


This article was downloaded by: 10.2.97.136

On: 27 Sep 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



## **The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe**

Agnieszka Weinar, Saskia Bonjour, Lyubov Zhyznomirska

### **Expertise, governing and migration in Europe**

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315512853-7>

Emma Carmel, Hester Kan

**Published online on: 09 Jul 2018**

**How to cite :-** Emma Carmel, Hester Kan. 09 Jul 2018, *Expertise, governing and migration in Europe* from: The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe Routledge

Accessed on: 27 Sep 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315512853-7>

**PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT**

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

# 6

## EXPERTISE, GOVERNING AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE

*Emma Carmel and Hester Kan*

### Introduction

This chapter examines the role of expertise and knowledge in relation to the politics and governance of migration. Knowledge has long been central to the complex processes that define who belongs, and on what terms, in a political community. Contemporary European experiences exemplify this importance. Countries inside and outside the European Union use: data to assign priorities relating to risk about rules of entry; statistical knowledge to extract resources and judge political performance; competing concepts from economics, sociology and legal studies to reshape understandings of who belongs; and they use practical ‘know-how’ and ‘ways of doing things’ between public authorities, to enact borders and maintain ‘security partnerships’.

Indeed, knowledge creation, presentation, recognition and deployment have been key tools for governing migration from the early days of national statehood formation in Europe. Examples include the development of social statistics and censuses, the invention of the passport, and the creation of ethnicised categories of (highly stratified) belonging in projects of imperial expansion. Insofar as migration governance concerns ‘population management’, then, the politics of designating who may move where, stay for how long and with what rights, has always required the generation of knowledge and data about who is counted as ‘the population’, the nation. As shown in other chapters in this Handbook, access to, and the terms of membership in, a political community are shaped by power dynamics between social and political actors, and these dynamics vary over time and place. In this chapter we explore how the production of knowledge – the things we think we know, or claim to know, about migration and migrants – is also shaped by such power dynamics. We explore the implications of knowledge production for the politics and governance of migration.

The chapter has two framing perspectives. The first is that knowledge is not given, or ‘out in the world’, waiting to be discovered. Rather, ideas about what counts as knowledge are part of what is contested in migration politics, and directly shape the ‘conditions of possibility’ for governing (Dean 1999, p. 4; Fischer 2003; Shore 2006). Analysing the politics of migration involves attending as much to how knowledge is produced, as to how it is used or contested (Walters 2006; Kuus 2014; Carmel 2016). The second framing perspective concerns the transnational politics of migration. Transnational governance and politics matters for migrants and migration, and the production of knowledge is an especially important aspect of governing in

such contexts. As such, we do not treat the European Union (EU) or United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, as separate from, or at a different policy-making 'level' to national states, whether those states are members of the EU or not (e.g. Walker 1998; Walters and Haahr 2005; Ebbinghaus 2006). Rather we explore these institutions as part of a wider and more fluid political landscape for migration governance. Diverse 'conditions of possibility' for how migration and migrants can be governed are available across this fluid landscape. And this landscape is itself understood and produced by political actors' concepts, knowledge and measurements. Across this fluid landscape, we distinguish between, and problematise, the relationship of two pairs of processes that shape migration governance and politics:

- how knowledge is produced, and how different forms of knowledge come to be recognised as valid and/or relevant;
- how these forms of knowledge are deployed in, and how they come to shape the very terms of, political contestation and governance.

We explore how the production, recognition and deployment of knowledge about migration has implications for how migration – and 'migrants' – are governed. Contestations of knowledge and expertise are thus placed at the heart of political contestations around migration.

## **How is knowledge produced and valorised?**

### ***Counting migrants, enumerating who belongs***

The most straightforward way of starting our discussion about the role of knowledge in migration politics and governance is to ask: who is a migrant? This deceptively simple question opens a veritable Pandora's Box of social, economic, statistical and legal forms of knowledge – often with variations by national state or institution – and most of which do not agree on how to define, let alone measure, who is a migrant.

