


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On: 27 Sep 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

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The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe

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The evolution of governance and financing of migration and development policy and politics in Europe

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315512853-40>

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Published online on: 09 Jul 2018

How to cite :- Marieke van Houte. 09 Jul 2018, *The evolution of governance and financing of migration and development policy and politics in Europe from: The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe* Routledge

Accessed on: 27 Sep 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315512853-40>

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THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND POLITICS IN EUROPE

Marieke van Houte

Introduction

Since the turn of the century, European states (both migrant-sending and -receiving), as well as the diverse institutions of the European Union (EU), have come to see mobility and migration as interrelated with development. Key words are remittances, diaspora, transnational engagement and return- and circular migration. Yet, despite the wide use of these general concepts, the migration-and-development (M&D) nexus remains under-defined, is interpreted differently by different stakeholders from sending and receiving perspectives, and is constantly evolving (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016).

In this chapter, I will argue that M&D policies, defined as ‘the particular area of (...) policy-making which is concerned with inter-linkages between migration and development’ (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016) serve three different priorities, specifically: (1) to promote international development, (2) defend domestic security and welfare, and (3) manage, control and regulate migration (Carling 2002; Duffield 2006; Skeldon 2008; Raghuram 2009; De Haas 2010). Efforts by European states and EU institutions to manage M&D goals have from the turn of the century led to the formulation of M&D policies and the spending of Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets on migration-related issues. Yet, the contradictions that emerge between enabling policies to foster M&D and constraining policies of migration management in practice cause ambivalent attitudes of states towards their migrants (Bakewell 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2010). Moreover, as this chapter will show, the EU has played a dominant role in this discourse, affecting both EU member states and European states outside of the EU. This notwithstanding, large divergences in perspectives on these policy priorities exist between Western and Eastern European countries, which largely coincides with differences among migrant-receiving and -sending perspectives.

This chapter first elaborates on how the discourse on M&D emerged, and how it attracted political interest and found its way into different European policies. Then, it moves on to analyse the different priorities of policymaking around migration and how they lead to concrete policies, budgets, and implementation. Finally, it discusses the effectiveness and coherence of

these policies. The chapter concludes that the policy approach to M&D cannot be understood without analysing the security dimension, and that the M&D nexus is really a migration-development-security nexus (Truong and Gasper 2011).

Evolution of migration-and-development policy and thinking

From the early 1990s, changing political and economic boundaries, growing inequality and globally increased civil conflicts in the post-Cold War period caused increased and more diversified migration flows and a shifting political and academic discourse with regard to the relationship between M&D in Europe (Black and Koser 1999; Chimni 2000; Hyndman 2012).

From the perspective of Western European countries, increased and more diverse immigration flows led to a realization that external efforts to enforce modernization and democratization of low-income countries, either through military, diplomatic or development aid intervention, tended to fail (Freyburg 2011). The limited success of classic development institutions and reduced budgets for aid and defence led to the search for alternative actors for development. At the same time, a paradigm shift towards post-structuralism and individualization led to more optimistic views on the power of grassroots actors, including individual migrants and migrant organizations, who would contribute to development from the bottom-up, rather than top-down, state-led approaches (Faist 2008). Western European national governments gradually became attracted to the idea of ascribing to migrants the moral responsibility to become grassroots actors for development in their places of origin (De Haas 2006; Faist 2008; Skeldon 2008; Raghuram 2009).

From a Central- and Eastern European (CEE) perspective, the transition after the end of the Soviet-backed communist regimes meant a transition from strongly restricted and relatively little mobility to increased out-migration and circular mobility, mostly within the region (Kaczmarczyk 2005; Kancs 2011). The accession of many CEE countries to the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 significantly reinforced transnational mobility, leading to unprecedented inflows of remittances which meant an important source of foreign exchange in the region (León-Ledesma and Piracha, 2004), but also inflation and shortages on domestic labour markets and return migration flows (Martin and Radu 2012).

