin of the immigrants. Generally, the effects are positive for the Western migrants, while non-Western ones are found to be net beneficiaries of the state. A study conducted in Sweden (Ekberg, 1999) showed a large, negative fiscal impact of immigration. However, the reference period coincided with economic recession, which could explain part of this outcome. In summary, results of the static approaches suggest that the fiscal effect of migration, even in the net immigration countries, is small compared to the state's GDP and in many cases positive, although the effect is subject to fluctuations resulting from the business cycle.

The *dynamic* approach addresses one of the shortcomings of the static approach by providing a long-term perspective. One of the methods, used to this effect, is based on the idea of expanding the static accounting exercise over time by calculating the *net present value* of both contributions paid and benefits received by the immigrants (and sometimes their offspring) over their lifetimes. In the case of Germany (Bonin, Raffelhüschen and Walliser, 2000), results suggest that there is a positive long-term effect of immigration on the welfare state, mostly due to the favourable age structure of the immigrants, and that those benefits could be increased by introducing a targeted immigration policy. However, in case of Sweden (Ekberg, 2011) and the Netherlands (Rodenburg, Euwals and ter Rele, 2003), the fiscal impact of immigration is negative, mostly due to unfavourable characteristics of newcomers. The above results do not account for return migration, which – due to the lack of transferability of some social benefits – can decrease the costs of immigration. Kirdar (2010) shows that correcting for this can further increase the positive fiscal impact of immigration in Germany. Another method focuses on intertemporal distribution of public debt, by means of Generational Accounting. It is assumed that every deficit ultimately needs to be paid by the residents of the country, and that the future burden is calculated as the difference between the Net Present Value (NPV) of projected government expenditure and the NPV of the tax payments of all living generations. This type of analysis usually requires very strong assumptions regarding the characteristics and behaviour of migrant households, both present and future, for example with regard to fertility rates, life expectancies, return migration rates, productivity rates, labour market participation rates, or regularity rates. Similar assumptions regarding natives and the government are necessary. In the European context, studies usually report the required tax increases for future or present generations. In the case of Germany, Bonin, Raffelhüschen and Walliser (2000) find that an additional 200,000 migrants reduce the NPV of taxes imposed on the native-born by US$68,000 per capita. Similar results are obtained for Spain (Collado, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera, 2004) and Austria (Mayr, 2005). In France (Chojnicki *et al.*, 2010), the calculated life-cycle contribution of an immigrant is positive, mostly due to the age distribution. Most Generational Accounting studies find a positive impact of immigration, due to the distribution of debt on a larger resident population. However, the overall impact of immigration on public finances is small. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models constitute the last group of methods typical for the dynamic approach. Fiscal effects are often a by-product of calculations of how an entire economy will react to the changing conditions such as immigration influx. In the case of Sweden, Storesletten (2003) finds a negative NPV of US$20,500 resulting from the admission of an additional typical immigrant household. He suggests that low labour market integration of immigrants' offspring is the main cause of this effect. Monso (2008) replicates this study for the case of France and arrives at the value of US$9,500. To summarise, the results of dynamic calculations vary, depending on the methods and assumptions. Generally, the impact of immigration remains small compared to the GDP. Moreover, the final effect is strongly dependent on the composition of the migration flow in terms of skill and age structure.

The political economics of migration policies remains a domain of mainly theoretical considerations. Empirical evidence can be found in Gaston and Rajaguru (2013), who test the impact of immigration on redistributive policies in 25 OECD countries between 1980 and 2008. Contrary to the findings from theoretical models, they conclude that an increase in immigration leads to higher social spending. More examples, which refer to the case of the US, can be found in Simon (1998) and DeVoretz (2006).

In summary, an empirical assessment of the relationship between migration and welfare concentrates on four main areas of interest. The question of how social benefits affect migration decisions is analysed mainly in the context of *welfare magnets*, and empirical evidence provides mixed results. The analysis of immigrant welfare dependency gives a more unequivocal answer – that immigrants generally do not depend on the welfare provisions to a greater extent than natives, after controlling for their characteristics. Although the methods of measuring the impact of immigration on welfare and the welfare state in the host society vary considerably, there is a common conclusion that this effect is small relative to the GDP, and can be positive. In the field of political economics of migration studies related to the US context, racial heterogeneity is documented as being responsible for lower support of redistributive policies. Against this background, empirical evidence related to European countries is still very limited and often in opposition to theoretical considerations. More specifically, recent studies show that the negative impact of immigration on redistributive policies in Europe is much lower in magnitude than in the US, or even negligible. This is due to both the 'skill composition' effect related to the inflow of well-skilled immigrants (very present in the media coverage of immigration to the EU) as well as to the 'labour market' effect resulting from the fact that a large portion of immigrants are perceived as being complementary to the natives in labour market terms (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016; Kaczmarczyk and Rapoport, 2014).