Both the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes non-European countries, and Eurostat, the EU's statistical office, each collate nationally produced data on all EU, and some European (but non-EU) countries. They produce measures of the 'stock' of migrants resident in a country. There are two main measures for achieving this, widely acknowledged and applied in global institutions as well as countries outside Europe. The first is to count all non-citizens. The second is to count everyone who was born in another country. Neither of these proves very satisfactory in practice. They each conflate different experiences. Usually we would refer to a person settled in a new country for more than 12 months as an immigrant, reserving the term 'migrant' for someone who moved more recently. But sometimes a person must be settled much longer before being legally considered an 'immigrant'. Counting all non-citizens as 'migrants' assumes (a) that all non-citizens *are* migrants, rather than, say, 'immigrants' whose permanent residence may be decades long, or people who were born in the country and never moved, but due to citizenship regulations cannot naturalise. It also assumes (b) that being a citizen excludes the possibility of having been a migrant, rather than, say, being naturalised, or having experienced periods of residence abroad. On the other hand, counting as a 'migrant' all those who were born in another country may include, again, many long term-resident 'immigrants' and even national citizens. Countries with relatively straightforward naturalisation procedures may want to 'count' the mobile (migrants) and the settled (immigrants) differently from those countries where access to citizenship is exclusive and difficult. This is because such legal differences shape the meaning and interpretation of these two

ways of counting ‘migrants’, especially where the children and even grandchildren of non-nationals are unable to be naturalised citizens. In addition, for countries, mostly in Europe’s East and South-East, with experience of sizeable national minorities (e.g. Hungary, Estonia, Russia, Greece, Macedonia and other Balkan states), distinctions by either citizenship or place of birth have very different connotations than in those countries with historical experience of imperial rule, mostly in the West and North-West (e.g. Belgium, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK).

These two ways of ‘counting migrants’ each demarcate a way of ‘knowing’ who is ‘in’ the political community, and who is not. In one, it is national citizenship that designates belonging; in the other, it is (presumed) mobility or lack of it; a belonging premised on individuals’ rootedness to place. As we will see below, these different demarcations of belonging also rest on, and reproduce, stratified conceptual categories about ‘types’ of migrants that are central to how migration is governed nationally and transnationally in Europe. However, there are also other statistical refinements that vary between countries. These refinements do not enhance our understanding of ‘levels’, ‘flows’ or patterns of migration, because they are often incommensurable between countries, and cannot be compared. Different definitions have significant consequences for what data is produced and how it can be used, both in terms of counting migrants and in shaping policies (Migration Observatory, 2015).

However, they do shed light on how migration is governed and contested in different countries, because they show us how migration is conceptualised, and how these conceptualisations intersect with (politicised) categorisations of religion and ethnicity (e.g. Vollmer 2011; Simon 2012; Brubaker 2013). In Germany the category of ‘having an immigrant background’ includes individuals who may never have migrated, but whose parents were ‘migrants’. The definition and measurement of migrant identity as a so-called ‘second generation’ immigrant (the term frequently used in English-language literature) problematises their status as a member of the political community by their familial lineage, even with German citizenship. In Greece, as in some other East European states, the historical importance of using religion to distinguish between resident majority and minority national populations has resulted in such identifications being used to make the status of migrant/non-migrant visible, too. Despite the similar importance of their colonial histories in shaping migration in France and the UK, in France, the Republican state tradition prevents the ‘counting’ of residents of France by ethnicised or religious characteristics. By contrast, ever more elaborated ethno-nationalist distinctions have been used to count and monitor post-colonial minority ethnic communities in the UK. Nonetheless, relatively straightforward access to the UK labour market between the 1940s and 1970s for so-called ‘Commonwealth’ immigrants, combined with relatively straightforward naturalisation procedures, mean that for 40 years or more such minority ethnic communities would not be considered ‘migrant’. As a result, such communities were excluded, discriminated against, and governed, by reference to racialised categories of belonging, rather than mobility. It is only since 2011 that the UK the national census has included questions on migrants directly in relation to their mobility and national backgrounds, even though it is questionable whether this produces reliable data, due to the nature of the questions posed (Duke-Williams 2011).

The question of ‘who is a migrant?’ then, cannot be answered by refining ever more ‘accurate’ definitions and measurements of migrants and their movements. Rather the answer to the question ‘who is a migrant?’ turns on understanding that such definitions and measurements are historically, socially and politically contingent. The knowledge or evidence we produce about migration plays a vital part in generating possibilities for political and policy action to shape entry conditions, identify ‘risk’, exclude ‘outsiders’. Doing this, however, requires an additional step in knowledge production – to categorise migrants.

### *Categorising migrants for selection*

Across the globe, the key defining categorisation of migrants – shaping understanding of the drivers for mobility, experiences of mobility, and political challenges – is between ‘forced migrant’ and ‘voluntary’ or (sometimes) ‘economic’ migrant. From a sociological perspective, this distinction is false and analytically unhelpful (why for example, is someone whose land has been confiscated by a new mining concession, an economic, rather than a forced migrant?). However, it remains a potent distinction in politics and governance. This has both political and legal origins.