Academic developments also inspired policy interests. The newly introduced concept of transnationalism captured the increased awareness of migrants' sustained multi-stranded ties and relationships across borders, linking their societies of origin and their societies of settlement (Basch, Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; Portes 1999). Among policy makers, the emerging evidence that financial remittances by migrants to their countries of origin outweighed the size of ODA in some aid-receiving countries (Gammeltoft 2002) and sparked a serious interest in seeing migrants as tools for development (Bakker 2015). Policy views started taking into account migrants' potential for poverty-reduction and the development of their countries of origin (Skeldon 2008). The academic world, in turn, shifted from the early 2000s from merely investigating transnational ties as such to investigating how migrants' transnational ties might lead to development in societies of origin. The term 'migration-development nexus' was first coined by Sørensen *et al.* (2002) and subsequently made its way into policy debates (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016).

The transnational literature on how migration can promote development was initially mainly developed by Western European scholars and US-based scholars, and was based on three assumptions (van Houte 2014). The first highlights the self-selection in processes of migration, as people with more money, networks, knowledge and entrepreneurial skills are better equipped to face the costs and the risks of migration (Faist 2008; De Haas 2010; Van Hear 2014). The idea

is that the transnational involvement of these 'functional elites' with their country of origin will be inherently good for the country of origin, as they can continue to play a role through remitting money and ideas (De Haas 2010). A second assumption has to do with any new capacities, such as education and work experience, and desires, such as democratic values, that migrants develop after arrival in the destination country. The implication for development is that these enhanced skills are a potential contribution to development and democratic change (Levitt 1995). A third assumption in the literature on migration and change is inspired by the notion of migrants' transnational connections to multiple places and assumes the ability of individuals and households to take advantage of geographical differences and transnational mobility to diversify, secure and improve their livelihoods, support coping mechanisms and reduce vulnerabilities (Gardner and Grillo 2002; Faist 2008). The implication for development and change is that the 'in-between' position of their multi-local ties makes them able to respond to local needs, while being relatively independent from the constraints of structures, giving them the freedom to negotiate change and hybridity (Portes 1999; Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Brinkerhoff 2011; Freyburg 2011).

Yet, along with an increased awareness of the development potential of increased global interconnectedness, the notion from a migrant-receiving countries' perspective had also emerged that increasing immigration flows, especially those from places that are considered poorer and culturally, ethnically or religiously 'distant', threaten social cohesion, welfare and security in destination countries. In (Western) Europe and other parts of the so-called Western world, this resulted in growing public and political resistance towards immigration in the 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001, which linked migration to issues of security, conflict and terrorism, led to a further decrease in tolerance towards non-Western, Muslim and immigrant groups in general. In a process labelled as the securitization of migration, increasing public and political pressure emerged to keep unwanted or even dangerous migrants out of their countries (Huysmans 2000; Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Bourbeau 2011; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; Schmidtke 2015). The need to defend domestic security and welfare increased further in the context of the economic recession in Europe from 2008 onwards (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). The perceived need of the host countries to contain migration and the tendency for more restrictive migration policies also affected the thinking on the migration-development nexus, as will be shown below.

Key actors of European migration-and-development policies

Some individual European destination countries, including Sweden, France and the UK, already started implementing ad hoc policies linking migration to development in the late 1990s, although most key destination countries were reluctant to embrace the idea (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Moreover, political changes, such as the removal of the severe restrictions on mobility in Central and Eastern European former communist states after 1989 and accession of these states to the EU, unintendedly affected the link between M&D through increased out-migration, remittances and return migration (León-Ledesma and Piracha 2004; Martin and Radu 2012).

However, the greatest deliberate push to promote M&D came from institutions and initiatives of the EU. Although several meetings were held at the EU level to develop common strategies and policies from 1999 onwards, concerns about security and sovereignty made many member states hesitant to get on board in endorsing such policy approach (Hugo 2012; Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Yet, the increased awareness of the total amount of remittances in the early 2000s caused a rapid attitude change of European governments and international institutions

towards the idea of migrants as tools for development (De Haas 2012). Effective EU policy engagement with M&D issues only really took off in 2005 with the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), later rebranded as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This policy framework for the EU's dialogue and cooperation with third countries on migration is 'the overarching framework of EU external migration policy, complementary to other, broader, objectives that are served by EU foreign policy and development cooperation' (EC 2011). With its key priority defined as 'maximising the positive impact of migration on development of partner countries (both of origin and destination) while limiting its negative consequences' (EC 2011), the GAMM seemed to sufficiently address both the hopes and fears of European immigrant-receiving states to get on board with the M&D nexus. While combining a number of goals around migration, the GAMM is clear about its strategic priorities, which are to improve the 'vitality and competitiveness of the EU', within the changing demographic and economic circumstances (EC 2011).