Lessons and challenges

The review of theoretical and empirical studies presented in this chapter perfectly points to two opposite strands in the general approach to migration and welfare. On the one hand, proponents of a relatively liberal approach to mobility would argue that migration can be a critical factor of the survival of welfare systems in the long run and can be at least a partial remedy for recent fiscal issues. On the other hand, immigrants are treated as outsiders breaking the very logic of exclusionary welfare systems and are commonly blamed for burdening the budgets of receiving countries and negatively affecting the socio-economic situation of natives.

In fact, as shown above, most empirical studies indicate that immigrants use social benefits more than natives. This difference, however, is not necessarily attributable to the fact of being a migrant but rather to the generally less favourable structural characteristics of migrants, particularly their labour market status. Additionally, the fiscal position of immigrants is strongly system dependent, i.e. the problem often lies not in immigration itself but rather in the construction of the welfare system. The general conclusion is that the net fiscal impacts of immigration are small (usually below 1 per cent of GDP) and can hardly impact the well-being of natives.

The above-presented review reveals a few key challenges. First, from the methodological point of view it is critically important to consider both the short-term (static) effect of immigration and immigrants' participation in contemporary welfare regimes as well as its long-term impacts on the sustainability of welfare states. Available empirical studies, particularly within the dynamic approach, clearly suggest that an inflow of immigrants can present a serious remedy for well-known deficiencies of aging economies. Second, political responses to the presence of immigrants in receiving societies and immigrants' inclusion into welfare systems remains an open question. Even if empirical studies for Europe show that we should not expect such negative impacts of immigration on the support of redistributive policies as identified in the US context, the intensity and scope of public debates on migration and welfare would suggest the opposite. Third, the relationship between immigration and welfare seems to influence public attitudes towards immigrants. And those attitudes are primarily driven by myth and stereotypes created and supported by the media and not by scientific evidence. Against this background this chapter reveals a number of politically relevant issues. We would argue that many – if not all – European countries will need more immigrants to sustain their welfare systems. In order to secure positive impacts on the welfare they will need to implement more selective immigration policies but also critically assess other public policies. As labour market absorption remains one of the key factors shaping immigrants' net fiscal contributions, it is critically important to improve the labour market integration of migrants and to work on the efficiency of welfare policies, which often tend to put immigrants in the 'poverty trap' rather than assimilating them out of welfare.

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SECTION COMMENTARY

Labour market

Agnieszka Fihel

The studies presented in this section on the effects of international migration in Europe contribute to what we could call mainstream economic studies on labour market effects, developed mostly in Anglo-Saxon countries and consisting both of advanced formal deliberations and econometric analyses. In this section commentary, I would like to present the specificity of research concerned with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and conducted in recent decades in this domain. I define the CEE as the group of post-communist countries in Eastern part of Europe which have been undergoing the institutional transition to democracy and a market economy; some of these countries are members of the European Union[1] and others are not.[2]

From the variety of 'push' and 'pull' factors contributing to intensified international mobility in the CEE, I need to mention three. First, the collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union, hitherto constituting a political and economic entity, had far-reaching consequences. For at least four decades of the communist regime, the migration potential of the CEE societies had been suppressed in many ways, and the sudden liberalisation of border traffic rules that occurred between the late 1980s and early 1990s obviously entailed a boom in international mobility. Second, in the CEE countries, less developed in economic terms as compared to Western Europe, fundamental institutional reforms implied a considerable increase in unemployment and a perceptible deterioration of living conditions, which constituted important 'push' factors for international migration not only by and large, but also at this particular time and in this region. And third, important discrepancies in wage levels between the CEE and major destinations enhanced intensive labour migration, which took a predominantly circular form due to restrictive institutional settings that were in force in the Western Europe in the 1990s.

Despite the common post-communist heritage and relevant economic hardships related to the institutional transition, trends and patterns in international migration remained very differentiated within the CEE region. As several authors provide extensive descriptions of trends in international migration in the CEE (i.e. Frejka and Bisi, 1996; Okólski, 2000; Wallace and Stola, 2001), let me mention only that as some countries were becoming a source of intensive emigration,[3] others began to absorb considerable numbers of immigrants from the CEE region[4] or from remote countries, such as China, India and Vietnam.[5] Also, some countries simultaneously became a source of massive outflow and a destination for return migrants and foreigners.[6] Given that no generalisations can be drawn here with regard to the (net) sending/receiving status of the CEE countries,[7] I would like to underline two important features specific to those

CEE countries that do register intensive international in- or outflow: the predominance of labour migration and the spread of short-term forms of migration, including temporary, circulatory or even trans-border movements.