Politically, countries of destination prefer to categorise and count migrants as ‘voluntary’ or ‘economic’. Doing so provides a rationale for selectivity in entry, stay and work, and this is reflected in historical patterns of migration governance. For example, ‘economic migrants’ (often post-colonial) and ‘guest workers’, usually from Southern and South-Eastern Europe, were encouraged to emigrate and settle, contributing to the economic development of the war-ravaged North-Western European states from the 1950s, and in Central-Eastern Europe from the 1960s. This was despite the even higher need for economic development in former colonies, and in the Southern and South-Eastern states of Europe. The subsequent economic crisis of the early 1970s led to the abandonment of guest-worker schemes in North-Western Europe, and high restrictions on most forms of migration, with (limited) family reunification becoming the main route of entry. Such categorisation strategies directly shape, and emerge from, the fluid transnational governance of migration. For example, in Polish political discourse, Ukrainian ‘migrants’ have been framed as legitimate/welcome, but were also equivalised with ‘refugees’ from middle-East and North Africa (MENA), despite being mostly workers. There are estimated to be over 1.3 million temporary workers from the Ukraine resident in Poland (*Financial Times*, 27 May 2017; Fomina 2017), filling jobs in labour market sectors that were in difficulty following earlier Polish emigration to Western Europe. Meanwhile, the EU’s refugee dispersal regime is politically contested in its entirety, and/or by claiming the right to select only ‘Christian’ refugees from the MENA region. The overall refusal to accept refugees in any meaningful numbers is the subject of an EU Commission case against Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the European Court of Justice. Refusing to accommodate MENA-region refugees for supposedly religious reasons also demonstrates the ethnicised character of such categorisations. It is in such shifting legal categorisations of, and presumed ‘knowledge’ about, migrants, that the power and economic imbalances between states of Europe, and across the globe, are used to pursue political goals at the expense of some ‘categories’ of migrant, and of other societies.

Since the 1990s, changes in the global economy and political conflicts, and shifting political and economic priorities among destination European states, have led to increasing emphasis on using legal categories of migrant for political purposes, such as ‘asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’ and so-called ‘illegal or irregular migrants’ with various subcategories of illegality. The ‘irregular’ status can be produced when migrants enter legally on a tourist visa and overstay; cross state borders without appropriate authorisation and documentation; are legally resident but find employment in the underground/informal economy; when administrative acts tighten immigration regulations. Thus biographies of mobility and settlement intersect with migration governance to consign people to ‘illegality’ (e.g. Sigona 2012; de Genova 2012). Meanwhile, both categorising and counting ‘irregular’ migrants is difficult using standard data collection methods (Vogel *et al.* 2011; Triandafyllidou 2016). Yet such categorisation efforts presume that we can grasp a ‘known reality’ about migrants, who need to be ‘counted’, in order to be ‘governed’, and selected for entry or expelled.

Thus, our 'knowledge' about migration and migrants is shaped by changing circumstances (e.g. increases in 'forced migrants' from particular places) and by political priorities (e.g. changing ideas about the 'need' for migrant labour). It also shapes our identification of policy problems, which leads us to the second rationale for the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants.

Legally, the distinction is underpinned by UN Convention on the Rights of the Refugee and associated international law. In the Convention itself, refugee status is rather narrowly defined as those who have a 'well-founded fear of persecution'. Growth in numbers of forced migrants from the 1970s onwards led scholars and migrants rights activists to argue for a wider understanding of 'forced migration' (e.g. Crisp 1999; Zetter 2007) to better reflect the experiences of many mobile people, and to argue for political action to meet their needs. At the same time, the distinction provides the basis for political action – whether governments seeking to exclude 'voluntary migrants', or activists seeking to gain rights and support for migrants categorised as 'forced'. This is not to say that migrants *are* 'forced', 'voluntary' or 'economic', but that they must often declare one status or another in the process of their mobility, in order to meet (often incommensurate) rules on entry, stay and work. It is research on the experience of Mexican Americans that first showed how whimsical and contradictory categories of entry and statistical measurement appear when they intersect with individuals' national, family, social and economic status from their places of origin (e.g. de Genova 2013). But this experience is shared in Europe and elsewhere. We need forms and sources of knowledge about migrants that are not only shaped by existing policy definitions and conceptual categories. Bakewell (2008), for example, calls for 'policy-irrelevant' research; research that deliberately ignores, interrogates and disrupts concepts and understandings that are based on conventional policy and legal categorisations.