Since the implementation of the GAM(M), the interest in the link between M&D has grown rapidly among mainly Western and Southern EU member states, in comparison to global developments (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Although the M&D nexus has become a common buzzword in policy terms, it is not always clear which policies and budgets fall under this header, which also relates to the fact that both terms are not explicitly defined (*ibid.*). Only a few countries (i.e. France, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland) have adopted policy papers specifically addressing M&D and their strategies in this area. Most other EU countries have instead developed communications or documents that select and prioritize particular aspects relating to the M&D nexus, with a focus on remittances, skilled migration and diaspora engagement (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Moreover, almost all EU countries earmark ODA budgets for migration-related issues, with or without explanation in policy papers. These migration-related ODA budgets include the expenditures to handle incoming asylum seekers and refugees, which have become increasingly significant. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), half of donor countries redirect their existing ODA budgets to cover these refugee costs (OECD 2016a). These in-donor refugee costs rose from US\$3.4 billion to US\$12 billion between 2010 and 2015, while its share of total net ODA rose from 2.7 per cent in 2010 to 9.1 per cent in 2015 (OECD 2016b).

The (Western) European countries, as well as the European Commission, operate in an institutional setting where different ministries, governmental and non-governmental agencies are responsible for different policy aspects of the M&D nexus. Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser argue that the prevailing mandate of the Ministry in the lead – Development, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs or Justice – is telling for the priorities of the M&D policy. Moving the portfolio from one ministry to another has frequently resulted in M&D policy changes (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Moreover, projects on M&D are implemented either by the government's own implementing agency or through international or non-governmental organizations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an important implementing partner for many European countries. Specifically, the European Commission and such countries as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland mainly 'outsource' the implementation of their M&D projects to international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Other key implementing partners include diaspora organizations (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016).

While the literature on M&D is dominated by a focus on Western European policy, not much literature is available that analyses the role of the CEE governments as active policy actors in this policy area. Instead, '[t]he focus on Europeanisation has been predominant in research on migration policy in the region' (Kicinger 2009). The image comes up of these governments as

subject to the policy adjustments in the context of EU accession requirements (Laczko, Stacher and von Koppenfels 2002; Black, Engbersen and Okólski 2010), or as one of the GAMMs main geographic region of interest as ‘the EU Neighbourhood’ that needs to be managed in terms of people flows.

Priorities and practices of migration-and-development policy

Despite a lack of a clearly defined understanding of migration and development, as well as patchy documentation of which policies and budgets can be considered as promoting the M&D nexus, three types of priorities and practices can be identified that link policies and budgets of migration and development in Europe, with diverging perspectives in migrant-sending and -receiving states.

Priority 1: promote international development

The most visible goal for European countries to link M&D is to promote international development through migrant actors, although the nature of the expected change often remains under-defined (Bakewell 2008; Faist 2008; Raghuram 2009; Brinkerhoff 2011). This particular conceptualization of M&D initially tended to focus on a number of migrants’ ‘resources’ or ‘assets’ to be ‘mobilized’, ‘harnessed’, ‘leveraged’ or ‘tapped into’ for the benefit of their country of origin (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016).

Both sending and receiving countries, as well as migrants themselves, are expected to benefit from this, hence the references to a win-win-win scenario of M&D. Nevertheless, the policy perspectives and priorities can be quite different, depending on the point of departure. A Western European, or receiving country perspective has an implicit but specific view of the ‘right’ kind of change that entails a socio-economic modernization and liberal democratic state building project covering the introduction of the rule of law, human rights and gender issues, secular and liberal democratic institutions, elections, civil society and market-based open economy (Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Suhrke 2007; Raghuram 2009; Mac Ginty 2010). For Western European countries, the ‘right’ kind of development entails the facilitation of constructive economic and diplomatic ties with these countries, in other words, a development towards regimes and systems that they can do business with. In a similar vein, migrants’ involvement that may have destabilizing effects or cause political unrest, are considered as undesirable. By contrast, Central and Eastern European countries, which are predominantly migrant-sending, seem to be more pragmatic and facilitate mobility to release pressure on the domestic labour market, and as a way of increasing national budget (Kicinger 2009).