Having said that, I would like to point out the main difference between studies concerned with the CEE region versus those dealing with the Western part of the continent: while the latter refer to economic consequences of international migration in the receiving countries (for wages, income, unemployment, welfare systems and labour market needs), the former obviously adopt the perspective of sending countries. As such, the debates on international migration in the CEE region refer to three main domains: (1) the selectivity of emigration and return migration; (2) the impact of those two types of flows on the source countries; and (3) emerging problems linked to intensive outflow and unfavourable demographic changes.

As for the selectivity of migration, the most frequently addressed socio-demographic characteristics of migrants include: gender, age, human capital, family situation, earnings, labour market status (in both the sending and receiving country) and various attachments of migrants to the home and destination countries, such as home ownership, citizenship and declared identity. Particular attention is paid to the structure of return migration as compared to the group of emigrants or nationals who stayed in the home country, and only selected examples can be mentioned here.[8] Some authors provide evidence for the overrepresentation of young and well-educated persons among the returnees. For instance, based on European LFS data, Martin and Radu (2012) examine the return migration to five home countries of CEE in the years 2002–2007. Return migrants appeared to be on average younger than the general group of emigrants. In comparison to natives, returnees were also more likely to be single, living in one-person households and possessing medium and higher education levels. In the study by Fihel and Górny (2013), specific institutional circumstances accompanying developments in Poland, characterised by the fall of communism and introduction of a market economy and liberal political system, appeared to attract expatriates in the 1990s with higher levels of human capital and strong family attachments to Poland.[9]

A selective pattern of emigration may imply important consequences for the labour market of a sending country. Thus, numerous studies concerned with the CEE address the impact that emigration and return migration exert on the unemployment rate registered in the country of origin. The conclusions are rather ambiguous; studies for Georgia (Tukhashvili and Shelia, 2012), Moldova (Ganta, 2012) and Ukraine (Pozniak, 2012) show that if not for emigration, the unemployment rate would be significantly higher than the registered one. In turn, it appears that most emigrants from Belarus (Bobrova and Shakhotska, 2012), Poland (Bieńkowska *et al.*, 2010, 2012; Szymańska *et al.*, 2012) and Ukraine (Kupets, 2012) were not unemployed before undertaking labour migration, and that the lack of employment opportunities in the home country did not constitute the main motive for leaving. In the CEE countries that were members of the European Union, the outflow of persons of working age exerted a negligible impact on the rate of unemployment; in fact, the decrease in the unemployment rate that was registered in these countries was attributed in the first place to an intensified creation of new jobs and in general, to growth in employment (Rutkowski, 2007, p. 10).

A large body of global research on international migration is concerned with the role of foreign workers in filling up the labour market gaps in specific economic sectors and professions. Some CEE countries are also affected by labour market mismatches,[10] especially – and as elsewhere in developed countries – in hard, low-paid and hazardous types of work. Interestingly, the CEE region appears to be both the source and destination for foreign workers ready to work in '3D' occupations,[11] often on a temporary and/or undocumented basis. As only a selected example of the growing reliance on labour migrants, the study for Russia evidences the large scale employment of foreigners, mostly from the Commonwealth of Independent States, who created 'migrant niches' in the construction sector, wholesale and retail and household services (Zayonchkovskaya and Tyuryukanova, 2010; Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk, 2012).[12] In Poland the scale of seasonal labour migration to the German agricultural sector reached 300,000 persons annually at the turn of the twenty-first century (Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz, 2008). But in approximately ten years the Polish agricultural sector also became dependent on foreign seasonal labour, originating mostly from Ukraine (Górny and Kaczmarczyk, 2017).

This thread of research is more frequently used in reference to CEE migrants working in the Western European countries, mostly due to larger wage disparities and the higher scale of East–West mobility. In this context, migrants from the CEE not only respond to labour market needs in the receiving countries, but also act as 'buffers' helping to regulate the labour supply according to the macroeconomic situation (Kahanec and Guzi, 2017): they fill labour vacancies during the period of prosperity and, by coming back to the countries of origin, they can alleviate the problem of unemployment during the economic recession. Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2016) provide evidence on increased return flows from the 'old' EU member states to the 'new' ones, due to unfavourable macroeconomic conditions. In another study, these authors show that such a return flow can be postponed if the economic situation in the sending country is also deteriorating (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2012). Focusing on the cross-border mobility from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to Austria, Wiesböck *et al.* (2016) show how this most temporary form of international mobility responded to changing conditions during the financial crisis.