In addition, in the EU there is another binary distinction – between EU 'mobile citizens' ('free movers') and 'third country national migrants'. There are a number of African free trade areas that make a similar categorisation, but across the globe, it is in the EU and select non-member states that this distinction is uniquely elaborated (Carmel and Paul 2013; Recchi 2015). Exploring this distinction also illuminates the 'blind spots' in understanding that are produced when we use categories as if they describe empirical reality, rather than interrogating how and why they were produced. To illustrate how conceptual categories are produced by governance processes, and themselves produce 'conditions of possibility' for political action, we can focus on this in more detail.

The reliance on the EU citizen/non-EU citizen legal category as a category of knowledge (that is, using this categorisation to draw distinctions between real people and their lives and experiences) pushes to the background some uncomfortable forms of knowledge about what it means to belong to an EU member state (or not). First, it underplays the profound inequalities among EU citizens that underpin the dynamics and patterns of intra-EU migration. These dynamics are directly shaped by socio-economic inequalities between member states (North–South and East–West), and the emergence of precarious labour market sectors in (North–Western) destination countries that rely on EU as well as non-EU migrant labour (Berggren *et al.* 2007; Paul 2013; Carmel 2014). Not all EU citizens have equal chances to stay or to move. Second, by reserving terms of trafficking, slavery and irregular migration for 'third country nationals', it makes shared conditions of exploitation more difficult to identify and intervene in. Third, it underplays the connection between EU member states and their non-EU neighbours. The changing routes and risks of migration across the Mediterranean and land borders are directly shaped by the geo-politics of longstanding historical ties, colonialism, interventions and deals between EU and non-EU states (Hansen and Jonsson 2014; de Genova 2016). Fourth, it

underplays the diversity among ‘third country nationals’ migration to the EU and reduces our knowledge of the ways in which inequalities between third country national residents are (re)produced in policies for entry, stay and residence. These include privileging some forms of migrants’ knowledge over others (e.g. Kofman 2013). The social and political consequences of national projects of economic competitiveness, pursuing highly skilled non-EU labour in EU, are rendered less visible by these legal categorisations.

### ***Governing migration through ‘knowledge’: from digital data to practical ‘know-how’***

Thus far in this chapter we have focused on rather ‘fixed’ and conventional understandings about what counts as knowledge in relation to migration – how states count and categorise migrants, and how the concepts we use can shape possibilities for political action (and thus migration governance). There are more direct ways in which ‘knowledge’ is used to directly govern migrants. We can enrich our conceptualisation of the role of knowledge in migration governance and politics by treating knowledge as both produced and practiced. It is not a thing to be supplied or (only) a resource to be used: producing knowledge itself produces the political conditions and possibilities for political action. It further produces, by imagining, and measuring them, the categories of social subject and spaces that are to be acted on (Foucault 2007; De Genova 2013). The most unambiguous example of this role of knowledge is in border control, where practices of knowledge generation and deployment work together to directly create statuses of ‘illegality’ and irregularity.

The different forms of knowledge produced in practices of border control contribute to sustaining norms about who belongs, when, where and under what conditions. They do so in different ways, but each is related to ideas about the migration–security ‘nexus’ (Huysmans 2000; Neal 2009). Walters, writing primarily about the US, argues that when migration governance is linked to territorial security, it becomes about

a risk-oriented knowledge focused upon systematic affinities between certain forms of immigration, terrorism, organised crime, drugs and smuggling ... illegal immigration itself becomes one more form of risky mobility.

*(Walters 2008, p. 170)*

The kinds of ‘knowledge’ that govern this ‘risky mobility’ depend on, and reproduce, expectations of threat and risk from migrants. They are associated with the use of new forms and technologies of ‘biopower’ (the power asserted through the production of knowledge about bodies, in this case, as they move). Technologies of biopower can include older technologies like human observation, and x-rays, but also iris scans, biometric data in passports, and the use of digital scanners at borders (Amoore and Hall 2009).