Practice: migrants as a tool to enhance development

In practice, this strand of M&D policy focuses on enhancing the potential of international migrants as ‘tools’ for development in poorer countries of origin (Skeldon 2008). Linked to this understanding, policy efforts to link migration to development initially focused in both sending and receiving countries on a limited set of specific issues, most notably remittances, particularly through transfer cost reduction, and measures to channel them through taxable routes. In addition, the prevention of brain drain became important. From a receiving country perspective, the activities of diaspora groups (a long-existent term in migration studies indicating the continuous connection of migrant communities to a shared homeland) was now framed in a development perspective (GCIM 2005; Skeldon 2008; ICMPD and ECDPM 2013; Keijzer, Heraud and

Frankenhaeuser 2016). The promotion of diasporic engagements appears prominently in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the UK (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Moreover, a large focus for receiving countries lies on return migration, based on the idea that migrants who return can add their acquired skills and capital directly to the country. Programmes that promote the link between return and development facilitate the temporary or circular return of highly skilled migrants (Faist 2008; Frouws and Grimmus 2012; ICMPD and ECDPM 2013).

Despite numerous evaluations, however, no clear effects of these policies to promote migrants' impact on development have been established. Rather, research has shown various limitations that prevent the success of this strand of policy. First, these policies pay too little attention to potential detrimental effects of remittances, such as increased inequality linked to the geographic and social selectivity of migration or the development of dependency on remittances in countries of origin. Second, these policies pay limited attention to the heterogeneity of migrants' skills, capacities and legal and economic status that would enable them to send remittances and otherwise contribute to development (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016), and similarly denied conflicting political agendas within the diaspora and between diaspora groups and their home country governments (Faist 2008). Although global discussions on the link between M&D have focused on the 'relatively successful' 'voluntary' or 'economic' migrant holding valuable resources, including skills, to be mobilized for the benefit of his/her country of origin' (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016), countries throughout the EU have expanded this link to encompass refugees, failed asylum seekers and undocumented migrants through their return (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013), which has become an intrinsic part of M&D policies.

Priority 2: defending domestic security and welfare

The section above showed that the EU and its member states have to constantly negotiate the priority to promote international development with the priority to defend domestic security and welfare. For this reason, despite the overall positive macro-economic effects of immigration for destination countries, policy makers in destination countries have come to see immigration as a challenge rather than an opportunity for domestic security and welfare. The link with M&D fits in a trend where ODA is increasingly used for enhancing domestic security and welfare (Brown and Grävingsholt 2016). Other than the first priority – where a level of common ground can be found between receiving and sending countries – this second priority reflects mainly a receiving country perspective, though similar concerns for security and domestic welfare can come up in sending countries, when confronted with forced repatriations.

Practice: root causes approach: development policy to prevent migration flows

M&D is connected to security through the argument that underdevelopment leads to migration, which in turn leads to insecurity (Marchand 2008). A second strand of M&D policy is therefore directed to eliminating the 'root', 'structural' or 'underlying' causes of migration flows (Lindstrom 2005; Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016), such as poverty, unemployment or lack of educational opportunities. Measures to prevent migration are therefore mostly found in Western European and EU policies, and in Central and Eastern Europe only insofar as they are dealing with immigration flows. Although many studies point out towards the fact that not the poorest people migrate and that the increased welfare leading to enhanced capacities and aspirations results in increased, rather than decreased, migration (De Haas 2007), the belief and rhetoric in the 'root causes approach' still prevails as a key motivation in the M&D policies of the

European Commission and many European destination countries. For example, in response to the recent inflow of asylum seekers into Europe, the EU launched the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa with the aim to

[H]elp foster stability in the regions to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and displacement and to contribute to better migration management. More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development.