The studies on the CEE region focus on two other types of consequences of international migration for the countries of origin: financial remittances and so-called social remittances, that is the related norms, practices, and social capital acquired in the countries of destination (Levitt, 1998, 2001). Estimates of the scale of financial remittances vary from one country to another; nonetheless, most authors stress that financial remittances sent to CEE are spent mostly on every-day subsistence needs of migrants' families and the purchase of durable goods (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008; Kupets, 2012). The same applies to the savings of migrants who, upon their return to the country of origin, rarely establish their own enterprises (see for Poland: Bieńkowska *et al.*, 2010, 2012; Szymańska *et al.*, 2012). Returnees are thought to bring 'Western' norms and practices to the labour markets in the countries of origin (Grabowska and Garapich, 2016), but studies are far from being conclusive. Migrants coming back to CEE countries experience reintegration difficulties, often remain jobless and do not necessarily get high wage returns from their migration experience abroad.[13] The problem of so-called brain waste may serve as an explanation here. Many authors show that the CEE labour migrants work abroad in positions below their skill levels (Dustmann *et al.*, 2010; Fihel *et al.*, 2015), with low returns to education (Jakubiak, 2016) in spite of their relatively good educational levels. This has been observed in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Norway (Bruecker *et al.*, 2009; Tijdens and van Klaveren, 2011; Galgóczi *et al.*, 2011, 2012; Hazans, 2016). Also, as Shima (2010) demonstrates for Bulgaria and Romania, the structure of labour demand in the countries of origin to a great extent determines the occupational status and possible wage premiums of the returnees.

The growing number of research studies addresses the economic consequences of international migration in the context of unfavourable population changes. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the CEE region has suffered from three demographic phenomena that contribute to and accelerate population ageing: (1) decline in fertility levels and the emergence of lowest-low fertility[14] (Kohler *et al.*, 2002); (2) increases or stagnation in life expectancy (Meslé, 2004); and (3) large outmigration of young persons, whose departures additionally intensify the depression of births.[15] Two of the above-listed processes result in depopulation, that is to say a decline in the population size, which is expected to occur in the near future in countries such as Poland, Ukraine and Russia (Eurostat, 2013; United Nations, 2015). Due to demographics, the CEE region is expected to struggle with important labour market mismatches and the growing fiscal burden of ageing. I believe that these threads of research will increase in CEE countries as a result.

Notes

1 In alphabetical order: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
2 Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia.
3 Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic or Ukraine.
4 Russia.
5 The Czech Republic.
6 In Poland, the number of persons staying abroad for at least 2 months increased from a million in 2004 to 2.4 million in 2015 (GUS, 2016). At the same time, the scale of labour inflow from Ukraine reached hundreds of thousands of persons (Kaczmarczyk, 2015).
7 The studies published in the collective book edited by Okólski (2012) provide far-reaching theoretical reflections on the migration trends in CEE region. The so-called migration transition from a net-sending to a net-receiving country, which occurred previously in the Western and Southern Europe, is expected to soon occur in CEE countries as well.
8 See also collective books edited by Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016), Galgóczi *et al.* (2012), a paper by Klüsener *et al.* (2015) and country-specific reports written in the framework of the project 'Labour mobility within the EU in the context of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements' (available at www.iab.de).
9 The terms 'brain gain' or 'brain circulation', coined to express the increase in overall human capital due to non-permanent migration, describe very well the impact of return flow to CEE shortly after the fall of communism (see also Klagge and Klein-Hitpaβ, 2010).
10 In the aftermath, *inter alia*, of labour outflow, as in the case of Belarus, Moldova, Poland, or Ukraine (Kupets, 2012).
11 Dirty, demanding and dangerous.
12 These 'migrant niches' have no impact on the level of unemployment or wages of the natives.
13 Although these conclusions are different for returnees in Latvia (Hazans, 2008) and Romania (Epstein and Radu, 2007).
14 The Total Fertility Rate oscillating at very low levels below 1.5 (less than approximately 1.5 child per a woman in the childbearing years).
15 The process of ageing in CEE differs from that registered in other well-developed countries due to the role of international migration. In CEE, as long as fertility decline intensifies the process of ageing from the 'bottom' of the population pyramid and rising life expectancy – from its 'top', emigration implies loss of middle-aged persons and their descendants and indirectly contributes to the increase in the old people proportion. This impact is already observed in Georgia (Tukhashvili and Shelia, 2012), Poland (Fihel and Anacka, 2014) or Ukraine (Pozniak, 2012).

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PART VII

Pan-European cooperation on migration management