As the capacity of computers increases, even biopower is being superceded, or at least combined, with new forms of knowledge, produced from innovative ways of understanding and using data (Amoore 2011). Louise Amoore (2013) has argued that the digital environment enables governing to be done, not on real bodies (associated with real people in real places), but by generating algorithms that identify patterns of behaviour and characteristics. The identification of particular patterns then trigger governing practices in the physical world (Paul 2017, chapter 18 this volume). Thus your own background (let’s say, choosing to travel on one passport rather than another, having a particular kind of visa, preferring particular kinds of food on aeroplanes, travelling at night) is reduced to bits (bytes) of data, marking a pattern of behaviour.

These bits of data are ‘washed through’ an algorithm to generate both ‘knowledge’ and governance. It is the algorithm (designed by software engineers in other, faraway, usually economically developed, metropolitan places) that produces the ‘knowledge’ to determine whether you should have your luggage searched on arrival, or whether you are a suspect migrant. As Regine Paul (2017) argues, the risk calculus on which such algorithms rest are not technical pieces of data. The calculus contains highly political, normatively laden assumptions about what is suspicious or dangerous. However, by inserting the risk calculus into surveillance algorithms, the possibilities for contesting those assumptions recede when faced with the relentless automatism of the algorithm. As a result, the personal and social contexts that result in particular decisions – those characteristics that mark a person’s self-hood – are no longer relevant to how a person is to be governed in the border-space. Similar ‘disembodiment’ of data can also be observed in ‘real-time’ surveillance in the Mediterranean, where it is not migrants, but patterns of movement of ships, that determine practices of border control (Walters 2016).

However, not all spaces of border crossing are so saturated with new forms of knowledge. The regimes of technologies that govern migration in many border spaces – the creation of what de Genova (2013) calls the ‘Border Spectacle’ – include many rather more mundane, everyday, physical encounters. These include co-operation between police forces between Spain and Morocco in tracking down smugglers in joint raids; the hauling-in of migrants from stranded boats to rescue ships; the dependence of migrants on the skill of a pilot in a storm; the sharing of knowledge about routes, or where a fence can be cut (e.g. Andersson 2014). The politics and governance of migration is shaped by the multiple (sometimes partial) knowledge of those to be governed and of those doing the ‘governing’ on the ground (Sigona 2012, 2014).

### **How is knowledge deployed and realised?**

So far, we have examined both formal aspects of knowledge production, and informal aspects of knowledge practices shaping the possibilities of governance. In this section we address how knowledge can circulate to shape migration politics and policymaking.

#### ***Knowledge as a claim to authority in EU migration governance***

Knowledge claims, when framed by specific policy actors as expertise and ‘information supply’, can be deployed to legitimise claims to authority and to govern. In doing so, they can shape policy processes and reforms (Boswell 2008). How successful such claims of expertise and authority are, depend on the more general conditions of ‘information supply’ and contestability in different policy domains (ibid.: 2012, 2015). As we saw earlier in the chapter, contestability of concepts, categories and knowledge are central to the politics and governance of migration. This contestability is compounded in the fluid political landscapes of transnational migration governance that slip, sometimes unpredictably, between national, EU and global regulation (Carmel 2013; Korneev 2015). For those European states that are member states of the EU, this contestability has distinctive characteristics and implications.

Access to knowledge, including practical knowledge and ‘know-how’ in policymaking, is frequently used as a bargaining tool by the Commission against member states (Boswell 2008; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011; Robert 2012; Böhling 2014). Chou and Riddervold (2015) demonstrate that the Commission got a foot in bi-lateral national mobility partnership negotiations with non-member states by deploying its expertise-by-experience and its organisational skills in developing such partnerships. Expertise has always been an essential component of EU governance, so this is not unique to migration governance. It is inherent to the role and



legitimacy base of the European Commission as a technocratic organisation, whose actions are based on rationalistic decision-making procedures and the use of expertise (Robert 2012). The Commission presents itself as mediator or 'honest broker' between member states and EU institutions, even while it has privileged access to data. This enables it to achieve cross-national comparative perspectives unavailable to national governments, marking out the weaker position of smaller Eastern European and Southern member states in particular (see Kuus 2014). Knowledge signals the Commission's conformity to 'rational' rules, underpinning the authority of policy-makers and their decisions.