(EC 2015)

The same root causes approach in the light of security also leads to policy that argues that migrants returning ‘home’ can contribute to the development of their country of origin, while European host states can be relieved from the burden of migrants who are economically and politically superfluous. In this light, Assisted Voluntary Return (and Reintegration) (AVRR) policies, which are designed to assist in the return of undocumented migrants and (rejected) asylum seekers who have no legal right to remain, is being presented as a solution. With 85 per cent of all AVRR coming from European host countries, this is a typical European policy instrument (Hart, Graviano and Klink 2015). A wide range of countries, including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, finance Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes from their ODA budgets (OECD 2016b). Several European countries explicitly include AVRR as part of their M&D policy and budget (e.g. Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain), claiming that such returns can be considered as capacity building for the country of origin (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). Nevertheless, research shows that a contribution to development cannot be expected from returnees returning through AVRR (van Houte and Davids 2014).

Priority 3: managing, controlling and regulating the movements of migrants

What follows from the two previous priorities is the need to maximize the positive impact of migration on the desirable kind of development in countries of origin, while limiting its negative consequences for domestic security and welfare. A third goal is therefore to bring together destination countries’ concerns with the control of migration on one hand and sending countries’ needs in terms of development aid and access to regular migration opportunities on the other (Pina-Delgado 2013), by managing, controlling and regulating the movements and behaviour of migrants. This is therefore a priority of both sending and receiving countries. This policy priority is, more than the other two, subject to complex power negotiations, of which it is not always clear who has the upper hand.

Practice: migration management as negotiation tool for aid

Following this goal, a third strand of M&D policy is about explicitly linking development to migration management on the bilateral level, by making development aid and cooperation conditional to migration management. The key instruments for the EU to do this are mobility partnerships (EC 2011). These policy instruments are designed to regulate migration in such a way that the EU’s economic, social, development and neighbourhood policies all benefit (Parkes 2009). According to the GAMM, the mobility partnership entails a ‘more for more’ approach, implying an element of conditionality. The mobility partnership offers:

[V]isa facilitation based on a simultaneously negotiated readmission agreement (...) an appropriately sized support package geared to capacity-building, exchanges of information and cooperation on all areas of shared interest.

(EC 2011)

M&D are here linked as strategic negotiation tools: with the mobility partnership, the EU, involved member states and third countries negotiate development cooperation and visa facilitation in exchange for readmission and stricter border control (Broczka and Paulhart 2015). A key priority for European host states here is readmission of unwanted migrants who refuse to return via AVR. As forced deportations require the cooperation of the government of the country of origin of the individual to be deported, the lack of cooperation with readmission has become an increasingly significant barrier to receiving countries. With these readmission agreements, accepting the return of their nationals is made into a duty for third countries. Failure to do so has repercussions on the wider partnership, which includes aid, trade and visa agreements (Collyer 2012). This arrangement is particularly effective when dealing with aid dependent countries. For example, in October 2016, world powers, including the EU, pledged \$15 billion towards development aid and peace building in Afghanistan, a day after the EU signed an agreement with the Afghan government allowing EU member states to deport an unlimited number of Afghan asylum seekers. Although the EU reinforced that the readmission deal should not be seen as a condition of the financial support coming out of the donor conference, some scholars (Bjelica 2016; van Houtte 2016) have observed that the donors would not have been as generous in their funding pledges if the deportation deal had not come through, and that the Afghan government would not have accepted the deal had it not been conditional on aid. By contrast, different power negotiations were at play in the EU–Turkey Migration deal, in which Turkey agreed to take back asylum seekers crossing over from Turkey to the EU, in exchange for additional financial aid and visa liberalization. Notably, where the Afghan administration may have felt forced into the deal, Turkey seems to use the agreement as a leverage of power over the EU (see for example Von Rohr 2016).

The other side of mobility partnerships is to facilitate legal forms of migration, including circular migration, meaning that migrants to high income countries ‘circulate’ back to their countries of origin after a period of time, creating a potential ‘triple win’ scenario. For the origin country, skilled migrants will not be ‘lost’ because they will return after a certain time and these countries will benefit from the remittances that are sent back. The circular migrants themselves should benefit through learning skills while abroad and from their higher earnings. Yet the focus seems to lie on the destination country perspective, as countries bring in the migrant labour that they need while not having to offer citizenship rights (Skeldon 2012). However, it has been argued that while the win-win-win scenario only works if circular migration implies both flexibility and regularity, allowing migrants to circulate freely, this circulation is in practice much more restricted (ibid.).

Effectiveness and coherence

As a result of the multitude of priorities and practices, the key challenge for policies on the M&D nexus is policy coherence, not only within national policies, but also in interaction between sending- and receiving national policies. Scholars studying the link between M&D have raised five main points of tension caused by this lack of coherence, which together hamper the effectiveness of M&D policies. These are the following:

- 1 *The tension between controlling and enabling migration.* Academic research highlights that the link between development and migration is the strongest when mobility flows are enabled, rather than restricted (Skeldon 2012). In practice, however, the development potential of migrants is undermined by increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum policies, which have increased the costs of migration and hampered transnational engagement (Sørensen 2012). As these policies damage rather than promote the conditions of mobility under which migrants might be actors of change, they arguably contribute to the ‘unmaking’ of the M&D nexus (Carling 2004).
- 2 *Denial of agency and heterogeneity of migrant populations.* Some scholars have criticized M&D policies for seeing migrants and migrant communities as mere ‘channels’ for implementing development cooperation budgets that negates the agency of migrants and diaspora organizations to innovate development (Sinatti and Horst 2014). At the same time, seeing migrants as instruments for fulfilling the priorities of the host state fails to see them as purposive actors whose actions are part of dynamic life strategies, ambitions, values and visions (Omata 2013). Although there is a recognition that migrants can shape change ‘from below’ and be grassroots agents of change (EC 2013), policies and budget mainly try to govern migrants’ actions and movements ‘from above’.
- 3 *Not the poorest regions.* While migrants are given the responsibility to contribute to development where official aid programmes have failed (Castles and Miller 2009, 58), the European receiving states increasingly channel their M&D funding towards the main countries of immigrants’ origin, which are usually not the poorest countries. This choice raises questions about whether projects seek optimal effectiveness of the ODA budget in terms of promoting sustainable development (Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016).
- 4 *Focus on migrants with the least development potential.* In addition to the focus not being on the poorest regions, the policy focus is also not on the migrants with the most potential to contribute to development. First, by focusing on migrants in Europe, a minority of all migrants are targeted (Skeldon 2008). Second, while skilled and mobile migrants have the most potential to contribute to development and change, only small shares of M&D budgets promote the initiatives of such privileged migrants. Instead, M&D policy budgets tend to focus on more vulnerable migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees and undocumented migrants, who are less likely to have the legal and economic capacities to contribute to development. (van Houte 2014; Keijzer, Heraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016). Spending ODA on these groups is considered controversial as they are not in line with ODA’s main objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries (OECD 2016b).
- 5 *Aggravating unequal power relationships.* Several authors argue that while M&D policies by European countries have to a certain extent been able to regulate migrant flows and behaviour in a way that serves their political and socio-economic goals, migrant-sending countries seldom have the power to regulate outflows and their impact in the same manner (Portes 2010). Despite the emphasis on ‘partnership’, mobility partnerships and readmission agreements are characterized by coercion more than equality, and expose strongly unequal power relationships (Collyer 2012). In this power position, it has been argued that, both in the trade-off with internal economic opportunities (Ford, Jennings and Somerville 2015), and with regard to their foreign policy, the EU consistently chooses to prioritize European security interests over shared prosperity and democracy promotion (Hollis 2012).

Thus, some scholars increasingly argue that, despite the policy rhetoric, ‘there is no simple one-way relationship between M&D’. ‘Development is unlikely to decrease migration in the short

run, and migration in itself cannot be the main recipe for development' (Sørensen 2016, 62). This understanding of the complexity of these links has led several authors to point towards the overly optimistic and instrumental take, in which political and economic agendas prevail, making policy-driven categories of M&D distorted by simplification and exaggeration and not evidence-based (De Haas 2012, 2014; Gamlen 2014). Sørensen (2016), for example, has argued that 'much migration-development policy in reality has served migration management functions rather than development goals' (Sørensen 2016).

Conclusion

Based on the priorities and challenges of policies on the M&D nexus, this chapter shows that from a European perspective, every hope for the development potential of migrants is intertwined with fears for security and welfare of the immigrant-receiving states. This means that the policy approach to M&D cannot be understood without analysing the security dimension. From a policy perspective, the M&D nexus is really a migration-development-security nexus (Truong and Gasper 2011). Domestic agendas of sovereignty and domestic security continue to hamper the transnational agenda that would aim to maximize the development benefits while mitigating the costs of human mobility.