Indeed, it is not just the Commission that makes a claim to authority, or a claim to speak through making claims to 'know-how' and practical knowledge. Private actors and corporations also produce and deploy 'knowledge' – as know-how, or as research, in a political strategy that enables them to claim expertise and to shape governing practices, especially in security and border governance (Feldman 2012). Those corporations that supply hardware and algorithms for digital security governance, for example, are deeply imbricated in how migration and migrants are governed, especially at the border, due to the products they provide, as we saw above (e.g. Paul 2017; Walters 2016). Carmel (2016) shows that since the early 2000s, trans-national corporations have deliberately tried to shape the knowledge that is produced in security research, by designing EU research programmes, including those on border security technologies. They have simultaneously structured knowledge production and established the concepts and agendas for governance. But the claim to have authority as an expert, or as a knowledgeable stakeholder, can also be deployed to reveal, or disguise, political agendas and contestation. The claim to 'impartial' or 'rigorous' knowledge is used as a weapon to assert political agendas – whether for integration or exclusion (see discussion of Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in Geddes and Achtnich 2015).

### ***Knowledge as claim to neutrality in EU migration governance***

The Commission also relies on its access to external 'expertise' to shape political and policy agendas (Holst 2014). One such expert group is the European Migration Network (EMN), whose formal role is 'to provide up-to-date, objective, reliable, relevant and comparable information in response to identified needs'. Its role is 'to share good practice and contribute to the development of practical co-operation in legal migration to overcome identified challenges and barriers' (Commission of the European Communities 2014, p. 4). Its current form and purpose as knowledge/expertise platform emerged directly from the failings of an explicitly 'politicised' predecessor (Boswell 2008). Annual reports are drawn up providing an overview of national policy changes in the field of migration, and member states engage in ad hoc information exchange. However, the network does not operate at a distance from the Commission, which has a strong hand in shaping its agenda and topics for discussion. It also provides funding for the network. This is in line with studies of other expert groups, whose agenda and processes were also actively steered by the Commission (see Dunlop and James 2007; Skjaereth and Wettstad 2010; Böhling 2014).

The designation of the EMN as an 'expert group' is technocratic and presents knowledge-gathering, production and deployment as neutral contributions to the (also politically neutral) 'improvement' of migration governance. This conceals the political nature of knowledge generation and governance processes. It also conceals how responsibility for migration is contested among and within member states. In practice the EMN is rather more an intergovernmental co-operation network, developing a 'community of practice', with common understandings of migration as a policy issue (Geddes and Achtnich, 2015, pp. 304–8), than an expert group. Most members are national civil servants, with some being members of national research councils, and

a few engaging from their national office of the International Organisation of Migration (Commission of the European Communities 2014). Such actors' claims to expertise, data and knowledge is produced in a highly politicised national context. We know that other similar EU networks are highly politicised, and oriented to shaping policy, with actors driven by their perceived interests, political preferences and national agendas (see Kan 2013). The network's apparently impartial, evidence-gathering rationale disguises rather than neutralises its politics.

Responsibility for migration policy is contested in this transnational environment, with both member states and the Commission shaping knowledge production and deployment with their own agendas. This has clear implications for the development of policy. Indeed the Commission requested an adaptation of the network to be better suited to the needs of policy-makers (Commission of the European Communities 2014). The boundaries between expertise as independent advice versus actual decision-making and policy are explicitly blurred.

When the Commission made a decidedly politicised deployment of 'knowledge' in its negotiations with member states about the burden sharing of refugees in 2015/16, it was a sign of how intractable the political crisis on this topic had become. Most member states had publicly failed to provide places for refugee applicants in anything like the number decreed necessary by the Commission. In response, the Commission decided to publish the derisory official numbers of people who were actually provided places (fewer than ten for some countries), in an attempt to 'name and shame' some member states. This controversial knowledge deployment ironically demonstrated (1) the role of knowledge deployment as a way of defining the terms of political conflict, in this case as being between 'the member states' and 'the Commission' (and not being about deeply politicised inequalities between member states, for example); and (2) the eventual weakness of the Commission in this highly politicised crisis in EU migration governance, as it was not able to persuade member states to provide more places as a result of this 'knowledge deployment'.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we argued that we need to attend to the conditions under which knowledge of and for migration governance is produced, selected and valorised, and the consequences of such selection processes for policy and politics.

The black box of knowledge production about migrants and migration needs to be opened and its relationship to knowledge deployment and the wider politics of migration governance should be interrogated. This perspective leads to a specific analytical focus when exploring the relationship between migration, knowledge and politics. Not 'what do we know about migrants and migration?' but rather 'how is the politics of migration revealed or disguised in the knowledge produced about migrants and their mobility?' This perspective implies we need empirical explorations of how different political actors come to be seen as experts and holders of knowledge about migration; of how the privileging of particular forms of knowledge (statistical measurement for example) shape how migrants are governed; of how political actors use knowledge and contestations about it in order to achieve their policy and political goals, and above all, of what are the implications of how knowledge is produced and by whom, for migrants themselves.