The notion of the migration-development nexus is present in many parts of the world. Yet the policy agenda and practice is strongly dominated by the EU and Western European states. The EU has played an instrumental and dominant role in that from a receiving perspective. This is not to say that the EU is successful in reaching their goals that should link migration, development and security. Sending countries, including countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which are not part of the EU or whose accession has been under debate in the past decade, have partly been subject to these policies while also assuming their own power positions. The latter are often called on to 'harvest the benefits' of their large migrant communities (associated with emigration, remittances and return) as the development potential in their ongoing political and economic transformations. Therefore, in wider Europe, both migrant-receiving and -sending states have adopted the M&D paradigm, even if for different reasons.

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SECTION COMMENTARY

Pan-European cooperation on migration?

Agnieszka Weiner

Europe is the continent with the longest history of cooperation on migration and mobility, which is part and parcel of political relations. The continent's history of being divided and separated by the Iron Curtain made mobility a cherished prize of European integration, and it was only recently that the European Union (EU)–Russia stand-off put the brakes on what would have inevitably been closer cooperation in this domain.

In fact, as the authors of the three contributions suggest, the European continent is divided into two spheres of influence, respectively centred in the Western countries of the EU and the Russian Federation. Each sphere is defined by the mobility rights it accords to its inhabitants and the cooperation tools it uses. Cooperation in pan-European institutions such as the Council of Europe or OSCE (Jaroszewicz, this volume) transcends both spheres and facilitates cooperation on migration between them. 'Independent' initiatives such as regional consultative processes by the two main international organisations in the field (IOM and ICMPD) have become vehicles of this cooperation. Even during the current stalemate over Ukraine, the EU and Russia continue their engagement on a lower technical level in these processes.

The central debate that is picked up in this section is the role of the EU in shaping its policy environment, especially on the European periphery. The chapters enumerate a range of vehicles that the EU uses to exert its influence: a number of policy tools under a 'partnership' label; financing of international organisations and regional consultative processes; migration and development policies, as well as specific visa policy, which makes a direct link between mobility and cooperation on border management. The EU has been identified as a regional hegemon (Haukkala 2008) and thus its policy choices have been seen as crucial to the continent-wise policy convergence.

Indeed, the EU has become a primary actor promoting cooperation on migration, especially after 2005 and the launch of the Global Approach to Migration. Yet, the application of the Approach to the non-EU regions of Europe was not seen as particularly fruitful; on the contrary, the additional layer of engagement on the EU-level was seen as overlapping with many other pre-existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives (European Commission 2007; Weiner 2011). The Annex II to the relevant EC Communication listed over 60 initiatives already funded on the continent by the EU in the years 2000–2006, and that list did not include the plethora of border management projects and anti-trafficking projects. This number was in addition to CoE, OSCE and bilateral projects and initiatives (European Commission 2007). The EU

thus entered an open door, bringing ideas and deep pockets to an area of already intense exchanges.

As presented in the chapters, the EU partnered with its European neighbours on a number of initiatives that should facilitate mobility. However, the idea that cooperation on readmission in exchange for visa liberalisation would be welcome sounds outlandish in the Southern Neighbourhood across the Mediterranean. In part the different attitude in Eastern Europe can be explained by the EU's own approach: the European partners were given the opportunity to combine two agreements, while non-European partners never had a clear prospect of visa facilitation (until the Arab spring). This different treatment showed more trust in Europe and also spread the spirit of European integration beyond the EU (Delcour, this volume). Until 2014, Europe as a continent was on the track of visa-less mobility for all Europeans. Labour mobility was to be facilitated through mobility partnerships. All that was underpinned by cooperation on readmission, counter-trafficking and border management (Reslow, this volume).

Russia is the main actor shaping the mobility and migration flows of nearly one-third of Europeans, as aptly described by Jaroszewicz. The architecture of the post-Soviet space consists of at least three different organisations with various levels of cooperation and openness. Russia is the centre of each of them. Russia's importance as a magnetic pole for migration and mobility in Eastern Europe remains high (Ivaschenko-Stadnik, this volume). What is interesting is that the policies do not differ much from the solutions adopted in Western Europe. It seems that pan-European cooperation has indeed succeeded and that similar concepts and solutions coexist on the continent: readmission, circular migration, visa facilitation, freedom of movement, safe third country, safe country of origin: all these ideas can be found both in the EU's policies and outside of the EU.

If policies travelled across the continent, the academic interest in that development and pan-European cooperation on migration has been very uneven. Traditionally, most of the existing scholarship has been dedicated to the Western European countries and to the role of the EU, as illustrated by the contributions to this section. Scholars from Central and Eastern Europe were not interested in these topics, at least until 2015. Even today, in 2017, the debates and analysis of the role of the EU in pan-European cooperation take place in Western European scholarship, while Central and Eastern European scholars produce rather descriptive pieces, filling an important knowledge-gap that has developed over the last two decades and preparing the ground for the future debates. The reasons for the uneven interest in broader questions of migration policy in these regions of Europe are quite clear: in countries where emigration (and ensuing socio-economic challenges) is more of a reality than immigration, mainstream literature on these issues had not developed. In fact, in the Central European countries for example, there was more interest in the EU impact on border management cooperation and asylum before the EU accession than after (Grabbe 2000; Igllicka 2000; Weinar 2006b). The process of the EU accession also meant that the tools and modes of cooperation on migration matters were adopted and internalised, and were thus never really contested or debated (Weinar 2006a; Kicingier, Weinar and Górny 2007; Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2010; Makaryan and Chobanyan 2014). The same can be said of the non-EU European countries, where the scholarship focuses on description rather than on offering a new analytical framework (Ivaschenko-Stadnik, this volume). It seems that pan-European cooperation on migration is taken for granted and seen in a rather neutral or positive light, regardless of the asymmetric power worries of the Western European scholarship. This in itself is a curious phenomenon that could be further explored.

Now, as regards the core of the matter: is there anything exceptional in these pan-European approaches to cooperation on migration?

I would argue that there are at least three defining European features that have been brought to the light by the chapters. First, the cooperation between the neighbours is highly institutionalised. It is a European tradition to have a bureaucratic architecture that can cover various areas of cooperation and underpin legal and semi-legal frameworks with regard to both bilateral relations and multilateral initiatives. The capacities of the European administrations to deal with the variety of initiatives are also relatively high across the continent. This makes for a unique network of political processes that have their own institutions, action plans and dialogue frameworks at quite low levels of government. This institutional density, and its long history, is not usually seen in other parts of the world. It allows for a day-to-day cooperation on technical level, independent from the high-level dialogues and international summits. The importance of that institutional framework has been noted especially by Jaroszewicz and van Houte in this section, who show its importance for the promotion of new policy ideas across the continent.

Second, there is always a discourse of partnership and equality, even where it is not the case. As Reslow convincingly argues, the EU is skilled at framing its dominant position as being a partnership of equals. Jaroszewicz suggests that similar techniques have been used by Russia (although only until 2014). The idea of partnership and the use of soft power permeates many policies and ideas of cooperation. The number of regional consultative processes in Europe, where participation is voluntary, speaks to this. In the Eastern regions of Europe that did not suffer from Western European colonialism, the talk of partnership that originates from the Western European core is not necessarily seen as ominous. In the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), however, soft power emanating from Russia has arguably been less evident in the recent years.

The third defining feature is policy convergence. Institutionalisation and equality are two features that allow policy learning. However, as aptly described by Delcour, sometimes the learning can be in fact conditional. The uses of visa policy by the EU, for example, speak to the idea of coercive learning for the willing neighbours. While the clear rules of visa liberalisation in the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans influenced the development of national visa policies outside of the EU (Mananashvili 2013), they also pushed a number of reforms in other areas (through the system of benchmarks). The benchmarking has not been defined as a constraint however. On the contrary, it has been seen as a palpable measurement of progress to democracy and the rule of law. Indeed, it seems that the EU is the only regional power using its visa policy to change the state of democracy and justice in its neighbourhood.

All in all, a European approach to cooperation on migration is still relatively unexplored. As the presented chapters testify, the Western European focus on the EU role has been well-conceptualised and probably over-researched, while the academic analysis that would stem from the perspectives of Central and Eastern European scholarship is scarce, if not non-existent. Therefore, solid academic work is needed to nuance the meaning of 'European' in the European cooperation on migration.

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PART VIII

Researching migration in Europe



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