## References

- Amoore, L. (2011) 'Data derivatives. On the emergence of a security risk calculus for our times'. *Theory, Culture and Society* 28(6): 24–43.
- Amoore, L. (2013) *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.

- Amoore, L. and A. Hall (2009) 'Taking people apart: digitised dissection and the body at the border'. *Environment and Planning D* 27(3): 444–64.
- Andersson, R. (2014) *Illegality, Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*. Oakland, CA., University of California Press.
- Bakewell, O. (2008) 'Research beyond the categories: the importance of policy irrelevant research into forced migration'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21(4): 432–53.
- Berggren, E., B. Likic-Brboric, G. Toksoz and N. Trimikliniotis (2007) *Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe*. Maastricht, Shaker Publishing.
- Böhling, K. (2014) 'Sidelined member states: commission-learning from experts in the face of comitology'. *Journal of European Integration* 36(2): 117–34.
- Boswell, C. (2008) 'The political functions of expert knowledge: knowledge and legitimization in European Union immigration policy'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(4): 471–88.
- Boswell, C. (2012) 'How information scarcity influences the policy agenda: evidence from U.K. immigration policy'. *Governance* 25(3): 367–89.
- Boswell, C. (2015) 'The double life of targets in public policy: disciplining and signalling in UK asylum policy'. *Public Administration* 93(2): 490–505.
- Brubaker, R. (2013) 'Categories of analysis and categories of practice: a note on the study of Muslims in European countries of immigration'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(1): 1–8.
- Carmel, E. (2013) 'Mobility, migration and rights in the European Union: critical reflections on policy and practice'. *Policy Studies* 34(2): 238–53.
- Carmel, E. (2014) 'With what implications?: an assessment of EU migration governance between Union regulation and national diversity'. *Migration Letters* 11(2): 137–53.
- Carmel, E. (2016) 'Re-interpreting knowledge, expertise and EU governance: the cases of social policy and security research policy'. *Comparative European Politics* online first.
- Carmel, E. and R. Paul (2013) 'Complex stratification: understanding European Union governance of migrant rights'. *Regions and Cohesion* 3(3): 56–85.
- Chou, M. and M. Riddervold (2015) 'The unexpected negotiator at the table: how the European Commission's expertise informs intergovernmental EU policies'. *Politics and Governance* 3(1): 61–72.
- Commission of the European Communities (2014) *Commission Decision on the Adoption of the 2015–2016 Work Programme for the European Migration Network Serving as a Financing Decision for 2015*, Brussels, European Commission.
- Crisp, T. (1999) "'Who has counted the refugees?'" UNHCR and the politics of numbers'. New Issues in Refugee Research working paper no. 12.
- de Genova, N. (2013) 'Spectacles of migrant "illegality": the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(7): 1180–98.
- de Genova, N. (2016) The 'European' question: migration, race, and post-coloniality in 'Europe', in A. Amelina, B. Meeus and K. Horvath (eds) *An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation. European Perspectives*, Heidelberg, Springer: 343–56.
- Dean, M. (1999) *Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London, Sage.
- Duke-Williams, O. (2011) 'The role of questions about migration in the UK censuses: A simple matter of counting, or a means of exerting power?'. *Geoforum* 42(5): 615–23.
- Dunlop, C. A. and O. James (2007) 'Principal-agent modelling and learning: the European Commission, experts and agricultural hormone growth promoters'. *Public Policy and Administration* 22(4): 403–22.
- Ebbinghaus, B. (2006) Europe through the looking-glass: comparative and multi-level perspectives, in A. Sica (ed.) *Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences*, London, Sage. 2: 108–29.
- Feldman, G. (2012) *The Migration Apparatus: Security Labor and Policymaking in the European Union*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Financial Times* (2017) 'Poland weighs benefits of surge in migrants from Ukraine', 28 May. [www.ft.com/content/aeda9ebe-3afa-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfec](http://www.ft.com/content/aeda9ebe-3afa-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfec). Last accessed 5 April 2018.
- Fischer, F. (2003) *Reframing Public Policy. Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Fomina, J. (2017) 'Economic migration of Ukrainians to the EU: a view from Poland, in Migration and the Ukraine Crisis: A Tow-country Perspective, E-IR books. [www.e-ir.info/2017/04/25/economic-migration-of-ukrainians-to-the-eu-a-view-from-poland/](http://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/25/economic-migration-of-ukrainians-to-the-eu-a-view-from-poland/). Last accessed 5 April 2018.
- Foucault, M. (2007) *Security. Territory. Population*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Geddes, A. and Achtmich, M. (2015) 'Research policy dialogues in the European Union', in P. Scholten, H. Entzinger, R. Penninx and S. Verbeek (eds) *Integrating Immigrants in Europe*. Springer Open: 293–311.

- Gornitzka, Å. and U. Sverdrup (2011) 'Access of experts: information and EU decision-making'. *West European Politics* 34(1): 48–70.
- Hansen, P. and S. Jonsson (2014) *Eurafrica*. London, Bloomsbury.
- Holst, C. (2014) *Expertise and Democracy*. Oslo, ARENA, University of Oslo.
- Huysmans, J. (2000) 'The European Union and the securitization of migration'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(5): 751–77.
- Kan, H. (2013) The transformation of European governance through networks: institutional innovations but continuation of hierarchies, struggles and contestation, in J. Garcés and M. Payá (eds) *Sustainability and Transformation in European Social Policy*, Bern, Peter Lang: 321–40.
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Gendered labour migrations in Europe and emblematic migratory figures'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(4): 579–600.
- Korneev, O. (2015) Exchanging knowledge, enhancing capacities, developing mechanisms: the role of the IOM in the implementation of the EU–Russia Readmission Agreement, in M. Geiger and A. Pecoud, (eds) *International Organisations and the Politics of Migration*. London: Routledge.
- Kuus, M. (2014) *Geopolitics and Expertise*. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons.
- Migration Observatory Oxford (2015) 'Who counts as a Migrant, Definitions and their Consequences'. *Briefing Migration Observatory*, Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Neal, A. W. (2009) 'Securitization and risk at the EU border: the origins of FRONTEX'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47(2): 333–56.
- Paul, R. (2013) 'Strategic contextualisation: free movement, labour migration policies and the governance of foreign workers in Europe'. *Policy Studies* 34(2): 122–41.
- Paul, R. (2015) *The Political Economy of Border-Drawing*. New York, Berghahn.
- Paul, R. (2017) 'Harmonization by risk analysis? Frontex and the risk-based governance of European border control'. *Journal of European Integration* 39 (6): 689–706.
- Recchi, E. (2015) *Mobile Europe. The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Robert, C. (2012) 'Expert groups in the building of European public policy'. *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 10(4): 425–38.
- Shore, C. (2006) "'Government without statehood'? Anthropological perspectives on governance and sovereignty in the European Union". *European Law Journal* 12(6): 709–24.
- Sigona, N. (2012) "'I have too much baggage": the impacts of legal status on the social worlds of irregular migrants'. *Social Anthropology* 20(1): 50–65.
- Sigona, N. (2014) 'Campzanship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space'. *Citizenship Studies* 19(1): 1–15.
- Simon, P. (2012) 'Collecting ethnic statistics in Europe: a review'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35(8): 1366–91.
- Skjaereth, J. B. and J. Wettstad (2010) 'Making the EU emissions trading system: the European Commission as an entrepreneurial epistemic leader'. *Global Environmental Change* 20(2): 314–21.
- Triandafyllidou, A., ed. (2016) *Irregular Migration in Europe: Myths and Realities*. London, Routledge.
- Vogel, D., V. Kovacheva and H. Prescott (2011) 'The size of the irregular migrant population in the European Union – counting the uncountable?' *International Migration* 49(5): 78–96.
- Vollmer, B. (2011) 'Policy discourses on irregular migration in the EU – "numbers games" and "political games"'. *European Journal of Migration & Law* 13(3): 317–39.
- Walker, N. (1998) 'Sovereignty and differentiated integration in the European Union'. *European Law Journal* 4(4): 355–88.
- Walters, W. (2006) 'Border/control'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 9(2): 187–203.
- Walters, W. (2008) Putting the migration-security complex in its place, in L. Amoore and M. de Goede (eds) *Risk and the War on Terror*, Oxford, Routledge: 158–77.
- Walters, W. (2016) 'Live governance, borders, and the time-space of the situation: EUROSUR and the genealogy of bordering in Europe'. *Comparative European Politics* online first.
- Walters, W. and J. H. Haahr (2005) *Governing Europe. Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration*. London, Routledge.
- Zetter, R. (2007) 'More labels, fewer refugees: remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20(2): 172–92.